Serious invasions of privacy in the digital era: final report by unknown
ALRC Report 123               June 2014
Serious Invasions 
of Privacy in the 
Digital Era
finAL RepoRt
    This Final Report reflects the law as at 30 June 2014 
 
The Australian Law Reform Commission  (ALRC) was established on 1 January 1975 
by the Law Reform Commission Act 1973 (Cth) and reconstituted by the Australian 
Law Reform Commission Act 1996 (Cth). 
The office of the ALRC is at Level 40 MLC Centre, 19 Martin Place, Sydney NSW 
2000 Australia. 
 
Postal Address: 
GPO Box 3708 
Sydney NSW 2001 
 
Telephone: within Australia (02) 8238 6333 
International: +61 2 8238 6333 
Facsimile: within Australia (02) 8238 6363 
International: +61 2 8238 6363 
 
E-mail:  info@alrc.gov.au 
Website:  www.alrc.gov.au 
ALRC publications are available to view or download free of charge on the ALRC 
website: www.alrc.gov.au/publications. If you require assistance, please contact the 
ALRC. 
 
ISBN: 978-0-9924069-1-2 
Commission Reference: ALRC Final Report 123, 2014 
 
© Commonwealth of Australia 2014 
This work is copyright. You may download, display, print and reproduce this material 
in whole or part, subject to acknowledgement of the source, for your personal, non-
commercial use or use within your organisation. Requests for further authorisation 
should be directed to the ALRC. 
Printed by Ligare Pty Ltd 
 
  
 
The Hon Ge
Attorney-G
Parliament 
Canberra A
 
30 June 201
 
 
Dear Attorn
 
ALRC 
 
On 12 Jun
Reference t
On behalf 
accordance 
present you
Digital Era.
Yours since
  
Professor R
President  
orge Brandi
eneral of Aus
House 
CT 2600 
4 
ey-General 
Terms of Re
e 2013, th
o undertake 
of the Mem
with the Au
 with the Fin
 
rely, 
osalind Cro
    
s QC MP 
tralia 
ference—Se
e Australian
a review into
bers of the
stralian Law
al Report on
 
ucher   
 
 
 
rious Invasi
 Law Refor
 Serious Inv
 Commissio
 Reform Co
 this referenc
               
 
ons of Priva
m Commiss
asions of Pr
n involved 
mmission Ac
e, Serious In
Professor B
Commissio
cy in the Dig
ion received
ivacy in the 
in this Inqu
t 1996, I am
vasions of Pr
arbara McD
ner in Char
ital Era 
 Terms of 
Digital Era. 
iry, and in 
 pleased to 
ivacy in the 
 
onald 
ge 
  
 
Contents 
 
 
Terms of Reference  5 
Participants    7 
Recommendations 9 
Part 1    15 
1. Introduction  17 
 Context of the Inquiry  17 
 The design of a cause of action  18 
 Should a new tort be enacted?  20 
 Other reforms 26 
 The law reform process  27 
2. Guiding Principles  29 
 Summary  29 
 Principle 1: Privacy is a fundamental value worthy of legal protection 30 
 Principle 2: There is a public interest in protecting privacy  32 
 Principle 3: Privacy should be balanced with other important interests 33 
 Principle 4: Australian privacy laws should meet international standards 35 
 Principle 5: Privacy laws should be adaptable to technological change 36 
 Principle 6: Privacy laws should be clear and certain 36 
 Principle 7: Privacy laws should be coherent and consistent 37 
 Principle 8: Justice to protect privacy should be accessible 38 
 Principle 9: Privacy protection is an issue of shared responsibility 39 
3. Overview of Current Law  41 
 Summary  41 
 Existing legislative privacy protection  42 
 Existing common law causes of action  47 
 Filling the gaps in existing law  51 
 A common law action for breach of privacy in Australia?  53 
Part 2    57 
4. A New Tort in a New Commonwealth Act 59 
 Summary  59 
 A new stand-alone Commonwealth Act  59 
 Constitutional issues  62 
 An action in tort  67 
 Abolition of common law actions  72 
2 Serious Invasions of Privacy in the Digital Era 
5. Two Types of Invasion  73 
Summary  73 
A cause of action for two types of invasion of privacy 74 
Intrusion upon seclusion  76 
Misuse of private information  81 
Examples  85 
False light and appropriation  87 
An open-ended action?  88 
One cause of action, not two  89 
6. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy  91 
Summary  91 
A test for what is private  92 
Considerations  96 
7. Fault     109 
Summary  109 
Intentional or reckless invasions of privacy 110 
Negligence 118 
Strict liability 124 
Effect of apology on liability  128 
8. Seriousness and Proof of Damage 131 
 Summary  131 
 Seriousness 132 
 Proof of damage not required 138 
9. Balancing Privacy with Other Interests  143 
 Summary  143 
 The balancing exercise 144 
 Public interest matters 150 
 Onus of proof 158 
 A discrete exercise  161 
10. Forums, Limitations and Other Matters 163 
 Summary  163 
 Forums  164 
 Alternative dispute resolution processes 168 
 Cause of action limited to natural persons 171 
 Non-survival of the cause of action 172 
 Limitation periods 177 
 Young plaintiffs 181 
 First publication rule  182 
11. Defences and Exemptions  185 
 Summary  185 
 Lawful authority 186 
 Incidental to the exercise of a lawful right of defence of persons or property 191 
 Necessity  193 
 Contents 3 
 Consent  195 
 Absolute privilege 202 
 Publication of public documents 204 
 Fair report of proceedings of public concern 205 
 Safe harbour scheme for internet intermediaries 207 
 Exemption or defence for children and young persons 210 
 Defences unsuited to a privacy action 213 
12. Remedies and Costs  219 
 Summary  219 
 Damages  220 
 Account of profits 238 
 No recommendation on notional licence fee 240 
 Injunctions 241 
 Delivery up, destruction or removal of material 251 
 Correction orders 252 
 Apology orders 254 
 Declarations 256 
 Costs    258 
Part 3     261 
13. Breach of Confidence Actions for Misuse of Private Information 263 
 Summary  263 
 The likely future development of the action for breach of confidence  264 
 Compensation for emotional distress 265 
 Public interest and injunction applications  273 
14. Surveillance Devices  275 
 Summary  275 
 Existing surveillance device laws 276 
 A Commonwealth Act 278 
 Technology neutral surveillance legislation 282 
 Telecommunications surveillance 285 
 Participant monitoring 286 
 Responsible journalism and the public interest 289 
 Workplace surveillance 293 
 Remedial relief and compensation 295 
 Alternative forums for complaints about surveillance  296 
15. Harassment  299 
 Summary  299 
 Statutory tort of harassment 300 
 Criminal offences for harassment 304 
 Harassment laws in other countries  307 
4 Serious Invasions of Privacy in the Digital Era 
16. New Regulatory Mechanisms  309 
 Summary  309 
 Privacy Commissioner investigations for serious invasions of privacy  310 
 Amicus curiae and intervener functions  317 
 Deletion of personal information  319 
 Review of the small business exemption  321 
 
 
Consultations   323 
Abbreviations  327 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Terms of Reference 
 
SERIOUS INVASIONS OF PRIVACY IN THE DIGITAL ERA 
 
I, Mark Dreyfus QC MP, Attorney-General of Australia, having regard to: 
• the extent and application of existing privacy statutes 
• the rapid growth in capabilities and use of information, surveillance and 
communication technologies 
• community perceptions of privacy 
• relevant international standards and the desirability of consistency in laws 
affecting national and transnational dataflows. 
REFER to the Australian Law Reform Commission for inquiry and report, pursuant to 
s 20(1) of the Australian Law Reform Commission Act 1996 (Cth), the issue of 
prevention of and remedies for serious invasions of privacy in the digital era. 
Scope of the reference 
The ALRC should make recommendations regarding: 
1.  Innovative ways in which law may reduce serious invasions of privacy in the 
digital era. 
2.  The necessity of balancing the value of privacy with other fundamental values 
including freedom of expression and open justice. 
3.  The detailed legal design of a statutory cause of action for serious invasions of 
privacy, including not limited to: 
a.  legal thresholds 
b.  the effect of the implied freedom of political communication 
c.  jurisdiction 
d.  fault elements 
e.  proof of damages 
f.  defences 
g.  exemptions 
h.  whether there should be a maximum award of damages 
i.  whether there should be a limitation period 
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j.  whether the cause of action should be restricted to natural and living 
persons 
k.  whether any common law causes of action should be abolished 
l.  access to justice 
m.  the availability of other court ordered remedies. 
4. The nature and appropriateness of any other legal remedies for redress for serious 
invasions of privacy. 
The Commission should take into account the For Your Information ALRC Report 
(2008), relevant New South Wales and Victorian Law Reform Commission privacy 
reports, the Privacy Amendment (Enhancing Privacy Protection) Act 2012 and relevant 
Commonwealth, State, Territory legislation, international law and case law. 
Consultation 
In undertaking this reference, the Commission will identify and consult relevant 
stakeholders including the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, and 
relevant State and Territory bodies. 
Timeframe 
The ALRC will provide its final report to the Attorney-General by June 2014. 
12 June 2013 
 
Mark Dreyfus 
Attorney-General 
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Recommendations 
 
 
4. A New Tort in a New Commonwealth Act 
Recommendation 4–1  If a statutory cause of action for serious invasion of 
privacy is to be enacted, it should be enacted by the Commonwealth, in a 
Commonwealth Act (the Act).  
Recommendation 4–2   The cause of action should be described in the Act as 
an action in tort. 
5. Two Types of Invasion 
Recommendation 5–1  The Act should provide that the plaintiff must prove 
that his or her privacy was invaded in one of the following ways:  
(a)  intrusion upon seclusion, such as by physically intruding into the plaintiff’s 
private space or by watching, listening to or recording the plaintiff’s private 
activities or private affairs; or 
(b)  misuse of private information, such as by collecting or disclosing private 
information about the plaintiff. 
Recommendation 5–2   The Act should provide that ‘private information’ 
includes untrue information, but only if the information would be private if it were 
true. 
6. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy 
Recommendation 6–1  The new tort should be actionable only where a 
person in the position of the plaintiff would have had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy, in all of the circumstances. 
Recommendation 6–2  The Act should provide that, in determining whether 
a person in the position of the plaintiff would have had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in all of the circumstances, the court may consider, among other things: 
(a)   the nature of the private information, including whether it relates to intimate or 
family matters, health or medical matters, or financial matters; 
(b)  the means used to obtain the private information or to intrude upon seclusion, 
including the use of any device or technology; 
(c)  the place where the intrusion occurred, such as in the plaintiff’s home; 
(d)  the purpose of the misuse, disclosure or intrusion; 
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(e)  how the private information was held or communicated, such as in private 
correspondence or a personal diary; 
(f)  whether and to what extent the private information was already in the public 
domain; 
(g)  the relevant attributes of the plaintiff, including the plaintiff’s age, occupation 
and cultural background; and 
(h)  the conduct of the plaintiff, including whether the plaintiff invited publicity or 
manifested a desire for privacy. 
7. Fault 
Recommendation 7–1  The new tort should be confined to intentional or 
reckless invasions of privacy. It should not extend to negligent invasions of privacy, 
and should not attract strict liability. 
Recommendation 7–2  The Act should provide that an apology made by the 
defendant does not constitute an admission of fault or liability and is not relevant to the 
determination of fault or liability. 
8. Seriousness and Proof of Damage 
Recommendation 8–1  The Act should provide that a plaintiff has an action 
under the new tort only where the invasion of privacy was ‘serious’, having regard, 
among other things, to:   
(a)   the degree of any offence, distress or harm to dignity that the invasion of privacy 
was likely to cause to a person of ordinary sensibilities in the position of the 
plaintiff; and 
(b)  whether the defendant was motivated by malice or knew the invasion of privacy 
was likely to offend, distress or harm the dignity of the plaintiff 
Recommendation 8–2  The plaintiff should not be required to prove actual 
damage to have an action under the new tort. 
9. Balancing Privacy with Other Interests 
Recommendation 9–1  The Act should provide that, for the plaintiff to have 
a cause of action, the court must be satisfied that the public interest in privacy 
outweighs any countervailing public interest. A separate public interest defence would 
therefore be unnecessary. 
Recommendation 9–2  The Act should include the following list of 
countervailing public interest matters which a court may consider, along with any other 
relevant public interest matter: 
(a)  freedom of expression, including political communication and artistic 
expression; 
 Recommendations 11 
(b)  freedom of the media, particularly to responsibly investigate and report matters 
of public concern and importance; 
(c)  the proper administration of government; 
(d)  open justice; 
(e) public health and safety; 
(f)  national security; and 
(g)  the prevention and detection of crime and fraud. 
Recommendation 9–3  The Act should provide that the defendant has the 
burden of adducing evidence that suggests there is a countervailing public interest for 
the court to consider. The Act should also provide that the plaintiff has the legal onus 
to satisfy the court that the public interest in privacy outweighs any countervailing 
public interest that is raised in the proceedings. 
10. Forums, Limitations and Other Matters 
Recommendation 10–1  Federal, state and territory courts should have 
jurisdiction to hear an action for serious invasion of privacy under the Act. 
Consideration should also be given to giving jurisdiction to appropriate state and 
territory tribunals. 
Recommendation 10–2  The new tort should only be actionable by natural 
persons. 
Recommendation 10–3  A cause of action for serious invasion of privacy 
should not survive for the benefit of the plaintiff’s estate or against the defendant’s 
estate. 
Recommendation 10–4  A person should not be able to bring an action under 
the new tort after the earlier of: 
(a)  one year from the date on which the plaintiff became aware of the invasion of 
privacy; or  
(b)  three years from the date on which the invasion of privacy occurred. 
Recommendation 10–5  In exceptional circumstances, the court may extend 
this limitation period, but the period should expire no later than six years from the date 
on which the invasion occurred. 
Recommendation 10–6  Consideration should be given to extending the 
limitation period where the plaintiff was under 18 years of age when the invasion of 
privacy occurred. 
Recommendation 10–7  Consideration should be given to enacting a ‘first 
publication rule’, also known as a ‘single publication rule’. This would limit the 
circumstances in which a person may bring an action in relation to the publication of 
private information, when that same private information had already been published in 
the past. 
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11. Defences and Exemptions 
Recommendation 11–1  The Act should provide for a defence that the 
defendant’s conduct was required or authorised by law. 
Recommendation 11–2  The Act should provide a defence for conduct 
incidental to the exercise of a lawful right of defence of persons or property, where that 
conduct was proportionate, necessary and reasonable. 
Recommendation 11–3  The Act should provide for a defence of necessity. 
Recommendation 11–4  The Act should provide for a defence of consent. 
Recommendation 11–5  The Act should provide for a defence of absolute 
privilege. 
Recommendation 11–6  The Act should provide for a defence of publication 
of public documents. 
Recommendation 11–7 The Act should provide for a defence of fair report of 
proceedings of public concern. 
Recommendation 11–8  The Act should provide for an exemption for children 
and young persons.   
12. Remedies and Costs 
Recommendation 12–1  The Act should provide that courts may award 
damages, including damages for emotional distress. 
Recommendation 12–2  The Act should set out the following non-exhaustive 
list of factors that a court may consider when determining the amount of damages: 
(a)  whether the defendant had made an appropriate apology to the plaintiff; 
(b)  whether the defendant had published a correction; 
(c)  whether the plaintiff had already recovered compensation, or has agreed to 
receive compensation in relation to the conduct of the defendant;  
(d)  whether either party took reasonable steps to settle the dispute without litigation; 
and 
(e)  whether the defendant’s unreasonable conduct following the invasion of privacy, 
including during the proceedings, had subjected the plaintiff to particular or 
additional embarrassment, harm, distress or humiliation. 
Recommendation 12–3  The Act should provide that the court may not award 
a separate sum as aggravated damages. 
Recommendation 12–4  The Act should provide that a court may award 
exemplary damages in exceptional circumstances. 
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Recommendation 12–5  The Act should provide for a cap on damages. The 
cap should apply to the sum of both damages for non-economic loss and any 
exemplary damages. This cap should not exceed the cap on damages for non-economic 
loss in defamation. 
Recommendation 12–6  The Act should provide that a court may award an 
account of profits. 
Recommendation 12–7  The Act should provide that the court may at any 
stage of proceedings grant an interlocutory or other injunction to restrain the threatened 
or apprehended invasion of privacy, where it appears to the court to be just or 
convenient and on such terms as the court thinks fit. 
Recommendation 12–8  The Act should provide that, when considering 
whether to grant injunctive relief before trial to restrain publication of private 
information, a court must have particular regard to freedom of expression and any 
other matters of public interest. 
Recommendation 12–9  The Act should provide that courts may order the 
delivery up and destruction or removal of material. 
Recommendation 12–10  The Act should provide that courts may, where false 
private information has been published, order the publication of a correction.  
Recommendation 12–11  The Act should provide that courts may order the 
defendant to apologise. 
Recommendation 12–12  The Act should provide that courts may make a 
declaration. 
13. Breach of Confidence Actions for Misuse of Private 
  Information 
Recommendation 13–1  If a statutory cause of action for serious invasion of 
privacy is not enacted, appropriate federal, state, and territory legislation should be 
amended to provide that, in an action for breach of confidence that concerns a serious 
invasion of privacy by the misuse, publication or disclosure of private information, the 
court may award compensation for the plaintiff’s emotional distress. 
14. Surveillance Devices 
Recommendation 14–1  The Commonwealth Government should enact 
surveillance legislation to replace existing state and territory surveillance device laws. 
Recommendation 14–2  Surveillance legislation should be technology neutral. 
It should regulate surveillance through the use of listening devices, optical devices, 
tracking devices, data surveillance devices, and other devices and systems. 
Recommendation 14–3  The Commonwealth Government should consider 
consolidating telecommunications surveillance laws with the new Commonwealth 
surveillance legislation. 
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Recommendation 14–4  Surveillance legislation should not contain a defence 
or exception for participant monitoring. 
Recommendation 14–5 Surveillance legislation should provide a defence for 
responsible journalism relating to matters of public concern and importance. 
Recommendation 14–6 Workplace surveillance laws should be made uniform 
throughout Australia. 
Recommendation 14–7  Surveillance legislation should provide that a court 
may order remedial relief, including compensation, for a person subjected to unlawful 
surveillance. 
Recommendation 14–8  State and territory governments should give 
jurisdiction to appropriate courts and tribunals to hear complaints about the installation 
and use of surveillance devices that can monitor neighbours on residential property. 
15. Harassment 
Recommendation 15–1  If a statutory cause of action for serious invasion of 
privacy is not enacted, state and territory governments should enact uniform legislation 
creating a tort of harassment.  
16. New Regulatory Mechanisms 
Recommendation 16–1  The Commonwealth Government should consider 
extending the Privacy Commissioner’s powers so that the Commissioner may 
investigate complaints about serious invasions of privacy and make appropriate 
declarations. Such declarations would require referral to a court for enforcement. 
Recommendation 16–2  The following functions should be conferred on the 
Privacy Commissioner: 
(a)  to assist a court as amicus curiae, where the Commissioner considers it 
appropriate, and with the leave of the court; and 
(b)  to intervene in court proceedings, where the Commissioner considers it 
appropriate, and with the leave of the court. 
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Context of the Inquiry 
1.1 A cause of action for serious invasion of privacy does not presently exist in 
Australian law. A person’s privacy may be invaded in a range of ways. Such invasions 
may occur with increasing ease and frequency in the digital era, when the mobile 
phones in our pockets are all potential surveillance devices, drones are becoming 
cheaper and more advanced, and personal information once put online seems 
impossible to destroy or forget.1 
1.2 This Inquiry considers how Australian law may be reformed to prevent and 
remedy serious invasions of privacy. However, it occurs in the context of other 
concerns about privacy, such as those raised by ‘big data’ and surveillance by 
governments and others. Indeed, it seems that privacy is rarely out of the news. 
                                                        
1  This has been called the problem of ‘digital eternity’: David Lindsay, ‘The “Right to Be Forgotten” in 
European Data Protection Law’, Emerging Challenges in Privacy Law: Comparative Perspectives 
(Cambridge University Press, 2014) 290, 293. 
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The design of a cause of action 
1.3 The Report sets out the detailed legal design of a statutory civil cause of action 
for serious invasion of privacy. This was the core task given to the ALRC for this 
Inquiry.2 
1.4 Notably, the cause of action designed in the Report is directed at invasions of 
privacy that are serious, committed intentionally or recklessly, and that cannot be 
justified in the public interest. It is also confined to invasions of privacy either by 
intrusion upon seclusion or by misuse of private information. 
1.5 The design of this action and the other recommendations in the Report were 
informed by nine guiding principles, discussed in Chapter 2. These include the 
principle that privacy is a fundamental value worthy of legal protection and an 
important public interest.  
1.6 Another principle is that privacy should be balanced with other rights and 
interests, such as freedom of expression. The ALRC considers that privacy and free 
speech are both better protected by finding a reasonable balance between them. 
1.7 The cause of action is designed in detail in the Report. This should make more 
clear the scope of the action, the extent of protection it may provide, and the impact it 
may have on potential defendants. The detailed design of the cause of action may also 
help better inform debates about the desirability of such a cause of action. 
1.8 In developing its recommendations, the ALRC considered, among other things, 
common law principles, developments in other jurisdictions, gaps in Australian 
common law and statute law, and recommendations made in previous inquiries into 
privacy law. The ALRC also considered community and industry concerns, including 
about threats to privacy by new technologies and the vital importance of free speech. 
Elements and essential features of the tort 
1.9 The cause of action should be enacted in a Commonwealth Act and should be 
described in the statute as an action in tort. This is the first essential feature of the 
cause of action. Chapter 4 sets out the constitutional background and legal implications 
of this recommendation. Importantly, describing the action as a tort will encourage 
courts to draw on established principles of tort law, when deciding a number of 
ancillary issues. This will provide a measure of certainty, consistency and coherence to 
the law. 
1.10 Chapters 5 to 8 set out the elements and essential features of the tort. The overall 
structure and elements of the cause of action should be read together, as each element 
depends in many ways on the existence of the others.  
                                                        
2  See the Terms of Reference. 
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1.11 These are the essential elements and features of the cause of action: 
• the invasion of privacy must be either by intrusion into seclusion or by misuse of 
private information (Chapter 5);  
• it must be proved that a person in the position of the plaintiff would have had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in all of the circumstances (Chapter 6); 
• the invasion must have been committed intentionally or recklessly—mere 
negligence is not sufficient (Chapter 7); 
• the invasion must be serious (Chapter 8); 
• the invasion need not cause actual damage, and damages for emotional distress 
may be awarded (Chapter 8); and 
• the court must be satisfied that the public interest in privacy outweighs any 
countervailing public interests (Chapter 9). 
1.12 This last point is the crucial ‘balancing exercise’, in which courts weigh privacy 
against other important public interests, such as freedom of speech, freedom of the 
media, public health and safety, and national security. The ALRC recommends that 
such competing interests be considered when determining whether the plaintiff has a 
cause of action. It should be an element of the tort, rather than a defence. A plaintiff 
should not be able to claim that a wrong has been committed—that their privacy has 
been seriously invaded—where there are strong public interest grounds justifying the 
invasion of privacy. 
Limitation periods and other matters 
1.13 Chapter 10 deals with important procedural and substantive matters. The ALRC 
recommends that: 
• federal, state and territory courts should have jurisdiction; 
• the cause of action should be limited to natural persons; 
• actions should not survive—either for the estate of the plaintiff or against the 
estate of the defendant; 
• the limitation period should be set at one year after the plaintiff becomes aware 
of the invasion, or three years after the invasion occurred, whichever comes 
first; and 
• alternative dispute resolution should neither be a bar to, nor a prerequisite for, 
litigation. 
Defences 
1.14 Chapter 11 sets out the recommended defences to the cause of action: 
• a defence of lawful authority; 
• a defence where the conduct was incidental to defence of persons or property; 
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• a defence of consent; 
• a defence of necessity; 
• a defence of absolute privilege; 
• a defence for the publication of public documents; and 
• a defence for fair reporting of public proceedings. 
Remedies 
1.15 Chapter 12 discusses the making of costs orders and sets out the monetary and 
non-monetary remedies that should be available for serious invasions of privacy, 
including: 
• damages, including for emotional distress and, in exceptional circumstances, 
exemplary damages; 
• an account of profits; 
• injunctions; 
• delivery up, destruction and removal of material; 
• correction and apology orders; and 
• declarations. 
1.16 The ALRC also recommends a list of factors for courts to consider in assessing 
damages and that there should be a statutory cap on the amount of damages that may 
be awarded in any particular case. 
Should a new tort be enacted?  
1.17 The ALRC was asked to design a cause of action, rather than to determine 
whether it is needed or desirable. This second question was considered and answered 
affirmatively by three recent law reform inquiries in Australia. It was also the subject 
of an Issues Paper prepared by the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet in 
September 2011.3 Nevertheless, many stakeholders in this Inquiry commented on the 
issue. 
1.18 The ALRC considers that the question of whether a statutory cause of action for 
serious invasion of privacy would be beneficial to the Australian community should be 
assessed on the basis of an understanding of: 
• the existing legal protections for privacy; 
• gaps and deficiencies in that legal protection; 
                                                        
3  See below, [1.41] ff. 
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• the likelihood of the common law developing a cause of action for invasions of 
privacy in the absence of a statute; 
• the detailed design of the cause of action—its elements, defences and remedies; 
and 
• whether the cause of action is better designed in statute, or left to be developed 
by the courts. 
1.19 Many stakeholders expressed their support for a statutory cause of action.4 Only 
a few told the ALRC that the law did not need to be changed at all, and that there were 
no gaps in the legal protection of privacy in Australia.5 Even many of those who 
opposed a privacy tort did not deny the importance or value of privacy.6 Rather, they 
based their opposition to the tort on other grounds. It was said that there was little 
evidence that privacy is invaded in Australia, and that there are no media practices in 
Australia such as those exposed in the UK phone hacking scandal involving the now 
defunct News of the World. It was also said that there are no significant gaps in the law, 
and a new tort would have an undesirable effect on the media, on other businesses, and 
on the free flow of information. 
1.20 The ALRC is not convinced that there is no evidence of invasions of privacy in 
Australia. Invasions of privacy by intrusion or misuse of private information are known 
to occur in a wide variety of circumstances.  
1.21 While it may be true that the Australian media operate more appropriately than 
some of their UK counterparts, it is not necessarily the case that the Australian media 
never unjustifiably invade people’s privacy. Rather, it may be that where they have 
done so, and the plaintiff complains, they have settled the plaintiff’s claims to avoid 
litigation, publicity and the setting of a precedent. 
1.22 The fact that courts have not recognised a common law cause of action, as they 
have in other countries, also does not show that there is no need for a statutory cause of 
action. It may merely indicate that litigants are reluctant to risk lengthy and costly 
proceedings and appeals arguing a novel point of law. ALRC consultations with 
practitioners confirmed this view. 
1.23 Some who opposed the introduction of a new cause of action recognised that 
there are gaps in the law, but submitted that it would be preferable to fill those gaps in 
other ways.7 Other stakeholders who opposed a new privacy tort submitted that it 
                                                        
4  Law Society of NSW, Submission 122; N Witzleb, Submission 116; Women’s Legal Services NSW, 
Submission 115; T Butler, Submission 114; Australian Privacy Foundation, Submission 110; Office of the 
Victorian Privacy Commissioner, Submission 108; Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 105; 
N Henry and A Powell, Submission 104; UNSW Cyberspace Law and Policy Community, Submission 98; 
Australian Sex Party, Submission 92; G Greenleaf, Submission 76; M Paterson, Submission 60. 
5  Free TV, Submission 55; The Newspaper Works, Submission 50. 
6  Media and Communications Committee of the Law Council of Australia, Submission 124; AMTACA, 
Submission 101. 
7  Telstra, Submission 107; Australian Bankers’ Association, Submission 84; Guardian News and Media Ltd 
and Guardian Australia, Submission 80; P Wragg, Submission 73; SBS, Submission 59; AIMIA Digital 
Policy Group, Submission 56; News Corp Australia, Submission 34. 
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would nevertheless be preferable to ‘shoehorning’ privacy protection into existing 
actions.8 
International developments 
1.24 There are civil causes of action for serious invasion of privacy in New Zealand, 
the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada. 
1.25 The UK has developed extensive legal protection of privacy by extending the 
equitable action for breach of confidence, under the influence of the Human Rights Act 
1998 (UK).9 This Act requires the courts to give effect to the protection of rights and 
freedoms in the European Convention on Human Rights.  
1.26 Article 8 of the Convention provides that everyone has the right to respect for 
their private and family life, their home and their correspondence, and that there shall 
be no interference with this right by a public authority except by lawful authority in the 
interests of national security, public safety, the economic well-being of the country, the 
prevention of disorder or crime, the protection of health or morals, or the protection of 
the rights and freedoms of others. Article 10 provides that everyone has the right to 
freedom of expression, subject to certain necessary restrictions, including the 
protection of the reputation or rights of others, and the prevention of disclosure of 
confidential information. 
1.27 This UK action for disclosure of private information—sometimes called a tort—
has provided a useful guide to the possible structure of the statutory cause of action 
designed in the Report. The UK has also enacted the Protection from Harassment Act 
1997 (UK), which provides a civil remedy for harassment.10  
1.28 New Zealand courts have recognised common law torts of misuse of private 
information11 and of intrusion.12 New Zealand has enacted the Harassment Act 1997 
(NZ), which provides criminal penalties for harassment. 
1.29 Although committees in the UK and New Zealand have recommended against 
the introduction of a statutory cause of action,13 this must be seen in light of the 
significant and recent developments in the common law in those two countries. 
1.30 The Canadian provinces of British Columbia,14 Manitoba,15 Newfoundland and 
Labrador,16 Quebec17 and Saskatchewan18 have enacted statutory torts for invasion of 
                                                        
8  Guardian News and Media Ltd and Guardian Australia, Submission 80. 
9  Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457. See Ch 12. 
10  See Ch 15. 
11  Hosking v Runting (2005) 1 NZLR 1. 
12  C v Holland [2012] 3 NZLR 672. 
13  Joint Committee on Privacy and Injunctions, Privacy and Injunctions, House of Lords Paper No 273, 
House of Commons Paper No 1443, Session 2010–12 (2012); New Zealand Law Commission, Invasion 
of Privacy: Penalties and Remedies: Review of the Law of Privacy Stage 3, Report No 113 (2010). 
14  Privacy Act, RSBC 1996, c 373 (British Columbia). 
15  Privacy Act, CCSM 1996, c P125 (Manitoba). 
16  Privacy Act, RSNL 1990, c P-22 (Newfoundland and Labrador). 
17  Civil Code of Quebec, SQ 1991, c 64 ss 3, 35–37. 
18  Privacy Act, RSS 1978, c P-24 (Saskatchewan). 
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privacy, and the Ontario Court of Appeal has also recognised common law 
protection.19  
1.31 Privacy torts have been well-established in the United States for many decades, 
although the protection they provide is limited by the special protection given to free 
speech by the First Amendment of the Constitution. Some states, such as California, 
have also introduced a statutory tort of invasion of privacy.20 
A common law or statutory tort? 
1.32 In contrast to these other jurisdictions, a common law tort for invasion of 
privacy has not yet developed in Australia, despite the High Court leaving open the 
possibility in Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd.21 
While a tort of invasion of privacy has been recognised by two lower court decisions,22 
no appellate court has confirmed the existence of this tort. In Chapter 3, the ALRC 
reviews the relevant case law, but agrees with the general consensus that the direction 
of the future development of the common law is difficult to predict.23 
1.33 However, Australian law is unlikely to stand still, given developments in other 
countries with similar legal systems and principles. Although Australia does not have a 
Human Rights Act, Australia is a signatory to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, which requires countries to protect the privacy of its citizens. Privacy 
is also grounded in clear and important common law principles. Professor Eric Barendt 
has noted that in the 18th century, property rights that would now be identified as 
personal privacy interests, ‘were used to safeguard radicals against the arbitrary 
confiscation of their manuscripts and papers’.24 It will be increasingly difficult to 
justify denying legal redress to people whose privacy has been seriously invaded, when 
other countries offer such redress. 
1.34 If a cause of action for serious invasion of privacy is likely to be developed in 
Australia, is it better enacted by parliament, or left for the courts to develop under the 
common law? There are benefits of having the law develop in the courts. A statute can 
have unintended consequences.25 It may capture, or fail to capture, activities or conduct 
that were not considered when the statute was enacted. A statute may also become 
outdated by changes in social or technological changes.26 A court, on the other hand, 
can only decide the case before it, and only the issues in contention between the 
                                                        
19  Jones v Tsige (2012) ONCA 32. 
20  California Civil Code § 1708.8. 
21  Australian Broadcasting Commission v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 199. 
22  Grosse v Purvis [2003] QDC 151 (16 June 2003); Doe v Australian Broadcasting Corporation [2007] 
VCC 281. Both cases were settled before appeals by the respective defendants were heard. 
23  The case law on the issue since Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd is 
discussed in Ch 3. 
24  Eric Barendt, ‘Privacy and Freedom of Speech’ in Andrew T Kenyon and Megan Richardson (eds), New 
Dimensions in Privacy Law: International and Comparative Perspectives (Cambridge University Press, 
2006) 11, 31. 
25  TT Arvind and Jenny Steele (eds), Tort Law and the Legislature: Common Law, Statute and the 
Dynamics of Legal Change (Hart Publisher, 2013) 8. 
26  SBS, Submission No 8 to DPM&C Issues Paper, 2011; Free TV, Submission 55. 
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parties. It does not need to anticipate or resolve all the possible issues that might arise 
in other cases. The common law may therefore develop more incrementally and, some 
would say, cautiously. 
1.35 However, there are also many benefits of statutory reform. Parliament can act on 
its own motion, and proactively address emerging issues in the community. The 
development of the common law depends on the existence of parties with the will, and 
the necessary resources, to litigate their claim in court.27 There will be continuing 
uncertainty about how the law will be developed in the courts.28 Reform by legislation 
can also be effected more rapidly than development at common law.29 
1.36 A statute can legislate for a range of situations, both for what has occurred in the 
past and for what may happen in the future. A court will focus on the specific issues of 
a particular case, and this may lead to the development of narrow, fact-specific legal 
principles.  
1.37 There is more flexibility in the development of the law by statute than by 
common law. Statute is not bound to follow precedent, unlike the courts.  
1.38 Statutes can also select the most appropriate elements of a cause of action, 
remedies, defences, thresholds, caps, conditions and exceptions, while courts often do 
not have this freedom.30 A statute can also build in incentives to use alternative dispute 
resolution processes.  
1.39 Finally, statutes can address the complex policy issues and legal concepts 
involved and express the law in language which is more accessible than case law for 
people without legal training.31 As a result, statutes may be more effective in having a 
normative impact on behaviour.  
1.40 The advantages of statutory reform should not be underestimated by those who 
oppose a new privacy tort. If instead of statutory reform, the equitable action for breach 
of confidence were extended, defendants may be faced with a much stricter standard of 
liability. There may also not be a clear and separate ‘seriousness’ threshold and 
countervailing public interests may not be given sufficient weight. Such things 
considered, potential defendants may prefer a more targeted statutory tort, such as the 
one designed in the Report. 
                                                        
27  Office of the Victorian Privacy Commissioner, Submission No 46 to DPM&C Issues Paper, 2011; 
Australian Privacy Foundation, Submission No 7 to DPM&C Issues Paper, 2011. 
28  Law Council of Australia, Submission No 55 to DPM&C Issues Paper, 2011; Office of the Australian 
Information Commissioner, Submission No 14 to DPM&C Issues Paper, 2011. 
29  Australian Privacy Foundation, Submission No 7 to DPM&C Issues Paper, 2011; Liberty Victoria, 
Submission No 34 to DPM&C Issues Paper, 2011. 
30  Mark Leeming, ‘Theories and Principles Underlying the Development of the Common Law: The 
Statutory Elephant in the Room’ (2013) 36 UNSW Law Journal 1002, 1021. 
31  M Paterson, Submission 60. 
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Other inquiries 
1.41 This Inquiry builds on four other recent inquiries into privacy law or related 
issues conducted in Australia, three of which recommended the enactment of a 
statutory cause of action.32 
1.42 The ALRC’s 2008 Report, For Your Information: Privacy Law and Practice, 
focused on data protection: information collection, access and use. The ALRC 
recommended that Commonwealth legislation should provide for a statutory cause of 
action for serious invasion of privacy.33 
1.43 In 2009, the New South Wales Law Reform Commission recommended that a 
general cause of action for invasion of privacy was required to provide a ‘basis for the 
ongoing development of the law of privacy in a climate of dynamic societal and 
technological change’.34 
1.44 In 2010, the Victorian Law Reform Commission issued the report, Surveillance 
in Public Places, which followed a decade-long inquiry into workplace privacy and 
privacy in public places.35 
1.45 In September 2011, the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet released 
an Issues Paper on a statutory cause of action for invasion of privacy,36 prompted by a 
number of ‘high profile privacy breaches’ in Australia and overseas.37 
1.46 During this Inquiry, the Law Reform Institute of South Australia has initiated an 
Inquiry into whether or not South Australia should enact a statutory cause of action for 
invasion of privacy.38  
                                                        
32  Privacy was also the subject of earlier reports by the ALRC. In 1979, the ALRC recommended that a 
person be allowed to sue for damages or an injunction if ‘sensitive private facts’ were published in 
circumstances that were likely to cause distress, annoyance or embarrassment to a person in the position 
of the relevant individual: Australian Law Reform Commission, Unfair Publication: Defamation and 
Privacy, Report 11 (1979). In 1983, the ALRC released a report concentrating on information privacy, 
and the need to implement the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Guidelines 
Governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data, 1983: Australian Law 
Reform Commission, Privacy, Report 22 (1983). This resulted in the enactment of the Privacy Act 1988 
(Cth). In the latter report at [1081], the ALRC declined to recommend the creation of a general tort of 
invasion of privacy. In the ALRC’s view at that time, ‘such a tort would be too vague and nebulous’. The 
ALRC considers that not only are social and technological conditions 30 years later very different, but 
also the legal landscape has changed considerably, as shown by developments in other countries 
discussed above.  
33  Australian Law Reform Commission, For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice, 
Report 108 (2008) Rec 74–1. 
34  NSW Law Reform Commission, Invasion of Privacy, Report 120 (2009) [4.14]. 
35  Victorian Law Reform Commission, Surveillance in Public Places, Report 18 (2010). 
36  ‘A Commonwealth Statutory Cause of Action for Serious Invasion of Privacy’ (Issues Paper, Department 
of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2011). 
37  This presumably referred to the widespread phone hacking by journalists and their sources that led to the 
Leveson Inquiry in the United Kingdom: Lord Justice Leveson, An Inquiry into the Culture, Practices 
and Ethics of the Press, House of Commons Paper 779 (2012). 
38  South Australian Law Reform Institute, Too Much Information: A Statutory Cause of Action for Invasion 
of Privacy, Issues Paper 4 (2013). 
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1.47 The Law Reform Committee of Victoria also recommended in early 2013 that 
Victoria give further consideration to introducing a statutory cause of action for 
invasion of privacy by the misuse of private information.39 
Other reforms 
1.48 In addition to designing the statutory cause of action, the ALRC was asked to 
make recommendations about other legal remedies and innovative ways in which the 
law could prevent or redress serious invasions of privacy. This is considered in Part 3 
of the Report. 
Breach of confidence 
1.49 Chapter 13 recommends that, if a statutory cause of action for serious invasion 
of privacy is not enacted, the equitable action for breach of confidence be strengthened 
by legislation enabling courts to award compensation for emotional distress. As noted 
in Chapter 3, compensation for emotional distress, falling short of a recognised 
psychiatric illness, is generally not available for breach of confidence. If a statutory 
cause of action for serious invasion of privacy is not enacted, enabling courts to award 
compensation for emotional distress in such cases would provide an important 
mechanism for redress. 
Surveillance 
1.50 Chapter 14 concerns legislation regulating the use of surveillance devices. 
Existing state and territory laws provide important protection of privacy and related 
rights—such as freedom of speech—however there is significant inconsistency in the 
law between jurisdictions. This inconsistency can make the laws less effective, 
undermining privacy, and it can also be costly for businesses that operate nationally. 
The ALRC considers that surveillance device laws should be the same throughout 
Australia, and recommends that Commonwealth legislation be enacted to replace 
existing state and territory laws. 
1.51 Surveillance legislation should also be technology neutral, so that the law can 
apply to new devices, such as unmanned aerial vehicles (drones), as well as to 
surveillance technologies which are not ‘devices’ in the traditional sense, such as 
software or networks of devices. The ALRC also questions the value of the existing 
distinction built into the law between surveillance using a device and surveillance 
using a communications network.40 
1.52 A ‘responsible journalism’ defence to surveillance laws is also recommended, to 
protect journalists and media groups who make appropriate use of a surveillance device 
for journalism in the public interest. 
                                                        
39  Law Reform Committee, Parliament of Victoria, Inquiry into Sexting (2013) 187–8. 
40  The Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs is conducting a comprehensive 
review of the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth). It is due to report in 
August 2014. 
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Harassment 
1.53 Chapter 15 recommends that, if a statutory cause of action for serious invasion 
of privacy is not enacted, state and territory governments should enact uniform 
legislation providing for a statutory tort of harassment. A tort of harassment, based on 
similar laws in other jurisdictions, would provide protection and redress for individuals 
who experience some of the most serious invasions of privacy. The ALRC also 
highlights some gaps in state, territory and Commonwealth criminal offences for 
harassment. 
Regulation 
1.54 Chapter 16 considers limited reforms to the existing regulatory mechanisms for 
protecting privacy. In particular, the ALRC recommends that the existing powers of the 
Privacy Commissioner to investigate breaches of the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) be 
extended to allow investigations of complaints about serious invasions of privacy more 
generally. This would provide a low-cost avenue for individuals to make complaints 
about serious invasions of privacy. The ALRC also recommends that the 
Commissioner be given the additional functions of amicus curiae or intervener in 
relevant court proceedings. 
The law reform process 
1.55 The ALRC was given Terms of Reference in June 2013 and asked to report to 
the Attorney-General by June 2014. These Terms of Reference set out and limit the 
scope of the ALRC’s Inquiry. 
1.56 The Report is the final stage in the process. The first stage included the release 
of an Issues Paper,41 and the second stage was a Discussion Paper.42  
1.57 Many valuable submissions to both papers were received.43 The ALRC also 
conducted a number of consultations with stakeholders and spoke at public and 
industry forums and conferences. The ALRC met with media, telecommunications, 
social media and marketing companies, among other organisations; many expert 
academic commentators, specialist legal practitioners, and judges; public interest 
groups; and government agencies, including the Office of the Australian Information 
Commissioner, the Australian Communications and Media Authority, and the 
Australian Human Rights Commission.44 The ALRC hosted two roundtables of legal 
experts, in Sydney and London. 
1.58 In addition to the contribution of expertise by way of consultations and 
submissions, specific expertise is also received by the ALRC from members of its 
Advisory Committee and the appointment of part-time Commissioners.  
                                                        
41  Serious Invasions of Privacy in the Digital Era (ALRC IP 43, 2013). 
42  Serious Invasions of Privacy in the Digital Era (ALRC DP 80, 2014). The Report, the Issues Paper and 
the Discussion Paper may all be downloaded free of charge from the ALRC website: <www.alrc.gov.au>. 
Hard copies may be obtained on request by contacting the ALRC on (02) 8238 6333. 
43  Public submissions are also published on the ALRC website: <www.alrc.gov.au>. 
44  A list of consultations is set out at the end of the Report. 
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1.59 The role of the Advisory Committee is to advise on the coherence and structure 
of the ALRC process and recommendations; it does not formulate reform 
recommendations, and members are invited in their individual capacity. They are 
explicitly asked not to act in any representative capacity. 
1.60 The ALRC acknowledges the contribution made by all the part-time 
Commissioners, Advisory Committee members and expert readers in this Inquiry and 
expresses gratitude to them for voluntarily providing their time and expertise.45 
1.61 The Report discharges the tasks given to the ALRC in the Terms of Reference: 
to design a statutory cause of action for serious invasion of privacy, and to recommend 
other ways the law might be reformed to deter and redress serious invasions of privacy. 
The ALRC considers that the recommendations in the Report, if enacted, would fill an 
increasingly conspicuous gap in Australian law. They would help protect the privacy of 
Australians, while respecting and reinforcing other fundamental rights and values, 
including freedom of expression. 
 
                                                        
45  The names of Commissioners and Advisory Committee members appears at the front of the Report. 
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Summary 
2.1 The ALRC has identified nine principles to guide the recommendations for 
reform in this Inquiry. The principles are not designed to limit the scope of the Inquiry, 
but rather to assist the ALRC, governments and other stakeholders, by providing a 
policy framework in which to consider options for reform of the law. 
2.2 The principles are not the only matters considered by the ALRC, but they 
generally accord with widely recognised values and concepts that have been set out in 
discussions about the legal protection of privacy. 
2.3 Stakeholders expressed general support for these principles.1 Some stakeholders 
suggested additional matters that should be incorporated; some argued that certain 
principles should be given greater emphasis or priority; others stressed that there 
should be no hierarchy or preference for certain interests. 
2.4 Discussion among government representatives, law practitioners, commentators, 
researchers and others into the value, importance and role of privacy in various 
contexts and from various perspectives—legal, philosophical, social, political, 
technical—is extensive. This chapter identifies key considerations from the literature 
that underpin the recommendations in this Final Report. 
                                                        
1  ASTRA, Submission 99; SBS, Submission 59; Women’s Legal Services NSW, Submission 57; Google, 
Submission 54; Electronic Frontiers Australia, Submission 44; Australian Privacy Foundation, Submission 
39; Australian Bureau of Statistics, Submission 32; Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 30; 
Insurance Council of Australia, Submission 15. 
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2.5 The principles draw on leading cases in Australia and other comparable 
jurisdictions, international conventions, academic commentary on privacy and related 
fields, the Terms of Reference for this Inquiry, and similar principles identified in 
earlier ALRC reports and submissions to this Inquiry. 
Principle 1: Privacy is a fundamental value worthy of legal 
protection 
2.6 Privacy is important to enable individuals to live a dignified, fulfilling, safe and 
autonomous life. It is fundamental to our understanding and appreciation of personal 
identity and freedom.2 Privacy underpins: 
• meaningful and satisfying interpersonal relationships, including intimate and 
family relationships; 
• freedom of speech, thought and self-expression; 
• freedom of movement and association; 
• engagement in the democratic process; 
• freedom to engage in secure financial transactions; 
• freedom to pursue intellectual, cultural, artistic, property and physical interests; 
and 
• freedom from undue interference or harm by others. 
2.7 The right to privacy is recognised as a fundamental human right in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) and other international instruments and treaties.3 Article 17 of the ICCPR, to 
which Australia is a signatory, provides: 
1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, 
family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation. 
2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or 
attacks.4
 
2.8 One challenge which arises when determining the boundaries for greater privacy 
protection is drawing the difficult distinction between the public and the private 
spheres. In ABC v Lenah Game Meats, Gleeson CJ stated that 
There is no bright line which can be drawn between what is private and what is not. 
Use of the term ‘public’ is often a convenient method of contrast, but there is a large 
area in between what is necessarily public and what is necessarily private.5 
                                                        
2  Jon L Mills, Privacy: The Lost Right (Oxford University Press, 2008) 13. 
3  Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for signature 20 December 1989, 1577 UNTS 3 (entered 
into force 2 September 1990) art 16; Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers 
and Members of Their Families, opened for signature 18 December 1990, 2220 UNTS 3 (entered into 
force 1 July 2003) art 14. 
4  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 
171 (entered into force 23 March 1976) art 17. 
5  Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 199, [42]. 
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2.9 There is no doubt that privacy is a complex concept, difficult to define at a 
conceptual level.6 It has even been said to be dogged by a ‘lack of precision’7 and 
possibly ‘more akin to a ‘bundle of rights’.8 However, privacy is not less valuable or 
deserving of legal protection simply because it is hard to define. The New South Wales 
Law Reform Commission said that to suggest that privacy is impossible to protect 
because it cannot be precisely defined is to ‘succumb to what Lord Reid once described 
as “the perennial fallacy that because something cannot be cut and dried or lightly 
weighed or measured therefore it does not exist”’.9 
2.10 In 1890, Professors Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis famously described 
privacy as the ‘right to be let alone’.10 In the United States (US), the development of 
privacy is also closely aligned with protection of autonomy,11 and privacy has been 
understood to include the right to make choices and exercise personal liberties.12 
2.11 There is debate about whether privacy should be expressed as a value, a right or 
an interest. The Office of the Australian Information Commissioner (OAIC) argued 
that privacy should be reframed as a right.13 In ABC v Lenah Games Meats, Gleeson CJ 
drew a distinction between legal ‘rights’ and ‘legal interests’, suggesting that 
talk of ‘rights’ may be question-begging, especially in a legal system which has no 
counterpart to the First Amendment to the United States Constitution or to the Human 
Rights Act 1998 of the United Kingdom. The categories that have been developed in 
the United States for the purpose of giving greater specificity to the kinds of interest 
protected by a ‘right to privacy’ illustrate the problem.14 
2.12 Jurisprudence from the European Court of Human Rights has developed a broad 
understanding of privacy in the context of art 8 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights. Article 8 has been interpreted to protect an individual’s correspondence, 
including through modern communication techniques such as email,15 physical 
integrity,16 home,17 identity,18 personal autonomy19 and personal development.20 
2.13 Many stakeholders stressed the importance of privacy to a person’s autonomy 
and rights of self-determination.21 The Law Institute of Victoria, for example, noted 
                                                        
6  Raymond Wacks, ‘The Poverty of Privacy’ (1980) 96 Law Quarterly Review 73. 
7  Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 199, [41] (Gleeson 
CJ). 
8  Mills, above n 2, 4. 
9  NSW Law Reform Commission, Invasion of Privacy, Report 120 (2009) [4.16], quoting Lord Reid in 
Ridge v Baldwin [1964] AC 40, 64–65.  
10  Samuel D Warren and Louis D Brandeis, ‘The Right to Privacy’ (1890) 4 Harvard Law Review 193. 
11  Mills, above n 2, 15. 
12  Ibid 4. 
13  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Submission 66. 
14  Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 199, [41]. 
15  Copland v UK (2007) 45 EHRR 37. 
16  YF v Turkey (2004) 39 EHHR 34. 
17  Keegan v UK (2007) 44 EHRR 112. 
18  I v UK (2003) 36 EHRR 53. 
19  Rotaru v Romania (2000) 8 EHRR 449. 
20  Gaskin v UK (1989) 12 EHRR 36. See, Ian Walden and Lorna Woods, ‘Broadcasting Privacy’ (2011) 3 
Journal of Media Law 117, 125. 
21  See, eg, Electronic Frontiers Australia, Submission 44; A Johnston, Submission 9; I Pieper, Submission 6. 
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that ‘the protection of an individual’s privacy is fundamental to their human dignity 
and is central to many other human rights such as the right of freedom of association, 
movement and expression’.22 
2.14 Privacy also gives individuals freedom to pursue cultural interests free from 
undue interference from others. This freedom may be particularly important for some 
ethnic, religious and cultural groups, such as Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
people, who have particular cultural identity, knowledge and customs that bear on the 
privacy interests of individuals within the group.23 
2.15 Some representative groups stressed the importance of a right to privacy for 
protecting vulnerable people in the community.24 Associate Professor Moira Paterson 
emphasised the potential impact of surveillance on vulnerable people who may rely on 
public places as social, living and cultural spaces.25 Protecting privacy can play an 
important role in ensuring personal safety and freedom from harassment. 
Principle 2: There is a public interest in protecting privacy 
2.16 While privacy must sometimes be set aside for broader public interests, privacy 
itself is also a vital public interest. The public interest does not simply comprise 
matters in which the public as a whole has a communal interest, such as the proper 
administration of government or the proper administration of justice. Rather, there is 
also a public interest in protecting and enforcing private freedoms, rights and 
interests.26 In Plenty v Dillon, Gaudron and McHugh JJ said: 
If the courts of common law do not uphold the rights of individuals by granting 
effective remedies, they invite anarchy, for nothing breeds social disorder as quickly 
as the sense of injustice which is apt to be generated by the unlawful invasion of a 
person’s rights.27 
2.17 Contractual and equitable obligations of confidence also have public interest 
justifications.28 In the Spycatcher case, Lord Goff noted that 
the basis of the law’s protection of confidence is that there is a public interest that 
confidences should be preserved and protected by the law 29 
2.18 Privacy, like confidentiality, underpins other important individual freedoms. 
Privacy and the ability to speak freely without fear of disclosure is important for social 
order and public health, private wellbeing, and the achievement of many social ideals 
and objectives. Without privacy and confidentiality, a person may feel unsafe or unable 
                                                        
22  Law Institute of Victoria, Submission 22. 
23  Arts Law Centre of Australia, Submission 43. 
24  Women’s Legal Services NSW, Submission 57; Women’s Legal Service Victoria and Domestic Violence 
Resource Centre Victoria, Submission 48. 
25  M Paterson, Submission 60. 
26  Australian Privacy Foundation, Submission 110; UNSW Cyberspace Law and Policy Community, 
Submission 98. 
27  Plenty v Dillon (1991) 171 CLR 635, 655 (Gaudron and McHugh JJ). 
28  On the public interest in upholding confidences, see Prince of Wales v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2007] 
3 WLR 222, [67]. See Ch 12. 
29  Attorney General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No 2) (Spycatcher) [1988] 1988 UKHL 6, 29 (Lord Goff). 
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to speak freely and honestly about important private matters, such as private sexual or 
medical matters. 
2.19 There is a public interest in the security of confidential information about an 
individual’s financial and commercial interests. There is, for example, a public interest 
in the benefits that online trade and commerce can offer. Respecting privacy helps 
establish consumer trust in these services. The preamble to the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation Privacy Framework states that balancing and promoting effective 
information privacy protection and the free flow of information is ‘a key part of efforts 
to improve consumer confidence and ensure the growth of electronic commerce’.30 
2.20 Protecting privacy also has an important role to play in protecting and promoting 
free speech—another vital public interest. Professor Eric Barendt has written: 
One value of privacy, and a reason why it is recognised as a constitutional or legal 
right, is that it gives individuals the space to develop their own identity by themselves, 
and in communication and cooperation with friends and lovers, free from observation 
and interference by Big Brother or even by a liberal democratic state. Some privacy is 
essential to enable us to read, contemplate and formulate thoughts, and some 
confidentiality and security is similarly necessary to exchange ideas with friends and 
colleagues.31 
2.21 Although privacy has been said to lie at the heart of liberty, and will often 
support other fundamental rights and freedoms, sometimes it must be balanced with 
other important interests. 
Principle 3: Privacy should be balanced with other important 
interests 
2.22 The privacy of an individual is not an absolute value or right that necessarily 
takes precedence over other values of public interest. As many stakeholders noted, it 
must be balanced with a range of other important values, freedoms and matters of 
public interest.32 These may include, in no particular order or hierarchy: 
• freedom of speech,33 including the freedom of the media and the implied 
constitutional freedom of political communication;34 
• freedom of artistic and creative expression and innovation in the digital era;35 
                                                        
30  Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, APEC Privacy Framework (2005) [1]. 
31  Eric Barendt, ‘Privacy and Freedom of Speech’ in Andrew T Kenyon and Megan Richardson (eds), New 
Dimensions in Privacy Law: International and Comparative Perspectives (Cambridge University Press, 
2006) 11, 30–31. 
32  Australian Human Rights Commission, Submission 75; SBS, Submission 59; Google, Submission 54; 
ASTRA, Submission 47; Law Institute of Victoria, Submission 22; Office of the Information 
Commissioner, Queensland, Submission 20. 
33  In Attorney-General (SA) v Corporation of the City of Adelaide [2013] HCA 3 (27 February 2013) French 
CJ summarises the ways in which freedom of speech as a value underpins much of Australian common 
law and statute law. 
34  RSPCA, Submission 49. The RSPCA submission referred to ABC v Lenah Game Meats, where Kirby J 
suggests that courts should give a wider interpretation to the matters falling within the implied freedom: 
Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 199, 286–287. 
35  Facebook, Submission 65. 
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• the public’s right to be informed on matters of public importance, in real time 
rather than after delay;36 
• public access to information and accurate historical records;37 
• the proper administration of government and matters affecting the public or 
members of the public; 
• the promotion of open justice; 
• national security and safety; 
• the prevention and detection of criminal and fraudulent activity and the 
apprehension of criminals;38 
• the effective delivery of essential and emergency services in the community;39 
• the protection of vulnerable persons in the community; 
• the right to be free from violence, including family violence;40 
• national economic development and participation in the global digital 
economy;41 
• the social and economic value of analysing ‘big data’;42 
• the free flow of information and the right of business to achieve its objectives 
efficiently;43 and 
• the value of individuals being enabled to engage in digital communications and 
electronic financial and commercial transactions.44 
2.23 The importance of balancing privacy with other important public interests 
underpins all the recommendations in this Report. The ALRC does, however, recognise 
                                                        
36  ASTRA, Submission 47. 
37  Arts Law Centre of Australia, Submission 43; Australian Institute of Professional Photography, 
Submission 31; Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 30. It should be noted that some limitations 
on public access to historical records already exist. For example, the National Archives of Australia is 
authorised to withhold information from public access if the release of that information would 
unreasonably disclose information relating to the personal affairs of an individual: Archives Act 1983 
(Cth) s 33(1)(g). 
38  In 2012–2013, information obtained under communications interception or stored communications 
warrants was used in 3,083 arrests, 6,898 prosecutions and 2,765 convictions: Attorney-General’s 
Department, Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979: Annual Report 2012–2013 (2013) 
4. See also Australian Federal Police, Submission 67; Google, Submission 54; CV Check, Submission 23; 
Insurance Council of Australia, Submission 15. 
39  Australian Communications and Media Authority, Submission 52. 
40  Women’s Legal Services NSW, Submission 115; Women’s Legal Service Victoria and Domestic 
Violence Resource Centre Victoria, Submission 48. 
41  Google, Submission 54; Telstra, Submission 45; Optus, Submission 41; Australian Bankers’ Association, 
Submission 27. 
42  See, eg, Malcolm Turnbull MP, ‘National Archives Conference Address—Open for Business in the 
Digital Economy’ (2 June 2014). 
43  Australian Bankers’ Association, Submission 27. 
44  CV Check, Submission 23. 
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that privacy should not be casually ‘traded off’ for the sake of other important 
interests.45 
Principle 4: Australian privacy laws should meet 
international standards 
2.24 The protection of individual privacy in Australia should be consistent with 
Australia’s international obligations.46 These include Australia’s obligations under the 
ICCPR47 and policies of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development.48 It should also take into account, as far as appropriate, international 
standards and legal developments in the protection of privacy.49 Human rights 
frameworks in Victoria and the ACT make specific reference to a person’s right to 
privacy.50 
2.25 Throughout this Report, reference is made to developments in the legal 
protection of privacy in other jurisdictions—particularly those with which Australia 
shares a common legal heritage. However, the ALRC recognises that every 
jurisdiction’s development of the law on privacy will depend on its constitutional 
framework, particularly its guarantees or protections of relevant interests or rights.51 
The need for statutory reform in a particular jurisdiction also depends on developments 
in the common law. 
2.26 Women’s rights organisations highlighted the relevance of the International 
Covenant on the Elimination of All Forms of Violence Against Women (CEDAW)52 to 
a new privacy tort. The disclosure of sexually explicit images of people without their 
consent by current or former intimate partners—‘revenge pornography’—is one type of 
violence against women raised by several stakeholders.53 
2.27 The Arts Law Centre of Australia said Indigenous culture and intellectual 
property should be recognised in the guiding principles: 
Any law protecting the privacy of individuals should also consider the confidential or 
culturally sensitive nature of cultural knowledge, stories, images of Indigenous 
Australians.54 
                                                        
45  Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 30. 
46  One of the ALRC’s functions is to recommend reforms consistent with Australia’s international 
obligations: Australian Law Reform Commission Act 1996 (Cth) s 24(1)(b). 
47  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 
171 (entered into force 23 March 1976) arts 17, 19. 
48  Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Guidelines Governing the Protection of 
Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data, 2013. 
49  Australian Bureau of Statistics, Submission 32. 
50  Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) s 13(a); Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT)  
 s 12. 
51  SBS, Submission 59. 
52  Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, opened for signature 18 
December 1980, 1249 UNTS (entered into force 3 September 1981). 
53  Women’s Legal Services NSW, Submission 57. 
54  Arts Law Centre of Australia, Submission 43. 
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2.28 Some stakeholders noted the value in constructing privacy law which is 
consistent with best practice in international standards, particularly in the area of data 
protection.55 
2.29 International law recognises the importance of other rights and interests, such as 
freedom of speech. As noted in Principle 3, privacy must often be balanced with these 
other important rights and interests. 
Principle 5: Privacy laws should be adaptable to 
technological change 
2.30 The design of any legal privacy protection should be sufficiently flexible to 
adapt to rapidly changing technologies and capabilities, without needing constant 
amendments. At the same time, laws should be drafted with sufficient precision and 
definition to promote certainty as to their application and interpretation. 
2.31 Several stakeholders stressed the need for law reform to be technologically 
neutral to avoid laws being rendered obsolete by rapid developments in technology.56 
For example, Google submitted that there is a need for flexible, forward-looking and 
adaptive data policies to ensure that society may benefit from the many beneficial uses 
of data analytics: 
policymakers need to understand the power of data, embrace its utility, and carefully 
address the challenges it raises without sacrificing the potential it offers.57 
2.32 The importance of flexibility and adaptability is reflected in the design of the 
statutory cause of action and the reforms to surveillance laws recommended in this 
Report. 
Principle 6: Privacy laws should be clear and certain 
2.33 The law should be precise and certain, while being flexible and adaptable to 
changes in social and technological conditions. This principle underpins all of the 
ALRC’s recommendations. Many stakeholders stressed the benefits of precision, 
clarity and certainty.58 
2.34 The ALRC is mindful that Parliament cannot legislate precisely for all future 
situations. Courts will need to apply broader principles and weigh competing interests, 
in the light of all the circumstances of a particular case. Stakeholders pointed out that 
judges are familiar with deciding the types of issues that will arise in privacy cases, 
                                                        
55  Google, Submission 54. 
56  Ibid; Australian Communications and Media Authority, Submission 52; Women’s Legal Service Victoria 
and Domestic Violence Resource Centre Victoria, Submission 48; Optus, Submission 41; Australian 
Privacy Foundation, Submission 39; Australian Bureau of Statistics, Submission 32; C Jansz-Richardson, 
Submission 24; CV Check, Submission 23; Law Institute of Victoria, Submission 22. 
57  Google, Submission 54. 
58  ASTRA, Submission 47; ABC, Submission 46; Telstra, Submission 45; C Jansz-Richardson, Submission 
24. 
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such as the existence and weight of public interests.59 Where appropriate, the ALRC 
suggests some guidance on the relevant factors the court might or should consider.60 
2.35 The ALRC has specifically addressed the desirability of precision and certainty 
in its recommendations, particularly in relation to the design of a statutory cause of 
action and in relation to reforming Australia’s fragmented surveillance laws.61 
Principle 7: Privacy laws should be coherent and consistent 
2.36 Coherence in the law and consistency with other Australian laws or regulatory 
regimes should be an important guiding force in any new privacy protection at law. In 
making recommendations in this Report, the ALRC aims to promote uniformity or 
consistency in the law throughout Australian jurisdictions. 
2.37 Laws that are unnecessarily complex, fragmented and inconsistent impose an 
unnecessary regulatory burden on business.  They also harm privacy. The ALRC heard 
concerns about differences in privacy-related laws—such as surveillance device laws—
between the various states and territories.62 These differences can cause uncertainty 
and confusion, and make the law less effective. 
2.38 Inconsistent laws not only provide poor protection for privacy, but also 
inadequately protect countervailing interests—such as freedom of the media. Victims 
of unauthorised surveillance are poorly protected if they are unable to determine if a 
breach of a statute has occurred. The important activities of others, such as media 
entities and other businesses, which operate nationally, may be overly restricted if it is 
unclear when and where they might be breaching a law.63 
2.39 The need for coherence and consistency also underlies the desirability of 
avoiding unnecessary overlap between legal regimes. Stakeholders said that any 
proposed remedial regime should not overlap or be inconsistent with the various 
regulatory schemes and statutory prohibitions that already affect them.64 This was a 
particular concern given the amendments to the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) that came into 
force in March 2014. 
2.40 However, regulation, the criminal law and the civil law can serve different 
purposes, even if they overlap in some ways. For example, a criminal law may aim to 
punish the perpetrator and deter similar conduct, while a civil cause of action may aim 
to give victims a remedy. 
                                                        
59  For example, B Arnold submitted that ‘Australian jurisprudence regarding confidentiality, defamation and 
national security has demonstrated that courts are fully capable of identifying public interest and of 
dealing with tensions in claims regarding public good.’: B Arnold, Submission 28. 
60  See, eg, Ch 8. 
61  See Ch 14. 
62  Standing Committee on Social Policy and Legal Affairs, Roundtable on Drones and Privacy, 28 February 
2014, Parliament House, Canberra. 
63  ASTRA, Submission 47; ABC, Submission 46. 
64  Australian Federal Police, Submission 67; Google, Submission 54; ABC, Submission 46; Telstra, 
Submission 45; Optus, Submission 41. 
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2.41 Furthermore, although there are many regulatory regimes, criminal laws and 
civil obligations and remedies that help protect people from breaches or invasions of 
privacy, there are also a number of notable gaps in these laws. This Report aims to fill 
some of these gaps. 
2.42 Finally, legal reforms affecting civil liability for invasions of privacy should be 
consistent with legislative policy as it affects civil liability for wrongs to others 
generally,65 and with other common law principles, unless there is an express and clear 
intent to override or distinguish them. 
Principle 8: Justice to protect privacy should be accessible 
2.43 The law should provide a range of means to prevent, reduce or redress serious 
invasions of privacy. Recommendations in this Report aim to facilitate access to justice 
for individuals affected by serious invasions of privacy. For the Women’s Legal 
Services NSW, access to justice means that 
it must be fair, simple, affordable and easy to understand and navigate. It must also 
have pathways for early intervention to prevent further disadvantage.66 
2.44 Many stakeholders submitted that any statutory cause of action or other remedy 
for serious invasions of privacy should be accessible to people with limited means as 
well as to those who can more easily afford the high costs of litigation.67 The law 
should make appropriate provision for people with disability or others who require 
assistance in obtaining access to justice.68 The Terms of Reference for the ALRC’s 
Inquiry into Equality, Capacity and Disability in Commonwealth Laws—being 
conducted at the same time as this Inquiry—refer to ensuring that Commonwealth laws 
and legal frameworks are responsive to the needs of people with disability and to 
advance, promote and respect their rights, in the area of access to justice and legal 
assistance program.69 
2.45 The Productivity Commission has stated that a ‘well functioning justice system’: 
means delivering fair and equitable outcomes as efficiently as possible and resolving 
disputes early, expeditiously and at the most appropriate level. A justice system which 
effectively excludes a sizable portion of society from adequate redress risks 
considerable economic and social costs.70 
                                                        
65  For example, the policy implicit in the civil liability legislation in most states, and in the common law, 
limiting liability for negligently inflicted mental harm to plaintiffs suffering a recognised psychiatric 
illness. 
66  Women’s Legal Services NSW, Submission 57. 
67  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Submission 66; Australian Communications and 
Media Authority, Submission 52; Women’s Legal Service Victoria and Domestic Violence Resource 
Centre Victoria, Submission 48; Optus, Submission 41; Australian Bureau of Statistics, Submission 32; 
Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 30; CV Check, Submission 23; Law Institute of Victoria, 
Submission 22; Office of the Information Commissioner, Queensland, Submission 20. 
68  Office of the Public Advocate (Queensland), Submission 12. Representative actions are discussed in Ch 
10. 
69  Australian Law Reform Commission, Equality, Capacity and Disability in Commonwealth Laws, 
Discussion Paper 81 (2014). 
70  ‘Access to Justice Arrangements’ (Draft Report, Productivity Commission, 2014) v. 
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2.46 In Chapter 16, the ALRC recommends that the Privacy Commissioner be 
empowered to hear complaints about serious invasions of privacy. This may be one 
way of increasing access to justice. Other recommendations also encourage, without 
compelling, people to pursue alternative dispute resolution mechanisms.71 
Principle 9: Privacy protection is an issue of shared 
responsibility 
2.47 Individuals must generally take some responsibility for the protection of their 
own privacy and the privacy of others. The exercise of personal responsibility should 
be encouraged, where possible. The ALRC considers that capable adults should be 
encouraged to take reasonable steps to use the privacy tools offered by service 
providers. Several stakeholders stressed the importance of personal responsibility.72 
2.48 However, government, corporations and small businesses that process personal 
information also have a responsibility to provide individuals with the necessary tools to 
protect their own privacy. Personal responsibility can only be fully exercised when 
individuals are provided with the education and tools necessary to protect their privacy, 
and when the choices expressed by individuals are respected.73 
2.49 Individual responsibility must therefore be balanced with the responsibility of 
organisations and service providers. These groups should provide transparent and 
accessible methods to protect the privacy of their customers. This includes providing 
clear privacy policies, information about how to protect privacy, and privacy warnings. 
2.50 In some circumstances, individuals may not be empowered to exercise personal 
responsibility in a meaningful way. Professor Daniel Solove has written that, although 
privacy self-management is ‘certainly a laudable and necessary component of any 
regulatory regime’, it is being ‘tasked with doing work beyond its capabilities’.74 
2.51 The ALRC is asked to consider how the law may redress and reduce serious 
invasions of privacy. But the law is not a panacea, and education has an important role 
to play in reducing and preventing serious invasions of privacy.75 
2.52 In the ALRC’s view, governments and industry have a responsibility to provide 
adequate education and assistance, particularly for vulnerable members of the 
Australian community, such as people living with disabilities, children and some young 
people. 
                                                        
71  Several stakeholders supported voluntary alternative dispute resolution under the new privacy tort: SBS, 
Submission 59; Women’s Legal Services NSW, Submission 57; Women’s Legal Service Victoria and 
Domestic Violence Resource Centre Victoria, Submission 48; Electronic Frontiers Australia, 
Submission 44; Australian Privacy Foundation, Submission 39; Public Interest Advocacy Centre, 
Submission 30; B Arnold, Submission 28; C Jansz-Richardson, Submission 24; T Gardner, Submission 3. 
72  Australian Federal Police, Submission 67; Facebook, Submission 65; National E-Health Transition 
Authority, Submission 8. 
73  Australian Privacy Foundation, Submission 110. 
74  Daniel J Solove, ‘Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma’ (2013) 126 Harvard Law Review 
1880, 1880. 
75  Australian Federal Police, Submission 67; Facebook, Submission 65; Google, Submission 54.  
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2.53 The OECD’s 2013 Privacy Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and 
Transborder Flows of Personal Data highlighted the need for greater government 
investment in education about privacy awareness, particularly concerning online 
privacy protection. The Guidelines recognise that ‘more extensive and innovative uses 
of personal data bring greater economic and social benefits, but also increase privacy 
risks’.76 
2.54 Education about privacy risks and management may be particularly important 
for children and young persons.77 Research suggests that the use of privacy settings on 
social media is higher among older Australians. For instance, sixteen to seventeen year 
olds are significantly more likely to have their Facebook profiles set to private—
limiting access to their private information to individuals whose online ‘friendship’ 
they have accepted—compared to twelve to fifteen year olds.78 This is affirmed by 
evidence suggesting some young people believe the internet to be a ‘necessity of life’ 
and that ‘it is better to take a beating from all your classmates than to be isolated from 
the Internet’.79 
2.55 This evidence may suggest the need for privacy awareness campaigns and other 
strategies targeted at younger Australians. 
2.56 Drs Nicola Henry and Anastasia Powell underscored the importance of non-
legal methods to reducing and redressing invasions of privacy which occur through the 
internet: 
Service providers of online communities and social media networks can and should be 
proactive in addressing these issues by providing mechanisms for users to report 
hateful and/or harassing content and can dedicate sufficient resources towards 
monitoring and removing such content. Clear community guidelines, terms of use on 
internet sites, and agreement between police and service providers may also be 
effective. Educational initiatives are crucial in fostering an ethical digital citizenship 
and can do much to educate people about the right to privacy.80 
2.57 The overall balance of recommendations in this Report is informed by the 
principle that responsibility for protecting privacy must often be shared. 
 
 
                                                        
76  Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Guidelines Governing the Protection of 
Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data, 2013. 
77  Facebook, Submission 65; National Children and Youth Law Centre, Submission 61. 
78  Australian Communications and Media Authority Australian Government, ‘Like, Post, Share—Short 
Report: Young Australians and Online Privacy’ (May 2013). 
79  Niels Baas, Menno de Jong and Constance Drossaert, ‘Children’s Perspectives on Cyberbullying: Insights 
Based on Participatory Research’ (2013) 16 Cyberpsychology, Behaviour and Social Networking 248, 
252. 
80  N Henry and A Powell, Submission 104. 
3. Overview of Current Law 
 
Contents 
Summary 41 
Existing legislative privacy protection 42 
Information privacy 42 
Health information privacy 44 
Communications privacy 44 
Surveillance laws and laws affecting photography 45 
Harassment and stalking offences 46 
Industry codes and guidelines 47 
Existing common law causes of action 47 
Physical intrusions 48 
Surveillance from outside a property 48 
Intrusions into airspace 49 
Defamatory publications 50 
Disclosures of confidential information 50 
Unauthorised photography 51 
Filling the gaps in existing law 51 
A common law action for breach of privacy in Australia? 53 
 
 
Summary 
3.1 This chapter sets out a brief survey of the existing legal regulation and remedies 
that protect people’s privacy in Australia. The existing legal protection of privacy in 
Australia takes many forms. Protection of the privacy interests of individuals can be 
found in regulatory schemes, criminal laws and civil or private law. 
3.2 This is followed by a brief summary of the main gaps or deficiencies in the way 
that Australian law prevents or redresses serious invasions of privacy. In the ALRC’s 
view, the existing law is a patchwork, with some important pieces missing and 
inconsistencies between others. 
3.3 An understanding of these gaps and deficiencies is important background to the 
recommendations in this Report. 
3.4 This chapter concludes with an outline of recent case law in which the 
possibility of a new common law cause of action for invasion of privacy has been 
raised. 
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Existing legislative privacy protection 
Information privacy 
3.5 The Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) is Australia’s key information privacy law.1 It is 
concerned with the security of personal information held by certain entities, rather than 
with privacy more generally.2 
3.6 The Privacy Act provides 13 ‘Australian Privacy Principles’ (APPs) that 
regulate the collection, use, disclosure and other handling of personal information.3 
The APPs bind only ‘APP entities’—primarily Australian Government agencies and 
large private sector organisations with a turnover of more than $3 million. Certain 
small businesses are also bound, such as those that provide health services and those 
that disclose personal information to anyone else for a benefit, service or advantage.4 
Generally, individuals are not bound by the Privacy Act.5 
3.7 Personal information is defined in s 6(1) of the Act as information or opinion 
about an identified individual, or an individual who is reasonably identifiable, whether 
or not true and whether or not in material form. 
3.8 A breach of an APP in respect of personal information is an ‘interference with 
the privacy of an individual’. Serious or repeated contraventions may give rise to a 
civil penalty order.6 
3.9 The Privacy Act provides several complaints paths for individuals where there 
has been (or is suspected to have been) a breach of an APP. The primary complaints 
process is through a complaint to the Australian Information Commissioner, initiating 
an investigation by the Commissioner.7 This process typically requires that the 
individual has first complained to the relevant APP entity.8 An investigation may result 
in a determination by the Commissioner, containing a declaration that: 
• the respondent’s conduct constituted an interference with the privacy of an 
individual and must not be repeated or continued; 
                                                        
1  The Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) has been the subject of recent reforms following the ALRC’s previous 
Privacy Inquiry. A number of recommendations made in ALRC Report 108 have been implemented by 
the Privacy Amendment (Enhancing Privacy Protection) Act 2012 (Cth), key provisions of which came 
into effect on 14 March 2014. 
2  Confusion about the role and scope of the Privacy Act might be avoided if it were renamed to, for 
example, the Information Privacy Act or the Data Protection Act. These titles are used for similar Acts in 
the UK and Canada, and would more accurately reflect the remit of the Australian Privacy Act. The 
ALRC previously made such a recommendation in Australian Law Reform Commission, For Your 
Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice, Report 108 (2008) Rec 5–3.  
3  Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) sch 1. 
4  ‘APP entity’ is defined in s 6(1) of the Privacy Act. Small businesses are not, in general, APP entities, 
with some exceptions as set out in s 6D. 
5  There are some exceptions. For example, an individual who is a reporting entity under the Anti-Money 
Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006 (Cth) will be treated as an APP entity under s 6E 
of the Privacy Act. 
6  Ibid s 13G. 
7  Ibid ss 36, 40. 
8  Ibid s 40(1A). 
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• the respondent must take specified steps within a specified period to ensure that 
such conduct is not repeated or continued; 
• the respondent must perform any reasonable act or course of conduct to redress 
any loss or damage suffered by the complainant; 
• the complainant is entitled to a specified amount by way of compensation for 
any loss or damage suffered by reason of the act or practice the subject of the 
complaint; or 
• that no further action is needed.9 
3.10 A complainant may apply to the Federal Court of Australia or the Federal 
Circuit Court of Australia to enforce a determination of the Commissioner.10 
3.11 An individual may also apply to the Federal Court or Federal Circuit Court for 
an injunction where a person has, is, or is proposing to engage in conduct that was or 
would be a breach of the Privacy Act.11 This path appears to have been used relatively 
infrequently.12 
3.12 The Privacy Act also grants a range of powers to the Australian Information 
Commissioner, including the power to: 
• investigate complaints made by individuals or on the Commissioner’s own 
motion;13 
• direct agencies to conduct privacy impact assessments;14 and 
• apply for Federal Court and Federal Circuit Court orders for civil penalties for 
serious or repeated breaches of the APPs.15 
3.13 State and territory legislation creates information privacy requirements similar 
to those under the Privacy Act, with application to state and territory government 
agencies, as well as (variously) local councils, government-owned corporations and 
universities.16 These laws provide various mechanisms for individuals to make 
complaints and seek redress. The Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 
1998 (NSW), for example, provides powers to the NSW Privacy Commissioner that 
                                                        
9  Ibid s 52(1). 
10  Ibid s 55A. 
11  Ibid s 98. 
12  The ALRC is aware of only two successful applications: Seven Network (Operations) Ltd v Media 
Entertainment and Arts Alliance [2004] FCA 637 (21 May 2004); Smallbone v New South Wales Bar 
Association [2011] FCA 1145 (6 October 2011). See Ch 16 on the potential for this path to be an 
important source of access to the courts if a wider complaints mechanism is introduced into the Act. 
13  Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) pt V. 
14  Ibid s 33D. 
15  Ibid s 80W. 
16  Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 (NSW); Information Privacy Act 2009 (Qld); 
Premier and Cabinet Circular No 12 (SA); Personal Information Protection Act 2004 (Tas); Information 
Privacy Act 2000 (Vic); Information Privacy Act 2014 (ACT); Information Act (NT). 
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are primarily conciliatory,17 while the Information Privacy Act 2009 (Qld) provides for 
the referral of complaints to Queensland’s Civil and Administrative Tribunal 
(QCAT),18 which may order, among other things, that the complainant is entitled to up 
to $100,000 in compensation.19 
3.14 The existing Commonwealth, state and territory legislation applies to major 
organisations that collect and store personal information, such as banks, large retailers, 
government departments and utilities providers. There are a large number of 
organisations that are exempt from the application of any of these Acts and whose 
activities may have an impact on individual privacy. These may include, for example, 
many small businesses.20 
3.15 Criminal sanctions currently exist for some specific invasions of privacy. For 
example, under s 62 of the Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 
(NSW) the unauthorised or corrupt use or disclosure by a public official of personal 
information obtained through their official functions is an offence punishable by up to 
100 penalty units or imprisonment for up to two years. 
Health information privacy 
3.16 Health and genetic information is recognised as ‘sensitive information’ under 
the Privacy Act. Sensitive information is given greater protection under the APPs than 
other information.21 Separate Commonwealth Acts protect healthcare identifiers22 and 
electronic health records.23 
3.17 Several state and territory laws also offer protections, including limitations on 
collection, use and disclosure, for health information held by state and territory public 
and private sector organisations.24 
Communications privacy 
3.18 The Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth) prohibits the disclosure of certain 
information by telecommunications providers.25 Contravention of these prohibitions is 
an offence punishable by up to two years imprisonment.26 
                                                        
17  Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 (NSW) s 49.  The Act also provides for an 
individual to make a complaint to the agency in question, and to apply to the Administrative Appeals 
Tribunal for a review of an agency’s decision. The Tribunal may make a variety of orders, including an 
order that the agency pay the individual compensation of up to $40,000: Privacy and Personal 
Information Protection Act 1998 (NSW) ss 53–55. 
18  Information Privacy Act 2009 (Qld) s 176(1). 
19  Ibid s 178(a)(v). 
20  Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) s 6C. 
21  ‘Sensitive information’ is defined in s 6(1) of the Privacy Act. A number of the APPs make special 
provisions for sensitive information: see, eg, APP 3. 
22  Healthcare Identifiers Act 2010 (Cth). 
23  Personally Controlled Electronic Health Records Act 2012 (Cth). 
24  Health Records and Information Privacy Act 2002 (NSW); Information Privacy Act 2009 (Qld); Health 
Records Act 2001 (Vic); Health Records (Privacy and Access) Act 1997 (ACT); Information Act (NT). 
25  Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth) pt 13. 
26  Ibid s 276(3). 
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3.19 There are a number of exceptions, for example, for disclosures to the Australian 
Security Intelligence Organisation or the Australian Federal Police, under the 
Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth) (TIA Act). Exceptions 
also exist for disclosure under the authority of an ‘authorised officer’ of an 
enforcement agency,27 but this does not permit the disclosure of the contents or 
substance of a communication.28 An authorised officer must consider the privacy of 
any person before making an authorisation.29 
3.20 The TIA Act prohibits the unauthorised access of communications, subject to 
various exceptions,30 unless a warrant is obtained.31 Those who issue warrants must 
consider, among other things, the privacy of persons affected by the access.32 
3.21 The TIA Act also prohibits the unauthorised interception of communications 
over a telecommunications system, again, subject to various exceptions,33 unless a 
warrant is obtained.34 Those who issue an interception warrant must consider, among 
other things, the privacy of persons affected by the interception.35 
Surveillance laws and laws affecting photography 
3.22 Legislation exists in each of the states and territories that variously restricts the 
use of listening, optical, data and tracking surveillance devices. These surveillance 
device laws provide criminal offences for using a surveillance device to record or 
monitor private conversations or activities, for tracking a person or for monitoring 
information on a computer system.36 The surveillance device laws also place 
restrictions on communicating information obtained through the use of a surveillance 
device. 
3.23 The surveillance device laws of each state and territory differ greatly, both in 
terms of the types of surveillance devices they regulate, and the circumstances in which 
those surveillance devices may or may not be used. For example, the laws of Victoria, 
Queensland and the Northern Territory permit a participant to record a private activity 
in the absence of the consent of other parties, while the remaining surveillance device 
laws do not.37 
3.24 Different state and territory workplace surveillance legislation prohibits 
employers monitoring their employees at work through covert surveillance methods, 
                                                        
27  Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth) ss 171–182. 
28  Ibid s 172. A disclosure under these provisions is therefore limited to communications data (‘metadata’). 
29  Ibid s 180F. 
30  Ibid s 108. 
31  Ibid ss 110–132. 
32  Ibid s 116(2). 
33  Ibid s 7. 
34  Ibid ss 9–18, 34–61A. 
35  Ibid ss 46(2), 46A(2). 
36  Surveillance Devices Act 2007 (NSW); Invasion of Privacy Act 1971 (Qld); Listening and Surveillance 
Devices Act 1972 (SA); Listening Devices Act 1991 (Tas); Surveillance Devices Act 1999 (Vic); 
Surveillance Devices Act 1998 (WA); Listening Devices Act 1992 (ACT); Surveillance Devices Act (NT). 
37  See Ch 13. 
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such as the use of CCTV cameras or computer, internet and email surveillance.38 Once 
again, there are inconsistencies between these laws, and such laws only exist in three 
jurisdictions—NSW, Victoria and the ACT. 
3.25 Criminal laws in some—but not all—jurisdictions provide for offences relating 
to photography being used for indecent purposes39 or indecent filming without 
consent.40 Criminal laws also provide protection against indecent photography of 
children in private and public places.41 In each case, the laws are restricted to specific 
subject matter, for example, matter of a sexual nature; filming for specific purposes, for 
example, for sexual gratification; or filming of a particular type of person, for example, 
a child. These laws therefore provide limited general privacy protection. 
3.26 At the Commonwealth level, the operation of the Privacy Act is restricted to the 
actions of government agencies and big business, and does not cover the activities of 
individuals acting in a personal capacity, such as freelance or amateur photographers. 
However the Act does regulate the activities of individuals, agencies and companies 
which ‘disclose personal information about another individual to anyone else for a 
benefit, service or advantage’.42 This may provide scope to regulate the actions of 
photographers who take unauthorised photographs of individuals.43 
Harassment and stalking offences 
3.27 State and territory laws criminalising harassment and stalking vary considerably 
by jurisdiction. Legislation in Queensland and Victoria expressly prohibits ‘cyber-
harassment’ committed through ‘electronic messages’44 or by ‘otherwise contacting the 
victim’.45 
3.28 The Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) provides offences for conduct amounting to 
harassment that occurs via a communications service (which includes the internet). 
Relevant offences include ‘using a carriage service to menace, harass or cause 
offence’46 and ‘using a carriage service to make a threat’.47 
                                                        
38  Workplace Surveillance Act 2005 (NSW); Surveillance Devices (Workplace Privacy) Act 2006 (Vic); 
Workplace Privacy Act 2011 (ACT). 
39  Summary Offences Act 1988 (NSW) s 4; Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) s 227(1); Police Offences Act 
1935 (Tas) s 13. 
40  Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) ss 91K–91M; Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) s 227A(1); Summary Offences Act 
1953 (SA) s 26D; Police Offences Act 1935 (Tas) s 13A; Summary Offences (Upskirting) Act 2007 (Vic) 
s 41A. 
41  See, eg, Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 63B. 
42  Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) s 6D(4)(c),(d). 
43  Ibid s 6: The definition of ‘record’ includes ‘a photograph or other pictorial representation of a person’. 
44  Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 21A(2)(b). 
45  Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) s 359A(7)(b). 
46  Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) s 474.17. 
47  Ibid s 474.15. 
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3.29 There is a strong framework in family law to protect individuals from 
harassment, including harassment that occurs via electronic communications. However, 
this is limited to the victims of family violence.48 
Industry codes and guidelines 
3.30 Various statutory and self-regulatory bodies oversee and enforce industry codes 
and guidelines which protect against invasions of privacy. 
3.31 Commercial television and radio broadcasters are subject to a self-regulatory 
scheme under the Broadcasting Services Act 1992 (Cth). Commercial broadcasting 
industry codes of practice include provisions relating to the protection of privacy.49 The 
ABC and SBS are each subject to a separate code of practice; each of these codes also 
contains provisions relating to the protection of privacy.50 The Australian 
Communications and Media Authority (the ACMA) has oversight of each of these 
codes of practice, however the ACMA has limited powers to provide redress to 
individuals when a code is breached. 
3.32 The Australian Press Council oversees the compliance of its members with its 
Charter of Press Freedom (2003) and Statement of Privacy Principles (2011). It does 
not provide a mechanism for individuals to obtain monetary redress. 
3.33 Part IIIB of the Privacy Act makes provision for the development of privacy 
codes (APP codes). APP codes can be developed on the initiative of ‘code developers’, 
or in response to a request from the Privacy Commissioner. The Commissioner may 
also develop an APP code. The codes set out compliance requirements for one or more 
APPs. The code developer may apply to the Commissioner to have the code registered. 
A breach of a registered code constitutes an ‘interference with privacy’ under the Act, 
and if the breach is serious or repeated the Commissioner may apply to the Federal 
Court or Federal Circuit Court for a civil penalty order. 
Existing common law causes of action 
3.34 There are a number of existing causes of action at common law which can, in 
some cases, be used to protect privacy or have the effect of protecting personal 
privacy.51 These causes of action protect against physical intrusions upon a person, 
surveillance of a person, and against unauthorised disclosure of private information. 
                                                        
48  For example, stalking is included in the definition of ‘family violence’ in the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) 
s 4AB(2)(c). 
49  Commercial Television Industry Code of Practice 2010 cl 4.3.5; Commercial Radio Codes of Practice and 
Guidelines 2011 cl 2.1(d). 
50  ABC Code of Practice 2011 cl 6.1; SBS Codes of Practice 2014 cl 1.9. 
51  Carolyn Sappideen and Prue Vines (eds), Fleming’s The Law of Torts (Lawbook Co, 10th ed, 2011)  
 ch 26. 
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Physical intrusions 
3.35 Trespass to the person and trespass to land provide some protection against 
unauthorised interference with a person’s body or intrusions into property.52 Both 
forms of the ancient tort of trespass are actionable per se, meaning that the tort is 
actionable when the interference occurs, without the need for the plaintiff to establish 
any recognised form of damage such as personal injury, psychiatric illness, property 
damage or economic loss. 
3.36 ‘General’ damages, sometimes substantial, are awarded to compensate the 
plaintiff for the wrong that has occurred, and for any actual damage sustained, or by 
way of solace or vindication of his or her rights.53 Aggravated damages may be 
awarded where there is a special humiliation of the plaintiff by the defendant. 
Exemplary or punitive damages may be awarded where the defendant has acted 
intentionally or maliciously and in arrogant or contumelious disregard of the plaintiff’s 
rights.54 Plaintiffs may seek injunctions to restrain the broadcast of video material 
recorded without authorisation while a defendant was trespassing on land,55 although 
damages have been deemed an adequate remedy in cases involving commercial 
enterprises.56 
3.37 However, both forms of trespass require a physical interference (or a threat of 
physical interference in the case of trespass to the person) and will therefore not apply 
to a person who merely follows or watches or keeps a person under surveillance 
without any threat, or who remains outside the land to carry out surveillance. 
3.38 Trespass to land also has strict requirements as to the title over the land that the 
plaintiff must have in order to sue in trespass. Thus, someone who is on the land under 
a mere contractual or other licence, for example, the hire of premises for a wedding57 
or the occupation of a hospital bed or room,58 will not have a sufficient right to 
exclusive occupation of the land or premises to sue in trespass for an invasion of 
privacy into that space. Finally, trespass to land has no operation where the plaintiff is 
in a public space and complains that there has been intrusion into his or her private 
activities, affairs or seclusion. 
Surveillance from outside a property 
3.39 A person may be liable in the tort of nuisance for an unreasonable interference 
with an occupier’s use and enjoyment of their land.59 For example, a person may be 
found liable in nuisance for keeping the occupier under surveillance or by positioning 
                                                        
52  Living in modern society automatically exposes a person to the risk of everyday forms of contact, and 
consent to this contact can be inferred: Collins v Wilcock (1984) 1 WLR 1172. 
53  Plenty v Dillon (1991) 171 CLR 635, 654–655 (Gaudron and McHugh JJ). 
54  XI Petroleum (NSW) Pty Ltd v Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty Ltd (1985) 155 CLR 448. 
55  Emcorp Pty Ltd v Australian Broadcasting Corporation [1988] 2 Qd R 169. 
56  Lincoln Hunt Australia Pty Ltd v Willesee (1986) 4 NSWLR 457; Brigthen Pty Ltd v Nine Network 
Australia Pty Ltd [2009] NSWCA 319. 
57  Douglas v Hello! Ltd [2005] EWCA Civ 595 (18 May 2005). 
58  Kaye v Robertson [1991] FSR 62. 
59  Rosalie Balkin and Jim Davis, Law of Torts (LexisNexis Butterworths, 5th ed, 2013) ch 14. 
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cameras or lights in situations where they interfere with, record or ‘snoop’ on the 
occupier’s activities.60 As in trespass, only the occupier with a right to exclusive 
possession may sue in nuisance, and the cause of action has been denied to other lawful 
occupants of the land who may be there under licence from the occupier. This 
characterisation of other occupants as mere licensees has even been applied to family 
members of the lawful occupier.61 
Intrusions into airspace 
3.40 Intrusions into airspace may amount to trespass to land if the intrusion is at a 
height that is potentially necessary for the ordinary use and enjoyment of the 
occupier.62 Exceptions apply in the case of aircraft merely flying through airspace. For 
example, s 72(1) of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) provides that 
no action lies in respect of trespass or nuisance by reason only of the flight (or the 
ordinary incidents of the flight) of an aircraft over any property at a height above the 
ground that is reasonable (having regard to wind, weather and all the circumstances of 
the case) so long as the Air Navigation Regulations are complied with.63 
3.41 These provisions were originally enacted in most jurisdictions in the 1950s to 
protect the then young commercial airline industry. Arguably, they were not directed at 
the sort of technological intrusions possible today, such as by the use of unmanned 
aerial devices or drones, which nevertheless come with the definition of aircraft. 
3.42 It is a question of fact in the circumstances as to whether or not a trespass has 
occurred according to common law principles. This would depend on whether the 
potential use and enjoyment of the land and airspace by the occupier has been 
interfered with from within the relevant height limit of the occupier’s interests.64 If the 
interference was from outside the occupier’s airspace, the circumstances could amount 
to a nuisance at common law. 
3.43 In the case of aircraft, whether or not a trespass has occurred would also depend 
on whether or not the height of the intrusion is reasonable in all of the circumstances.65 
Mere compliance with Air Navigation Regulations, which are aimed at safety issues,66 
would not necessarily excuse the use of an aircraft to interfere with the occupier’s use 
or enjoyment of the land or the occupier’s privacy or that of the occupier’s guests.67 
Aerial photography, recording and surveillance carried out from a plane or helicopter 
                                                        
60  Raciti v Hughes (1995) 7 BPR 14 837. The plaintiffs successfully obtained an injunction to prevent the 
use of motion-triggered lights and surveillance cameras aimed at their backyard. 
61  Hunter and Others v Canary Wharf Ltd; Hunter and Others v London Docklands Corporation [1997] AC 
655; Oldham v Lawson (No 1) [1976] VR 654. 
62  LJP Investments Pty Ltd v Howard Chia Investments Pty Ltd (1989) 24 NSWLR 490, 495. 
63  Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 72(1). 
64  LJP Investments Pty Ltd v Howard Chia Investments Pty Ltd (1989) 24 NSWLR 490, 495; Lord 
Bernstein v Skyviews and General Ltd [1978] 1 QB 479, 489. See also Bocardo SA v Star Energy UK 
Onshore Ltd [2010] 3 ER 975, 984–993. 
65   See, eg, Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 72(1). A similar provision applies in the United Kingdom: 
Lord Bernstein v Skyviews and General Ltd [1978] 1 QB 479. 
66  Civil Aviation Safety Authority, Submission 2. 
67  New South Wales v Ibbett (2006) 229 CLR 638; Halliday v Neville (1984) 155 CLR 1, 8. 
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or drone may therefore amount to a trespass to land or a nuisance, but there is a dearth 
of case authority dealing with these types of intrusion. 
3.44 In Bernstein v Skyviews, the defendant photographed the plaintiff’s property 
from a flight many hundreds of feet above the property for the purpose of offering to 
sell the photographs to the plaintiff. The plaintiff was unsuccessful in this case. 
However, Griffiths J said: 
I [would not] wish this judgment to be understood as deciding that in no 
circumstances could a successful action be brought against an aerial photographer to 
restrain his activities. The present action is not founded in nuisance for no court would 
regard the taking of a single photograph as an actionable nuisance. But if the 
circumstances were such that a plaintiff was subjected to the harassment of constant 
surveillance of his house from the air, accompanied by the photographing of his every 
activity, I am far from saying that the court would not regard such a monstrous 
invasion of his privacy as an actionable nuisance for which they would give relief.68 
Defamatory publications 
3.45 The tort of defamation provides redress for a person whose reputation is 
damaged by a publication to a third party. Until the enactment of the Uniform 
Defamation Laws in 2005 in Australian states and territories,69 defamation law 
provided considerable indirect70 protection of private information because in some 
states defendants could only justify a defamatory publication by showing not only its 
truth but also that it was published in the public interest or for the public benefit.71 
However, the truth of a defamatory statement is now a complete defence, so that 
defamation actions provide much more limited protection of privacy.72 
Disclosures of confidential information 
3.46 The equitable action for breach of confidence has long been a key source of 
protection against the misuse or disclosure of confidential information. Confidential 
information is information which is not generally or publicly known but is only known 
to a deliberately restricted number of individuals. 
3.47 The action was originally confined to information that had been imparted in 
circumstances expressly or impliedly imposing an obligation of confidence. Sometimes 
this obligation arises under contract, with normal contractual remedies flowing from 
the breach, including, in limited cases, damages for mental distress. But the courts of 
equity also recognised the obligation outside contract—for example, as to personal 
details imparted in a close personal relationship,73 although they might refuse relief 
where the parties had already been very public about their relationship. 
                                                        
68  Lord Bernstein v Skyviews and General Ltd [1978] 1 QB 479, 489. 
69  Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) 2005; Defamation Act 2006 (NT) 2006; Defamation Act 2005 (Qld) 2005; 
Defamation Act 2005 (SA) 2005; Defamation Act 2005 (Tas); Defamation Act 2005 (Vic); Defamation 
Act 2005 (WA); Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) ch 9; Defamation Act 2006 (NT) 2006. 
70  Australian Consolidated Press Ltd v Ettingshausen [1993] NSWCA (13 October, 1993). 
71  John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v Hitchcock [2007] NSWCA 364 (14 December 2007) [124]. 
72  Sappideen and Vines, above n 51, ch 25. 
73  Argyll v Argyll (1965) 1 ER 611. 
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3.48 It is now well accepted in the United Kingdom74 (UK) and Australia75 that an 
obligation of confidence may arise where a party comes into possession of information 
which he or she knows, or ought to know, is confidential. This extension of the law 
makes the equitable action for breach of confidence a powerful legal weapon to protect 
individuals from the unauthorised disclosure of confidential information, although 
there is still some uncertainty in Australia as to what compensation is available in an 
equitable action for breach of confidence.76 
Unauthorised photography 
3.49 Generally speaking, there is no common law right not to be photographed that 
can be exercised to prevent photography or filming of someone in a public place 
without their consent.77 There is also no prohibition on taking photographs of private 
property from public land, unless the conduct amounts to stalking or the intent is to 
‘peep or pry’ on an individual.78 Private property owners or public entities such as local 
councils, educational institutions or museums may regulate photography on private 
property or places they control, by the express terms on which entry is authorised. In 
other cases, a lack of authority to enter for the purpose of taking photographs or 
recordings may be inferred.79 
Filling the gaps in existing law 
3.50 Although the existing law provides protection against some invasions of 
privacy, there are significant gaps or uncertainties. These include the following: 
• The tort actions of trespass to the person, trespass to land and nuisance do not 
provide protection from unauthorised and serious intrusions into a person’s 
private activities in many situations.80 A statutory cause of action for serious 
invasions of privacy,81 or a statutory tort for harassment,82 would supplement the 
common law. 
• Outside actions of trespass, malicious prosecution or defamation, tort law does 
not provide a remedy for intentional infliction of emotional distress which does 
not amount to psychiatric illness.83 The ALRC recommends that a tort for 
serious invasions of privacy should be actionable per se, therefore allowing for 
the recovery of damages for emotional distress.84 
                                                        
74  Attorney General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No 2) (1990) 1 AC 109. 
75  Australian Broadcasting Commission v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 199, 224 (Gleeson 
CJ). 
76  See Ch 13. 
77  ‘[A] person, in our society, does not have a right not to be photographed’: R v Sotheren [2001] NSWSC 
204 (16 March 2001) [25] (Dowd J). 
78  See, eg, Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 547C. 
79  Halliday v Neville (1984) 155 CLR 1, 8; TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd v Anning (2002) 54 NSWLR 333. 
80  Trespass to the person requires bodily contact or a threat of such contact. Both trespass to land and 
nuisance protect only the occupier of the relevant land, and the former requires an intrusion onto the land.  
81  See Chs 4–12. 
82  See Ch 15. 
83  Wainwright v Home Office [2004] 2 AC 406; Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Naidu (2007) 71 NSWLR 417. 
84  See Ch 8. 
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• While the equitable action for breach of confidence can provide effective legal 
protection to prevent the disclosure of private information (and especially if the 
Australian common law develops as it has in the UK), it is currently less 
effective after a wrongful disclosure, because it is unclear or uncertain whether a 
plaintiff may recover compensation for emotional distress. This uncertainty 
should be removed.85 
• There is further uncertainty, or at least some debate, as to the relevant principles 
to be applied when a court is considering whether to grant an interlocutory 
injunction to restrain the publication of true, private information.86 The 
Discussion Paper included a proposal that courts be required to give particular 
consideration to freedom of expression and matters of public interest when 
considering such an injunction on the basis of common law actions.87 The 
ALRC considers that it may be premature to proceed with this proposal unless 
and until there is further development of the common law.88 
• Legislation dealing with surveillance and with workplace surveillance is not 
uniform throughout Australia, and is outdated in some states. The ALRC 
recommends that these surveillance device laws should be made replaced by a 
Commonwealth Act.89 
• There is no tort or civil action for harassment, nor is there sufficient deterrence 
against ‘cyber-harassment’ in Australian law, compared with overseas 
jurisdictions.90 The ALRC recommends civil remedies and criminal penalties for 
harassment if a statutory cause of action for serious invasion of privacy is not 
enacted.91 
• Legislation and common law protection against aerial and other surveillance 
may not provide sufficient protection against advances in technology that 
facilitate new types of invasion into personal privacy.92 This limitation would be 
addressed by the statutory cause of action for serious invasions of privacy. In 
addition, ALRC recommendations for the replacement of state and territory 
                                                        
85  See Ch 13. 
86  The guidance provided by defamation cases such as Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill 
(2006) 227 CLR 57 and by cases on protection of confidential information is of uncertain application in 
view of the potentially different interests in privacy actions.  
87  Australian Law Reform Commission, Serious Invasions of Privacy in the Digital Era, Discussion Paper 
80 (2014) Prop 12–2. 
88  See Ch 13. 
89  See Ch 14. 
90  A number of US states have enacted cyber-stalking or cyber-harassment legislation or have laws that 
explicitly include electronic forms of communication within more traditional stalking or harassment 
laws. Most of these constitute amendments to State Criminal Codes, updating the meaning of harassment 
and/or stalking to include electronic communications. In Nova Scotia in Canada, the Cyber-Safety Act 
2013 (SNS), c 2 criminalises cyber-bullying. 
91  See Ch 15 and in particular Rec 15–1.  
92  An example is the increasing use of unmanned aerial vehicles (drones) to carry out unauthorised aerial 
surveillance.  
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surveillance devices laws would technology-neutral legislation would allow for 
the regulation of new means of surveillance.93 
• The Privacy Act and state and territory equivalents deal only with information 
privacy. Further, the Privacy Act provides for only limited civil redress, that is, 
by way of complaints made to the Australian Information Commissioner. While 
of central importance, this legislation by no means covers the field of invasions 
of privacy. The Act does not generally apply to intrusions into personal privacy 
or to the behaviour of individuals or media entities,94 and does not generally 
apply to businesses with an annual turnover of less than $3 million.95 
• There is no regulatory avenue for monetary redress for complaints about 
invasions of privacy by media or communications entities.96 
3.51 Some of the gaps identified above are more properly dealt with by existing 
regulatory bodies. Some concerns have been the subject of recent, carefully considered 
enactments—for example, the recent amendments to the Privacy Act made by the 
Privacy Amendment (Enhancing Privacy Protection) Act 2012 (Cth), many of which 
came into effect only in March 2014, three months before the completion of this 
Inquiry. 
3.52 Further, in many instances a targeted review of existing legislation which is the 
subject of community debate is more appropriate. For example, the privacy protections 
under the Telecommunications Act and the TIA Act were the subject of a 2013 
Parliamentary Inquiry.97 At the time of writing, a further Parliamentary Inquiry is 
ongoing.98 The ALRC therefore does not consider these provisions in this Report. 
A common law action for breach of privacy in Australia? 
3.53 A common law tort for invasion of privacy has not yet developed in Australia, 
despite the High Court leaving open the possibility of such a development in 
Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd in 2001.99 A tort of 
invasion of privacy has been recognised by two lower court decisions: Grosse v Purvis 
in the District Court of Queensland100 and Doe v Australian Broadcasting 
                                                        
93  See Ch 14. 
94  A proposal to extend the Commissioner’s powers to investigate complaints about serious invasions of 
privacy is considered in Ch 16. This extension would make use of the Commissioner’s existing powers, 
including powers to make non-binding declarations. This power could also allow the Commissioner to 
investigate complaints about serious invasions of privacy by the media. 
95  The small business exemption in the Privacy Act is discussed in Ch 16. 
96  See above on the Australian Press Council. The ALRC has not proceeded with a proposal for the ACMA 
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of privacy. 
97  Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, Parliament of Australia, Report of the 
Inquiry into Potential Reforms of Australia’s National Security Legislation (2013). 
98  Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Committee, Comprehensive Revision of Telecommunications 
(Interception and Access) Act 1979 (referred by Senate on 12 December 2013; reporting date 27 August 
2014). 
99  Australian Broadcasting Commission v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 199. 
100  Grosse v Purvis [2003] QDC 151 (16 June 2003). See, also, Des A Butler, ‘A Tort of Invasion of Privacy 
in Australia?’ (2005) 29 Melbourne University Law Review 352. 
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Corporation101 in the County Court of Victoria. However, both cases were settled 
before appeals by the respective defendants were heard. 
3.54 No Australian appellate court has confirmed the existence of this tort, and the 
judgments of several courts suggest that the common law is unlikely to recognise the 
tort in the foreseeable future: 
• commenting on Grosse v Purvis, Heerey J in Kalaba v Commonwealth of 
Australia held that the weight of authority was against the proposition that the 
tort is recognised at common law;102 
• in Chan v Sellwood; Chan v Calvert, Davies J described the position on the 
existence of the tort at common law as ‘a little unclear’;103 
• in Sands v State of South Australia, Kelly J stated that ‘the ratio decidendi of the 
decision in Lenah is that it would require a further development in the law to 
acknowledge the existence of a tort of privacy in Australia’;104 and 
• in Giller v Procopets,105 the Supreme Court of Victoria Court of Appeal found it 
unnecessary to consider whether the tort of invasion of privacy exists at 
common law, having upheld the plaintiff’s claim on the basis of the equitable 
action for breach of confidence. 
3.55 In other cases, the existence of the tort at common law has been left open: 
• in Maynes v Casey, Basten J, with whom Allsop P agreed, referring to 
Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats and Giller v 
Procopets, said that ‘[t]hese cases may well lay the basis for development of 
liability for unjustified intrusion on personal privacy, whether or not involving 
breach of confidence’, but held that the facts as found were against the 
plaintiff;106 
• in Saad v Chubb Security Australia Pty Ltd, Hall refused to strike out a claim for 
breach of confidence, holding that it was not open to conclude ‘that the cause of 
action for breach of confidence based on invasion of the plaintiff’s privacy 
would be futile or bad law’;107 
• in Gee v Burger, McLaughlin AsJ considered the matter ‘arguable’;108 
• in Dye v Commonwealth Securities Ltd, Katzmann J noted ‘that it would be 
inappropriate to deny someone the opportunity to sue for breach of privacy on 
the basis of the current state of the common law’;109 and 
                                                        
101  Doe v Australian Broadcasting Corporation [2007] VCC 281 (2007). 
102  Kalaba v Commonwealth of Australia [2004] FCA 763 (8 June 2004) [6]. 
103  Chan v Sellwood; Chan v Calvert [2009] NSWSC 1335 (9 December 2009) [34]. 
104  Sands v State of South Australia [2013] SASC 44 (5 April 2013) [614]. 
105  Giller v Procopets (2008) 24 VR 1. 
106  Maynes v Casey [2011] NSWCA 156 (14 June 2011) [35]. 
107  Saad v Chubb Security Australia Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSC 1183 [183].  
108  Gee v Burger [2009] NSWSC 149 (13 March 2009) [53]. 
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• in Doe v Yahoo!7 Pty Ltd, Smith DCJ said, ‘it seems to me there is an arguable 
case of invasion of privacy. … I would be very hesitant to strike out a cause of 
action where the law is developing and is unclear’.110 
3.56 The cases suggest that the future development of the common law is, at best, 
uncertain. Moreover, any significant development of the common law would require 
litigants with the resources and determination both to initiate proceedings and to take 
those proceedings through the appeals process. In Goodwin v News Group Newspapers 
—a case involving a privacy claim against a media defendant in the UK—Tugendhat J 
noted that 
it is essential that the parties to litigation put their evidence and submissions before 
the court. It is by weighing up arguments and counter arguments that judges are best 
able to interpret the law. … To the extent that media defendants choose not to submit 
evidence and argument to the courts, judges will find it difficult to develop the law of 
privacy to meet the needs of society.111 
3.57 There are indications that litigants may prefer to rely on the limited remedies of 
well-established causes of action, rather than risk the prolonging of proceedings or 
appeals on uncertain points of law or novel arguments. This is particularly so if the 
monetary compensation for any new cause of action is not likely to be high. 
3.58 However, the dependence on parties to bring their case or assert their defence in 
court is an inherent feature of the system underlying the development of the common 
law.112 It is unlikely that Australian law on privacy will stand still indefinitely, even if 
its precise development cannot yet be predicted. 
                                                                                                                                             
109  Dye v Commonwealth [2010] FCA 720 [290]. However, Katzmann J refused leave to the plaintiff to 
amend her pleadings to include such a claim, on various grounds. 
110  Doe v Yahoo!7 Pty Ltd [2013] QDC 181 (9 August 2013) [310]–[311]. 
111  Goodwin v NGN Ltd [2011] EWHC 1437 (QB) [145] (Tugendhat J). 
112  See Ch 1. 
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Summary 
4.1 This chapter sets out the ALRC’s recommendation that a statutory cause of 
action for serious invasions of privacy should be contained in a new, stand-alone 
Commonwealth Act. 
4.2 Locating the new action in a Commonwealth Act would ensure uniformity and 
consistency in the operation of the cause of action throughout Australia. Uniformity of 
law across Australia was consistently identified by stakeholders as important, 
particularly to avoid the unnecessary costs to business that arise from inconsistent legal 
regimes across the country. 
4.3 In the ALRC’s view, the new cause of action should be set out in a new Act, 
rather than the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth). The Privacy Act largely concerns information 
privacy, while the new cause of action is designed to remedy a number of different 
types of invasions of privacy, including physical invasions of privacy. Further, the 
Privacy Act has a number of exemptions which would not apply to the new action. 
4.4 The ALRC recommends that a statutory cause of action for serious invasions of 
privacy should be a tort to provide increased certainty around various ancillary matters, 
such as vicarious liability. There would also be the benefit of more consistency, since 
the statutory cause of action would operate in concert with existing tort law. 
A new stand-alone Commonwealth Act 
Recommendation 4–1 If a statutory cause of action for serious invasion 
of privacy is to be enacted, it should be enacted by the Commonwealth, in a 
Commonwealth Act (the Act). 
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4.5 This recommendation is about the location of a statutory cause of action in 
Australian law. There are two aspects to this recommendation: that the legislation 
should be enacted by the Commonwealth rather than by the states and territories; and 
that the statutory cause of action should preferably be located in a stand-alone Act, 
rather than the Privacy Act. 
4.6 First, the ALRC considers that if a statutory cause of action is introduced, it 
should be in Commonwealth legislation, as this is the best way to ensure the action is 
available and consistent throughout Australia. Many stakeholders emphasised the need 
for and value of uniformity and consistency of law across Australia.1 
4.7 The Western Australian Attorney-General submitted that co-operative 
Commonwealth and state legislation would be preferable.2 However, it is demonstrably 
difficult to achieve consistency across state and territory legislation,3 and even where 
this has been achieved on certain legal issues, it has taken a very long time.4 
Inconsistent statutory provisions in state and territory legislation would be highly 
confusing, and increase fragmentation and unnecessary complexity in the law. 
Complexity would result in poor protection of privacy generally and have a damaging 
effect on many other activities that are of significant public interest. Inconsistency and 
complexity of legislation substantially increases costs for businesses, particularly those 
operating across state and international boundaries. Difficult questions of jurisdiction 
and applicable law would arise. There would also be a risk of ‘forum shopping’ if the 
details of the cause of action differed between Australian jurisdictions. 
4.8 On the second aspect of the recommendation, the ALRC considers that the 
better course is for the cause of action to be in a stand-alone Act to avoid confusion and 
to enhance clarity.5 The court-ordered remedial regime that would follow invasions of 
privacy under the statutory cause of action would be distinct from the regulatory 
regime which is the essence of the Privacy Act. 
4.9 The essential purposes and scope of the two regimes are different. The Privacy 
Act sets up a regime for the security and privacy of personal information which is 
collected, stored or used by certain entities (often known as ‘data protection’ 
                                                        
1  Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 105; South Australian Law Reform Institute, Submission 
87; Australian Pork Ltd, Submission 83; Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Submission 
66. Australian Pork Ltd also noted that enacting a Commonwealth Act would be quicker than the time 
frame needed for uniform state and territory legislation. 
2  Office of the Western Australian Attorney-General, Submission 25. 
3  This is illustrated by the continuing variation in surveillance devices legislation discussed in Ch 14, but 
also in other regimes such as civil liability legislation. 
4  See, eg, the Uniform Defamation Laws, finally introduced in 2005 after 150 years of inconsistency, and 
decades of discussion on reform. David Rolph, ‘A Critique of the National, Uniform Defamation Laws’ 
(2008) 16 Torts Law Journal 207. 
5  In 2008, the ALRC also expressed this view, stating that ‘there may be significant confusion arising from 
the placement of the cause of action in that Act [the Privacy Act]. For example, whether the exemptions 
under the Privacy Act applied to the cause of action, and the interaction between the cause of action and 
other complaint mechanisms, may be unclear if the Privacy Act were amended to include the cause of 
action’: Australian Law Reform Commission, For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and 
Practice, Report 108 (2008) [74.195]. 
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regulation). The statutory cause of action would relate not only to the privacy of 
information but also to other types of privacy, such as territorial, communications and 
bodily privacy. 
4.10 The Privacy Act sets up a regime to ensure compliance with a number of 
Australian Privacy Principles (APPs). There is a complaints mechanism which may 
lead to compensation being paid for an interference with privacy by an act or practice 
relating to personal information in a manner set out in the Act.6 However, breaches of 
the requirements of the Privacy Act generally lead to regulatory responses by the 
Office of the Australian Information Commissioner (OAIC) including, from March 
2014, the possible imposition of significant civil penalties on the relevant entity.7 By 
contrast, an invasion of privacy that is actionable under the Act would lead only to a 
range of civil remedies sought by and for the benefit of the plaintiff. 
4.11 Importantly, the Privacy Act is limited in its application to certain entities across 
Australia. It does not apply to most individuals,8 or to state agencies. It also includes a 
number of exemptions, such as for small businesses (defined as having an annual 
turnover of less than $3 million) and media and other activities.9 The ALRC 
recommends that there be no limitations or exemptions under the statutory cause of 
action. Subject to jurisdictional limitations, any justification in the public interest or 
defences including lawful authority,10 the new statutory cause of action would apply to 
any person or entity that invades the privacy of a person in the manner and 
circumstances set out in the Act. 
4.12 A number of stakeholders considered that the cause of action, if enacted, should 
be contained in the Privacy Act.11 Dr Normann Witzleb submitted that the cause of 
action is consistent with the objects of the Privacy Act, would make the name of that 
Act more appropriate, and would involve the Privacy Commissioner being given 
additional powers.12 The Media and Communications Committee of the Law Council 
of Australia submitted that, if it were enacted, a statutory cause of action should be in 
the Privacy Act and subject to the existing media exemptions.13 
4.13 On balance, and particularly because it recommends that the statutory cause of 
action should not include the exemptions in the Privacy Act, the ALRC considers that it 
                                                        
6  The existing complaints mechanism is discussed in Ch 15. 
7  These responses are outlined in Ch 3. 
8  As noted in Ch 3, the Privacy Act does apply to some individuals, including individuals who operate 
certain types of businesses and businesses that trade in personal information: see Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) 
ss 6C–6EA. Section 16 provides that the APPs do not apply to personal information that is collected, 
used, held or disclosed by an individual in connection with the individual’s family or household affairs. 
9  Ibid ss 6C(1), 6D (small businesses); s 7B(4) (journalistic acts); and s 7C (political acts). 
10  The defence of lawful authority provides a significant exemption to a wide range of government and other 
agencies. See Ch 11. 
11  N Witzleb, Submission 116; Australian Bankers’ Association, Submission No 72 to DPM&C Issues 
Paper, 2011. 
12  N Witzleb, Submission 116. See, also, Australian Bankers’ Association, Submission No 72 to DPM&C 
Issues Paper, 2011. 
13  Media and Communications Committee of the Law Council of Australia, Submission 124. 
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would be less confusing if the new cause of action were located in a new stand-alone 
Commonwealth Act. It would be appropriate for this Act to be called the Serious 
Invasions of Privacy Act. 
4.14 If, however, an enhanced and broader model of complaints to the Australian 
Privacy Commissioner were to be introduced, as proposed by the OAIC, to provide 
complainants with an alternative to court proceedings in respect of invasions of privacy 
in general, there would be a stronger case for including the statutory cause of action in 
the Privacy Act.14 The OAIC’s proposal for a complaints model is discussed in Chapter 
16. 
Constitutional issues 
Head of power 
4.15 This section examines the scope of the Commonwealth’s power under the 
Australian Constitution to legislate for the new tort. This issue was discussed in the 
ALRC’s report, For Your Information: Privacy Law and Practice (2008).15 The 
constitutional aspects of the ALRC’s recommendations with regard to surveillance and 
harassment legislation are discussed in chapters 14 and 15 respectively. 
4.16 The Commonwealth has the power to make laws with respect to ‘external 
affairs’.16 This power enables the Commonwealth to give effect to its international 
obligations under a bona fide treaty.17 It is open to the legislature to decide the means 
by which it gives effect to those obligations, but those means must be ‘reasonably 
capable of being considered appropriate and adapted to that end’.18 This is a key issue 
in considering the constitutionality of a Commonwealth statute providing a cause of 
action. The ALRC noted in 2008 that the Privacy Act was enacted on the basis of the 
external affairs power and other powers.19 
4.17 Australia is a State Party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR). Australia ratified the ICCPR in 1980. Article 17 provides: 
                                                        
14  ‘If a new cause of action is actionable only in the courts, further consideration should be given as to 
whether the provisions are included in either the Privacy Act or in separate Commonwealth legislation. 
On the one hand, there is benefit in having all federal privacy regulation within the same piece of 
legislation. On the other hand, the Privacy Act largely pertains to the OAIC’s functions, so provisions 
unrelated to the OAIC may be better placed in other legislation’: Office of the Australian Information 
Commissioner, Submission 66. 
15  Australian Law Reform Commission, For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice, 
Report 108 (2008) [3.17]–[3.28]. 
16  Australian Constitution s 51(xxix).  
17  Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983) 158 CLR 1, 130–131, 172, 232, 259 (The Tasmanian Dam case). See, 
also, Richardson v Forestry Commission (1988) 164 CLR 261, 289; 303; Castlemaine Tooheys v SA 
(1990) 169 CLR 436, 473; Victoria v Commonwealth (1996) 187 CLR 416 at 487. The Commonwealth is 
not required to implement all provisions of a treaty.  
18  Victoria v Commonwealth (1996) 187 CLR 416, 487 (Brennan CJ, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh and 
Gummow JJ). 
19  Australian Law Reform Commission, For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice, 
Report 108 (2008) 195–196, referring to the Preamble. See now Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) s 2A: ‘The 
objects of this Act are (h) to implement Australia’s international obligation in relation to privacy.’ 
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(1) No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, 
family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour or 
reputation. 
(2) Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or 
attacks. 
4.18 The ICCPR was ratified by Australia subject to a number of reservations and 
declarations which included, in relation to art 17, the right to ‘enact and administer 
laws which, insofar as they authorise action which impinges on a person’s privacy, 
family, home or correspondence, are necessary in a democratic country in the interests 
of national security, public safety, the economic well-being of the country, the 
protection of public health or morals, or the protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others’.20 Australia withdrew this reservation to art 17 on 6 November 1984. 
4.19 In light of the Commonwealth’s power to implement treaty obligations under s 
51(xxix), it is likely that a law which created a statutory cause of action for serious 
invasions of privacy would be valid on the basis that the law would be reasonably 
capable of being considered appropriate and adapted to fulfilling Australia’s 
obligations under art 17 of the ICCPR. 
4.20 To reflect art 17, the new tort would need to be seen as a measure aimed at 
prohibiting or regulating certain conduct in order to protect privacy. 
4.21 Article 17 is intended to be a general protection against arbitrary or unlawful 
interference with privacy; it is not intended merely to restrict the actions of 
governments. The Human Rights Committee, which is an independent body 
established to supervise the application of the ICCPR,21 in its General Comment 16 on 
art 17, states: 
In the view of the Committee this right is required to be guaranteed against all such 
interferences and attacks whether they emanate from State authorities or from natural 
or legal persons. 
… 
States parties are under a duty themselves not to engage in interferences inconsistent 
with article 17 of the Covenant and to provide the legislative framework prohibiting 
such acts by natural or legal persons.22 
                                                        
20  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 
171 (entered into force 23 March 1976) art 17. 
21  Ibid art 28. 
22  Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 16: Article 17 (The Right to Respect of Privacy, Family, 
Home and Correspondence, and Protection of Honour and Reputation), 35th sess, UN Doc A/43/40 (28 
September 1988) [1], [9]. The views of the Human Rights Committee, while not binding, represent a 
strongly persuasive view of what the international obligation entails. The High Court has been prepared to 
have regard to a range of international law sources in interpreting international obligations, see, eg, R v 
Tang (2008) 237 CLR 1. 
64 Serious Invasions of Privacy in the Digital Era 
4.22 ‘Arbitrary interference’ means interferences that are not reasonable in the 
particular circumstances. General Comment 16 says expressly: 
The introduction of the concept of arbitrariness is intended to guarantee that even 
interference provided for by law should be in accordance with the provisions, aims 
and objectives of the Covenant and should be, in any event, reasonable in the 
particular circumstances.23 
4.23 In its Toonen decision, the Human Rights Committee also said: 
The Committee interprets the requirement of reasonableness to imply that any 
interference with privacy must be proportional to the end sought and be necessary in 
the circumstances of any given case.24 
4.24 The High Court grants some latitude to Parliament in selecting the means by 
which to give effect to a treaty obligation.25 
4.25 It has been suggested that a treaty setting out a ‘broad objective with little 
precise content and permitting widely divergent policies by parties’ may not be 
sufficiently specific to support legislation.26 However, the High Court has recognised 
that international obligations need not be defined with the precision required under 
domestic law, and that ‘absence of precision does not, however, mean any absence of 
international obligation’.27 Moreover, art 17(2) of the ICCPR explicitly provides that 
the protection of law should be afforded to those subject to interference with or attacks 
on their privacy, so that there is not a problem of insufficient specificity. 
4.26 The ALRC considers that the enactment of a statutory cause of action for serious 
invasion of privacy carries the provisions of art 17(2) into effect and satisfies the 
requirement of proportionality. The creation of the action is likely to act as a 
disincentive to engage in invasions of privacy in Australia. Conferring a private right to 
redress will have the effect of protecting persons from interferences with their privacy. 
Further, in addition to according individuals the ‘protection of law’ as required by 
art 17(2), a statutory cause of action could be said to further the fulfilment of 
Australia’s obligation to provide an effective remedy to violations of art 17 as required 
by art 2(3) of the ICCPR. 
4.27 The limited interests protected by the cause of action are generally accepted as 
falling within the notion of ‘privacy’. To aid the courts in interpreting the statutory 
cause of action, it could be made clear in the Act or extrinsic material (such as the 
                                                        
23  R v Tang (2008) 237 CLR 1, [4]. 
24  Human Rights Committee, Communication No. 488/1992, UN Doc CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 (4 April 
1994). 
25  Leslie Zines, The High Court and the Constitution (Butterworths, 4th ed, 1997) 288; Sir Anthony Mason, 
‘The Influence of International Law and Transnational Law on Australian Municipal Law’ (1996) 7 
Public Law Review 20, 24. See, also, Victoria v Commonwealth (1996) 187 CLR 416, 486–487; 
Richardson v Forestry Commission (1988) 164 CLR 261, 289, 296.  
26  Victoria v Commonwealth (1996) 187 CLR 416, 486. 
27  Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983) 158 CLR 1, 242; Victoria v Commonwealth (1996) 187 CLR 416, 
486. 
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Explanatory Memorandum) that Parliament did not intend that the cause of action 
would extend beyond what is encompassed in the notion of ‘privacy’ in art 17. 
4.28 In its 2008 report, the ALRC canvassed other heads of power as a basis for 
legislating on privacy, which may also support aspects of the statutory cause of 
action.28 One of these was the Commonwealth’s power to legislate with respect to 
‘postal, telegraphic, telephonic and other like services’.29 The technology-neutral 
phrase ‘other like services’ demonstrates that the possibility of developments in 
technology was contemplated by drafters when framing s 51(v).30 Radio and television 
broadcasting have been held to be within the Commonwealth’s power under s 51(v).31 
Although the Commonwealth’s power to regulate the internet under this head of power 
is yet to be considered by the High Court, it does not seem controversial that it would 
be a ‘like service’.32 
4.29 The ALRC notes that a number of other powers could be relied upon to provide 
partial support for Commonwealth legislation enacting a statutory cause of action, but 
they would not in total provide the Commonwealth with the full support that the 
external affairs power would provide. The legislation enacting the statutory cause of 
action could, however, include a ‘reading down’ provision, invoking the 
communications power and the following additional heads of power to ensure that the 
legislation is as robust as possible from a constitutional perspective: 
• s 51(xx) of the Constitution, which gives the Parliament the power to make laws 
with respect to ‘foreign corporations, and trading or financial corporations 
formed within the limits of the Commonwealth’; 
• s 122 which confers near plenary power on the Commonwealth to legislate in 
respect of the Territories; 
• ss 51(xiii) and (xiv), the banking and insurance powers, which would enable the 
Commonwealth to legislate to regulate relevant conduct of persons engaging in 
the business of banking or insurance (provided this was not state insurance or 
state banking carried on within the limits of a state); 
• s 51(i), the interstate and overseas trade and commerce power, which would 
enable the Commonwealth to legislate with respect to relevant conduct engaged 
in in the course of interstate or overseas trade or commerce; 
                                                        
28  Australian Law Reform Commission, For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice, 
Report 108 (2008) 196; Australian Constitution s 51(i), (v), (xiii), (xiv), (xx).  
29  Australian Constitution s 51(v).  
30  Grain Pool of Western Australia v Commonwealth (2000) 202 CLR 479, 493. 
31  R v Brislan; Ex parte Williams (1935) 64 CLR 262; Jones v Commonwealth (No 2) [1965] HCA 6 
(3 February 1965).  
32  Helen Roberts, ‘Can the Internet Be Regulated?’ (Research Paper No 35, Parliamentary Library, 
Parliament of Australia, 1996) 25. 
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• the ‘geographically external’ aspect of the external affairs power in s 51(xxix), 
which would permit the Commonwealth to legislate to regulate relevant conduct 
occurring outside Australia (eg the electronic surveillance of a person in 
Australia by a person outside of Australia); and 
• s 51(xxxix), the express incidental power, which would enable the 
Commonwealth to regulate its own conduct and the conduct of bodies 
established by Commonwealth legislation. 
4.30 If the Commonwealth does enact a statutory cause of action, it may expressly or 
impliedly ‘cover the field’ on the subject matter. Any state act which was inconsistent 
with the Commonwealth Act would be inoperative.33 
Constitutional limits 
4.31 The Commonwealth’s power to legislate is subject to both express and implied 
constitutional limitations. 
Implied freedom of political communication 
4.32 The legislative power of the Commonwealth is subject to the implied freedom of 
political communication,34 although the precise scope of the communications protected 
is still a matter of some uncertainty. In assessing whether a law infringes the freedom, 
there are two questions. 
4.33 The first question is, does the law effectively burden freedom of communication 
about government or political matters in its terms, operation or effect? 
4.34 The second question is, if the law effectively burdens that freedom, is the law 
reasonably appropriate and adapted to serve a legitimate end in a manner which is 
compatible with the maintenance of the constitutionally prescribed system of 
representative and responsible government and the procedure prescribed by s 128 of 
the Constitution for submitting a proposed amendment to the Constitution to the 
informed decision of the people?35 
4.35 A law will only infringe the implied freedom if the answer to the first question is 
‘yes’ and the answer to the second question is ‘no’. This test has been affirmed in a 
number of recent decisions of the High Court.36 
                                                        
33  Australian Constitution s 109.  
34  Australian Capital Television v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106; Lange v Australian Broadcasting 
Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520; APLA Ltd v Legal Services Commissioner (NSW) (2005) 224 CLR 
322; Unions NSW v State of New South Wales (2013) 88 ALJR 227. 
35  Wotton v Queensland (2012) 246 CLR 1; Monis v The Queen (2013) 87 ALJR 340; Attorney-General 
(South Australia) v Corporation of the City of Adelaide (2013) 249 CLR 1; Unions NSW v State of New 
South Wales (2013) 88 ALJR 227. 
36  Wotton v Queensland (2012) 246 CLR 1; Monis v The Queen (2013) 87 ALJR 340; Attorney-General for 
South Australia v Corporation of the City of Adelaide [2013] HCA 3; Unions NSW v State of New South 
Wales (2013) 88 ALJR 227. 
 4. A New Tort in a New Commonwealth Act 67 
4.36 The ALRC considers that the recommended statutory cause of action would not 
infringe the implied freedom of political communication. The recommended cause of 
action requires that the court be satisfied that the plaintiff’s interest in privacy 
outweighs the defendant’s interest in freedom of expression and any broader public 
interest, and includes a number of relevant defences such as absolute privilege. It is 
suggested that freedom of expression be specified as including the freedom to discuss 
political matters. It is likely that the cause of action is ‘reasonably appropriate and 
adapted’ to serve a legitimate end, that is, the protection of privacy, in a manner 
compatible with the maintenance of representative and responsible government. 
4.37 However, it may be prudent to include a provision expressly stating that the Act 
does not apply to the extent (if any) that it infringes the implied freedom of political 
communication.37 
Impact on states 
4.38 The ALRC’s 2008 report discussed the Melbourne Corporation principle, as an 
implied limitation on the Commonwealth’s power to legislate. In 2012, the High Court 
expressed the Melbourne Corporation principle as concerned with 
whether impugned legislation is directed at States, imposing some special disability or 
burden on the exercise of powers and fulfilment of functions of the States which 
curtails their capacity to function as governments.38 
4.39 The immunity applies not only to state governments but also to state agencies, 
including state corporations, to the extent that they are carrying out the functions of the 
state.39 
4.40 The ALRC considers that a statutory cause of action, while imposing a burden 
on state governments or agencies, would not curtail the states’ capacity to function as 
governments. This is particularly so in view of the defence of lawful authority, which 
will provide government agencies including law enforcement agencies with protection 
from liability for serious invasions of privacy where that conduct was consistent with 
their statutory powers. The Act would not place any greater burden on a state (or 
states) than on the Commonwealth itself.40 
An action in tort 
Recommendation 4–2 The cause of action should be described in the Act 
as an action in tort. 
                                                        
37  The use of constitutional terms in this way has sometimes been criticised, but was recently upheld in 
Wurridjal v Commonwealth (2008) 237 CLR 309. 
38  Fortescue Metals Group Ltd v Commonwealth (2012) 247 CLR 486, [130] (Hayne, Bell and Keane JJ). 
French CJ, Crennan and Kiefel JJ agreed with the joint reasons on this issue in separate judgments: [6], 
[145], [229]. See, also, Austin v Commonwealth (2003) 215 CLR 185. 
39  Queensland Electricity Commission v Commonwealth (1985) 159 CLR 192, 218. 
40  Austin v Commonwealth (2003) 215 CLR 185; Clarke v Commissioner of Taxation (2009) 240 CLR 272. 
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4.41 There are a number of reasons for the ALRC’s recommendation that the new 
cause of action should be specifically described as an action in tort. 
4.42 First, and most importantly, describing the statutory cause of action as a tort 
action will provide certainty, and prevent disputes arising, about a number of ancillary 
issues that will inevitably arise. Courts frequently have to decide whether a particular 
statute gives rise to an action in tort for the purpose of determining whether other 
consequences follow at common law or under other statutes.41 This would also be the 
case if a new statutory cause of action were enacted.42 For example: 
• At common law, an employer is vicariously liable where an employee has 
injured a third party by a tort committed in the course of employment.43 It may 
be relevant to decide whether an employer is vicariously liable to the plaintiff, in 
addition to an employee, where the employee is liable under the statutory cause 
of action. 
• At common law, the applicable law for intra-Australian and international torts 
depends on the place where the tort was committed.44 
• Many legislative provisions refer to liability in tort. For example, some 
Australian jurisdictions impose an obligation on an employer to indemnify an 
employee in respect of ‘liability incurred by the employee for the tort’ to a third 
party where the tort occurred in the course of employment.45 Statutory 
contribution rights may apply only to ‘tortfeasors’.46 
                                                        
41  Commissioner of Police v Estate of John Edward Russell (2002) 55 NSWLR 232, [62]–[78] (Spigelman 
CJ); Hampic Pty Ltd v Adams [1999] NSWCA 455 [61]. See also Vidal-Hall v Google Inc [2014] EWHC 
13 (QB) (16 January 2014); cf Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No 3) [2006] QB 125 [96]. 
42  The Australian Bankers’ Association was the only stakeholder who raised concerns with this proposal, 
citing concerns about overlapping causes of action: Australian Bankers’ Association, Submission 84. The 
ALRC notes, however, that it is commonplace for a person to have more than one cause of action and the 
courts are alive to the risk of double compensation. Doctrines such as issue estoppel and Anshun estoppel 
prevent undesirable duplication of litigation. Several stakeholders, including PIAC, agreed with the 
proposal but most did not comment: Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 105. 
43  Lewis Klar, ‘Vicarious Liability’ in Carolyn Sappideen and Prue Vines (eds), Fleming’s The Law of Torts 
(Lawbook Co, 10th ed, 2011) ch 19. 
44  John Pfeiffer Pty Ltd v Rogerson (2000) 203 CLR 503; Regie Nationale des Usines Renault SA v Zhang 
(2002) 210 CLR 491. It is not always an easy task to determine the place of the tort: M Davies, AS Bell 
and PLG Brereton, Nygh’s Conflict of Laws in Australia (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2010) 425. Professor 
Dan Svanntesson submitted that the ALRC in its Discussion Paper, while correctly stating the law, 
understated the complexity of the application of private international rules which ‘will be far from a 
mechanical task even when the action is classed as a tort’ and that it would be better to clarify the 
application of private international law rules to specific types of privacy violation that may attract liability 
under the tort, rather than leaving these matters in limbo: D Svantesson, Submission 70. However, given 
the wide range of possible factual situations, the ALRC doubts that such a task is feasible for any 
legislator and in any event such an attempt may quickly become outdated by changes in technology. 
Further, leaving the application of the general rules to the courts is more likely to lead to consistency 
when there are different causes of action arising out of the same conduct. 
45  Employees Liability Act 1991 (NSW) s 3; Law Reform (Contributory Negligence and Apportionment of 
Liability) Act 2001 (SA) s 6(9)(c); Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1956 (NT) s 22A. 
46  See, eg, Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1946 (NSW) s 5. 
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4.43 Describing the action as a tort action will therefore avoid many consequential 
questions arising once primary liability is established. The cause of action will be more 
fully integrated into existing laws than if it were simply described as a cause of action. 
This will also avoid the need for numerous specific provisions dealing with these 
ancillary issues, adding undesirable length to the legislation.47 
4.44 Secondly, classifying a civil action for redress which leads to monetary 
compensation as a tort is consistent with accepted legal classifications. Defining what 
is a tort precisely, exhaustively and exclusively is a surprisingly difficult task. Leading 
texts tend to answer the question in relatively general terms. Fleming’s The Law of 
Torts, for example, defines a tort as ‘an injury other than a breach of contract, which 
the law will redress with damages’, but then goes on to say that ‘this definition is far 
from informative’.48 Torts may be created by common law or statute.49 
4.45 Definitions of ‘tort’ often contain two key features. First, a tort is a civil (as 
opposed to a criminal) wrong, which the law redresses by an award of damages. 
Secondly, the wrong consists of a breach of an obligation, often in negative terms such 
as not to harm or interfere with the plaintiff, imposed by law (rather than by 
agreement). But neither of those factors is exclusive to tort law and neither is always 
borne out, as most texts go on to discuss. 
4.46 Nevertheless, liability for conduct invading the privacy of another is analogous 
to, and will often co-exist with, other torts protecting people from interferences with 
fundamental rights. Situating the cause of action within tort law will allow the 
application of common law principles settled in analogous tort claims, particularly in 
relation to fault, defences and the award of damages and assessment of remedies, 
where these matters are not set out in the Act. This will enhance the coherence and 
consistency of the law. 
4.47 Thirdly, the nomenclature of tort is consistent with developments in comparable 
jurisdictions and would allow Australian courts to draw on analogous case law from 
other jurisdictions, thus reducing uncertainty and complexity. The four Canadian 
provinces which have enacted legislation for invasions of privacy describe the relevant 
conduct as ‘a tort’.50 The New Zealand courts have recognised new causes of action in 
                                                        
47  However, as seen below, special provision is made with respect to the limitation period and defences. It 
may also be preferable to make specific provision for vicarious liability to avoid the kind of dispute that 
arose in New South Wales v Bryant [2005] NSWCA 393 and Canterbury Bankstown Rugby League 
Football Club Ltd v Rogers (1993) Aust Torts Reps 81-246, deriving in part from the conflicting views of 
Kitto J and Fullagar J in Darling Island Stevedoring and Lighterage Co Ltd v Long (1957) 97 CLR 36 as 
to whether an employer is vicariously liable for the acts or the torts of an employee. 
48  Prue Vines, ‘Introduction’ in Carolyn Sappideen and Prue Vines (eds), Fleming’s The Law of Torts 
(Lawbook Co, 10th ed, 2011) 3. 
49  ‘Indeed, the only answer [to the question “What is a Tort?”] may be to say that a compensation right is of 
a tortious character if it is generally regarded as tortious … the phrasing of the statute is likely to play a 
large part in the classification of rights’: Keith Stanton et al, Statutory Torts (Sweet & Maxwell, 2003) 6. 
50  Privacy Act, RSBC 1996, c 373 (British Columbia); Privacy Act, CCSM 1996, c P125 (Manitoba); 
Privacy Act, RSS 1978, c P-24 (Saskatchewan); Privacy Act, RSNL 1990, c P-22 (Newfoundland and 
Labrador). 
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tort to protect privacy.51 While developments in the United Kingdom derive from the 
extension of the equitable action for breach of confidence under the influence of the 
Human Rights Act 1998 (UK), the misuse of private information giving rise to the 
extended or new cause of action in the United Kingdom is increasingly referred to as a 
‘tort’.52 While Australian courts may not be prepared to take the same leap in 
classification as may have occurred in the United Kingdom, the legislature is not so 
constrained. 
4.48 Fourthly, describing the action as a tort action will clarify and highlight the 
distinctions between the statutory cause of action for serious invasion of privacy and 
existing regulatory regimes, such as those under the Privacy Act and the Broadcasting 
Services Act 1992 (Cth). 
4.49 Fifthly, describing the statutory cause of action as a tort action will clearly 
differentiate it from the equitable and contractual actions for breach of confidence. 
These will continue to exist and develop to protect confidential information against the 
contracting party or confidant and against a third party who has the requisite 
knowledge that the material is confidential.53 
4.50 Lastly, there is no reason why the tort nomenclature should constrain the 
legislature from making specific provision for remedies not generally available in tort 
at common law—for example, ordering an apology or an account of profits; limiting 
remedies usually available in tort; or capping the amounts of certain types of damages. 
4.51 In 2009, the New South Wales Law Reform Commission (NSWLRC) 
recommended against identifying the statutory cause of action as an action in tort, or 
leaving the courts to construe the action as one in tort. It gave two reasons. First, tort 
actions do not generally require courts to engage in the sort of overt balancing of 
interests involved in the statutory cause of action.54 In the ALRC’s view this point 
                                                        
51  Hosking v Runting (2005) 1 NZLR 1; C v Holland [2012] 3 NZLR 672. 
52  Vidal-Hall v Google Inc [2014] EWHC 13 (QB) (16 January 2014) [50]–[75]. Many commentators now 
use this nomenclature: eg, Richard Clayton and Hugh Tomlinson, ‘The Human Rights Act and Its Impact 
on the Law of Tort’ in TT Arvind and Jenny Steele (eds), Tort Law and the Legislature: Common Law, 
Statute, and the Dynamics of Change (Hart Publishing, 2012) 466–467. However, precisely when and 
how this change from an extended equitable action for breach of confidence to a tort of misuse of private 
information happened has not been pinpointed. Some judicial statements simply ignore the difference: eg, 
Lord Neuberger MR in Tchenguiz v Imerman (Rev 4) [2010] EWCA Civ 908 [65]: ‘following … 
Campbell, there is now a tort of misuse of private information': as Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers MR 
put it in Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No 3) [2006] QB 125. Cf Coogan v News Group Newspapers Ltd  [2012] 
EWCA Civ 48; [2012] 2 WLR 848 [48] where he said: ‘it is probably fair to say that the extent to which 
privacy is to be accommodated within the law of confidence as opposed to the law of tort is still in the 
process of being worked out’. Possibly, such detail is of less concern to English courts than it would be to 
Australian courts, where a stricter approach to the classification of legal wrongs is evident: Farah 
Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd (2007) 230 CLR 89; Bofinger v Kingsway Group Ltd (2009) 239 
CLR 269. 
53  Attorney General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No 2) (1990) 1 AC 109; Australian Broadcasting 
Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 199, 224–225; Vestergaard Frandsen A/S v 
Bestnet Europe Ltd [2013] 1 WLR 1556; AMI Australia Holdings Pty Ltd v John Fairfax Publications Pty 
Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1395.  
54  NSW Law Reform Commission, Invasion of Privacy, Report 120 (2009) [5.55]. 
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seems to overlook or downplay the balancing that is required in some existing tort 
actions, such as in private nuisance, in which courts balance the interests of the 
plaintiff with those of the defendant in their respective use of their land.55 
4.52 Secondly, the NSWLRC said that describing the cause of action as a tort would 
require the legislation to specify whether the cause of action requires fault on the 
defendant’s part. Further, if it did require fault, what kind of fault, and whether it 
requires proof of harm or is actionable per se. The NSWLRC considered that the issue 
of fault was ‘appropriately left to development in case law’ and that it was unnecessary 
to specify whether the action is maintainable only on proof of damage.56 The Victorian 
Law Reform Commission (VLRC) agreed with this approach, adding that ‘there is little 
to be gained—and many complex rules of law to be navigated—if any new cause of 
action is characterised as a tort’.57 Examples given were rules as to fault, damage, 
remedies and vicarious liability. 
4.53 The ALRC considers that it is highly desirable, if not essential, that the 
legislator should determine whether or not the cause of action requires proof of a 
certain type of fault and harm. To leave such key elements of a statutory cause of 
action to be decided by the courts would be highly problematic. An absence of 
specificity would increase uncertainty as to the statute’s application. This has been a 
key concern of stakeholders in relation to previous proposals for a statutory cause of 
action.58 People need to have some guidance in advance as to when their activities 
might be judged to be an actionable invasion of privacy leading to civil liability. 
Similarly, potential plaintiffs need guidance as to whether they could prove an 
actionable invasion of their privacy. The comments by the European Court of Human 
Rights in 1966 on the law of the United Kingdom in a different context are apposite: 
The relevant national law must be formulated with sufficient precision to enable the 
persons concerned—if need be with appropriate legal advice—to foresee, to a degree 
that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may 
entail.59 
4.54 If no element of fault is included, it would be open for a court to determine that 
strict liability was intended or imposed, as for example under ss 18 and 237 of the 
Australian Consumer Law.60 The ALRC considers that strict liability, or negligence 
based liability, would be oppressive or undesirable.61 Certainty is also desirable in 
relation to the issue of damage or actionability per se. Questions will undoubtedly arise 
as to other ancillary issues on liability. The ALRC recommends the integration of the 
                                                        
55  See Ch 9.  
56  NSW Law Reform Commission, Invasion of Privacy, Report 120 (2009) [5.56]–[5.57]. 
57  Victorian Law Reform Commission, Surveillance in Public Places, Report 18 (2010) [7.134]. 
58  Free TV, Submission 55; The Newspaper Works, Submission 50; ASTRA, Submission 47; Telstra, 
Submission 45; Australian Bankers’ Association, Submission 27. 
59  Goodwin v United Kingdom (1996) 22 EHRR 123, 140. See, also, David Eady, ‘Injunctions and the 
Protection of Privacy’ (2010) 29 Civil Justice Quarterly 411, 418. 
60  Neither of which include any fault requirements for liability: Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) 
sch 2. 
61  See Ch 7. 
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statutory action into the existing legislative and common law framework of tort law. 
This approach is preferable to the establishment of an entirely separate legislative 
framework,62 or to leaving these issues open and therefore uncertain in key respects. 
Abolition of common law actions 
4.55 The Terms of Reference ask whether, in the event that the statutory action were 
enacted, any common law actions should be abolished. Such a provision may be 
unnecessary, depending on common law developments at the time of enactment. 
4.56 There is no case for abolishing the equitable action for breach of confidence in 
its entirety, as it protects ‘confidential’ information whether or not it is also private in 
nature. 
4.57 The NSWLRC recommended the enactment of the following provision: 
To the extent that the general law recognises a specific tort for the invasion or 
violation of a person’s privacy, that tort is abolished.63 
4.58 To capture possible tort and equitable developments at common law, the Act 
might provide that to the extent that the general law recognises a specific cause of 
action for the invasion of a person’s privacy, that cause of action is abolished. 
 
 
                                                        
62  This is the approach in, for example, the Australian Consumer Law, in respect of liability for misleading 
or deceptive conduct. 
63  NSW Law Reform Commission, Invasion of Privacy, Report 120 (2009) NSWLRC Draft Bill, cl 80(1). 
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Summary 
5.1 The ALRC recommends that for an action under the new tort, a plaintiff must 
prove that their privacy was invaded in one of the following ways: 
 (a)  intrusion upon seclusion; or 
 (b)  misuse of private information. 
5.2 Intrusion upon seclusion will usually involve watching, listening to, or recording 
someone’s private activities or private affairs. It can also involve unwanted physical 
intrusion into someone’s private space. Examples might include taking a photo of 
someone in a change room, reading their bank statements, tapping their phone calls, or 
hacking into their computer. 
5.3 Misuse of private information will usually involve collecting or disclosing 
someone’s private information. Examples might include publishing a person’s medical 
records in a newspaper or posting sexually explicit photographs of someone on the 
internet, without their permission. 
5.4 These two categories of invasion of privacy are widely considered to be the core 
of a right to privacy—and the chief mischief that needs to be addressed by a new cause 
of action. 
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5.5 The two types of invasion may sometimes overlap: taking a photo of a person in 
the bathroom may be both an intrusion into their seclusion, as well as a wrongful 
collection of private information. Perhaps more often, a misuse of private information 
will follow an intrusion upon seclusion: a photo will be wrongly published, after it was 
wrongly taken. 
5.6 Confining the tort to these two types of invasion of privacy will make the scope 
of the tort more certain and predictable. Invasions of privacy that do not fall into one of 
these two categories of invasion will not be actionable under this statutory tort. 
5.7 This first element of the tort cannot be considered in isolation, because much 
turns on the question of what is ‘private’. To determine what is private in a particular 
case, the second element of the tort must be considered, namely, whether a person in 
the position of the plaintiff would have a reasonable expectation of privacy. This is 
discussed in Chapter 6. 
5.8 In other chapters of this Report, the ALRC recommends that the invasion of 
privacy must be committed intentionally or recklessly, must be found to be serious, and 
must not be justified by broader public interest considerations, such as freedom of 
speech. 
A cause of action for two types of invasion of privacy 
Recommendation 5–1 The Act should provide that the plaintiff must 
prove that his or her privacy was invaded in one of the following ways: 
(a) intrusion upon seclusion, such as by physically intruding into the 
plaintiff’s private space or by watching, listening to or recording the 
plaintiff’s private activities or private affairs; or 
(b) misuse of private information, such as by collecting or disclosing private 
information about the plaintiff. 
5.9 Unwanted access to private information and unwanted access to one’s body or 
personal space have been called the ‘two core components of the right to privacy’.1 
Most examples of invasions of privacy given to support the introduction of a new cause 
of action, and most cases outside Australia relating to invasions of privacy, relate either 
to an intrusion upon seclusion or a misuse of private information. 
5.10 To provide clarity, certainty and guidance about the purpose and scope of the 
new action, the ALRC recommends that the action be explicitly confined to these two 
                                                        
1  M Warby et al, Tugendhat and Christie: The Law of Privacy and The Media (OUP Oxford, 2011) [2.07], 
cited with approval in Goodwin v NGN [2011] EWHC 1437 (QB) (09 June 2011) [85]. See also Michael 
Tilbury, ‘Coherence, Non-Pecuniary Loss and the Construction of Privacy’ in Jeffrey Berryman and Rick 
Bigwood (eds), The Law of Remedies: New Directions in the Common Law (Irwin Law, 2010) 127. 
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types of invasion of privacy.2 This means that invasions of privacy that do not fall into 
one of these two categories will not be actionable under the new tort.3 This should help 
address the common concern among some stakeholders that a new tort might be 
uncertain.4 
5.11 The two categories of invasion of privacy recommended above draw on the 
well-known categorisation of privacy torts in the United States (US), first set out by 
William Prosser in 1960, and followed in the US Restatement of the Law (Second) of 
Torts.5 Prosser wrote that the law of privacy 
comprises four distinct kinds of invasion of four different interests of the plaintiff, 
which are tied together by the common name, but otherwise have almost nothing in 
common except that each represents an interference with the right of the plaintiff, in 
the phrase coined by Judge Cooley, ‘to be let alone’. Without any attempt to exact 
definition, these four torts may be described as follows: 
1. Intrusion upon the plaintiff’s seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs. 
2. Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff. 
3. Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye. 
4. Appropriation, for the defendant’s advantage, of the plaintiff’s name or likeness.6 
5.12 Prosser’s taxonomy focused on tort law, but there are other more general 
privacy taxonomies. US scholar Daniel Solove looked more broadly at ‘the different 
kinds of activities that impinge upon privacy’ and discovered ‘four basic groups of 
harmful activities’, each of which ‘consists of different related subgroups of harmful 
activities’: 
(1)  Information collection: surveillance, interrogation; 
(2)  Information processing: aggregation, identification, insecurity, secondary use, 
exclusion; 
(3)  Information dissemination: breach of confidentiality, disclosure, exposure, 
increased accessibility, blackmail, appropriation, distortion; 
(4)  Invasion: intrusion, decisional interference.7 
5.13 Solove’s taxonomy highlights that many harmful activities may be characterised 
as invasions of privacy. A general legal action for invasion of privacy would therefore 
seem to be too broad and imprecise.8 Gleeson CJ said in ABC v Lenah Game Meats 
                                                        
2  This is similar to the approach recommended by the Victorian Law Reform Commission (VLRC). As 
discussed further below, the VLRC recommended two separate causes of action, though with very similar 
elements: one for intrusion upon seclusion and the other for misuse of private information. 
3  As discussed below, such conduct may be actionable under other causes of action, such as defamation. 
4  That privacy laws should be clear and certain is one of the ALRC’s guiding principles: see Ch 3. 
5  American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law Second, Torts (1977) § 652A. Professor Prosser was one 
of the reporters. 
6  William L Prosser, ‘Privacy’ (1960) 48 California Law Review 383, 389. 
7  Daniel J Solove, ‘A Taxonomy of Privacy’ (2006) 154 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 477. 
8  This is discussed later in this chapter. 
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that ‘the lack of precision of the concept of privacy is a reason for caution in declaring 
a new tort of the kind for which the respondent contends’.9 
5.14 Dr Nicole Moreham has identified two ‘overarching categories’ covering six 
different ways of breaching privacy.10 The first overarching category is unwanted 
watching, listening, recording and disseminating of recordings—namely, intrusion. The 
second is obtaining, keeping and disseminating private information—which ‘have at 
their heart the misuse of private information’.11 
5.15 The ALRC recommends that, in Australia, a new privacy tort should be confined 
to two broad categories of invasion of privacy, similar to the first two of Prosser’s four 
categories and similar to Moreham’s two overarching categories: (1) intrusion upon 
seclusion; and (2) misuse of private information. In ABC v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd, 
Gummow and Hayne JJ said that ‘the disclosure of private facts and unreasonable 
intrusion upon seclusion, perhaps come closest to reflecting a concern for privacy “as a 
legal principle drawn from the fundamental value of personal autonomy”’.12 These two 
types of invasion of privacy are discussed further below. 
5.16 It should be noted that this element of the tort cannot be satisfied without 
considering the second element of the tort, recommended in Chapter 6: whether a 
person in the position of the plaintiff would have a reasonable expectation of privacy, 
in all of the circumstances. The two elements will need to be considered together. In 
determining whether this element is satisfied, courts will usually consider whether 
there has been an intrusion into the private space, private activities or private affairs of 
the plaintiff, or a misuse of private information. The question of what is private in a 
particular case should be determined by asking whether a person in the position of the 
plaintiff would have had a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
Intrusion upon seclusion 
5.17 Intrusion upon seclusion is one of the two most commonly recognised categories 
of invasion of privacy. It is essential that the new tort for serious invasions of privacy 
capture this type of conduct. 
5.18 Intrusions upon seclusion usually refer to intrusions into a person’s physical 
private space. Watching, listening to and recording another person’s private activities 
are the clearest and most common examples of intrusion upon seclusion. They are the 
types of activities the ALRC intends should be captured by this limb of the tort. To 
make this clear, the ALRC recommends that these types of intrusion be specifically 
included in the Act, as examples of intrusion upon seclusion. The examples are 
intended to clarify, but not limit, the meaning of ‘intrusion upon seclusion’. 
                                                        
9  Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 199, [41]. 
10  Nicole Moreham, ‘Beyond Information: The Protection of Physical Privacy in English Law’ (2014) 73(2) 
Cambridge Law Journal (forthcoming). 
11  Ibid. 
12  Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 199, 251 (Gummow 
and Hayne JJ), quoting Sedley LJ in Douglas v Hello! [2001] 2 WLR 992, 1025.  
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5.19 Intrusion upon seclusion aligns with Moreham’s second overarching category of 
invasion of privacy. Moreham writes: 
Peering through a person’s bedroom window, following her around, bugging her 
home or telephone calls, or surreptitiously taking for one’s own purposes an intimate 
photograph or video recording are all examples of this kind of intrusion.13 
5.20 Although watching and listening to private activity may be an invasion of 
privacy, it might often not be serious. Recording a private activity is clearly less 
justifiable, and more likely to be a serious invasion of privacy. This is partly because 
the recording may later be distributed, although this may be considered a separate 
wrong. If the recording is not distributed, or shown to anyone else, it may nevertheless 
be watched or listened to later by the person who made the recording. 
5.21 It is important not to look at these elements in isolation. To have an action, the 
plaintiff must also have a reasonable expectation of privacy, the intrusion must have 
been both intentional or reckless and serious, and the intrusion must not be in the 
public interest. 
5.22 In many cases there is no legal redress in Australia for intrusions upon seclusion, 
because of the limitations of other tort actions.14 The tort of intrusion upon seclusion, 
Prosser wrote in 1960 concerning US law, ‘has been useful chiefly to fill in the gaps 
left by trespass, nuisance, the intentional infliction of mental distress, and whatever 
remedies there may be for the invasion of constitutional rights’.15 These gaps in 
privacy protection remain in Australia today. The Office of the Victorian Privacy 
Commissioner submitted that a large number of individuals contact its office seeking 
redress for interferences with spatial or physical privacy, ‘for which there is currently 
no readily accessible remedy in Australian law’: 
Increasingly, people are becoming concerned about intrusions into their spatial 
privacy, particularly given the rise in surveillance technologies. The Privacy 
Commission receives hundreds of complaints each year relating to spatial privacy. In 
many cases (eg, in situations where surveillance is conducted by an individual or 
small business, or where information is not recorded) such intrusions will not be 
covered by current information privacy laws.16 
Intrusion in the United States 
5.23 Prosser cited a number of US cases involving intrusion upon seclusion, 
including cases in which the defendant intruded into someone’s home, hotel room and 
‘stateroom on a steamboat’, and upon a woman in childbirth. The principle was ‘soon 
carried beyond such physical intrusion’ and ‘extended to eavesdropping upon private 
conversations by means of wire tapping and microphones’ and to ‘peering into the 
windows of a home’.17 Prosser cited a case in which a creditor ‘hounded the debtor for 
a considerable length of time with telephone calls at his home and his place of 
                                                        
13  Moreham, above n 11, 1. 
14  See Ch 3. 
15  Prosser, above n 7, 392. 
16  Office of the Victorian Privacy Commissioner, Submission 108. 
17  Prosser, above n 7, 389–92; Jones v Tsige (2012) ONCA 32. 
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employment’ and another case of ‘unauthorized prying into the plaintiff’s bank 
account’.18 
5.24 Section 652B of the US Restatement of the Law Second, Torts concerns 
intrusion upon seclusion, and states: 
One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or 
seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the 
other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a 
reasonable person. 
5.25 The accompanying commentary in the Restatement reads: 
a. The form of invasion of privacy covered by this Section does not depend upon any 
publicity given to the person whose interest is invaded or to his affairs. It consists 
solely of an intentional interference with his interest in solitude or seclusion, either as 
to his person or as to his private affairs or concerns, of a kind that would be highly 
offensive to a reasonable man. 
b. The invasion may be by physical intrusion into a place in which the plaintiff has 
secluded himself, as when the defendant forces his way into the plaintiff’s room in a 
hotel or insists over the plaintiff’s objection in entering his home. It may also be by 
the use of the defendant’s senses, with or without mechanical aids, to oversee or 
overhear the plaintiff’s private affairs, as by looking into his upstairs windows with 
binoculars or tapping his telephone wires. It may be by some other form of 
investigation or examination into his private concerns, as by opening his private and 
personal mail, searching his safe or his wallet, examining his private bank account, or 
compelling him by a forged court order to permit an inspection of his personal 
documents. The intrusion itself makes the defendant subject to liability, even though 
there is no publication or other use of any kind of the photograph or information 
outlined.19 
5.26 The US tort of intrusion has been said to focus on ‘the means of obtaining 
private information rather than on the publication of the information so gained. The 
core of the tort is the offensive prying into the private domain of another.’20 
Intrusion in the United Kingdom 
5.27 The tort of invasion of privacy by intrusion upon seclusion is less clearly 
recognised in the United Kingdom (UK), but this appears to be changing.21 Professor 
Chris Hunt has noted a recent trend in cases suggesting ‘English law is evolving to 
capture intrusions’.22 After journalists intruded into the hospital room of the actor 
Gordon Kaye and took photos of the injured man, the English Court of Appeal in 1990 
held that he had no right to privacy as such in English law. And in 2004, the House of 
Lords in Wainwright v Home Office23 ‘expressly declined to recognize a general right 
                                                        
18  Prosser, above n 7, 389–92. 
19  American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law Second, Torts (1977) § 652B. 
20  Warby et al, above n 2, [3.68]. 
21  ‘Unlike US law, there is, as yet, no general tort of intrusion recognised by English law’: Raymond Wacks, 
Privacy and Media Freedom (Oxford University Press, 2013) 186. 
22  Chris Hunt, ‘Refining Privacy in Tort Law by Patrick O’Callahan’ (2014) 73 Cambridge Law Journal 
178. 
23  Wainwright v Home Office [2004] 2 AC 406. 
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to privacy which would extend to physical privacy interferences not involving the 
dissemination of information’.24 But in a book review published in 2014, Hunt writes 
that it ‘seems inevitable that English courts would in fact provide a remedy to a 
claimant in Kaye’s situation if the case were decided today’.25 
5.28 Discussing the ‘curious’ resistance of the English courts to recognise a cause of 
action for intrusion, Professor Raymond Wacks writes that, nevertheless, 
there are a number of obiter dicta that imply that the clandestine recordings of private 
matters does ‘engage’ Article 8 [of the European Convention on Human Rights], that 
the mere taking of a photograph of a child or an adult in a public place might fall 
within the category of ‘misuse’. These pronouncements are either (uncharacteristic) 
judicial lapses or subtle, possibly even subconscious, acknowledgements of the 
present anomaly!26 
5.29 UK courts have recognised the potential for intrusions to invade privacy and 
cause harm. The majority of the House of Lords in Campbell v MGN Ltd emphasised 
that the covert way in which private information about the model Naomi Campbell, 
later published, was obtained in that case, heightened the invasion of Campbell’s 
privacy. Lord Hoffmann said: ‘the publication of a photograph taken by intrusion into a 
private place (for example, by a long distance lens) may in itself be such an 
infringement [of the privacy of the personal information], even if there is nothing 
embarrassing about the picture itself’.27 Similarly, in Murray v Express Newspapers, 
Sir Anthony Clarke MR said that, ‘“the nature and purpose of the intrusion” is one of 
the factors which will determine whether the claimant had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy’.28 
5.30 Further, in a number of recent cases, the English and European courts have 
begun to emphasise the intrusive aspects of the conduct under consideration, not only 
in the way the private information was collected,29 but also in the effect the publication 
will have on the claimant’s and related parties’ lives after publication.30 Intrusive 
behaviour by the UK media led to the Leveson Inquiry into the Culture, Practice and 
Ethics of the Press.31 
5.31 It remains to be seen whether a separate cause of action for intrusion upon 
seclusion will be recognised at common law in the UK.32 The authors of Gurry on 
Breach of Confidence note that the case for recognising a separate tort of privacy, as 
                                                        
24  Warby et al, above n 2, [10.04]. 
25  Hunt, above n 23. 
26  Wacks, above n 22, 247 (citations omitted). 
27  Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457, [75]. 
28  Murray v Big Pictures (UK) Ltd [2009] Ch 481, [36]. See, also, Warby et al, above n 2, [10.06]. 
29  See, further, Moreham, above n 11; Tsinguiz v Imerman [2010] EWCA Civ 908 in which it was held that 
misuse of confidential information for the equitable cause of action may include intentional observation 
and acquisition of the information.  
30  Goodwin v NGN Ltd [2011] EWHC 1437 (QB); Mosley v United Kingdom [2011] ECHR 774; A v United 
Kingdom [2002] ECHR 811; [2003] EHRR 51. 
31  See, further, The Leveson Inquiry <www.levesoninquiry.org.uk>.  
32  See, further, Moreham, above n 11. 
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opposed to an extended equitable action for disclosure of private information, will be 
stronger if the courts seek to protect against intrusions into private life as well.33 
5.32 In any event, any gap in the UK law may not be as concerning as it is in 
Australia, because the UK has a Protection from Harassment Act 1997 (UK), which 
provides some legislative protection against invasions of privacy by intrusion into 
seclusion.34 
Intrusions in New Zealand 
5.33 A New Zealand court has recognised a tort of intrusion upon seclusion, in a case 
about a man who installed a recording device in a bathroom to record his female 
flatmate showering. In this case, C v Holland, Whata J said that the ‘critical issue I 
must determine is whether an invasion of privacy of this type, without publicity or the 
prospect of publicity, is an actionable tort in New Zealand’.35 The court concluded that 
it was. An intrusion tort was a ‘logical extension or adjunct’ to the tort for misuse of 
private information.36 Whata J said that the court ‘can apply, develop and modify the 
tort to meet the exigencies of the time’.37 
5.34 In defining the ingredients of the tort, Whata J drew guidance from the decision 
of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Jones v Tsige,38 which had recognised a tort of 
intrusion into seclusion. Whata J stated: 
I consider that the most appropriate course is to maintain as much consistency as 
possible with the North American tort given the guidance afforded from existing 
authority. I also consider that the content of the tort must be consistent with domestic 
privacy law and principles. On that basis, in order to establish a claim based on the 
tort of intrusion upon seclusion a plaintiff must show: 
(a) An intentional and unauthorised intrusion; 
(b) Into seclusion (namely intimate personal activity, space or affairs); 
(c) Involving infringement of a reasonable expectation of privacy; 
(d) That is highly offensive to a reasonable person.39 
5.35 This closely resembles the tort recommended in this Report. Including intrusion 
upon seclusion as one of the two types of actionable invasion of privacy in the new tort 
would remedy one of the key deficiencies in Australian law identified in Chapter 3. 
                                                        
33  Tanya Aplin et al, Gurry on Breach of Confidence (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2012) [7.102]. 
34  In Ch 15, the ALRC recommends the introduction of a statutory tort of harassment, in the event that the 
privacy tort is not introduced. 
35  C v Holland 3 NZLR 672, [1]. 
36  Ibid [86]. 
37  Ibid. 
38  Jones v Tsige (2012) ONCA 32. In this case, the defendant, who was in a relationship with the claimant’s 
former husband, and who worked for the same bank as the claimant in different branches, used her 
workplace computer to gain access to the claimant’s private banking records 174 times. Again there was 
no publication. 
39  C v Holland 3 NZLR 672, [94]–[95] (Whata J). 
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Misuse of private information 
5.36 The second type of invasion of privacy that the ALRC recommends should be 
covered by the new privacy tort is misuse of private information. This should be 
neither surprising nor contentious. Misuse of private information is a widely 
recognised type of invasion of privacy, already actionable in the UK, the US, New 
Zealand, Canada and elsewhere. No stakeholder suggested that if a new privacy tort 
were enacted in Australia, it should not cover misuse of private information. 
5.37 Most cases involving private information are concerned with unauthorised 
disclosure. Lord Hoffmann has identified ‘the right to control the dissemination of 
information about one’s private life’ as central to a person’s privacy and autonomy.40 
But there are other ways of misusing private information, including wrongfully 
obtaining it. The ALRC recommends that the Act include the two most common types 
of misuse of private information as illustrative examples: collecting or disclosing 
private information. 
5.38 This corresponds to the second of Moreham’s two overarching categories of 
invasion of privacy, under which Moreham found three sub-categories of invasion. It 
was a breach of privacy to: 
(1) ‘find out things about others that they wish to keep to themselves, by acquiring  
bank records, reading diaries, or hacking e-mails, for instance’; 
(2) ‘keep that private information either for one’s own future reference or to share it 
with others’; and 
(3) disclose private information to another, for example ‘by uploading it onto the 
internet, disseminating it in the media or passing it on through gossip’.41 
5.39 ‘The objection in these cases,’ Moreham writes, ‘is to the fact that someone is 
finding out about you against your wishes. She is reading your private records, building 
up a file or dossier about you or, by disseminating private information, allowing others 
to do the same’.42 
Misuse in other jurisdictions 
5.40 The elements of the US tort, set out in the Restatement of the Law Second, Torts, 
are that publicity is given to a matter concerning the private life of another, and ‘the 
matter publicized is of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, 
and (b) is not of legitimate concern to the public’.43 The commentary to the 
Restatement notes that publicity ‘means that the matter is made public, by 
communicating it to the public at large, or to so many persons that the matter must be 
regarded as substantially certain to become one of public knowledge’.44 
                                                        
40  Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457, [51]. 
41  Moreham, above n 11, 3. 
42  Ibid. 
43  American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law Second, Torts (1977) § 652D. 
44  Ibid (commentary on § 652D). 
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5.41 The disclosure of private information is now also a settled basis for action in the 
UK. The new or extended cause of action has developed out of the equitable cause of 
action for breach of confidence, as formulated in Campbell v MGN Ltd, since the 
enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK), which incorporates elements of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).45 Article 8 of the ECHR provides, in 
part, that ‘everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and 
his correspondence’. Although art 8 is not confined to private information, the focus of 
the UK action on disclosure of private information may be partly attributed to its roots 
in the equitable doctrine of breach of confidence, which protects confidential 
information. 
5.42 The New Zealand courts have recognised a new tort of invasion of privacy by 
giving publicity to private facts.46 There are two fundamental requirements for a 
successful claim. The first is the ‘existence of facts in respect of which there is a 
reasonable expectation of privacy’.47 The second is ‘publicity given to those private 
facts that would be considered highly offensive to an objective reasonable person’.48 
Misuse or disclosure? 
5.43 Solove has argued that privacy ‘involves more than avoiding disclosure; it also 
involves the individual’s ability to ensure that personal information is used for the 
purposes she desires’.49 
5.44 Disclosure of personal information is perhaps the most common type of misuse 
of personal information that will invade a person’s privacy. Wacks writes that the ‘tort 
of misuse of private information obviously requires evidence of misuse which, in 
practice, signifies publication of such information’.50 
5.45 It is important to note that many invasions of privacy that seem to involve 
misuse, but not publication, of private information, may better be considered intrusions 
into private affairs. For example, an employee of a company who, without 
authorisation, accesses private information of a customer (or fellow employee)51 may 
have intruded into the private affairs of that customer. Such an intrusion would be 
covered by the first category of invasion recommended by the ALRC. Nevertheless, 
the ALRC considers that it is reasonable not to confine this second type of invasion to 
disclosure as some other type of misuse of private information may invade a person’s 
privacy. 
                                                        
45  European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for 
signature 4 November 1950, 213 UNTS 221 (entered into force 3 September 1953). 
46  Hosking v Runting (2005) 1 NZLR 1.  
47  Ibid [117] (Gault P and Blanchard J).  
48  Ibid.  
49  Daniel J Solove, ‘Conceptualizing Privacy’ (2002) 90 California Law Review 1087, 1108. 
50  Wacks, above n 22, 247, quoting Lord Hoffmann in Campbell.  
51  See, eg, Jones v Tsige (2012) ONCA 32. 
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5.46 Public disclosure of private information will be a common type of misuse, but 
the Act should not confine misuse to public disclosures. In some circumstances, the 
disclosure of personal information to one other person may be a serious invasion of 
privacy.52 
5.47 The US tort, on the other hand, is confined to public disclosures. The 
Restatement of the Law Second, Torts, states that publicity means ‘the matter is made 
public, by communicating it to the public at large, or to so many persons that the matter 
must be regarded as substantially certain to become one of public knowledge’.53 
5.48 The fact that a disclosure of personal information was not public may make it 
more difficult for a plaintiff to satisfy other elements of the action. For example, it may 
suggest the invasion of privacy was less serious than it might otherwise have been. 
Also, the plaintiff’s expectation of privacy may not always extend to non-public 
disclosures of personal information. However, there may be some cases in which it is 
reasonable to expect one’s personal information not to be disclosed even within a small 
circle.54 
Untrue personal information 
Recommendation 5–2 The Act should provide that ‘private information’ 
includes untrue information, but only if the information would be private if it 
were true. 
5.49 A person’s privacy can in some cases be invaded by the disclosure of untrue 
information, but perhaps this would only amount to an invasion of privacy if the 
information were true. For example, a court might consider that the fact that a 
particular person, an ordinary citizen, is suffering from a mental illness is private 
information which should not be disclosed in the press. If a newspaper disclosed that a 
particular person had a mental illness, and it turned out that the person did not, then an 
action for invasion of privacy should not be defeated merely on the basis that the 
information was incorrect. 
5.50 This is one reason why the ALRC recommends that the new Australian tort refer 
to private ‘information’, rather than ‘facts’. The use of the word ‘fact’ in this statutory 
tort may imply that the relevant private information must be true for it to be the subject 
of the cause of action. 
                                                        
52  Further, disclosure is not the only type of misuse of private information.  
53  American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law Second, Torts (1977). 
54  See, eg, Giller v Procopets (2008) 24 VR 1. 
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5.51 This position is consistent with the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth), in which personal 
information is defined in s 6 to include information or an opinion ‘whether true or 
not’.55 It is also the position in UK law. Former judge of the UK High Court, Sir David 
Eady, has written that 
a claimant is not now expected to go through an article about (say) his or her sex life, 
or state of health, in order to reveal that some aspects are true and others false. That 
would defeat the object of the exercise and involve even greater intrusion. Any 
speculation or factual assertions on private matters, whether true or false, can give rise 
to a cause of action.56 
5.52 In McKennitt v Ash, Longmore LJ of the English Court of Appeal stated: 
The question in a case of misuse of private information is whether the information is 
private, not whether it is true or false. The truth or falsity is an irrelevant inquiry in 
deciding whether the information is entitled to be protected and judges should be 
chary of becoming side-tracked into that irrelevant inquiry.57 
5.53 Dr Normann Witzleb submitted that ‘the misuse or disclosure of untrue private 
information can be just as damaging as the misuse or disclosure of true private 
information’: 
There is no reason to limit the protection to true information. Limiting the tort to true 
information would require a plaintiff to confirm or admit in court the veracity of 
information which she would not like to see in the public domain, at all. This would 
be likely to unfairly prejudice the plaintiff’s interests in protecting her private life 
from publicity.58 
5.54 Sometimes the disclosure of untrue private information will amount to 
defamation, but often it may not. The ALRC does not consider, as one stakeholder 
suggested, that the law of defamation provides ‘adequate protection to individuals for 
information that is found to be incorrect’.59 
5.55 Also, it should be stressed that for the plaintiff to have an action under the 
privacy tort in this Report, the other elements of the tort would of course have to be 
satisfied. The untrue information would have to be a matter about which the plaintiff 
had a reasonable expectation of privacy and the misuse would have to be serious.60 The 
ALRC is not recommending a tort for the publication of untrue information or, as 
discussed below, a tort for placing a person in a ‘false light’. 
                                                        
55  Privacy Act 1988 (Cth). 
56  David Eady, ‘Injunctions and the Protection of Privacy’ (2010) 29 Civil Justice Quarterly 411, 422: ‘It 
soon became established in McKennitt v Ash [2006] and in Browne v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2007], 
also in the Court of Appeal, that a remedy will lie in respect of intrusive information irrespective of 
whether it happens to be true or false’. 
57  McKennitt v Ash [2008] QB 73, [86]. This was quoted in N Witzleb, Submission 116. 
58  N Witzleb, Submission 116. 
59  Guardian News and Media Limited and Guardian Australia, Submission 80. 
60  See Chs 6 and 8. 
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Examples 
5.56 Examples of invasion of privacy should provide additional guidance and 
certainty. The ALRC recommends that brief and general examples of certain types of 
invasion of privacy be included in the Act. 
5.57 For intrusion upon seclusion, the ALRC recommends the Act include the 
following: ‘such as by physically intruding into the plaintiff’s private space or by 
watching, listening to or recording the plaintiff’s private activities or private affairs’. 
5.58 For misuse of private information, the ALRC recommends the Act include the 
following: ‘such as by collecting or disclosing private information about the plaintiff’. 
5.59 A number of stakeholders in the current Inquiry said a non-exhaustive list of 
examples should be included in the new provision,61 stressing that this would provide 
courts, parties and business with some guidance and certainty.62 Some stakeholders 
said that the examples should be general and flexible, so that the action could ‘evolve 
with social and technological developments’.63 
5.60 Candice Jansz-Richardson said the examples should be ‘relatively general in 
nature to ensure their ability to translate over time’.64 The Public Interest Advocacy 
Centre (PIAC) submitted that examples should be ‘open-ended and inclusive, which 
would build sufficient flexibility into the recommended cause of action for it to be 
appropriately adapted to changing social and technological circumstances’.65 The 
Australian Privacy Foundation said ‘the list should be clearly identified as non-
exclusive and non-exhaustive, ie courts should be able to deal with serious invasions of 
privacy that fall outside the list’.66 
5.61 Other stakeholders said that the cause of action should not include a list of 
examples.67 Some were concerned the list would narrow the scope of the action, by 
implying that invasions of privacy not covered by an example would not be 
                                                        
61  N Witzleb, Submission 116; N Henry and A Powell, Submission 104; Office of the Australian 
Information Commissioner, Submission 66; NSW Young Lawyers, Submission 58; Women’s Legal 
Service Victoria and Domestic Violence Resource Centre Victoria, Submission 48; Telstra, Submission 
45; Electronic Frontiers Australia, Submission 44; Optus, Submission 41; Australian Privacy Foundation, 
Submission 39; Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 30; N Witzleb, Submission 29; C Jansz-
Richardson, Submission 24; Office of the Information Commissioner, Queensland, Submission 20; 
Insurance Council of Australia, Submission 15. 
62  Women’s Legal Service Victoria and Domestic Violence Resource Centre Victoria, Submission 97; 
Telstra, Submission 45; Australian Privacy Foundation, Submission 39; Public Interest Advocacy Centre, 
Submission 30; Insurance Council of Australia, Submission 15. Examples ‘may be useful in guiding 
courts and more broadly in addressing unfounded anxieties about the purpose of the legislation or its 
scope’: Australian Privacy Foundation, Submission 39. A ‘list of examples should be included in the Act 
to provide guidance to business’: Telstra, Submission 45. 
63  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Submission 66. 
64  C Jansz-Richardson, Submission 24. 
65  Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 105; Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 30. 
66  Australian Privacy Foundation, Submission 39. 
67  ASTRA, Submission 99; P Wragg, Submission 73; SBS, Submission 59; ASTRA, Submission 47; ABC, 
Submission 46; Law Institute of Victoria, Submission 22; Pirate Party of Australia, Submission 18; 
P Wragg, Submission 4. 
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actionable.68 It was also suggested that the examples in the list might become 
outdated.69 Other stakeholders suggested that examples were unhelpful because privacy 
was ‘contextual and depends on facts and circumstances’.70 The ABC said there needs 
to be ‘an intense focus on how the various interests at stake are implicated in the 
particular circumstances of each case’.71 SBS submitted that ‘the key for any statutory 
cause of action is flexibility’, warning that: 
The more activities or matters that are included to ‘assist’ with the formulation of a 
breach of privacy action, the more likely it is that these tests will become rigid and 
inflexible. It is vital that courts consider each case on its facts.72 
5.62 Some stakeholders suggested that more specific examples of invasion of privacy 
might be included in the Act. For example, Electronic Frontiers Australia submitted 
that there should be examples for data breaches, aggregated collections of data, and 
‘posting of photographs, audio-recordings, and video-recordings of personal spaces, 
activities, and bodies for which consent to post has not been expressly provided by the 
participant’.73 Drs Nicola Henry and Anastasia Powell said examples in the Act should 
include ‘technology-facilitated sexual violence and harassment’.74 
5.63 One Victorian legal service recommends the following examples: 
a person’s online accounts such as their email account or social media account has 
been accessed, interfered with or misused; a person’s private information, including 
photographs or personal details, have been accessed or disclosed; an individual’s 
private email correspondence or telephone calls have been monitored or recorded; or 
an individual’s movements and locations have been monitored and tracked, for 
example via mobile technology.75 
5.64 In its 2008 privacy report, the ALRC also recommended that examples be 
included in a statute providing for a cause of action for serious invasion of privacy; 
where 
• there has been an interference with an individual’s home or family life; 
• an individual has been subjected to unauthorised surveillance; 
• an individual’s correspondence or private written, oral or electronic 
communication has been interfered with, misused or disclosed; or 
                                                        
68  Law Institute of Victoria, Submission 22; P Wragg, Submission 4. The Law Institute of Victoria submitted 
that the inclusion of a list ‘might give would-be defendants the impression that conduct outside the 
parameters of the list does not constitute an invasion of privacy’. 
69  Law Institute of Victoria, Submission 22. For example, the Law Institute of Victoria stated that: ‘In the 
current technological age, it is likely that any examples in a list could be quickly superseded by other 
types of privacy invasions that might evolve in the future’. 
70  Ibid. 
71  ABC, Submission 46. 
72  SBS, Submission 59. 
73  Electronic Frontiers Australia, Submission 44. 
74  N Henry and A Powell, Submission 104. 
75  Women’s Legal Service Victoria and Domestic Violence Resource Centre Victoria, Submission 97. 
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• sensitive facts relating to an individual’s private life have been disclosed.76 
5.65 The ALRC considers many of the examples provided by stakeholders and in its 
past report to be good examples of serious invasions of privacy. Some would clearly be 
covered by the examples recommended above. 
5.66 Some examples suggested above are more specific and descriptive. The ALRC 
considers that the application of the tort to particular circumstances is best left to the 
courts to consider on a case by case basis. Specific examples may provide additional 
guidance, but may risk distracting the court from the consideration of the distinct facts 
and circumstances of a particular case. 
False light and appropriation 
5.67 The cause of action in this Report is not designed to capture the two other so- 
called ‘privacy torts’ in the United States, namely, ‘publicity which places the plaintiff 
in a false light in the public eye’ and ‘appropriation, for the defendant’s advantage, of 
the plaintiff’s name or likeness’.77 
5.68 Discussing the four US torts, the Australian High Court has said that, in 
Australia, one or more of the four types of invasion of privacy would often ‘be 
actionable at general law under recognised causes of action’: 
Injurious falsehood, defamation (particularly in those jurisdictions where, by statute, 
truth of itself is not a complete defence), confidential information and trade secrets (in 
particular, as extended to information respecting the personal affairs and private life 
of the plaintiff, and the activities of eavesdroppers and the like), passing-off (as 
extended to include false representations of sponsorship or endorsement), the tort of 
conspiracy, the intentional infliction of harm to the individual based in Wilkinson v 
Downton and what may be a developing tort of harassment, and the action on the case 
for nuisance constituted by watching or besetting the plaintiff’s premises, come to 
mind.78 
5.69 The disclosure of private facts and unreasonable intrusion upon seclusion 
concern the key privacy interests, such as personal dignity and autonomy, whereas the 
other US torts arguably protect other interests. Gummow and Hayne JJ stated in ABC v 
Lenah Game Meats: 
Whilst objection possibly may be taken on non-commercial grounds to the 
appropriation of the plaintiff’s name or likeness, the plaintiff’s complaint is likely to 
be that the defendant has taken the steps complained of for a commercial gain, thereby 
depriving the plaintiff of the opportunity of commercial exploitation of that name or 
likeness for the benefit of the plaintiff. To place the plaintiff in a false light may be 
objectionable because it lowers the reputation of the plaintiff or causes financial loss 
or both.79 
                                                        
76  Australian Law Reform Commission, For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice, 
Report 108 (2008) Rec 74–1. 
77  Prosser, above n 7, 392. 
78  Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 199, 255 (Gummow 
and Hayne JJ).  
79  Ibid, 256 (Gummow and Hayne JJ). 
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5.70 The tort of passing off does not provide full protection of people’s image 
rights,80 but the ALRC considers that reform to the law relating to image rights would 
need to be considered more broadly and in the context of Australia’s intellectual 
property law. 
5.71 Wacks has written that the ‘false light’ category ‘seems to be both redundant 
(for almost all such cases might equally have been brought for defamation) and only 
tenuously related to the protection of the plaintiff against aspects of his or her private 
life being exposed’.81 Prosser himself wrote that the ‘false light cases obviously differ 
from those of intrusion, or disclosure of private facts’: 
The interest protected is clearly that of reputation, with the same overtones of mental 
distress as in defamation.82 
5.72 In the US, Prosser’s formulation of appropriation as a privacy tort is contentious 
and often described as a ‘right of publicity’. The Supreme Court of Colorado has noted 
that Prosser’s formulation of the tort 
subsumed the two types of injuries—personal and commercial—into one cause of 
action that existed under the misleading label of ‘privacy’. The privacy label is 
misleading both because the interest protected (name and/or likeness) is not ‘private’ 
in the same way as the interests protected by other areas of privacy law and because 
the appropriation tort often applies to protect well-known ‘public’ persons.83 
5.73 It should be noted that putting someone in a false light or appropriating their 
name or likeness may, in some cases, also be a serious invasion of a person’s privacy 
under the tort designed in this Report. For example, the Domestic Violence Legal 
Service and the North Australian Aboriginal Justice Agency noted the ‘common 
scenario in domestic violence cases where the perpetrator hacks into the victim’s 
existing social media account or creates a false social media account in the name and or 
image of the victim and then posts material purporting to be authored by the victim’.84 
The ALRC considers that, depending on the circumstances, this may be both an 
intrusion into seclusion (hacking into a person’s social media account) and a misuse of 
private information (posting private photos). The tort in this Report is certainly not 
designed to deny relief where the plaintiff has been put in a false light, or had their 
name or likeness appropriated. But it is not intended to capture these other wrongs per 
se. Other causes of action will more directly relate to these wrongs. 
An open-ended action? 
5.74 Some stakeholders submitted that the new tort should be framed more broadly—
that it should not be confined to intrusions upon seclusion and misuse of private 
information. They favoured a single cause of action, often because this was thought to 
                                                        
80  To have an action under the tort of passing off, the plaintiff or the plaintiff’s business must have ‘a certain 
goodwill or reputation’ and must suffer ‘injury in his trade or business’: Fletcher Challenge Ltd v 
Fletcher Challenge Pty Ltd (1981) 1 NSWLR 196, [204]. 
81  Wacks, above n 22, 181. 
82  Prosser, above n 7, 400. 
83  Joe Dickerson & Associates, LLC v Dittmar 34 P3d 995 (Supreme Court of Colorado, 2001, Bender J). 
84  Domestic Violence Legal Service and North Australian Aboriginal Justice Agency, Submission 120. 
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make the action more flexible—that is, open to invasions other than by misuse of 
personal information or intrusion upon seclusion.85 Witzleb, for example, said the 
action should be formulated broadly, to leave its further development to the courts.86 
The Australian Privacy Foundation likewise said that introducing two torts may result 
in some privacy breaches not being covered.87 The Office of the Australian Information 
Commissioner (OAIC) supported the enactment of ‘a single and comprehensive tort’, 
rather than one confined to intrusion upon seclusion and misuse of private information. 
The OAIC said that confining the tort ‘risks leaving gaps in privacy protection’ and 
makes the tort less flexible and adaptive to new technologies and practices’.88 
5.75 Other stakeholders stressed the need for certainty. For example, Telstra 
submitted that the categories of conduct caught by any cause of action ‘should be listed 
exhaustively, using unambiguous and objective terms, in order to reduce the 
uncertainty and impact that the introduction of such a cause of action would cause to 
businesses and service providers’.89 
5.76 The ALRC considers that the Act should provide as much certainty as possible 
on what may amount to an invasion of privacy. This will make the scope of the action 
more predictable and targeted. The ALRC recommends that the new tort should not be 
broadly drafted to capture all invasions of privacy, but rather should be confined to the 
two more precisely defined types of invasion of privacy that are the key mischief that 
the cause of action is designed to remedy. Arguing for even greater prescription and 
certainty than the ALRC recommends, Professor Kit Barker submitted that 
generalised causes of action give great discretion and little guidance to judges. More 
discrete, lower-level rules provide higher levels of guidance and greater predictability. 
Joseph Raz is notorious for preferring rules to general principles for precisely these 
reasons. They give greater respect to the rule of law.90 
5.77 As discussed below, greater guidance could, in theory, also be achieved by 
enacting two separate and tailored causes of action, but the ALRC considers this to be 
unnecessary. 
One cause of action, not two 
5.78 The ALRC recommends that there be one cause of action covering the two 
broad types of invasion of privacy. A similar approach, recommended by the Victorian 
Law Reform Commission (VLRC), would be to enact two separate but ‘overlapping’ 
causes of action. However, enacting separate causes of action should only be necessary 
if the actions would be substantially different—that is, have different elements, 
defences and remedies. The ALRC considers that separate actions are not necessary. 
                                                        
85  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Submission 66; SBS, Submission 59; Electronic 
Frontiers Australia, Submission 44; Australian Privacy Foundation, Submission 39; N Witzleb, 
Submission 29; Law Institute of Victoria, Submission 22. 
86  N Witzleb, Submission 29. 
87  Australian Privacy Foundation, Submission 39. 
88  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Submission 66. 
89  Telstra, Submission 45. However, Telstra opposes even a more confined privacy tort. 
90  K Barker, Submission 126. 
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5.79 The VLRC’s reasons for recommending two causes of action largely relate to 
the widely recognised difficulty of defining privacy: 
Legislating to protect these broadly recognised sub-categories of privacy is likely to 
promote greater clarity about the precise nature of the legal rights and obligations that 
have been created than by creating a broad civilly enforceable right to privacy.91 
5.80 The ALRC has come to a similar conclusion, which is one reason it recommends 
that the action be confined to two more precisely defined sub-categories of invasion of 
privacy. The categories recommended by the ALRC are broadly the same as the 
categories identified by the VLRC. 
5.81 Although the ALRC and VLRC approaches are broadly consistent, the ALRC 
considers it important that there be only one cause of action. The availability of two 
causes of actions may cause unnecessary overlap and duplication in many cases in 
which both types of invasion arise. Dr Ian Turnbull submitted that one reason for 
having only one cause of action is that ‘in most cases intrusion upon seclusion will be 
followed by misuse of the private information obtained by the intrusion’.92 
5.82 The availability of two torts would increase the length and cost of proceedings 
and risk duplication in monetary damages. There will already be cases where the cause 
of action may overlap with other causes of action such as trespass or breach of contract 
or breach of confidence. It would be undesirable to risk inviting further duplication. 
5.83 Some stakeholders argued that there are important differences between 
intrusions upon seclusion and misuse of private information, and that these differences 
suggest there should be two separate and tailored causes of action. Barker submitted 
that there should be separate causes of action because they should have different fault 
elements.93 However, as discussed in Chapter 7, the ALRC considers that they should 
have the same fault element—they should only be actionable where the conduct of the 
plaintiff was intentional or reckless. 
5.84 Importantly, as Hunt has argued, having a single action also ‘avoids the problem 
of discordant principles emerging between the two actions, which would be 
undesirable since they protect the same interest’.94 
5.85 The ALRC considers the cause of action designed in this Report to be flexible 
enough to deal with both types of invasion of privacy, while providing sufficient 
guidance and certainty. 
                                                        
91  Victorian Law Reform Commission, Surveillance in Public Places, Report 18 (2010) [7.126]. 
92  I Turnbull, Submission 5. 
93  K Barker, Submission 126. 
94  Chris DL Hunt, ‘Privacy in the Common Law: A Critical Appraisal of the Ontario Court of Appeal’s 
Decision in Jones v Tsige’ (2012) 37 Queen’s LJ 665, 673. 
 6. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy 
 
Contents 
Summary 91 
A test for what is private 92 
Highly offensive? 95 
Relationship with other elements and defences 95 
Considerations 96 
Different for misuse and intrusions 97 
Nature of the information 98 
Means used 100 
Place of intrusion 100 
Purpose of intrusion 102 
How information was held or communicated 102 
Information in the public domain 103 
Attributes of the plaintiff 104 
Conduct of the plaintiff 105 
Other matters 107 
 
 
Summary 
6.1 The ALRC recommends that, to have an action, a plaintiff must prove that a 
person in the position of the plaintiff would have had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in all of the circumstances. 
6.2 This is essentially an objective test used to answer the question ‘Is this private?’ 
The subjective expectation of the plaintiff may be a relevant consideration, but it is not 
the focus of the inquiry. The question is determined by the court, after close analysis of 
the particular circumstances of the case. 
6.3 The ALRC also recommends that the Act include a non-exhaustive list of factors 
that a court may consider when determining whether a person would have had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy. This is intended to provide guidance and assistance 
to the parties and the court, without limiting the matters that might be considered in a 
particular case. 
6.4 The recommended factors include: the nature of the private information; the 
means used to obtain the private information or to intrude upon seclusion; the place 
where the intrusion occurred; the purpose of the misuse or intrusion; how the private 
information was held or communicated; whether the private information was already in 
the public domain; the attributes of the plaintiff, such as their age; and the conduct of 
the plaintiff. 
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A test for what is private 
Recommendation 6–1 The new tort should be actionable only where a 
person in the position of the plaintiff would have had a reasonable expectation 
of privacy, in all of the circumstances. 
6.5 Whether a plaintiff has a reasonable expectation of privacy is a useful and 
widely adopted test of what is private, for the purpose of a civil cause of action for 
invasions of privacy. The ALRC recommends that, to have an action under the new 
tort, the plaintiff should be required to establish that a person in the plaintiff’s position 
would have had a reasonable expectation of privacy, in all of the circumstances. 
6.6 This is preferable to attempting to define ‘privacy’ in the Act as it is notoriously 
difficult to define. In ABC v Lenah Game Meats, Gleeson CJ said: 
There is no bright line which can be drawn between what is private and what is not. 
Use of the term ‘public’ is often a convenient method of contrast, but there is a large 
area in between what is necessarily public and what is necessarily private.1 
6.7 The test recommended by the ALRC is an objective one. The court must 
consider, not whether the plaintiff subjectively expected privacy, but whether it would 
be reasonable for a person in the position of the plaintiff to expect privacy. The 
subjective expectation of the plaintiff may be a relevant consideration, particularly if 
that expectation was made manifest, but it is not the focus of the test, nor an essential 
element that must be satisfied.2 
6.8 In determining whether a person would have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy, the court should consider ‘all of the circumstances’. Some of these 
circumstances will relate to the position of the particular plaintiff, and therefore to this 
extent the test has a subjective element. More broadly, the phrase ‘all of the 
circumstances’ highlights that whether this test will be satisfied will depend very much 
on the facts of each particular case. 
                                                        
1  Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 199, [42]. 
2  Expectation of privacy has for this reason been called a normative rather than a descriptive standard. 
‘Suggestions that a diminished subjective expectation of privacy should automatically result in a lowering 
of constitutional protection should therefore be opposed. It is one thing to say that a person who puts out 
the garbage has no reasonable expectation of privacy in it. It is quite another to say that someone who 
fears their telephone is bugged no longer has a subjective expectation of privacy and thereby forfeits the 
protection of s 8 [Human Rights Act 1998 (UK)]. Expectation of privacy is a normative rather than a 
descriptive standard’: R v Tessling [2004] 3 SCR 432 (Binnie J). 
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6.9 The ‘reasonable expectation’ test was supported by a number of stakeholders.3 It 
was said to be flexible and able to adapt to new circumstances.4 This is important, 
because community expectations of privacy will change between cultures and over 
time. The Office of the Information Commissioner, Queensland, submitted that the 
reasonable expectation of privacy test ‘would reflect both community standards and 
provide sufficient flexibility for the modern range of social discourses’.5 The 
Australian Interactive Media Industry Association submitted that the reasonable 
expectation requirement was ‘an important mechanism by which to ensure that only 
sensible and genuine privacy matters are able to access the courts and seek redress’.6 
6.10 Similar tests have been recommended in reports of the ALRC, the NSW Law 
Reform Commission (NSWLRC) and the Victorian Law Reform Commission 
(VLRC).7 This test is also used in a number of other jurisdictions. It has been adopted 
in the United Kingdom (UK), New Zealand, and several Canadian provinces.8 
6.11 In Campbell v MGN, Lord Nicholls said that ‘the touchstone of private life is 
whether in respect of the disclosed facts the person in question had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy’.9 Lord Hope said that the ‘question is what a reasonable person 
of ordinary sensibilities would feel if she was placed in the same position as the 
claimant and faced with the same publicity’.10 
6.12 Some stakeholders opposed the use of a reasonable expectation test,11 with some 
saying that the test was too vague.12 In the ALRC’s view, the test must be flexible, but 
not uncertain. Courts are used to determining issues of reasonableness or even 
reasonable expectation in other contexts.13 
                                                        
3  Australian Interactive Media Industry Association (AIMIA), Submission 125; Domestic Violence Legal 
Service and North Australian Aboriginal Justice Agency, Submission 120; T Butler, Submission 114; 
Google, Submission 91; J Chard, Submission 88; S Higgins, Submission 82; Guardian News and Media 
Limited and Guardian Australia, Submission 80; Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, 
Submission 66; SBS, Submission 59; NSW Young Lawyers, Submission 58; Free TV, Submission 55; 
Queensland Council of Civil Liberties, Submission 51; ASTRA, Submission 47; Electronic Frontiers 
Australia, Submission 44; Arts Law Centre of Australia, Submission 43; Optus, Submission 41; Australian 
Privacy Foundation, Submission 39; Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 30; B Arnold, 
Submission 28; C Jansz-Richardson, Submission 24; Law Institute of Victoria, Submission 22; Office of 
the Information Commissioner, Queensland, Submission 20; Women’s Legal Centre (ACT & Region) 
Inc, Submission 19; Insurance Council of Australia, Submission 15. 
4  Office of the Victorian Privacy Commissioner, Submission 108; ASTRA, Submission 99. 
5  Office of the Information Commissioner, Queensland, Submission 20. 
6  Australian Interactive Media Industry Association (AIMIA), Submission 125. 
7  Australian Law Reform Commission, For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice, 
Report 108 (2008) Rec 74–2; Victorian Law Reform Commission, Surveillance in Public Places, Report 
18 (2010) Recs 25, 26; NSW Law Reform Commission, Invasion of Privacy, Report 120 (2009) 20–26. 
8  ‘A Commonwealth Statutory Cause of Action for Serious Invasion of Privacy’ (Issues Paper, Department 
of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2011) 17–21. 
9  Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457, [21]. 
10  Ibid [99]. 
11  Australian Bankers’ Association, Submission 27; P Wragg, Submission 4. 
12  Australian Bankers’ Association, Submission 27. 
13  Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479. See, also, B Arnold, Submission 28. 
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6.13 Professor Eric Barendt has said the test is artificial.14 He wrote that in ‘many 
cases a claimant will have had no actual expectations at the time his privacy was 
infringed’.15 The ALRC considers that, although the subjective expectations of the 
plaintiff may sometimes be relevant, the focus of the test should be on whether a 
reasonable person would expect privacy, not whether the plaintiff in fact expected 
privacy. To make this clearer, the ALRC recommends that the Act refer to whether a 
‘person in the position of the plaintiff’ would have a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
6.14 The ALRC also considers that there are notable benefits in using a test that has 
been used for some time in other jurisdictions: in applying the test, Australian courts 
will be able to draw on jurisprudence from the UK, New Zealand and the United States 
(US). 
6.15 Some stakeholders, while supporting a reasonable expectation of privacy test, 
nevertheless expressed some concern that expectations of privacy may be considered to 
have fallen, perhaps following common and unchallenged industry practices. The 
concern was that, because technologies and services would increasingly encroach into 
people’s private lives, people will then either actually expect less privacy, or it will 
increasingly seem unreasonable to expect the same level of privacy. There is a concern 
that privacy standards would erode.16 
6.16 However, as noted above, other stakeholders considered that its ability to adapt 
to community standards to be one of the strengths of the reasonable expectation of 
privacy test. For example, the Australian Subscription Television and Radio 
Association (ASTRA) noted the ‘evolution of society’s understanding of what is a 
private matter since the advent of publicly available social media profiles’.17 
6.17 Community expectations of privacy no doubt change, but the ALRC considers 
that a privacy tort must be able to adapt to such changes. Legislative privacy standards 
cannot be set in stone. But this does not mean the standards are infinitely flexible, or 
that it might soon be unreasonable to expect any privacy. Privacy has been valued by 
so many for so long that not only is it not dead, as some have dramatically claimed, but 
it should continue to be reasonable to expect privacy in many circumstances. 
6.18 Although there is a separate element of the tort that explicitly confines the tort to 
‘serious’ invasions of privacy,18 the ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ test should also 
help ensure that non-serious privacy interests are not actionable under the tort. 
                                                        
14  Eric Barendt, ‘A Reasonable Expectation of Privacy?’ A Coherent or Redundant Concept?’ in Andrew 
Kenyon (ed) (forthcoming, 2014). 
15  Ibid. Barendt raises other concerns. For example, he writes that courts might be tempted to consider 
matters when applying this test, when those matters should instead be considered when balancing privacy 
with freedom of expression: Ibid. The ALRC acknowledges the potential for overlap between this test and 
other elements and defences in the new tort. 
16  See, eg, Australian Privacy Foundation, Submission 110. 
17  ASTRA, Submission 99. 
18  See Ch 8. 
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Highly offensive? 
6.19 In ABC v Lenah Game Meats, Gleeson CJ proposed a different test for what is 
private: 
Certain kinds of information about a person, such as information relating to health, 
personal relationships, or finances, may be easy to identify as private; as may certain 
kinds of activity, which a reasonable person, applying contemporary standards of 
morals and behaviour, would understand to be meant to be unobserved. The 
requirement that disclosure or observation of information or conduct would be highly 
offensive to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities is in many circumstances a 
useful practical test of what is private.19 
6.20 This passage was referred to, a number of times, in opinions of the House of 
Lords in Campbell. Lord Nicholls said this test should be used with care, for two 
reasons: 
First, the ‘highly offensive’ phrase is suggestive of a stricter test of private 
information than a reasonable expectation of privacy. Second, the ‘highly offensive’ 
formulation can all too easily bring into account, when deciding whether the disclosed 
information was private, considerations which go more properly to issues of 
proportionality; for instance, the degree of intrusion into private life, and the extent to 
which publication was a matter of proper public concern. This could be a recipe for 
confusion.20 
6.21 Baroness Hale also preferred an objective reasonable expectation test, saying 
that it was ‘much simpler and clearer’ than an offensiveness test of privacy.21 Further, 
Baroness Hale said that it was apparent that Gleeson CJ did not intend for the ‘highly 
offensive’ test to be the only test, 
particularly in respect of information which is obviously private, including 
information about health, personal relationships or finance. It is also apparent that he 
was referring to the sensibilities of a reasonable person placed in the situation of the 
subject of the disclosure rather than to its recipient.22 
6.22 The ALRC considers that the offensiveness of a disclosure or intrusion should 
be one matter able to be considered by a court in determining whether there is a 
reasonable expectation of privacy. It is more reasonable to expect privacy, where a 
breach of privacy would be considered highly offensive. As discussed in Chapter 8, 
offence may also be used to distinguish serious invasions of privacy from non-serious 
invasions of privacy. 
Relationship with other elements and defences 
6.23 Some matters will be relevant to the reasonable expectation of privacy test and 
also to other elements and defences of the tort. 
                                                        
19  Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 199, [42]. 
20  Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457, [22]. 
21  Ibid [135]. 
22  Ibid [136]. 
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6.24 For example, some public interest matters may be considered when determining 
whether the plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of privacy, even though the ALRC 
recommends that the tort feature a separate public interest test. In some cases, a public 
interest matter will be so conspicuous that it may not be sensible to ignore it when 
determining whether the plaintiff has a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
6.25 Other matters may be the subject of a separate defence. For example, a separate 
defence for consent is recommended in Chapter 11. However, evidence of consent to 
the relevant conduct or related or similar conduct may also affect whether the plaintiff 
had a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
Considerations 
Recommendation 6–2 The Act should provide that, in determining 
whether a person in the position of the plaintiff would have had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in all of the circumstances, the court may consider, 
among other things: 
(a)  the nature of the private information, including whether it relates to 
intimate or family matters, health or medical matters, or financial matters; 
(b)  the means used to obtain the private information or to intrude upon 
seclusion, including the use of any device or technology; 
(c)  the place where the intrusion occurred, such as in the plaintiff’s home; 
(d)  the purpose of the misuse, disclosure or intrusion; 
(e)  how the private information was held or communicated, such as in private 
correspondence or a personal diary; 
(f)  whether and to what extent the private information was already in the 
public domain; 
(g)  the relevant attributes of the plaintiff, including the plaintiff’s age, 
occupation and cultural background; and 
(h)  the conduct of the plaintiff, including whether the plaintiff invited 
publicity or manifested a desire for privacy. 
6.26 The ALRC recommends that this non-exhaustive list of considerations should be 
set out in the Act. It is designed to assist rather than confine the court, when the court 
assesses whether the plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of privacy. Not all matters 
can be listed, but the ALRC has listed some of the more common or important matters. 
6.27 The NSWLRC recommended the inclusion of a comparable list of matters that 
would help a court determine whether a person’s privacy has been invaded.23 
                                                        
23  NSW Law Reform Commission, Invasion of Privacy, Report 120 (2009) Draft Bill, cl 74(3)(a). 
 6. A Reasonable Expectation of Privacy 97 
6.28 A number of stakeholders submitted that the Act should include a list of factors 
for a court to consider,24 and many generally supported the factors recommended in the 
Discussion Paper.25 Others suggested that the reasonable expectation of privacy test 
would remain uncertain even if such a list of factors were included.26 However, the 
ALRC considers that the lack of a comprehensive definition of privacy should not be a 
reason for denying remedies to people whose privacy is clearly invaded in certain 
ways. 
6.29 In Murray v Big Pictures, which concerned photographs taken of a child in the 
street for commercial publication, the High Court of England and Wales set out a non-
exhaustive list of matters a court should consider when determining whether the 
plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of privacy: 
They include the attributes of the claimant, the nature of the activity in which the 
claimant was engaged, the place at which it was happening, the nature and purpose of 
the intrusion, the absence of consent and whether it was known or could be inferred, 
the effect on the claimant and the circumstances in which and the purpose for which 
the information came into the hands of the publisher.27 
6.30 Other matters will be relevant in other cases, particularly in cases concerning 
intrusion upon seclusion. Professor Raymond Wacks has suggested that, in an action 
for intrusion upon seclusion, a court should take into account the following factors 
when determining whether the claimant had a reasonable expectation of privacy: 
(a)  the place where the intrusion occurred (for example, whether the claimant is at 
home, in office premises or in a public place, and whether or not the place is 
open to public view from a place accessible to the public, or whether or not the 
conversation is audible to passers-by); 
(b)  the object and occasion of the intrusion (for example, whether it interferes with 
the intimate or private life of the claimant); and 
(c)  the means of intrusion employed and the nature of any device used (for 
example, whether the intrusion is effected by means of a high-technology sense-
enhancing device, or by mere observation or natural hearing).28 
Different for misuse and intrusions 
6.31 Before discussing the different factors, it should be noted that the factors that 
will be relevant to the reasonable expectation of privacy test may differ, depending on 
whether an invasion of privacy was by misuse of private information, or by intrusion 
                                                        
24  See, eg, Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 105; Insurance Council of Australia, Submission 
102; Office of the Victorian Privacy Commissioner, Submission 108. 
25  See, eg, Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 105; UNSW Cyberspace Law and Policy 
Community, Submission 98; Guardian News and Media Limited and Guardian Australia, Submission 80. 
AIMIA said the ALRC’s factors ‘recognise that privacy is contextual in nature’: Australian Interactive 
Media Industry Association (AIMIA), Submission 125. 
26  Eg, the Australian Bankers’ Association submitted that a ‘shopping list’ of criteria would be ‘of little use 
unless there is complete clarity about exactly what “privacy” is’... [T]his approach increases the risk of 
uncertainty for business and the community’: Australian Bankers’ Association, Submission 84. 
27  Murray v Big Pictures (UK) Ltd [2009] Ch 481, [36]. 
28  Raymond Wacks, Privacy and Media Freedom (Oxford University Press, 2013) Appendix, Draft Bill,  
cl 2(2). 
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upon seclusion. As Associate Professor Paul Wragg submitted, a court’s approach to 
determining whether a person in the position of the plaintiff would have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy is likely to be ‘markedly different in intrusion claims than 
informational claims’.29 Within these broad categories of invasion, there are sub-
categories, and the factors may also differ in relevance between those categories too. 
6.32 In fact, which factors are relevant may differ in every case. As noted above, the 
test very much depends on the particular circumstances of the case. Different lists of 
factors could no doubt be created, for different types of invasion of privacy. But the 
ALRC considers that one list that is not exhaustive or prescriptive will be sufficient. 
Courts may consider the matters on the list that are relevant to the particular case, 
ignore those that are not, and consider any other matter that is relevant that is not on 
the list. 
Nature of the information 
6.33 The nature of the information will often suggest whether or not it is private. 
Information concerning the plaintiff’s intimate or family matters, health or medical 
matters,30 and financial matters are all likely to be private. Gleeson CJ said in 
Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats that certain kinds of 
information about a person may be easy to identify as private, ‘such as information 
relating to health, personal relationships, or finances’.31 
6.34 Personal information taken from medical records, reports, or interviews is also 
generally considered private in English courts.32 
6.35 ‘The nature of the subject matter’ was included in a list of matters the NSWLRC 
recommended should be considered in determining whether there has been an invasion 
of privacy.33 
6.36 The definition of ‘sensitive information’ in the Privacy Act may also be of some 
assistance to the courts, but should not be determinative of the question of whether the 
plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of privacy. ‘Sensitive information’ is defined to 
mean: 
(a)  information or an opinion about an individual’s: 
  i)  racial or ethnic origin; or 
  ii)  political opinions; or 
 iii)  membership of a political association; or 
  iv)  religious beliefs or affiliations; or 
                                                        
29  P Wragg, Submission 73. 
30  Biometric data, such as a fingerprint, may also be private information. The OAIC submitted that the new 
tort should provide a remedy ‘in the case of serious invasion of an individual’s bodily privacy (such as in 
the case of unauthorised bodily testing’): Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Submission 
90. 
31  Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 199, [42]. 
32  M Warby et al, Tugendhat and Christie: The Law of Privacy and The Media (OUP Oxford, 2011) [5.35]. 
33  NSW Law Reform Commission, Invasion of Privacy, Report No 120 (2009) Draft Bill, cl 74(3)(a)(i). 
 6. A Reasonable Expectation of Privacy 99 
  v)  philosophical beliefs; or 
  vi)  membership of a professional or trade association; or 
 vii)  membership of a trade union; or 
 viii)  sexual preferences or practices; or 
  ix)   criminal record; 
that is also personal information; or 
(b)  health information about an individual; or 
(c)  genetic information about an individual that is not otherwise health information; 
(d)  biometric information that is to be used for the purpose of automated biometric 
verification or biometric identification; or 
(e)  biometric templates.34 
6.37 This definition serves a particular regulatory purpose. It should be stressed that 
the types of sensitive information included in the definition will not necessarily give 
rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy under the tort. Whether something is private 
under the tort will depend on context and other relevant factors. 
6.38 In the UK, it has been said that the nature of the information itself ‘is plainly of 
considerable if not prime importance. It may even be decisive in the question of 
whether the claimant enjoys a reasonable expectation of privacy in respect of it’.35 
6.39 Intimate matters will often be sexual matters, widely considered to be private: 
‘There are numerous general statements from English courts to the effect that sexual 
behaviour is an aspect of private life’.36 
6.40 However, intimate and family matters can extend beyond sexual matters. 
Professor Des Butler submitted that people are ‘entitled to expect privacy for anything 
non-criminal taking place in the home environment, including any conversations or 
disagreements occurring therein’.37 Butler also noted that, ‘[e]ven where the plaintiff 
has courted publicity, it would normally be expected that his or her family would 
nevertheless be entitled to their privacy, especially when there are children of a 
vulnerable age who are involved’.38 
                                                        
34  Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) s 6. 
35  M Warby et al, Tugendhat and Christie: The Law of Privacy and The Media (OUP Oxford, 2011) [5.28] 
(citation omitted). 
36 Ibid [5.40]. A distinction is sometimes made between the details of a person’s sexual life, and the mere 
fact of a sexual relationship or sexual orientation, with the latter being sometimes considered less private 
than the former. 
37  D Butler, Submission 10, citing McKennitt v Ash [2005] EWHC 3003 (QB) (21 December 2005) [137]; 
Lee v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2010] NIQB 106 [32], [43]; Green Corns Ltd v Claverley Group Ltd 
[2005] EWHC 958, [53]. 
38  D Butler, Submission 10. 
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Means used 
6.41 The means used to obtain private information or to intrude upon seclusion will 
sometimes be relevant to whether or not there is a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
For example, the fact that the defendant used spyware, or hacked into the plaintiff’s 
personal computer to take personal information, or used a long distance camera lens to 
peer into the plaintiff’s home, may suggest the plaintiff’s privacy has been invaded 
(regardless of what personal information or photograph is taken). 
6.42 ASTRA submitted that it is ‘difficult to see how a person could form an 
expectation of privacy based on a use of technology of which they are unaware’.39 
However, the ALRC considers that a person can quite reasonably expect not to be 
intruded upon, even if they do not turn their minds to the means that might used to 
intrude upon their privacy. They may even reasonably expect privacy without even 
considering whether their privacy is remotely likely to be intruded upon at all. 
6.43 Butler submitted that ‘[t]he fact that the information could only be obtained 
through surreptitious means should normally be an indication that in the circumstances 
there was a high expectation of privacy’.40 
Place of intrusion 
6.44 The physical place in which a person’s seclusion is intruded upon may have a 
bearing on whether they had a reasonable expectation of privacy in those 
circumstances. Most clearly, a person will have a greater expectation of privacy in the 
home than in a public place. 
6.45 Although a person should generally have a lower expectation of privacy when in 
public, the ALRC considers that privacy may reasonably be expected in public 
places—in some circumstances.41 
6.46 This has been recognised in a number of invasion of privacy cases outside 
Australia.42 In one US case in 1964, a woman was photographed at a country fair 
leaving a ‘fun house’ at the moment at which some air jets blew her dress up. The 
photo was published on the front cover of a newspaper. The fact that she was in public, 
did not mean that she had no right to privacy. Harwood J of the Supreme Court of 
Alabama said: 
a purely mechanical application of legal principles should not be permitted to create 
an illogical conclusion. To hold that one who is involuntarily and instantaneously 
enmeshed in an embarrassing pose forfeits her right of privacy merely because she 
                                                        
39  ASTRA, Submission 99. 
40  D Butler, Submission 10. Butler’s submission cited Shelley Films v R Features [1994] EMLR 134; 
Creation Records Ltd v News Group Newspapers Ltd (1997) 39 IPR 1. 
41  It is ‘not possible to draw a rigid line between what is private and that which is capable of being 
witnessed in a public place by other persons’: D Butler, Submission 10. Butler cited Andrews v Television 
New Zealand Ltd [2009] 1 NZLR 220. 
42  Weller v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2014] EWHC 1163 (QB); Murray v Express Newspapers [2008] 
EWCA Civ 446. 
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happened at the moment to be part of a public scene would be illogical, wrong, and 
unjust.43 
6.47 In an English case that went to the European Court of Human Rights, CCTV 
footage of a man in a public street, taken moments after he had tried to commit suicide, 
were later broadcast on television. The Court found this was an invasion of his 
privacy.44 The man ‘was in a public street but he was not there for the purposes of 
participating in any public event and he was not a public figure. It was late at night, he 
was deeply perturbed and in a state of some distress’.45 The footage was ‘viewed to an 
extent which far exceeded any exposure to a passer-by or to security observation and to 
a degree surpassing that which the applicant could possibly have foreseen’.46 
6.48 In Campbell, Naomi Campbell was also in a public place when she was 
photographed leaving a Narcotics Anonymous meeting. The publication of that 
photograph in a newspaper was found to be an invasion of her privacy.47 Although 
Lord Hoffmann thought there was ‘nothing embarrassing’ about the particular picture, 
he did say that the 
the widespread publication of a photograph of someone which reveals him to be in a 
situation of humiliation or severe embarrassment, even if taken in a public place, may 
be an infringement of the privacy of his personal information.48 
6.49 These cases illustrate some of the circumstances that may suggest that a person 
may have a reasonable expectation of privacy, despite being in a public place. 
6.50 There may be different expectations of privacy with respect to the taking of a 
photo and to its later publication. It may be unreasonable to expect not to be 
photographed, particularly when in public,49 but quite reasonable to expect the 
photograph not to be published, particularly if the photo captures a clearly private or 
humiliating moment. The importance of this distinction was stressed by 
photographers.50 
6.51 Expectations of privacy may also vary between different types of public place. 
For example, a person may expect more privacy in a restaurant than when on the street. 
6.52 Whether people can expect privacy at work is another interesting question. 
Although people should generally expect less privacy at work than at home, it is 
reasonable to expect some privacy at work. One case before the Supreme Court of 
California concerned whether a woman employed as a ‘telepsychic’ had invaded the 
privacy of one of her fellow employees—using, not her psychic powers, but a video 
camera hidden in her hat. The court found that the fact that other co-workers may have 
                                                        
43  Daily Times Democrat v Graham, 276 Ala 380 (1964) 478. 
44  Peck v United Kingdom [2003] ECHR 44 (28 January 2003).  
45  Ibid [62].  
46  Ibid.  
47  Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457. 
48  Ibid [75].  
49  Randerson J said the taking of photographs in a public place ‘must be taken to be one of the ordinary 
incidents of living in a free community’: Hosking v Runting (2005) 1 NZLR 1, [2003] NZHC 416, [138] 
(Randerson J).  
50  Australian Institute of Professional Photography (AIPP), Submission 95. 
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witnessed the interactions and conversations did not mean the plaintiff could not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy: 
In an office or other workplace to which the general public does not have unfettered 
access, employees may enjoy a limited, but legitimate, expectation that their 
conversations and other interactions will not be secretly videotaped by undercover 
television reporters, even though those conversations may not have been completely 
private from the participants’ co-workers.51 
Purpose of intrusion 
6.53 An intrusion into a person’s seclusion for a particular purpose may invade that 
person’s privacy, while the same intrusion for a different purpose would not. For 
example, a patient’s reasonable expectation of privacy has not been invaded when a 
nurse enters the patient’s hospital room to take their temperature, but may be invaded 
by a journalist entering the room to take photos of the patient for publication in a 
newspaper.52 
6.54 In Murray v Big Pictures, the High Court of England and Wales included, in a 
list of matters a court should consider when determining whether the plaintiff had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy, ‘the nature and purpose of the intrusion’ and ‘the 
circumstances in which and the purpose for which the information came into the hands 
of the publisher’.53 In that case, the court held that pictures had been 
taken deliberately, in secret and with a view to their subsequent publication. They 
were taken for the purpose of publication for profit, no doubt in the knowledge that 
the parents would have objected to them.54 
6.55 Tugendhat and Christie’s The Law of Privacy and the Media states, concerning 
the UK law, that this aspect of the law is ‘relatively undeveloped’ and it may be ‘open 
to debate how the “purpose of the intrusion” is to be determined (including whether the 
“purpose” is objective or subjective), and what weight should be accorded to what 
purposes’.55 
6.56 The motivation of the defendant may also be relevant to an assessment of the 
seriousness of an invasion of privacy.56 
How information was held or communicated 
6.57 This matter relates to the form in which information is held, stored or 
communicated. Information held in some forms—such as a personal diary—may more 
clearly suggest that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to the 
information than to the same information held in another form. 
                                                        
51  Sanders v American Broadcasting Companies Inc (1999) 85 Calif. Rep. 2d 909. See, also, Saad v Chubb 
Security Australia Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSC 1183. 
52  See, eg,  Kaye v Robertson [1991] FSR 62. 
53  Murray v Big Pictures (UK) Ltd [2009] Ch 481, [36]. 
54  Ibid [50], quoted in Warby et al, above n 32, [5.124]. 
55  Warby et al, above n 32, [5.123]. 
56  A malicious invasion of privacy, for example, may be more offensive and more serious. See Ch 8 for a 
discussion of the recommended ‘seriousness’ threshold. 
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6.58 The authors of Tugendhat and Christie’s The Law of Privacy and the Media 
have written that in some cases, ‘the principal focus of the court has been on the 
repository of the information as one likely to contain confidential or private 
information’: 
Personal diaries, private correspondence, together with similarly private written 
communications, and conversations on the telephone have all been recognized as 
likely repositories of such information. More recently it has been held that 
information stored on a personal computer is prima facie confidential.57 
6.59 New digital technologies will raise other questions. Email correspondence is 
treated like private correspondence, but not all information sent by email will be 
private in nature. 
6.60 That a password or some other form of personal identification is required to gain 
access to a digital location containing personal information should, in the ALRC’s 
view, strongly suggests that the information is likely to be subject to a reasonable 
expectation of privacy. 
6.61 Similar reasoning may apply to intrusions upon seclusion. A locked solid door 
suggest that those in the room behind the door expect complete privacy, but a glass 
door involves different expectations. 
Information in the public domain 
6.62 Whether and to what extent the information was in the public domain should be 
considered when determining if the plaintiff has a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
6.63 There may be no clear line between what is in the public domain and what is 
not. In the context of confidential information, the public domain has been said to 
mean ‘no more than that the information in question is so generally accessible that, in 
all the circumstances, it cannot be regarded as confidential’.58 Private information 
differs from confidential information in that the former is often private because of its 
nature, whereas the latter is often confidential only because of the obligation under 
which it was imparted. 
6.64 Information that is private in nature will not automatically cease to be private 
once it is in the public domain. A person’s medical records, for example, do not cease 
to be private when someone wrongly publishes them on a website. Not only will the 
original publication to the internet be an invasion of privacy, but other subsequent uses 
of the records may also, in some cases, amount to an invasion of privacy. Eady J said 
in McKennitt v Ash: 
there are grounds for supposing that the protection of the law will not be withdrawn 
unless and until it is clear that a stage has been reached where there is no longer 
anything left to be protected. For example, it does not necessarily follow that because 
personal information has been revealed impermissibly to one set of newspapers, or to 
                                                        
57  Warby et al, above n 32, [5.80]. 
58  Attorney General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No 2) (1990) 1 AC 109, 282 (Lord Goff). Cf Prince of 
Wales v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2007] 3 WLR 222. 
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readers within one jurisdiction, that there can be no further intrusion upon a 
claimant’s privacy by further revelations. Fresh revelations to different groups of 
people can still cause distress and damage to an individual’s emotional or mental 
well-being.59 
6.65 However, an expectation of privacy will usually decrease, the more widely a 
piece of information has been published by someone. 
Attributes of the plaintiff 
6.66 Some attributes of a plaintiff, such as age, may affect whether the person had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy. A young person may have an expectation of privacy 
in some circumstances where an older person does not. Butler submitted that where 
‘the plaintiff is a child of vulnerable age there would normally be a high expectation 
that he or she is entitled to a measure of privacy’.60 
6.67 The occupation of the plaintiff may also be relevant, particularly if the plaintiff 
is a ‘public figure’. Persons in some occupations necessarily or traditionally invite or 
receive considerable attention from the public. A professional sportsperson or a 
politician, for example, cannot reasonably expect the same level of privacy as other 
members of the public, although they can reasonably expect some privacy. 
6.68 ‘The extent to which the individual has a public profile’ was included in a list of 
matters the NSWLRC recommended should be considered in determining whether 
there has been an invasion of privacy.61 People who are reluctantly or involuntarily put 
in the public spotlight, such as the victim of a crime, may however be distinguished 
from those who seek the limelight.62 
6.69 The NSWLRC also included in this list the ‘extent to which the individual is or 
was in a position of vulnerability’.63 Being in a position of vulnerability may not 
always be an attribute of the plaintiff, but the ALRC agrees that vulnerability may not 
only make an invasion of privacy more offensive and harmful, but will also sometimes 
suggest information is private, or that a person should not be intruded upon. A patient 
in a hospital would seem to have a reasonable expectation of privacy, for instance.64 
6.70 The culture and background of a plaintiff may also be relevant to whether they 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy. Some information may be considered to be 
more private in some cultures than in others. These expectations may be well-known in 
the community. For example, the cultural expectations of Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander peoples and other cultural or ethnic groups may be relevant to the reasonable 
expectation of privacy in some circumstances. The Arts Law Centre of Australia 
                                                        
59  McKennitt v Ash [2005] EWHC 3003 (QB) (21 December 2005) [81]. 
60  D Butler, Submission 10. Butler cites Murray v Big Pictures (UK) Ltd [2009] Ch 481; Hosking v Runting 
(2005) 1 NZLR 1, [147]; Lee v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2010] NIQB 106, [44]. 
61  NSW Law Reform Commission, Invasion of Privacy, Report No 120 (2009) Draft Bill, cl 74(3)(a)(iv). 
62  In re S [2003] 3 WLR 1425; Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457, [142]. 
63  NSW Law Reform Commission, Invasion of Privacy, Report 120 (2009) Draft Bill cl 74(3)(a)(v). 
64  Kaye v Robertson [1991] FSR 62.  
 6. A Reasonable Expectation of Privacy 105 
stressed the importance of considering the ‘confidential or culturally sensitive nature of 
cultural knowledge, stories, images of indigenous Australians’.65 
6.71 The Australian Privacy Foundation said ‘great care’ should be given in taking 
into account age, occupation and other like factors, because it may suggest some 
people warrant less protection from invasions of privacy than others.66 The ALRC 
agrees that the various factors should be considered carefully, when determining 
whether the plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of privacy, but it seems clear that 
some attributes of a plaintiff should give rise to a greater, or lesser, expectation of 
privacy. 
Conduct of the plaintiff 
6.72 The conduct of the plaintiff may sometimes affect whether the plaintiff had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy. 
6.73 Some conduct may undermine a person’s expectation of privacy. For example, if 
a plaintiff invited publicity about a particular matter, it may be less reasonable for them 
to expect the matter to be kept private. A person who runs naked on a football field can 
hardly expect not to be photographed. 
6.74 A plaintiff cannot generally expect privacy where they have freely consented to 
the conduct that compromises their privacy.67 In Chapter 11, the ALRC recommends 
that consent be a defence to this tort, but the plaintiff’s consent to certain conduct may 
also arise when determining whether the plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy. Consent given to someone other than the defendant can also be relevant. A 
plaintiff who has consented to the publication of private information in one newspaper, 
may not always reasonably expect the information not to be published in another 
newspaper. 
6.75 A court might also ask whether the plaintiff had ‘courted publicity on the 
relevant occasion’.68 A person who has courted publicity cannot expect the same level 
of privacy as those who have not. However, care must be taken here, because it does 
not follow that such persons forgo any right to privacy, just as a person does not, by 
manifesting a desire for privacy, automatically become entitled to it. People should 
generally be able to set limits on how far the public may see into their private life. That 
a person reveals some facts about their private life certainly does not suggest that all 
aspects of their private life are then open to public attention. But if a person has invited 
publicity on a particular matter, it may generally be less reasonable for them to later 
say that the defendant went too far. 
                                                        
65  Arts Law Centre of Australia, Submission 43. See, also, Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 
105.  
66  Australian Privacy Foundation, Submission 110. 
67  ‘There is one basic principle which can be seen to underlie all the variously named versions of the 
defence of consent: it is “good sense and justice” [that] one who has … assented to an act being done 
towards him cannot, when he suffers from it, complain of it as a wrong’: Warby et al, above n 23, [12.08], 
quoting Smith v Baker [1891] AC 325, 360 (Lord Herschell). 
68  D Butler, Submission 10. Butler cites Hickey v Sunday Newspapers Ltd [2010] IEHC 349. 
106 Serious Invasions of Privacy in the Digital Era 
6.76 A claim to privacy may also be more difficult to maintain where the plaintiff has 
been deceptive or hypocritical about the particular matter. Guardian News and Media 
Limited and Guardian Australia submitted that 
a public figure who makes a public stand on a particular issue may then, 
inconsistently, seek to cloak particular facts relating to that issue in privacy: in such 
circumstances the Court should be entitled to consider those additional circumstances. 
Further it is often the case that plaintiffs’ actual conduct can differ from and be 
inconsistent with their publicly stated views.69 
6.77 On this last point, it is interesting to compare the comments of Professor James 
Griffin, in his article The Human Right to Privacy: 
a society is the healthier for combating certain forms of hypocrisy; it is certainly 
better for combating injustice. But a homosexual bishop who believes, even if 
misguidedly, that priests should not be active homosexuals is not necessarily abusing 
his power. Not all persons whose appearance differs from their reality are thereby 
hypocrites. A homophobe, whether homosexual or not, who acts hostilely towards 
homosexuals solely because they are homosexual is unjust. The injustice deserves 
exposure. That is the public interest. But if the homophobe is himself also 
homosexual, to publicize that further fact is protected neither by the outer’s freedom 
of expression not the public’s right to information. On the contrary, it is an outrageous 
infringement of the homophobe’s right to privacy. It is not that a person’s sex life is 
never of public interest but that usually it is not.70 
6.78 Other conduct of the plaintiff may strengthen a plaintiff’s claim that they had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy. Notably, it is more reasonable to expect privacy, if 
one has asked for it. The author of a document marked ‘private’ obviously thereby 
manifests some desire for the document to be treated as private. Similarly, a person 
who asks to sit in a private room of a restaurant may more reasonably expect privacy 
than a person who does not. Accordingly, the ALRC recommends that the Act refer to 
whether, and if so to what extent, the plaintiff had manifested a desire for privacy, in 
the list of relevant considerations. It was submitted that whether the plaintiff had been 
‘directly informed about how to manifest a desire not to have his or her privacy 
invaded’ might also be relevant.71 
6.79 The Australian Privacy Foundation (APF) said there was ‘little utility’ in this 
factor. A person should not ‘need to express a desire not to be the subject of a tortious 
wrong’. The APF said that this factor is ‘likely to be used by defendants who may use 
the lack of a demonstrated, overt desire as being a factor to be taken into account 
against a plaintiff’.72 The ALRC agrees that a person should not easily be taken to have 
forfeited their privacy, simply because they did not manifest a clear desire for privacy. 
But where such a desire for privacy is made manifest, it does seem more reasonable to 
expect privacy. 
                                                        
69  Guardian News and Media Limited and Guardian Australia, Submission 80. 
70  James Griffin, ‘The Human Right to Privacy’ (2007) 44 San Diego Law Review 697, 720. 
71  S Higgins, Submission 82. 
72  Australian Privacy Foundation, Submission 110. Telstra also submitted that whether someone has a 
manifest a desire not to have their privacy invaded is not relevant: Telstra, Submission 107. 
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Other matters 
6.80 The list of factors is not exhaustive. A court may consider other matters when 
determining whether a person in the plaintiff’s position would have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy. 
6.81 For example, the nature of the relationship between the parties may also be 
relevant. There do not appear to be many cases in which a person has brought an action 
for invasion of privacy against his or her spouse, partner or other family member. It 
would generally not be reasonable to expect the same level of privacy from partners 
and family members. But when relationships break down, the expectation of privacy 
may then increase. In some cases, the expectation of privacy may even be higher with 
respect to a former intimate partner, than with others. Women’s Legal Services NSW 
submitted that it is reasonable that victims of family violence should have a higher 
expectation of privacy.73 
6.82 Butler submitted a list of matters that should be considered. Many of these 
matters are included in the list recommended by the ALRC, but others include the 
intimacy of a sexual relationship; whether the disclosure would cause a risk of serious 
injury to the plaintiff; and whether the information is ‘contained in a public record 
which is part of the public consciousness’.74 
6.83 It is not possible to list or analyse all of the factors that may affect whether a 
person in a particular case can reasonably expect privacy. This is why it is important 
that a list of relevant factors be non-exhaustive. A court should consider any other 
relevant factors. By adopting the widely used test of whether the plaintiff had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy, Australian courts may also draw on the analysis of 
courts in other countries. 
 
                                                        
73  Women’s Legal Services NSW, Submission 115. 
74  D Butler, Submission 10. 
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Summary 
7.1 There are essentially three types of liability to consider when designing a cause 
of action for serious invasion of privacy: liability based on intention; liability based on 
negligence; and strict liability. 
7.2 The ALRC recommends that, for an action under the tort to succeed, the 
invasion of privacy must be either intentional or reckless. Confining the tort in this way 
will ensure that the new tort applies to the most objectionable types of invasion of 
privacy. 
7.3 Analogous torts protecting fundamental personal rights, such as assault and false 
imprisonment, also require proof of intent. 
7.4 In addition, confining the tort to intentional or reckless conduct is critical to the 
justification for the tort being actionable without proof of damage. Not requiring proof 
of actual damage—essentially, allowing actions where there is ‘only’ emotional 
distress—will provide an important level of protection and vindication for victims of 
intentional or reckless invasions of privacy, and will enhance the tort’s deterrent and 
normative influence. 
7.5 The cause of action should not extend to negligent invasions of privacy, and 
should not attract strict liability. Negligence or strict liability would make the scope of 
the tort too broad. 
7.6 This chapter also recommends that an apology should not be admissible as 
evidence of an admission of fault or liability. 
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Intentional or reckless invasions of privacy 
Recommendation 7–1 The new tort should be confined to intentional or 
reckless invasions of privacy. It should not extend to negligent invasions of 
privacy, and should not attract strict liability. 
7.7 The ALRC recommends that, in a cause of action for serious invasion of 
privacy, the defendant must be shown to have intended to invade the privacy of the 
plaintiff. This intention could encompass either: 
• a subjective desire or purpose to intrude or to misuse or disclose the plaintiff’s 
private information; or 
• circumstances where such an intent may be imputed to the defendant on the 
basis that the relevant consequences—the intrusion, misuse or disclosure—were, 
objectively assessed, obviously or substantially certain to follow. 
7.8 This approach to intent is consistent with the principles set out in Fleming’s Law 
of Torts in relation to the tort of battery,1 and with the Restatement (Third) of Torts: 
Liability for Physical & Emotional Harm.2 As discussed further below, the defendant 
should also be liable if they were reckless. 
7.9 It may be helpful for both intent and recklessness to be defined in the legislation. 
A definition of intent—including both subjective and imputed intent—could be 
modelled on the US Restatement definition, discussed below. The Commonwealth 
Criminal Code set out in the Schedule to the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) contains a 
definition of recklessness that could serve as a model for a definition of recklessness in 
the new tort. Alternatively, the provision could state that a person is reckless if they are 
aware of a substantial risk that an invasion of privacy will occur, and acts regardless of, 
or with indifference to, that risk. 
7.10 Previous law reform reports have diverged on the issue of fault. In 2008, the 
ALRC recommended that liability for invasions of privacy should be limited to 
intentional or reckless conduct, with ‘intentional’ defined as being where the defendant 
‘deliberately or wilfully invades the plaintiff’s privacy’ and ‘reckless’ having the same 
meaning as in s 5.4 of the Criminal Code (Cth).3 The ALRC said that ‘including 
                                                        
1  ‘Battery is an intentional wrong: the offensive contact must have been desired, expected or known to be 
substantially certain to result’: Carolyn Sappideen and Prue Vines (eds), Fleming’s The Law of Torts 
(Lawbook Co, 10th ed, 2011) [2.60]. 
2  ‘Section 1 provides a new general definition of intent. An “intent” to produce a consequence means either 
the purpose to produce that consequence or the knowledge that the consequence is substantially certain to 
result’: Kenneth W Simons, ‘A Restatement (Third) of Intentional Torts?’ (2006) 48 Arizona Law Review 
1061. 
3  Australian Law Reform Commission, For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice, 
Report 108 (2008) 2576. This report also cited in support: Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong, Civil 
Liability for Invasion of Privacy, (2004) [6.71]. 
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liability for negligent or accidental acts in relation to all invasions of privacy would, 
arguably, go too far’.4 
7.11 Neither the New South Wales Law Reform Commission (NSWLRC) nor the 
Victorian Law Reform Commission (VLRC) recommended a fault element as part of 
the recommended cause or causes of action, but the NSWLRC recommended a defence 
of innocent dissemination similar to that found in the Defamation Acts.5 The NSWLRC 
explained why it had not suggested a fault element in its design: 
We prefer not to lay down an absolute rule [as to whether conduct must be intentional 
(that is, deliberate or wilful)]. Submissions generally favoured extending liability 
beyond intentional conduct. While our view is that liability will generally arise under 
the legislation only where the defendant has acted intentionally there may be 
circumstances where the defendant ought to be liable for an invasion of privacy that 
is, for example, reckless or negligent, as where a doctor is grossly negligent in 
disclosing the medical records of a patient. This is a matter that is appropriately left to 
development in case law.6 
7.12 Many stakeholders agreed that the cause of action should be confined to 
intentional or reckless invasions of privacy.7 
7.13 Some stakeholders suggested that requiring the plaintiff to prove intent or 
recklessness sets too high a bar for liability or is too difficult for plaintiffs.8 However, 
although the burden of proving fault will be on the plaintiff,9 it will not always be 
difficult for the plaintiff to prove that the defendant’s conduct involves the first kind of 
intent above—that is, a subjective desire or purpose. A subjective intent may be 
obvious on the facts or readily inferred from the defendant’s behaviour or statements. 
7.14 The second kind of intent—one where the defendant is taken to have intended to 
invade the plaintiff’s privacy—could be described as an ‘imputed intent’.10 In the 
ALRC’s view, the notion of ‘imputed intent’ is consistent with the well-accepted 
principle that a person who acts with knowledge of a substantial certainty of a 
                                                        
4  ALRC, Review of Australian Privacy Law, Discussion Paper 72 (2007) 2577. See also NSW Law Reform 
Commission, Invasion of Privacy, Report 120 (2009) 171. 
5  NSW Law Reform Commission, Invasion of Privacy, Report 120 (2009) [6.9]. 
6   Ibid [5.56]. 
7  ASTRA, Submission 99; ABC, Submission 93; Australian Bankers’ Association, Submission 84; 
Guardian News and Media Limited and Guardian Australia, Submission 80; SBS, Submission 59; Google, 
Submission 54; Arts Law Centre of Australia, Submission 43. 
8  Electronic Frontiers Australia Submission 118; Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 105. 
9  The ALRC considers that any statutory action should follow the basic principle that whoever asserts 
something should bear the onus of proving it: James Goudkamp, Tort Law Defences (Hart Publishing, 
2013) 12. The ALRC does not consider that a statutory cause of action should follow the unusual, and 
contentious, position in relation to trespass off the highway that the onus of proving lack of fault should 
be on the defendant: see further Rosalie Balkin and Jim Davis, Law of Torts (LexisNexis Butterworths, 
5th ed, 2013) 25–27. 
10   It was such an imputed intent that Wright J found in the well-known case of Wilkinson v Downton when 
he said: ‘It is difficult to imagine that such a statement, made suddenly and with apparent seriousness, 
could fail to produce grave effects under the circumstances upon any but an exceptionally indifferent 
person, and therefore an intention to produce such an effect must be imputed’: Wilkinson v Downton 
(1897) 2 QB 57, 59. In this case, the defendant had, as a ‘practical joke’, told the plaintiff that her 
husband had been badly injured and needed her to collect him in a horse and cab. Mrs Wilkinson suffered 
a psychiatric illness as a result. 
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consequence will be taken to have intended that consequence. ‘Imputed intent’ is a 
short-hand term for this method of finding intent. 
7.15 Therefore, a plaintiff would not necessarily have to prove that the defendant had 
a subjective intent (or purpose) to invade his or her privacy. An intent may be imputed 
from the circumstances: if an invasion of privacy is substantially or obviously certain 
to follow from certain conduct, then the defendant may be taken to have intended the 
invasion of privacy, even if the defendant in fact did not put his or her mind to 
invading the plaintiff’s privacy. 
7.16 There is little argument against the proposition that, if a statutory tort of invasion 
of privacy is to be enacted (or a common law tort developed), it should be actionable 
where the defendant has intentionally invaded the privacy of the plaintiff. Deliberate 
and unjustifiable invasions of an individual’s privacy11 are clearly culpable and beyond 
what any person should be expected to endure in the ordinary circumstances and 
exigencies of everyday life12 or from their interactions with others in society. 
7.17 Protection against intentional or reckless conduct is clearly within the protection 
intended by art 17 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which 
provides that: ‘no one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his 
privacy, family, home or correspondence’. Intentional or reckless invasions of privacy 
would be likely to be considered ‘arbitrary interferences’ for the purposes of art 17. 
7.18 It is sometimes said that the purpose of a tort is to remedy the harm that is 
suffered by a plaintiff, and that the harm in an invasion of privacy is the interference 
with the plaintiff’s dignity and autonomy, regardless of the type of conduct that causes 
that interference. However, it can also be argued that the purpose of a tort or statutory 
action is to remedy and prevent the wrong which the plaintiff suffers or may suffer, and 
that the nature of the conduct and the purpose or motives or state of mind of the actor 
are closely bound up with making that conduct wrongful.13 ‘Intentional wrongdoers are 
the worst type of tortfeasor, worse than merely reckless or negligent actors.’14 This 
notion is also reflected in the ‘seriousness’ element, discussed in Chapter 8. 
7.19 Most jurisdictions that have a tort or torts of invasion of privacy require that the 
conduct be intentional or reckless. The statutory torts in four Canadian provinces— 
British Columbia, Saskatchewan, Newfoundland and Labrador—all apply to a 
violation of privacy done ‘wilfully’.15 These statutory offences for violation of 
another’s privacy do not distinguish between different types of conduct or invasion. 
                                                        
11  That is, assuming that the requirement that there exists a reasonable expectation of privacy has been met. 
12  Lord Goff enunciated a similar principle in relation to when a touching in the course of daily life will or 
will not amount to the tort of battery, in the case of Collins v Wilcock (1984) 1 WLR 1172.  
13  That the ‘mere touching of another in anger is a battery’: Cole v Turner (1704) 6 Mod Rep 149. Anger or 
ill intent may turn what would otherwise be an everyday contact into a battery, while hostility is no longer 
required for touching to amount to battery: Rixon v Star City Pty Ltd (2001) 53 NSWLR 98, 112. 
14   Simons, above n 2, 1079. The author does, however, go on to show how this simple hierarchy of fault is 
not the whole picture. 
15  Privacy Act, RSBC 1996, c 373 (British Columbia) s 1(1); Privacy Act, RSNL 1990, c P-22 
(Newfoundland and Labrador) s 3(1); Privacy Act, RSS 1978, c P-24 (Saskatchewan) s 2. Only Manitoba 
uses a different formulation which is that a person ‘substantially, unreasonably and without a claim of 
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7.20 Torts of intrusion upon seclusion in other jurisdictions generally require 
intentional or reckless conduct. In the American Law Institute’s Restatement (Second) 
of Tort (1977), which identifies four privacy torts,16 only the formulation of the tort of 
‘intrusion upon seclusion’, at s 652B includes the element of intention: 
One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the seclusion of another 
or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his 
privacy, if the invasion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person. 
7.21 In 2012, the Ontario Supreme Court adopted the elements set out in the 
Restatement (Second) of Tort, to recognise a common law tort of intrusion. Sharpe JA, 
with whom Winkler CJO and Cunningham ACJ agreed, noted: 
the defendant’s conduct must be intentional, within which I would include reckless... 
A claim for intrusion upon seclusion will arise only for deliberate and significant 
invasions of personal privacy.17 
7.22 Similarly, in a New Zealand case about intrusion upon seclusion, C v Holland, 
Whata J said that the plaintiff must show an intentional intrusion, where intentional 
‘connotes an affirmative act, not an unwitting or simply careless intrusion’.18 
7.23 The Restatement (Second) of Tort also identifies a tort relating to giving 
publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another person, in s 652D. There is 
no express reference in this tort to fault on the part of the actor.19 
7.24 The ALRC considers that fault should be required for cases of invasion of 
privacy involving publication of private information. Intentional—or deliberate—or 
reckless publications are the primary mischief to which the tort should be directed, and 
there currently exists a gap in legal protection for such invasions of privacy. While 
fault is not a distinct element in the torts relating to invasion of privacy by wrongful 
use or disclosure of private information in other jurisdictions, most have involved 
deliberate disclosures,20 either by the media or by individuals formerly in a personal 
relationship. Fault is rarely at issue, as the defendant’s intent to publish or 
communicate the information about the plaintiff has been obvious. For example, in 
Hosking v Runting, the publication of a photograph of the plaintiff’s infant children by 
the defendants, a photographer and media company, was clearly deliberate. 
                                                                                                                                             
right’ violating the privacy of another, but then includes a defence that the defendant neither knew or 
should have known that the conduct would have violated the privacy: Privacy Act, CCSM 1996, c P125 
(Manitoba) ss 2(1), 5(1)(b). 
16  See Ch 5. 
17  Jones v Tsige (2012) ONCA 32, [71]–[72]. The ALRC’s recommendation on a threshold of seriousness in 
Ch 8 reflects the criterion of the invasion being ‘significant’.  
18  C v Holland [2012] 3 NZLR 672 ,[94]–[95] (Whata J). 
19  The same formulation was adopted by the New Zealand Court of Appeal when it recognised a tort of 
invasion of privacy by publication of private information: Hosking v Runting (2005) 1 NZLR 1, [117] 
(Gault and Blanchard JJ), [259] (Tipping J). 
20  K Barker, Submission 126. 
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7.25 Some stakeholders have suggested that the ALRC should distinguish between 
the fault required for intrusions upon seclusion and the fault required for wrongful use 
or disclosure of private information.21 Others have argued that differing fault 
requirements for different kinds of invasions of privacy justify having two separate 
torts.22 However, conduct invading privacy will often involve both types of invasion 
and the ALRC considers that the creation of two separate statutory torts would be 
undesirable. Further, for the reasons set out below, the ALRC considers that any 
liability under the new tort should be confined to intentional or reckless conduct, 
regardless of the type of invasion. 
7.26 Data breaches caused by or contributed to by negligent conduct, omissions or 
poor security systems are discussed below. In most cases, if within the jurisdiction, 
they will attract significant regulatory consequences, which may now include civil 
penalties, and will give rise to a range of other legal remedies. 
Recklessness 
7.27 It is the ALRC’s view that liability should be extended to situations where the 
defendant’s conduct invaded the plaintiff’s privacy recklessly: that is, where the 
defendant was aware of the risk of an invasion of privacy and was indifferent to 
whether or not an invasion of the plaintiff’s privacy would occur as a result of the 
conduct.23 
7.28 Recklessness may be described as reckless indifference to a result. In a case 
involving workplace bullying and harassment, Spigelman CJ said: 
Clearly something substantially more certain [than reasonable foreseeability] is 
required for the intentional tort ... However, a test of reckless indifference to a result 
will, in this context, satisfy the requirement of intention.24 
7.29 Many stakeholders supported the proposal that fault should include 
recklessness.25 However, some stakeholders opposed this. For example, Free TV 
submitted that: 
News and current affairs reporting takes place under strict time constraints that 
require rapid evaluation of material. In these circumstances, penalties for reckless 
                                                        
21  Ibid. 
22  Ibid. 
23  Recklessness therefore looks to the subjective awareness of the risk of an invasion, whereas an imputed 
intention rests on the obvious or substantial certainty that the invasion would occur.    
24  Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Naidu (2007) 71 NSWLR 417, [76]–[80]. While this statement seems to 
equate or subsume recklessness within intention, the ALRC considers it clearer to treat recklessness as a 
separate type of fault from subjective or imputed intention. Note also Northern Territory v Mengel (1995) 
185 CLR 307, [60]: ‘Principle suggests that misfeasance in public office is a counterpart to, and should be 
confined in the same way as, those torts which impose liability on private individuals for the intentional 
infliction of harm. For present purposes, we include in that concept acts which are calculated in the 
ordinary course to cause harm, as in Wilkinson v Downton, or which are done with reckless indifference 
to the harm that is likely to ensue, as is the case where a person, having recklessly ignored the means of 
ascertaining the existence of a contract, acts in a way that procures its breach.’  
25  Insurance Council of Australia, Submission 102; ASTRA, Submission 99; ABC, Submission 93; 
Australian Bankers’ Association, Submission 84; SBS, Submission 59; Telstra, Submission 45; Arts Law 
Centre of Australia, Submission 43. 
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breaches would be likely to introduce a level of conservatism that may prevent or 
delay the reporting of news, because the test for ‘recklessness’ in law carries with it a 
necessary value judgment about what is a reasonable or unreasonable risk.26 
7.30 The ALRC agrees that there are important public interest considerations 
involved here. The new tort addresses these concerns by providing that the public 
interest in the reporting of news on matters of public importance and concern is a 
matter that a court may take into account, when determining whether there has been an 
actionable invasion of privacy.27 These considerations are not best addressed by 
excluding any liability for reckless conduct. 
What conduct must the fault relate to? 
7.31 The ALRC considers that the new tort should only be actionable where the 
defendant intended to invade the plaintiff’s privacy in one of the ways set out in the 
legislation or was reckless as to that invasion. It should not be actionable where there is 
merely an intention to do an act that has the consequence of invading a person’s 
privacy. In some cases, this distinction will be difficult to draw, such that the 
consequences of an act will be so inextricably linked to the act, or so substantially 
certain to follow,28 that an intention to do the act will strongly suggest an intention to 
bring about the consequences of the act. But this will not always be the case. 
Furthermore, it may be quite common to intend an action that will have the 
consequence of invading someone’s privacy, without intending to invade their privacy. 
7.32 For example, if an absent-minded person walks into a neighbour’s home, 
thinking it is their own home, the person may have invaded the neighbour’s privacy. 
The action in walking through the front door may have been intended,29 but the 
invasion of the neighbour’s privacy was not. It would merely have been done 
negligently. 
7.33 To take a more common example, a media entity may publish a story that has 
the effect of invading a person’s privacy, but without any knowledge of the facts which 
would make it an invasion of that person’s privacy.30 An example would be 
interviewing a person about the fact that they were adopted as a baby: unknown to the 
journalist, the person’s adoptive parents had not disclosed to their friends the fact that 
they had adopted their baby. The publishing of the story may have been intended, but 
not the consequences of the publication, namely, the invasion of the parents’ privacy 
by the publication of this information. 
7.34 Some stakeholders said the relevant intent should be an intent to invade the 
privacy of the plaintiff and not merely an intent to do an act which invades the privacy 
                                                        
26  Free TV, Submission 109. 
27  See Ch 9. 
28  Sappideen and Vines, above n 1, 34. 
29  Ibid 88. 
30  As explained below, lack of knowledge of the facts that make the statement defamatory would not be an 
excuse to the strict liability under that tort. 
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of the plaintiff.31 While Telstra considered current privacy protections sufficient, it 
submitted that, if there were a cause of action, 
intent should be determined by reference to the invasion of privacy and the harm to 
the complainant, rather than the conduct of the defendant, in order to be as specific 
and targeted in its application as possible.32 
7.35 There is much confusion over the use of the term ‘intention’. However, some 
points may clarify the ALRC’s recommendation. The requirement does not mean that 
the defendant needs to intend to commit a legal wrong, or that he or she intends to 
fulfil the other ingredients for liability (seriousness, lack of public interest justification 
or defence). This would be too stringent a hurdle for the plaintiff to overcome.33 It does 
mean that the defendant needs to have been aware of the facts from which it can be 
objectively assessed whether or not the plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy and of the facts that an intrusion or disclosure would (or in the case of 
recklessness, may) occur. 
7.36 Two examples may explain this last point. First, in relation to private 
information: some information is obviously private so that there would be no doubt that 
the defendant would have knowledge of the facts that support a reasonable expectation 
of privacy. For example, secretly filming a person in the shower, as in C v Holland,34 
or surreptitiously prying into someone’s bank account, as in Jones v Tsige.35 
7.37 However, in other cases, the defendant may have no knowledge of the facts that 
would make the disclosure an invasion of privacy. An example is a photographer who 
takes a photograph of a public event, without realising that the photograph captures a 
private activity, perhaps of people inside a building in the background to the event. The 
taking of the photograph in that case would not be an intentional or reckless intrusion 
into the privacy of the people involved. 
Intend the harm? 
7.38 Some may argue that requiring an intent to intrude into space or affairs that are 
private, or disclose information that is private, will remove liability for some conduct 
that results in a serious invasion of privacy. However, if it were sufficient merely to 
intend the act, and not the consequences of the act—being the invasion of privacy— 
then this would effectively impose either a negligence standard (in the sense that the 
defendant ought to have realised the invasion would occur and taken care that it not do 
so) or a strict liability standard as in defamation. In defamation, the publisher will be 
strictly liable if the publication defames the plaintiff, even if the defendant was 
unaware of the facts making it defamatory,36 or even of the plaintiff’s existence or 
                                                        
31  See, eg, SBS, Submission 59; Telstra, Submission 45; Arts Law Centre of Australia, Submission No 15 to 
DPM&C Issues Paper, 2011. 
32  Telstra, Submission 45. 
33  N Witzleb, Submission 116. 
34  C v Holland [2012] 3 NZLR 672. 
35  Jones v Tsige (2012) ONCA 32. 
36  Cassidy v Daily Mirror [1929] KB 331; Lee v Wilson (1934) 51 CLR 276.  
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circumstances.37 For reasons discussed below, the ALRC considers that negligence 
should not be sufficient fault for an action for breach of privacy, and strict liability 
would be unduly burdensome and discouraging to other worthwhile competing 
interests. 
7.39 It is also clear, by reference to the existing law on other intentional torts, that if 
the defendant intended the invasion of privacy (that is, to intrude upon the plaintiff’s 
seclusion or to disclose private information), it would not be necessary, in order to 
prove intent, for the plaintiff to show that the defendant intended to offend, distress or 
harm the plaintiff by the conduct.38 In an analogous tort, the tort of battery, the tort is 
made out by proof of an intent to touch, without the need to show an intent to inflict the 
actual personal injury that followed.39 The question then becomes one of whether or 
not the particular damage claimed is too remote from the defendant’s tort. In 
intentional torts, the test is whether the damage claimed was a natural and probable 
consequence of the tort.40 
7.40 In some cases, a person will have intent to inflict harm or cause distress to the 
plaintiff. In such cases, this may satisfy the intent element for the tort,41 but also 
amount to ‘malice’ in law that would aggravate the damages that could be claimed.42 
However, many invasions of privacy will not be motivated by malice towards the 
victim. If a media organisation invades a person’s privacy, this may largely be 
motivated by a desire to inform the public, pursue a newsworthy story, attract more 
viewers or increase the sale of newspapers, rather than to harm the victim. 
Fault and actionability per se 
7.41 If the tort were not confined to intentional or reckless invasions of privacy, but 
was extended to include negligence or provide for strict liability, this would undermine 
an important justification for making the tort actionable without proof of damage. 
Rather, such an extension would require proof of actual damage to be consistent with 
other tort law. 
                                                        
37  Hulton v Jones [1910] AC 20; Mirror Newspapers Ltd v Fitzpatrick (1984) 1 NSWLR 643. It is only if  
the fact of publication itself was accidental or could not have been foreseen that a defendant may escape 
liability: Sappideen and Vines, above n 1, 631. See also, Anthony Dugdale and Michael Jones (eds), 
Clerk and Lindsell on Torts (Sweet & Maxwell, Limited, 19th ed, 2006) 1311–1312. 
38  This is described by Simons as a ‘dual intent’, required by courts in many states of the United States for 
battery, but he prefers as ‘the only plausible interpretation of the case law’, the ‘single intent’ requirement 
favoured by courts in other states: Simons, above n 2, 1067. 
39  What injuries or damage flowing from the tort may be compensated in an intentional tort action is 
governed by the principles of remoteness of damage: whether the particular head of damage is a natural 
and probable result of the conduct: Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Naidu (2007) 71 NSWLR 417, [81]. 
40  Palmer Bruyn & Parker Pty Ltd v Parsons (2001) 208 CLR 388.  
41  ‘If the only motive of the actor is a desire to harm the plaintiff, this fact becomes a very important factor. 
A motive of this sort is sometimes called a disinterested malevolence, to indicate that the defendant has 
no interests of his own to promote by his conduct, other than venting his ill will. It is sometimes said that 
an evil motive cannot make tortious an act that is otherwise rightful. The nature of the motive, however, 
may be a factor that tips the scale in determining whether the liability should be imposed or not’: 
American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law of Torts (Second) (1977) s 870. 
42  Giller v Procopets (2008) 24 VR 1.  
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7.42 It is not just the law of negligence that requires proof of actual damage. Usually 
the isolated remaining common law tort causes of action imposing strict liability also 
require damage, as in the case of liability for nuisance arising out of a positive conduct 
creating a nuisance.43 Statutory strict liabilities, such as civil liability to pay 
compensation for misleading or deceptive conduct, or civil liability in relation to 
defective products, also only arise where the plaintiff proves loss.44 
7.43 Defamation liability, which is strict, is a special case. It is actionable per se: 
there is no requirement that the plaintiff suffer ‘actual’ or ‘special’, that is, provable 
damage. However, it works slightly differently in that a presumption of ‘general’ 
damage to reputation is inherent in the tort itself.45 
7.44 Overall, defamation is not a tort the ALRC considers should be used as a model 
for liability for invasions of privacy, even though some of its elements and defences 
provide a useful point of comparison. Although there will be no presumption of general 
damage where the new tort of invasion of privacy is made out—it will be for the 
plaintiff to persuade the court what emotional distress or other harm they have 
suffered—the ALRC considers that the combination of strict liability and actionability 
per se for a new tort of invasion of privacy would still be undesirably onerous on many 
organisations and individuals. 
Negligence 
7.45 The ALRC does not recommend that negligent invasion of privacy be actionable 
under the new tort. Negligence depends on whether the actor’s conduct46 measured up 
to an objective standard of what a reasonable person in the position of the defendant 
would or would not do in the circumstances. In this objective test, the intention of the 
defendant is not relevant, even if the defendant was well-meaning.47 
7.46 A number of stakeholders submitted that liability for breach of privacy should 
be imposed for negligent invasions of privacy, in addition to reckless and intentional 
invasions of privacy.48 As noted above, however, many stakeholders submitted or 
                                                        
43  Sappideen and Vines, above n 1, 509. 
44  See, eg, Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) sch 2. 
45  ‘[Special damages] are much less important than general damages, which are presumed to follow 
publication of the libel. The claimant does not have to prove the particular respects in which it has 
damaged his reputation or injured his feelings.’: Eric Barendt et al, Media Law: Text, Cases and 
Materials (Pearson, 2013) 445; Sappideen and Vines, above n 1, 632–634. See also Defamation Act 2005 
(NSW) 2005 s 7(2).There are equivalent provisions in the other Australian uniform defamation laws 
which provide that ‘the publication of defamatory matter of any kind is actionable without proof of 
special damage’. ‘Special damage’ refers to particular financial loss which the plaintiff proves was caused 
by the tort, such as cancellation of a sponsorship contract or loss of profits.  See, also, Ch 8 and Ell v 
Milne (No 8) [2014] NSWSC 175 (7 March 2014).  
46  In this context, ‘conduct’ might be comprised of an omission to do something. It could also refer to the 
actor’s conduct in operating or maintaining a system, such as a data storage system. 
47  Blyth v Birmingham Waterworks Company (1856) 11 Ex Ch 781; Vaughan v Menlove (1837) 132 ER 490 
(CP).  
48  See, eg, Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Submission 66; Australian Privacy 
Foundation, Submission 39; Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 30; B Arnold, Submission 28; 
T Gardner, Submission 3.  
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argued strongly that the requisite fault should not extend to negligence. Some argued 
that fault should be relevant only to damages, or that reasonable care should be a 
defence.49 
7.47 There were two main arguments for extending liability to negligence: first the 
harm that may result from negligence; secondly, the deterrent or regulatory effect of 
negligence liability. 
Harm caused by negligence 
7.48 Some stakeholders who called for negligence-based liability stressed the harm 
that may be caused by unintentional invasions of privacy,50 arguing that negligence can 
be just as damaging as, or even more damaging than, intentional or reckless conduct.51 
7.49 Two possible types of harm need to be distinguished. First, where ‘actual 
damage’—in the form of physical injury, psychiatric illness, property damage or 
financial loss—has been suffered by the plaintiff from the defendant’s negligent 
invasion of privacy; and secondly, where the harm to the plaintiff is emotional distress 
only. 
7.50 The first kind of harm may already be actionable under existing law. The ALRC 
considers that, because of this, the new cause of action should not extend to cover such 
situations. As the ALRC pointed out in the Discussion Paper, if actual damage is 
suffered beyond ‘mere’ emotional distress, it may well be the case that the plaintiff 
would already have a tort action in negligence because the defendant would be under a 
duty of care to the plaintiff. 
7.51 Whether the defendant owed the plaintiff the necessary legal duty of care would 
depend on a range of factors, particularly the type of damage suffered by the plaintiff. 
It is straightforward to succeed in a negligence claim where a plaintiff has suffered 
physical injury or property damage due to another’s negligence. If the harm is in the 
form of psychiatric illness, civil liability statutes in most states and territories impose 
extra requirements for recovery.52 If the claim is for pure economic loss, then the 
requirements for liability are specific, but Australian courts do recognise such claims in 
limited circumstances. Much will depend on whether the defendant knew of the 
plaintiff and the risk of financial loss to that plaintiff, whether the defendant had made 
a representation to the plaintiff and whether the plaintiff was able to protect themself 
from the effects of the defendant’s negligence.53 
                                                        
49  See, eg, Office of the Privacy Commissioner NSW, Submission No 79 to DPM&C Issues Paper, 2011; 
Maurice Blackburn Lawyers, Submission No 45 to DPM&C Issues Paper, 2011.  
50  See, eg, Women’s Legal Services NSW, Submission 57; Electronic Frontiers Australia, Submission 44; 
Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 30; C Jansz-Richardson, Submission 24; Office of the 
Information Commissioner, Queensland, Submission 20. ‘In many cases, regardless of the intent of the 
invasion, the resultant consequences are the same, and the revelation that the circumstances were caused 
by negligence or a failure to act is likely to be cold comfort to the individual or group whose privacy has 
been breached’: C Jansz-Richardson, Submission 24. 
51  Electronic Frontiers Australia Submission 118. 
52  See, eg, Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) pt 3.  
53  Perre v Apand (1999) 198 CLR 180.  
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7.52 This kind of negligence may occur in the privacy context in situations involving 
data breaches. In many cases of data breach, the parties are already known to each 
other through a series of transactions or contractual or licensing arrangements—the 
plaintiff may, for example, be a customer of the defendant. 
7.53 In addition, or alternatively to tort liability, the plaintiff who has suffered actual 
loss as a result of a negligent data breach is likely in many cases to have a claim for 
breach of contract. It would not, it is suggested, be difficult to find an implied term that 
private information about the plaintiff should not be disclosed except for the purposes 
of the contract or in compliance with terms of the contract. Liability in contract may be 
strict or negligence-based. In addition, the plaintiff may also have a claim under the 
Australian Consumer Law or an equitable claim for breach of confidence, if the 
information was collected in confidence, as would often be the case. 
7.54 In the second, and probably more common,54 type of scenario, where the 
plaintiff has suffered only emotional distress, negligence liability would provide no 
remedy, nor would consumer protection laws. Contract law will only remedy mental 
distress when protection or freedom from such distress is a major or important purpose 
of the contract.55 Compensation for distress may be awarded in appropriate contractual 
breach of confidence cases.56 
7.55 Negligence law would provide no remedy, because the well-entrenched policy 
of the common law—and now the clear legislative policy across most Australian states 
and territories—is that liability for negligence generally does not extend to ‘mere’ 
emotional distress.57 PIAC argued that this is not a convincing reason of principle as to 
why liability for invasion of privacy should not do so, as ‘the nature of the breach is 
distinct and the facts are commonly if not invariably different from those involved in 
other forms of negligence’.58 The Australian Privacy Foundation also argued that the 
new tort ‘is discrete and stands alone, being designed to address specific forms of 
harm’.59 
7.56 However, there are very many distressing situations in society caused by 
another’s negligence, yet recovery is denied. If the new tort were to provide both that it 
should be actionable per se or should treat emotional distress as actual damage and that 
fault should extend to negligence, the coherence and overall consistency of the law in 
Australia would be undermined. Not only would the proposal conflict with clear 
legislative policy, but it is also difficult to see, as a matter of fairness, why a person 
should be able to recover for emotional distress caused by a negligent but unintentional 
invasion of privacy when another can recover nothing for emotional distress in a wide 
range of situations: the loss of a child’s or other family member’s life due to the 
                                                        
54  Leaving aside the common problem of fraud and identity theft where the plaintiff suffers actual financial 
loss. 
55  Farley v Skinner (2002) 2 AC 750, 755; John W Carter, Contract Law in Australia (Lexis Nexis 
Butterworths, 6th ed, 2013) 855.   
56  Cornelius v de Taranto [2001] EMLR 12, [69]. 
57  See, eg, Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 31. 
58  Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 105. 
59  Australian Privacy Foundation, Submission 110. 
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negligence of another person; from closely witnessing a terrifying event caused by 
negligence; or even from malicious conduct specifically aimed at distressing the 
plaintiff.60 
7.57 Some stakeholders submitted that it would be consistent with the tort of 
‘negligent trespass’, which is still recognised in Australia,61 if a tort of invasion of 
privacy was actionable per se even where committed negligently.62 However, the 
analogy is arguably inapt. While there are many case authorities, including in the High 
Court of Australia, which support an action of negligent trespass for direct physical 
impact and injury,63 there is no case authority which supports the view that a trespass 
comprising an assault or false imprisonment and without any physical damage is 
actionable as a trespass (per se) on the basis of negligence. In fact there are numerous 
cases which analyse the requirement of intention in assault cases and whether intention 
was made out on the facts.64 The ALRC suggests that the correct view is that assault 
and false imprisonment—and their actionability per se—are torts of intention or 
recklessness. Being concerned with intangible and dignitary interests of the plaintiff, 
these are the torts that are most analogous to an invasion of privacy.65 
Deterrence and regulation 
7.58 The second main argument advanced by stakeholders for extending liability to 
negligence, was the potential deterrent or regulatory effect of liability. Excluding 
negligence, it was argued, would encourage indifference to invasions of privacy.66 
Some argue that data breaches are often the result of negligence, and if the cause of 
action included negligence it would encourage companies to take steps to prevent such 
                                                        
60  As in the United Kingdom, there is no tort in Australia of intentionally causing ‘mere’, even severe, 
emotional distress.  
61  Unlike in England since the Court of Appeal decision of Letang v Cooper (1965) in which Lord Denning 
limited actions in trespass to intentional wrongs. This decision has been criticised in Australia: NSW v 
Knight [2002] NSWCA 393. This decision has also been criticised in the United Kingdom. See Ulele 
Burnham, ‘Negligent False Imprisonment—Scope for Re-Emergence?’ (1998) 61 Modern Law Review 
573. But the real problem identified in that article seems to be not that a tort of false imprisonment cannot 
be brought on the basis of trespass if negligently committed, but that it is not clear if mere detention is to 
be treated as actual damage for the purposes of a negligence action. Further, in England, there is the 
difficulty of suing public authorities in negligence. 
62  N Witzleb, Submission 116. 
63  Williams v Milotin (1957) 97 CLR 465, 474. 
64  Sappideen and Vines, above n 1, 35. Kit Barker et al, The Law of Torts in Australia (Oxford University 
Press, 2012) 46. Cf Balkin and Davis, above n 9, 41. Luntz et al, notes the lack of case authority for the 
proposition that there can be a ‘negligent assault’: Harold Luntz et al, Torts: Cases and Commentary 
(Lexis Nexis Butterworths, 7th ed, 2013) 621. Lord Hope defined assault as ‘any act by which the 
defendant, intentionally or recklessly, causes the claimant to apprehend immediate and unlawful personal 
violence’, noting that ‘this meaning is well vouched by authority’: R v Ireland [1997] 4 All ER 255. 
65  The same may well be true of battery, leaving the generic term ‘negligent trespass’ to apply only to 
negligent, direct, unauthorised, physical contact. Barker et al argue against the continuing role of 
negligent trespass. Barker et al, above n 64, 34. In Marion’s Case, McHugh J described battery as 
follows: ‘The essential element of the tort is an intentional or reckless, direct act of the defendant which 
makes or has the effect of causing contact with the body of the plaintiff’: Marion’s Case (1992) 175 CLR 
218, 311.   
66  Law Institute of Victoria, Submission 22. 
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breaches.67 Bruce Arnold submitted that the action for negligence ‘provides a 
necessary and appropriate incentive for Australian organisations to move towards best 
practice in information management’.68 
7.59 The Law Institute of Victoria argued that ‘[i]ntentional privacy breaches, ‘such 
as those alleged against News of the World in the United Kingdom, are not the norm’: 
The larger threat comes from unintentional breaches caused by: a lack of 
understanding of privacy obligations; technological malfunction and human error; or 
systemic failures.69 
7.60 PIAC also suggested that many systemic breaches of privacy may be due to 
negligence: 
Restricting liability to reckless or intentional acts may also discourage organisations 
from taking steps to ensure that their privacy management systems are adequate, and 
may encourage indifference to privacy protection.70 
7.61 However, at least in respect of data breaches by government agencies and 
organisations with a turnover of more than $3 million, there is already considerable 
regulation to protect private information. Such entities are required to take such steps 
under the Privacy Act (and to some extent the Telecommunications Act), or under state 
and territory legislation.71 Although it could be argued that these Acts have significant 
gaps, due to exemptions for most small businesses, for the media, and for most 
individuals, the new tort cause of action should not be designed as a remedy for 
deliberate exemptions in existing legislation. Instead, it may be more appropriate for 
that legislation to be reviewed, amended or strengthened. 
7.62 Further, entities subject to the Privacy Act whose activities result in data 
breaches, whether caused negligently, accidentally or by systemic problems, will be 
subject to a range of remedial responses by the Privacy Commissioner. Since March 
2014, this includes the possibility of substantial civil penalties.72 While the advent of 
these reforms and new regulatory powers is not a reason, of itself, to stall the 
introduction of a tort directed at intentional invasions of individual privacy, as argued 
by some stakeholders,73 they do counteract the argument that the existing law 
encourages indifference and negligence in systems maintenance. The ALRC considers 
that, in general, regulatory responses are a better way to deal with data breaches than a 
civil action for invasion of privacy, but as noted above, in any event many entities may 
be subject to a range of other civil legal liabilities. 
                                                        
67  Electronic Frontiers Australia, Submission 44: ‘Indeed, data breaches … are often the result of 
negligence. The cause of action should therefore be available for intentional, reckless and negligent 
invasions of privacy’. 
68  B Arnold, Submission 28. See, also, Law Institute of Victoria, Submission 22. The Law Institute of 
Victoria submitted that, ‘In the absence of a cause of action, there is little to no benefit or incentive for 
holders of private information in taking privacy obligations seriously’. 
69  Law Institute of Victoria, Submission 22. 
70  Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 30. 
71  See Ch 3. 
72  Privacy Amendment (Enhancing Privacy Protection) Act 2012 (Cth). 
73  Interactive Games and Entertainment Association, Submission 86. 
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Too wide a liability 
7.63 If the new tort extended to negligent invasions of privacy, there is a serious 
potential for a wide range of people to face liability for invading privacy by common 
human errors. While the ALRC agrees that human error is not synonymous with 
negligence,74 and that negligence depends on an objective standard of the reasonable 
person, nevertheless the law of negligence does not consider degrees of negligence. A 
small degree of negligence, a momentary lapse of attention, may be adjudged to be 
negligence, and the extent of the harm is irrelevant to this issue. Further, in a 
negligence case, the defendant’s conduct is also a breach of a pre-existing legal duty 
owed to the plaintiff or to a class to whom the plaintiff belongs: what may be expected 
of a defendant depends on the nature and scope of the duty of care. The proposed 
liability would not depend on a pre-existing duty of care. 
7.64 A tort based on negligent invasion of privacy could capture many accidental or 
unintended occurrences. It is entirely conceivable that many legitimate activities may 
involve the unintended invasion of the privacy of a person unknown to the defendant. 
Street photography, CCTV cameras, drone usage or media activities may inadvertently 
capture footage or images of private activities or intrude into private spheres. Private 
information may be posted online or disclosed or lost in circumstances that a court 
could find to be negligent, even though that was done accidentally. If negligence were 
a basis of liability, it would be open for a plaintiff to argue that the defendant should 
have taken more precautions to ensure that these consequences did not happen. 
7.65 It was suggested in the Canadian case, Jones v Tsige, that confining the tort to 
intentional and reckless conduct will help ensure the new tort will not ‘open the 
floodgates’ to privacy claims.75 
7.66 While data breaches by commercial and government entities should be treated 
seriously by the law, there is a real risk, in the ALRC’s view, that extending liability to 
negligence generally would lead to onerous and broad liability under the new tort, and 
in view of existing remedies and regulation outlined above, there is no compelling case 
to so extend it. 
Chilling effect of negligence liability 
7.67 Some stakeholders argued that extending liability to include negligence might 
lead people to be ‘unduly careful about disclosing information’.76 It may lead to 
excessive self-censorship77 or too great a chilling effect on everyday activities that 
carry even a remote risk of unintentionally invading someone’s privacy. The Arts Law 
Centre said that it would be concerned 
that creating a cause of action for negligence has the potential to create a great deal of 
uncertainty and discourage artists from engaging in activities that could accidentally 
                                                        
74  N Witzleb, Submission 116. 
75  Jones v Tsige (2012) ONCA 32, [71]–[72]. 
76  ASTRA, Submission 47. 
77  National Association for the Visual Arts Ltd, Submission 78. 
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or inadvertently expose them to the risk of breaching the law. Inadvertent invasions 
will lead to self censorship, chilling effect.78 
7.68 The Australian Privacy Foundation argues that a robust public interest defence, 
which protects freedom of speech, would obviate problems that negligence liability 
would chill or inhibit free expression or free speech.79 However, it is implicit in the 
assertion of public interest that the conduct was deliberately done in the public interest. 
Recklessness is a preferable standard to gross negligence 
7.69 Some stakeholders, while accepting the argument that negligence may be too 
wide a liability, argued that ‘gross negligence’ should be sufficient fault to ground 
liability. The UNSW Cyberspace Law and Policy Community submitted that 
excluding negligence entirely provides minimal incentive to put in place procedures to 
protect privacy. The inclusion of a ‘gross negligence’ standard would provide such 
incentives, while avoiding liability for the ‘absent-minded person’ who ‘walks into a 
neighbour’s home’.... A gross negligence standard will increase the reach of the 
proposed tort.80 
7.70 However, Australian tort law does not recognise a concept of gross negligence81 
and it could be a source of uncertainty. 
7.71 In the ALRC’s view, the inclusion of recklessness as a form of fault will come 
close to what some may have in mind when referring to ‘gross negligence’. While 
negligence refers to unreasonable inadvertence to a risk, a situation where the actor 
ought reasonably to have foreseen but did not foresee a risk, recklessness refers to a 
subjective state of mind where the actor was aware of the risk but did not care whether 
or not it occurred.82 In many situations involving serious data breaches, for example, 
the risk may be well-known in the industry so that it may be obvious or provable that 
the defendant was aware of the risk, providing the basis for a finding of recklessness, 
or even intent on an imputed basis. 
Strict liability 
7.72 The ALRC does not support the new tort imposing strict liability. Strict liability 
leads to liability regardless of fault. If the cause of action were one of strict liability, 
                                                        
78  Arts Law Centre of Australia, Submission 113. 
79  Australian Privacy Foundation, Submission 110. See also N Witzleb, Submission 116. 
80  UNSW Cyberspace Law and Policy Community, Submission 98. 
81  Sappideen and Vines, above n 1, 148. The criminal law has a standard of criminal negligence which tends 
to be higher than the civil standard of care in negligence. For example the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) 
sch, s 5.5 defines negligence as conduct that involves such a great falling short of reasonable care that the 
conduct merits criminal punishment. 
82  See Lord Millet in Three Rivers DC v Bank of England (No 3) about the tort of misfeasance in public 
office: ‘This is an intentional tort. It involves deliberate or reckless wrongdoing. It cannot be committed 
negligently or inadvertently. Accordingly it is not enough for the [claimants] to establish negligence, or 
even gross negligence, on the part of the [defendant]. They must establish some intentional or reckless 
impropriety’: Three Rivers DC v Bank of England (No 3) [2003] 2 AC 1 [179] (Lord Millet). See also, 
Three Rivers DC v Bank of England [2000] UKHL 33; Bici v Ministry of Defence [2004] EWHC 786 
(QB). 
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then the defendant would be held liable even though they were not at fault, that is, the 
defendant’s actions were not intentional, reckless or negligent. 
7.73 The ALRC considers that strict liability would be too onerous and broad, and 
that it is inconsistent with modern trends in tort law to fault-based liability. Examples 
of statutory strict liability are directed at pecuniary loss or material damage in 
particular contexts, such as consumer protection or product liability, unlike claims for 
invasion of privacy which will arise in a wide variety of contexts and generally involve 
dignitary or intangible interests. 
7.74 For similar reasons to those outlined in respect of negligence-based liability, it 
would not be appropriate to make a strict liability tort actionable per se, yet this feature 
of the new tort is an important protection of privacy from intentional or reckless 
invasion. 
7.75 Strict liability is now relatively rare in Australian common law, outside 
contractual obligations and fiduciary obligations, both of which rest on relationships 
that, ordinarily, have been voluntarily entered into by the parties. In Northern Territory 
v Mengel, a majority of the High Court remarked that 
the recent trend of legal development, here and in other common law countries, has 
been to the effect that liability in tort depends on either the intentional or the negligent 
infliction of harm. That is not a statement of law but a description of the general 
trend.83 
7.76 Defamation is one of the rare examples of a common law tort liability that is 
strict, and is complete on proof of publication of defamatory material. It is the fact of 
defamation, not the intention of the defendant, that generates liability. Fleming’s The 
Law of Torts states that the 
justification for this stringent liability is presumably that it is more equitable to protect 
the innocent defamed rather than the innocent defamer (who, after all, chose to 
publish); another is that the publication, not the composition of the libel, is the 
actionable wrong, making the state of mind of the publisher, not the writer, relevant ... 
Does reputation deserve a higher level of protection than personal safety?84 
7.77 The ALRC considers that the same may be said of privacy. 
7.78 The Uniform Defamation Laws that came into force in the Australian states and 
territories in 2006 does provide for a defence of innocent dissemination,85 so that an 
absence of fault may excuse the defendant. This defence is available where the 
defendant proves, among other things, that he or she ‘neither knew, nor ought 
reasonably to have known, that the matter was defamatory’.86 Nevertheless, liability 
arises upon publication.87 It is not incumbent on the plaintiff to prove that the 
                                                        
83  Northern Territory v Mengel (1995) 185 CLR 307, [341]–[342] (Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron 
and McHugh JJ).  
84  Sappideen and Vines, above n 1, 630. 
85  See, eg, Defamation Act 2005 (Qld) s 32. 
86  Ibid s 32(1)(b). This is similar to the position in Privacy Act, CCSM 1996, c P125 (Manitoba) s 5(b). 
87  The plaintiff must be identifiable from the publication. This may occur even where the plaintiff is not 
named. See, further, Sappideen and Vines, above n 1, 623. 
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defendant knew that the publication was defamatory of the plaintiff or even knew the 
circumstances that rendered the publication defamatory or that the defendant failed to 
take care in relation to the publication of the statement.88 
7.79 Liability in defamation is notoriously onerous and is widely regarded as a 
significant limitation on freedom of speech in Australia,89 and particularly burdensome 
on the media,90 compared to the position in other countries such as the United States 
and the United Kingdom. The ALRC considers it undesirable to introduce a tort that 
would lead to a potential liability as onerous and as restrictive on freedom of speech as 
current liability in defamation. 
7.80 Most strict liabilities now arise by statute91 and provide a remedy for physical 
damage or financial loss. Important examples in Australian law are: 
• statutory liability for (financial) losses caused by breach of the prohibition of 
misleading or deceptive conduct in trade or commerce imposed by the 
Australian Consumer Law and state and territory Fair Trading Acts;92 
• statutory liabilities for physical damage caused by defective products;93 and 
• statutory liability for damage caused by aircraft.94 
7.81 The Office of the Australian Information Commissioner (OAIC) noted that no 
fault element is required for complaints made to the OAIC for an interference with 
privacy under the Privacy Act, and that a finding of an interference with privacy can be 
made in relation to ‘negligent and accidental acts, as well as those which are intentional 
or reckless’.95 However, the Privacy Act regulates government agencies and 
corporations which have the resources to take precautions to avoid negligent data 
breaches. An action under the new tort, on the other hand, could be taken against 
natural persons, who will usually not have such resources. Further, liability and costs 
may potentially be greater under the new tort than as a result of the complaints process 
under the Privacy Act. The statutory cause of action potentially applies to a wider range 
of activities than the Privacy Act. 
                                                        
88  ‘Publication’ may even be comprised by a failure to remove a publication where there was power to do 
so: Byrne v Deane [1937] 1 KB 818. 
89  David Rolph, ‘Irreconcilable Differences? Interlocutory Injunctions for Defamation and Privacy’ (2012) 
17 Media & Arts Law Review 170, 195. 
90  Australian defamation law does not include a principle such as that in New York Times v Sullivan, which 
requires public figures to show malice in order to sue for libel: New York Times v Sullivan [1964] 376 US 
254. Nor does Australian defamation law provide for a responsible journalism defence, such as 
formulated in the UK in Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd [2001] 2 AC 127. Australian defamation law 
does not include a wide public interest defence such as in Defamation Act 2013 (UK) s 4(6). 
91  A statute imposing a strict liability may be the basis  of a common law tort of breach of statutory duty: 
Sappideen and Vines, above n 1, 434. 
92  Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) sch 2, s 236. Each state and territory Fair Trading Act applies 
the Australian Consumer Law as a law of its jurisdiction: see, for example, Fair Trading Act 1987 (NSW) 
s 28.  
93  Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) sch 2, ss 138–141. 
94  See, for example, Damage by Aircraft Act 1999 (Cth) s 10. 
95  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Submission 66. 
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7.82 Some have argued that one reason why liability for invasions of privacy should 
be strict, at least with respect to wrongful disclosure of private information, is that this 
would be consistent with actions in defamation and breach of confidence.96 However, 
the analogy with breach of confidence is imperfect. Breach of confidence arises where 
there was a pre-existing obligation which informs and binds the defendant’s 
conscience, or knowledge that the information was imparted under that obligation.97 
There is therefore a stronger case for strict liability in such circumstances than under 
the new tort where a plaintiff merely has to show a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
7.83  Further, given that the ALRC does not recommend that the new tort of invasion 
of privacy replace the action for breach of confidence, a plaintiff who can rely on a pre-
existing obligation of confidence will still be able to sue in that equitable action, 
relying on strict liability.98 Such plaintiffs would also, no doubt, wish to rely on the 
favourable principles underlying the remedy of an injunction in the equitable breach of 
confidence action.99 
7.84 Some stakeholders suggested that some invasions of privacy should not attract 
liability where the conduct is not blameworthy. The Arts Law Centre of Australia 
submitted the example of a documentary maker ‘filming in a public place which looks 
onto a private apartment where someone is getting undressed’ and so accidentally 
invading someone’s privacy.100 Similarly, SBS noted: 
There are many ways in which footage, images or other material may breach 
someone’s privacy in a way which is unintentional. A common example would be the 
kind of footage filmed for use in news broadcasts, often wide angle shots of crowds, 
or footage of incidental comings and goings out of buildings relevant to a news story. 
It is very possible that in such a story, a person or incident might be captured that the 
person considered a breach of their privacy.101 
7.85 The Australian Bankers’ Association submitted that ‘the trend in legislation to 
more strict liability provisions associated with the imposition of civil penalties 
continues to be a major concern for the private sector’: 
The cause of action given its likely scope and imprecision should not be cast in the 
tortious framework of negligence. Rather it should apply only to an intent to seriously 
interfere with a person’s privacy or to do so with reckless indifference to that result 
and this has occurred. 102 
7.86 The ALRC agrees that strict liability would be too onerous. 
                                                        
96  Normann Witzleb, ‘A Statutory Cause of Action for Privacy? A Critical Appraisal of Three Recent 
Australian Law Reform Proposals’ (2011) 19 Torts Law Journal 104, 118–119; Cassidy v Daily Mirror 
[1929] KB 331. See also K Barker, Submission 126.  
97  Vestergaard Frandsen A/S v Bestnet Europe Ltd [2013] 1 WLR 1556. 
98  See for example, Candy v Bauer Media Limited [2013] NSWSC 979 (20 July 2013). 
99  See Ch 13. 
100  Arts Law Centre of Australia, Submission 43. 
101  SBS, Submission 59. 
102  Australian Bankers’ Association, Submission 27. 
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Effect of apology on liability 
Recommendation 7–2 The Act should provide that an apology made by 
the defendant does not constitute an admission of fault or liability and is not 
relevant to the determination of fault or liability. 
7.87 The ALRC recommends that any apology or correction of published material by 
a defendant should not be treated in evidence as an admission of fault. 103 
7.88 This recommendation is intended to encourage the early resolution of disputes 
without recourse to litigation. It is similar to provisions in state and territory legislation 
regulating civil liability,104 and in defamation law.105 There is a body of academic 
literature supporting the role of apologies in resolving disputes and such provisions as a 
mechanism for achieving justice between disputants. There was also strong stakeholder 
support for this proposal. 
7.89 The ALRC considers that the definition of apology in the NSW Civil Liability 
Act 2002 should apply to this recommendation: 
‘apology’ means an expression of sympathy or regret, or of a general sense of 
benevolence or compassion, in connection with any matter whether or not the apology 
admits or implies an admission of fault in connection with the matter.106 
7.90 Apologies are often associated with an assumption or admission of guilt and are 
therefore seen to be ‘highly prejudicial’.107 This recommendation aims to encourage 
individuals to make apologies without the risk of liability: 
It would detract from any dispute resolution process of the parties were reluctant to 
offer an apology due to possible use as evidence of fault or liability.108 
7.91 Encouraging defendants to make formal apologies may assist with the resolution 
of disputes as, in many circumstances, an apology may provide a sufficient response to 
                                                        
103  Several stakeholders supported this recommendation: Domestic Violence Legal Service and North 
Australian Aboriginal Justice Agency, Submission 120; Australian Privacy Foundation, Submission 110; 
Office of the Victorian Privacy Commissioner, Submission 108; Telstra, Submission 107; Public Interest 
Advocacy Centre, Submission 105; Telecommunications Industry Ombudsman, Submission 103; 
Insurance Council of Australia, Submission 102; Australian Bankers’ Association, Submission 84; 
S Higgins, Submission 82; I Turnbull, Submission 81; Guardian News and Media Limited and Guardian 
Australia, Submission 80; N Witzleb, Submission 29. 
104  For example, Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 69. See also: Prue Vines, ‘The Power of Apology: Mercy, 
Forgiveness or Corrective Justice in the Civil Liability Arena?’ (2007) 1 Public Space 1; Prue Vines, ‘The 
Apology in Civil Liability: Underused and Undervalued?’ (2013) 115 Precedent 28; Robyn Carroll, 
‘Apologies as a Legal Remedy’ (2013) 35 Sydney Law Review 317; Australian Treasury, ‘Review of the 
Law of Negligence: Final Report’ (2002). 
105  Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) 2005 s 20; Defamation Act 2005 (Qld) 2005 s 20; Defamation Act 2005 
(SA) 2005 s 20; Defamation Act 2005 (Tas) s 20; Defamation Act 2005 (Vic) s 20; Defamation Act 2005 
(WA) s 20. 
106  Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 68. 
107  Vines, ‘The Apology in Civil Liability: Underused and Undervalued?’, above n 104, 30. 
108  Telecommunications Industry Ombudsman, Submission 103. 
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appease someone whose privacy has been invaded. Guardian News and Media Limited 
and Guardian Australia supported this point, arguing that 
Parties should be encouraged to resolve matters prior to or during litigation. The 
nature of invasions of privacy is that in many instances an apology, freely given, may 
be sufficient to resolve the matter. Accordingly, protecting the making of apologies is 
an important aspect of the ALRC’s proposals.109 
7.92 The Telecommunications Industry Ombudsman provided analysis of the positive 
role apologies play in the resolution of disputes under their complaints model: 
From our experience, consumers will request apologies to resolve privacy complaints 
and an apology genuinely made has the potential to encourage the early resolution of 
disputes. It would detract from any dispute resolution process if the parties were 
reluctant to offer an apology due to possible use as evidence of fault or liability. An 
apology can be an important part of resolving a dispute and it is one of several readily 
available remedies used in ADR processes. From our experience, apologies can help: 
• diffuse tension and create common ground between opposing parties 
• foster constructive discussion and even conciliation between parties 
• alleviate injury and distress caused to aggrieved parties, and 
• reduce the length and severity of disputes.110 
7.93 Australian research shows that in medical negligence cases, apologies (not 
court-ordered apologies), can have psychological benefits to plaintiffs.111 
7.94 Prior to the enactment of the Uniform Defamation Laws in 2005, there was a 
disincentive for a publisher to apologise for publishing defamatory matter since such 
an apology could be construed as an admission of liability.112 Civil liability legislation 
stipulating that apologies should not be taken as admissions of fault reflects a similar 
concern: 
It was felt that if people apologise it was less likely that there would be litigation; and 
there is indeed some evidence for this proposition.113 
7.95 Dr Ian Turnbull raised the concern that some defendants may use apologies as a 
vehicle to exacerbate the harm caused by the initial invasion, as publishing an apology 
may 
reconvey the private information to a wider audience as part of the apology. That is 
particularly so where media is used and, for example, a more prominent location 
within the website or paper is used for the apology.114 
                                                        
109  Guardian News and Media Limited and Guardian Australia, Submission 80. 
110  Telecommunications Industry Ombudsman, Submission 103. 
111  Carroll, above n 104, 319. 
112  Des A Butler and Sharon Rodrick, Australian Media Law (Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia 
Limited, 2011) [3.600]. 
113  Vines, ‘The Apology in Civil Liability: Underused and Undervalued?’, above n 104, 28. 
114  I Turnbull, Submission 81. 
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7.96 To ameliorate this harm, Turnbull suggested the recommendation be qualified 
by a requirement that the apology be ‘sincere’ or ‘genuine’.115 The ALRC considers 
that it is more appropriate to consider the nature or quality of any apology when a court 
assesses an award of damages. 
                                                        
115  Ibid. 
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Summary 
8.1 The tort designed in this Report is concerned with providing civil redress for 
serious invasions of privacy. The ALRC recommends that this should be made clear in 
the Act, by including a separate and discrete element of the tort requiring a court to 
consider whether the invasion of privacy was ‘serious’. This will help deter people 
from bringing trivial privacy claims before the courts. 
8.2 Guidance on the meaning of serious should be provided in the statute. The 
relevant Act should provide that a court may consider the degree of any offence, 
distress or harm to dignity that the invasion of privacy was likely to cause a person of 
ordinary sensibilities in the position of the plaintiff. The Act should also provide that 
courts may consider whether the defendant was motivated by malice or knew the 
invasion of privacy was likely to offend, distress or harm the dignity of the plaintiff. 
8.3 Other matters may also be relevant, but the ALRC considers these to be the most 
important. Including them will provide some certainty about the meaning of ‘serious’. 
8.4 The second question discussed in this chapter is whether the plaintiff should be 
required to prove that they suffered ‘actual damage’—more than emotional distress—
from the invasion of privacy. Given the invasion of privacy must not only be serious, 
but the defendant must have invaded the plaintiff’s privacy intentionally or recklessly, 
the ALRC considers the plaintiff should not also have to prove that they suffered actual 
damage. The tort should be actionable per se. 
8.5 Further, in many cases a serious invasion of privacy will cause emotional 
distress, rather than a type of harm traditionally treated by the law as ‘actual damage’. 
Making the tort actionable per se, like an action in trespass, will enable the plaintiff to 
be compensated for emotional distress caused by the defendant’s intentional or reckless 
conduct. 
132 Serious Invasions of Privacy in the Digital Era 
Seriousness 
Recommendation 8–1 The Act should provide that a plaintiff has an 
action under the new tort only where the invasion of privacy was ‘serious’, 
having regard, among other things, to: 
(a) the degree of any offence, distress or harm to dignity that the invasion of 
privacy was likely to cause to a person of ordinary sensibilities in the 
position of the plaintiff; and 
(b) whether the defendant was motivated by malice or knew the invasion of 
privacy was likely to offend, distress or harm the dignity of the plaintiff. 
The need for a threshold 
8.6 Some invasions of privacy should not be actionable, because they are not 
sufficiently serious. The ALRC recommends that the Act provide for a threshold test of 
seriousness that would ensure that trivial and other non-serious breaches of privacy are 
not actionable. 
8.7 The Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) provides for civil penalties in cases of ‘serious’ or 
‘repeated’ interferences with privacy.1 A seriousness threshold is also recognised in the 
United Kingdom (UK). Hon. Justice Roger Toulson and Charles Phipps write that 
unauthorised ‘disclosure or use of information about a person’s private life will be a 
violation of art 8 only if … it is sufficiently serious to cause substantial offence to a 
person of ordinary sensibilities’.2 However, this may be a low bar, intended mainly to 
exclude only limited or trivial disclosures. Lord Neuberger MR in Ambrosiadou v 
Coward, said that, 
Just because information relates to a person’s family and private life, it will not 
automatically be protected by the courts: for instance, the information may be of 
slight significance, generally expressed, or anodyne in nature. While respect for 
family and private life is of fundamental importance, it seems to me that the courts 
should, in the absence of special facts, generally expect people to adopt a reasonably 
robust and realistic approach to living in the 21st century.3 
8.8 Some stakeholders submitted that there should not be an additional threshold.4 If 
a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy then, subject to public interest matters, 
                                                        
1  Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) s 13G. The Act does not define ‘serious’; the ordinary meaning of the word 
applies. 
2  Roger Toulson and Charles Phipps, Confidentiality (Sweet & Maxwell, 2012) [7–033]. Toulson and 
Phipps write that the other condition is that ‘there is no good and sufficient reason for it—“good” 
meaning a reason capable of justifying the interference, and “sufficient” meaning sufficient to outweigh 
the person’s Art 8 rights on a balance of the legitimate competing interests’. 
3  Ambrosiadou v Coward (Rev 1) [2011] EWCA Civ 409 (12 April 2011) [30] (Lord Neuberger MR). 
4  A number of stakeholders opposed an additional separate threshold: eg, N Witzleb, Submission 116; 
Australian Privacy Foundation, Submission 110; Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 105; 
N Witzleb, Submission 29; Office of the Information Commissioner, Queensland, Submission 20; 
Women’s Legal Centre (ACT & Region) Inc., Submission 19; Pirate Party of Australia, Submission 18; 
P Wragg, Submission 4.  
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the person should have an action. It was also suggested that, where there is a 
reasonable expectation of privacy and no countervailing public interest, then an 
invasion would necessarily be serious, and therefore an additional threshold 
unnecessary. 
8.9 The Australian Privacy Foundation submitted that an additional threshold for 
seriousness was ‘unnecessary and arbitrary’: 
If the cause of action is structured as an intentional tort, as the cause of action appears 
to be, damage should be presumed. The remedy, whether in the form of injunctive 
relief, damages or other relief, will (or should) reflect the seriousness of the breach.5 
8.10 Associate Professor Paul Wragg also had some concerns. Although he said the 
point should not be overstated, given that the risk would not to arise in obvious cases, 
there was a ‘danger of the seriousness standard being applied twice if not three times’: 
first through the ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ test where the UK standard 
(which already excludes non-serious intrusions) is taken as the benchmark; secondly, 
as a means of limiting interferences to those that not only satisfy the reasonable 
threshold standard but also may be said to be a serious breach of that standard (so as 
to be highly offensive, etc ) and thirdly (potentially) through the use of the balancing 
approach where the intrusion must not only be serious but also so serious as to 
outweigh everyone else’s rights (ie, the public interest at stake).6 
8.11 The New South Wales Law Reform Commission also did not see the need for an 
additional threshold.7 There is no threshold of seriousness in the statutes of the four 
Canadian provinces which have a statutory cause of action for invasion of privacy.8 
8.12 Some stakeholders, however, submitted that there should be a discrete 
seriousness threshold.9 Some suggested that there should be a threshold, but that it 
should be set at ‘highly offensive’ invasions of privacy, rather than merely ‘serious’ 
ones.10 Others said that the threshold should be a high one, so that the new tort does not 
undermine freedom of expression and of the media.11 
8.13 The ALRC has concluded that there should be an additional threshold of 
seriousness. In some circumstances, it will be obvious that the invasion of privacy was 
serious. In fact, the seriousness may well often be evident from the other elements of 
the offence. If a plaintiff has a reasonable expectation of privacy, and this privacy is 
                                                        
5  Australian Privacy Foundation, Submission 110. 
6  P Wragg, Submission 73. 
7  NSW Law Reform Commission, Invasion of Privacy, Report 120 (2009) [23]–[33]. 
8  Privacy Act, RSBC 1996, c 373 (British Columbia); Privacy Act, RSS 1978, c P-24 (Saskatchewan); 
Privacy Act, RSNL 1990, c P-22 (Newfoundland and Labrador); Privacy Act, CCSM 1996, c P125 
(Manitoba). 
9  See, eg, Women’s Legal Services NSW, Submission 115; Office of the Victorian Privacy Commissioner, 
Submission 108; ASTRA, Submission 99; ABC, Submission 93; Google, Submission 91; Australian 
Bankers’ Association, Submission 84; Guardian News and Media Limited and Guardian Australia, 
Submission 80; National Association for the Visual Arts Ltd, Submission 78; Telstra, Submission 45 (‘A 
seriousness threshold must be imposed, both in order to discourage trivial or minor claims, and in order to 
provide business and the community with a level of certainty and consistency in its application’). 
10  SBS, Submission 123; ABC, Submission 93. 
11  The ALRC recommends a separate public interest balancing test in Ch 9. 
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intentionally invaded, then in some cases the facts leading to these conclusions will 
themselves strongly suggest the invasion of privacy was serious. However, an 
additional and discrete threshold of seriousness would provide an additional means of 
discouraging people from bringing actions for trivial invasions of privacy. The risk of 
non-serious actions or a proliferation of claims was raised by a number of 
stakeholders.12 
8.14 For similar reasons, a serious harm test has been introduced to defamation law in 
the UK. The Defamation Act 2013 (UK) provides that a ‘statement is not defamatory 
unless its publication has caused or is likely to cause serious harm to the reputation of 
the claimant’.13 This provision was intended to discourage trivial claims.14 
8.15 The ALRC also considers that a discrete seriousness threshold, in addition to the 
public interest balancing test,15 would further ensure the new tort does not unduly 
burden competing interests such as freedom of speech. 
Serious 
8.16 If there is a threshold, where should it be set? The ALRC recommends the Act 
provide that for the plaintiff to have an action, the court must consider the invasion of 
privacy ‘serious’. 
8.17 ‘Serious’ can mean ‘not trifling’, ‘weighty or important’,16 ‘important, 
demanding consideration, not to be trifled with, not slight’.17 These definitions may be 
helpful, but the ALRC recommends that the Act provide specific guidance to courts on 
the meaning of serious. This guidance should be in the form of a few important factors 
for the court to consider, along with any other relevant factor, when determining 
whether an invasion of privacy was serious. These factors are discussed below. 
8.18 This is an objective test. It is not about whether the plaintiff considered the 
invasion of privacy to be serious, or even whether the plaintiff has proved that they 
suffered serious damage from the invasion of privacy.18 Rather, it is about whether the 
court views the invasion as serious. 
Offence, distress and other privacy harms 
8.19 The first and perhaps most important factor for a court to consider when 
determining whether an invasion of privacy was serious is the degree of any offence, 
                                                        
12  Eg, SBS, Submission 59; ABC, Submission 46; Telstra, Submission 45; Free TV Australia, Submission 
No 10 to DPM&C Issues Paper, 2011; SBS, Submission No 8 to DPM&C Issues Paper, 2011. 
13  Defamation Act 2013 (UK) s 1. 
14  Jonathan Djanogly MP quoted in James Price (ed) and Felicity McMahon (ed), Blackstone’s Guide to the 
Defamation Act 2013 (Oxford University Press, 2013) 20. This provision differs from the seriousness test 
recommended by the ALRC in a few ways. Perhaps most notably, the UK provision is a subjective test—
harm or likely harm to the claimant must be proven. 
15  See Ch 9. 
16  Macquarie Dictionary. 
17  Concise Oxford Dictionary. 
18  The plaintiff should not be required to prove actual damage: Rec 8–2. 
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distress or harm to dignity that the invasion of privacy was likely to cause a person of 
ordinary sensibilities in the position of the plaintiff. This should be set out in the Act. 
8.20 Although other harms may often be relevant, offence and distress are two 
common types of harm that commonly follow serious invasions of privacy. 
8.21 Professor Kit Barker submitted that the essence of what is wrong about an 
invasion of privacy is ‘harm to the personal dignity of the plaintiff and/or the plaintiff’s 
autonomy in controlling elements of his or her private life’.19 The ALRC agrees that 
these are important types of harm that should be considered by a court in determining 
whether a particular invasion of privacy was serious. 
8.22 The privacy and dignitary interests of a person may be harmed without that 
person’s knowledge. For example, in some circumstances it may be a serious invasion 
of privacy to take or publish a photo of a person who is in a coma or a state of 
dementia, or perhaps even of a young child, despite the fact that a person is unlikely to 
be offended or distressed by the incident or the publication. Such invasions of privacy 
may be serious, even though distress, offence or harm to the plaintiff may be unlikely. 
This is one reason why offence and distress are not the only harms that might make an 
invasion of privacy serious.20 
Extent of harm 
8.23 In the Discussion Paper, the ALRC proposed that courts consider whether the 
invasion of privacy was likely to be ‘highly’ offensive, distressing or harmful.21 This 
may have suggested that if it were not highly offensive, highly distressing or highly 
harmful, it could not be serious. As a number of stakeholders pointed out, this may be 
too limiting.22 Some offensive, distressing or harmful invasions of privacy will be 
serious, even when the invasion cannot be described as ‘highly’ offensive, distressing 
or harmful. 
8.24 The ALRC therefore recommends that a court consider the ‘degree’ or ‘extent’ 
of the offence, distress or harm to dignity likely to be caused by the invasion of 
privacy. The greater the likely offence, distress or harm, the more likely the invasion 
will be serious. This formulation provides the court with somewhat more discretion in 
its assessment of seriousness. 
A person of ordinary sensibilities in the position of the plaintiff 
8.25 It is important to ask whether the conduct was likely to offend, distress or harm 
the dignity of a person ‘in the position of the plaintiff’. Most people are not particularly 
                                                        
19  K Barker, Submission 126. 
20  ‘A young child photographed naked through a telephoto lens may well experience no offense or distress 
at all. Nor is it really relevant whether anyone else is offended by the publication of the photograph. The 
point is that privacy laws should “carve out some personal space” for the child which protects it against 
such intrusion and potentially prejudicial disclosure.’: Ibid. 
21  This was intended to mean ‘highly offensive, highly distressing or highly harmful’. 
22  ‘If a seriousness threshold were introduced, it should be set at “offensive, distressing or harmful”. 
I believe that it would be setting the bar much too high if a privacy invasion was actionable only if it was, 
or was likely to be, “highly distressing” or “highly harmful”’: N Witzleb, Submission 116. 
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offended, distressed, much less harmed, when the privacy of other people—particularly 
strangers—is invaded. The seriousness of an invasion of privacy should not be assessed 
by considering its effect on other people; it should be assessed by considering its likely 
effect on a person subjected to the invasion of privacy.23 
8.26 Lord Hope in Campbell v MGN said that the ‘mind that has to be examined is 
that, not of the reader in general, but of the person who is affected by the publicity. The 
question is what a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities would feel if she was 
placed in the same position as the claimant and faced with the same publicity’.24 
8.27 Although this was said in the context of whether the plaintiff in Campbell had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy, the ALRC considers that the same reasoning should 
apply to the question of whether the invasion of privacy was serious. The two tests 
overlap, but it is clear that when applying each test, both of which are objective, it is 
important to consider a person in the position of the plaintiff. 
8.28 The court should also consider the likely harm to a person of ‘ordinary 
sensibilities’. That a particularly sensitive person would be offended or distressed by an 
invasion of privacy may not be a good indication that the invasion was serious. 
Likely harm and actual harm 
8.29 The likely effect of the conduct should be distinguished from the actual effect of 
the conduct. An invasion of privacy may be likely to cause harm, even though in a 
particular case it does not cause harm, and vice versa. Whether the cause of action 
should require proof of damage is a related question, discussed separately below. 
8.30 The actual effect of the invasion on the plaintiff may give some indication that 
the invasion of privacy was likely to have that effect, but it would not be conclusive. 
An invasion of privacy may have been unlikely to have any effect on anyone, or it may 
have been likely only to have a minor effect on persons of ordinary sensibilities. If the 
actual plaintiff is highly sensitive and was very much distressed by the invasion, a 
court might nevertheless consider that a person of ordinary sensibilities would be 
unlikely to be so distressed, and that therefore the invasion of privacy was not serious. 
8.31 It should also be noted that the word ‘likely’ in Recommendation 8–1 should not 
be taken to mean ‘probable’, that is, more likely than not. Rather, ‘likely’ should mean 
‘a real possibility, a possibility that cannot sensibly be ignored having regard to the 
nature and gravity of the feared harm in the particular case’.25 Some stakeholders said 
                                                        
23  Professor Kit Barker submitted that it was not ‘really relevant whether anyone else is offended by the 
publication of the photograph’: K Barker, Submission 126. 
24  Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457, [99] (emphasis added). 
25  These are the words of Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead speaking in a different context in Re H and R (Child 
Sexual Abuse) [1996] 1 FLR 80 [69] (Lord Nicholls). This definition was referred to in Venables & Anor 
v News Group News Papers Ltd & Ors [2001] EWHC QB 32 (8 January 2001) (Butler–Sloss P). Cf 
Cream Holdings Ltd v Banerjee (2004) 1 AC 253. 
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that if this is what the ALRC intends ‘likely’ to mean, then it should be set out in the 
Act.26 
Knowledge and motive of the defendant 
8.32 Although the likely effect of the plaintiff’s conduct should perhaps be the main 
focus of the court’s inquiry, the motives of the defendant may also suggest an invasion 
of privacy is serious. An invasion of privacy that was motivated by malice is more 
likely to be serious. The ALRC recommends that a court consider whether the 
defendant acted maliciously, when determining whether the invasion of privacy was 
serious. 
8.33 Further, the fact that the defendant knew that the particular plaintiff was likely to 
be highly offended, distressed or harmed by the invasion of privacy, will also be a 
factor to be considered. In such circumstances, the invasion may be found to be 
serious, even if a person of ordinary sensibilities might not have been likely to suffer 
such offence, distress or harm. The court should not be required to ‘disregard what the 
defendant knew or ought to have known about the fortitude of the plaintiff’. These are 
the words in s 32(4) of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), which relates to a confined 
duty to take care not to cause someone mental harm. The statutory cause of action for 
serious invasion of privacy should contain a provision similar to s 32(4). 
8.34 This provision would also be relevant to the question of the reasonable 
expectation of the plaintiff in their particular circumstances. 
Other factors 
8.35 Other relevant factors could also be considered by the court when determining 
seriousness. For example, the Law Institute of Victoria suggested a court might take 
into account: the nature of the breach; the consequences of the invasion for an 
individual; and the extent of the invasion in terms of the numbers of individuals 
affected.27 It should be made clear in the Act that a court may consider other relevant 
factors. 
A higher threshold? 
8.36 Some stakeholders submitted that the threshold should be set higher than 
‘serious’. The most common alternative threshold suggested by stakeholders was 
‘highly offensive’. 
8.37 The ALRC in 2008 and the Victorian Law Reform Commission (VLRC) in 
2010 recommended that a plaintiff be required to show that the act or conduct 
complained of was highly offensive to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities.28  
                                                        
26  Eg, Law Society of NSW, Submission 122 (‘Given the degree of particularity ascribed to “likely” the 
BLC recommends that this detail be included in any legislation’). 
27  Law Institute of Victoria, Submission 22. 
28  Australian Law Reform Commission, For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice, 
Report 108 (2008) Rec 74–2; Victorian Law Reform Commission, Surveillance in Public Places, Report 
18 (2010) Recs 25, 26. It is worth noting that the ‘highly offensive’ test is at times conceptualised as 
going to the seriousness of an invasion and, at others, as a test of what may be considered private. 
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A ‘highly offensive’ test was supported by some stakeholders.29 A ‘highly offensive’ 
threshold is also favoured in New Zealand.30 
8.38 As discussed above, the ALRC considers that the degree of offence caused by an 
invasion of privacy is one factor to consider when assessing seriousness, but it is not 
the only factor, nor necessarily the most important. Courts should also consider 
whether the invasion of privacy was likely to cause distress or harm to dignity, and 
other matters that make the invasion of privacy serious. In any event, the plaintiff 
should not be required to prove the invasion of privacy was highly offensive, if it can 
otherwise be shown to be serious. 
Proof of damage not required 
Recommendation 8–2 The plaintiff should not be required to prove 
actual damage to have an action under the new tort. 
8.39 The new tort should not require the plaintiff to prove—as an element of the tort, 
rather than for the purpose of awarding compensation—that he or she suffered actual 
damage. The tort should be actionable per se. 
8.40 If the privacy tort is actionable per se, it will in this respect be similar to other 
intentional torts that are concerned with the intangible, dignitary interests of the 
plaintiff—assault, battery and false imprisonment.31 In a sense, the wrong itself is the 
harm. Or in other words, the harm is inherent in the wrong.32 
8.41 The authors of Markesinis and Deakin’s Tort Law state that ‘the function of the 
interference torts is not to engage in loss-spreading in the same way [as the tort of 
negligence], but to affirm the fundamental importance of certain constitutional 
interests, such as personal bodily integrity and freedom of movement, in their own 
                                                                                                                                             
An example of the latter is Gleeson CJ’s statement that ‘the requirement that disclosure or observation of 
information or conduct would be highly offensive to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities is in 
many circumstances a useful practical test of what is private’: ABC v Lenah Game Meats (2001) 208 CLR 
199, [42].  
29  SBS, Submission 59; Australian Bankers’ Association, Submission 27; Insurance Council of Australia, 
Submission 15. This threshold was supported by some stakeholders who opposed the introduction of the 
cause of action, perhaps because the threshold is high. 
30  The New Zealand Court of Appeal has said that one of the two fundamental requirements for a successful 
claim for interference with privacy was publicity given to private facts ‘that would be considered highly 
offensive to an objective reasonable person’: Hosking v Runting (2005) 1 NZLR 1, [117]. See also C v 
Holland 3 NZLR 672 [94] (Whata J). 
31  On trespass, see O’Donohue v Wille and Ors [1999] [1999] NSWSC 661 (6 July 1999); Rosalie Balkin 
and Jim Davis, Law of Torts (LexisNexis Butterworths, 5th ed, 2013) 30; Letang v Cooper [1965] 1 QB 
232 245. Defamation, while sometimes described as actionable per se, is different in that some damage to 
reputation is presumed to follow the defamatory publication: Ratcliffe v Evans (1892) 2 QB 524, cited in  
Ell v Milne (No 8) [2014] NSWSC 175 (7 March 2014) [69]. There would be no presumption of damage 
in the new tort. The Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) s 7(2) provides that the ‘publication of defamatory 
matter of any kind is actionable without proof of special damage’. Note, however, that there is a defence 
to defamation of triviality. 
32  See M Warby et al, Tugendhat and Christie: The Law of Privacy and The Media (OUP Oxford, 2011) 
[8.48]. 
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right’.33 Further, they write, in the torts of trespass to the person and interference with 
land and with chattels, 
the emphasis is less on the nature of the damage suffered and on whether the 
defendant’s conduct can be characterised as ‘fault’, as on the nature of the 
interference with the claimant’s rights, in particular on whether it was direct or 
indirect and on whether, in the context of various defences, it can be characterised as 
justified or not.34 
8.42 The ALRC considers that the tort for serious invasion of privacy should have a 
similar function—it should affirm the fundamental importance of privacy. 
8.43 In Tugendhat and Christie: The Law of Privacy and the Media, the authors state 
that because one of the principal aims of the torts of battery, assault and false 
imprisonment is to ‘vindicate the indignity inherent in unwanted touching, threatening, 
and confinement, they are actionable per se. That is, harm to the plaintiff is assumed’.35 
The authors go on to state that, if 
one of the principal aims of the protection of privacy is the preservation of dignity, 
then consistency with trespass to the person might suggest that breaches of a 
reasonable expectation of privacy should also be actionable per se.36 
8.44 In practice, serious invasions of privacy will usually cause emotional distress to 
the plaintiff. Emotional distress is not generally recognised by the common law as 
‘actual damage’, which refers to personal injury, property damage, financial loss, or a 
recognised psychiatric illness. As a number of stakeholders submitted, the damage 
often caused by invasions of privacy—such as distress, humiliation and insult—may be 
intangible and difficult to prove.37 The Public Interest Advocacy Centre submitted that 
a person’s ‘dignity is vitally important but its intrinsic nature makes it difficult to 
quantify in monetary terms the impact of any damage to it’.38 Many stakeholders 
submitted that the action should not require proof of damage.39 
8.45 The ALRC agrees that invasions of privacy may often cause ‘only’ emotional 
distress. If proof of actual damage as recognised by the common law were required, 
this would deny redress to many victims of serious invasions of privacy, and 
significantly undermine the value and purpose of introducing the new tort. If the goal 
                                                        
33  Simon F Deakin, Angus Johnston and Basil Markesinis, Markesinis and Deakin’s Tort Law (Oxford 
University Press, 2012) 360. 
34  Ibid.   
35  Warby et al, above n 32, [8.48]. 
36  Ibid. 
37  N Witzleb, Submission 29; Law Institute of Victoria, Submission 22; NSW Council for Civil Liberties, 
Submission No 62 to DPM&C Issues Paper, 2011; Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission No 59 to 
DPM&C Issues Paper, 2011. 
38  Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 30. 
39  Office of the Victorian Privacy Commissioner, Submission 108; Office of the Australian Information 
Commissioner, Submission 66; NSW Young Lawyers, Submission 58; Women’s Legal Services NSW, 
Submission 57; Queensland Council of Civil Liberties, Submission 51; ABC, Submission 46; Electronic 
Frontiers Australia, Submission 44; Australian Privacy Foundation, Submission 39; Public Interest 
Advocacy Centre, Submission 30; N Witzleb, Submission 29; B Arnold, Submission 28; Law Institute of 
Victoria, Submission 22; I Pieper, Submission 6; I Turnbull, Submission 5. 
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then is to allow plaintiffs to recover damages for emotional distress, the issue is how 
the law may best achieve this. 
8.46 One option would be to require proof of damage but define damage, for the 
purposes of the action, to include emotional distress. This would be consistent with 
s 52 of the Privacy Act. This provides that the Australian Information Commissioner 
may make declarations regarding, among other things, redress or compensation for 
‘loss or damage’, which is defined to include: 
(a) injury to the feelings of the complainant or individual; and 
(b) humiliation suffered by the complainant or individual.40 
8.47 However, this approach would be inconsistent with both the well-established 
common law definition of actual damage and with the civil liability legislation in most 
states and territories (dealing with negligently inflicted mental harm).41 It is desirable 
for civil liability under the new tort to be consistent with other civil liability in tort. The 
ALRC considers that the preferable approach is to make the new tort actionable per se. 
The threshold of seriousness and the fault element will bar trivial or minor claims, and 
it will be rare that a plaintiff will suffer no distress from a serious invasion of privacy. 
In practice, if no emotional distress or actual damage has been suffered by a plaintiff, 
there would only be an award of damages if the circumstances of the invasion were 
such that there was a strong need for vindication, or, in exceptional circumstances, 
exemplary damages. 
8.48 Some stakeholders supported making the tort actionable per se, arguing that 
invasions of privacy were ‘abhorrent’ and that it was important that the cause of action 
‘establish a clear deterrent’.42 Others submitted that requiring proof of damage would 
burden or deter potential litigants.43 
8.49 The ALRC recommended that plaintiffs should not be required to prove damage 
in its 2008 privacy report.44 The recommendation is also consistent with Canadian 
statutory causes of action.45 
8.50 It also appears that there is no requirement to prove damage in claims for 
disclosure of private information under UK law. This is consistent with equitable 
claims for breach of confidence, where proof of detriment is not required.46 In practice 
this issue is not significant as most, if not all, privacy claims in the UK have been 
                                                        
40  Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) s 52(1AB). 
41  Eg, Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 31. 
42  B Arnold, Submission 28. 
43  Ibid. 
44  Australian Law Reform Commission, For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice, 
Report 108 (2008) Rec 74–3. 
45  In British Columbia, for example, ‘[i]t is a tort, actionable without proof of damage, for a person, wilfully 
and without a claim of right, to violate the privacy of another’: Privacy Act, RSBC 1996, c 373 (British 
Columbia) s 1(1). See also Privacy Act, RSS 1978, c P-24 (Saskatchewan) s 2; Privacy Act, CCSM 1996, 
c P125 (Manitoba) s 2(2); Privacy Act, RSNL 1990, c P-22 (Newfoundland and Labrador) s 3(1).  
46  Dyson Heydon, Mark Leeming and Peter Turner, Meagher, Gummow and Lehane’s Equity: Doctrines 
and Remedies (LexisNexis Butterworths, 5th ed, 2014) 1121. 
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either for an injunction to prevent an invasive publication or for damages for emotional 
distress. 
8.51 A number of stakeholders submitted that the plaintiff should be required to 
prove actual damage.47 If proof of damage is not required, these stakeholders argued, 
there will be a proliferation of claims, many without merit, and this may lead to 
significant extra costs to industry.48 For example, the Australian Subscription 
Television and Radio Association submitted that not requiring proof of damage may 
‘encourage serial litigants and dubious proceedings’.49 Free TV Australia said it ‘would 
significantly increase the risk of the cause of action being misused and simply 
encouraging litigation in circumstances where there is a clear public interest in 
dissemination of the relevant private information’.50 
8.52 The Arts Law Centre of Australia also submitted that if the new tort were 
actionable per se, the arts and media industries would bear much of the cost of 
‘determining these potentially unfounded or unmeritorious claims’.51 Telstra suggested 
that if proof of damage were not required, it would not be an action for ‘serious’ 
invasions of privacy: without actual damage, the invasion would not be serious.52 
8.53 In the ALRC’s view, other elements of the cause of action should ensure that 
frivolous and unmeritorious claims are neither brought nor successful. To have an 
action under the privacy tort, the plaintiff must prove that he or she had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy, that the invasion of privacy was intentional or reckless, and that 
it was serious. The court must also be satisfied that there was no countervailing interest 
justifying the invasion of privacy. If the plaintiff is able to get over these significant 
hurdles, it should not be necessary for them to also prove actual damage. 
8.54 If a new privacy tort were enacted that required the plaintiff to prove damage, it 
would be essential that damage include emotional distress. 
                                                        
47  ASTRA, Submission 47; Telstra, Submission 45; Arts Law Centre of Australia, Submission 43; Optus, 
Submission 41; Australian Bankers’ Association, Submission 27; Office of the Information 
Commissioner, Queensland, Submission 20; Insurance Council of Australia, Submission 15; D Butler, 
Submission 10. 
48  Telstra, Submission 45; Arts Law Centre of Australia, Submission 43; Insurance Council of Australia, 
Submission 15; Office of the Victorian Privacy Commissioner, Submission No 46 to DPM&C Issues 
Paper, 2011 4688; SBS, Submission No 8 to DPM&C Issues Paper, 2011; Australian Direct Marketing 
Association, Submission No 57 to DPM&C Issues Paper, 2011. 
49  ASTRA, Submission 47. 
50  Free TV, Submission 109. 
51  Arts Law Centre of Australia, Submission 43. 
52  ‘If an individual has suffered no damage, an alleged privacy breach should not give rise to a cause of 
action as a serious invasion of privacy’: Telstra, Submission 107 (emphasis in original). 
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Summary 
9.1 Privacy is an important public interest, but it must be balanced with, and 
sometimes give way to, other rights and interests. 
9.2 Although respecting privacy will promote free expression and the free media 
necessary for effective democracy, privacy can sometimes conflict with these and other 
important public interests. Where breaching someone’s privacy is justified for an 
important public interest, privacy must give way. 
9.3 In this chapter, the ALRC recommends that, in order for a plaintiff to have a 
cause of action under a tort for serious invasion of privacy, the court must be satisfied 
that the public interest in privacy outweighs any countervailing public interest. 
9.4 The ALRC also recommends that the Act provide guidance on the meaning of 
‘public interest’, by setting out a list of public interest matters. These include freedom 
of expression, freedom of the media, public health and safety, and national security. 
9.5 The ALRC recommends that competing interests be considered when 
determining whether the plaintiff has a cause of action. It should be an element of the 
tort, rather than a defence. A plaintiff should not be able to claim that a wrong has been 
committed—that their privacy has been seriously invaded—where there are strong 
public interest grounds justifying the invasion of privacy. 
9.6 The defendant will generally be best placed to bring the court’s attention to any 
evidence of countervailing public interests. The ALRC therefore recommends that the 
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Act should provide that the defendant has the burden to adduce such evidence. The 
court must then be satisfied that the public interest in privacy outweighs these other 
public interests. The Act should provide that the plaintiff bears the onus of satisfying 
the court of this. 
The balancing exercise 
Recommendation 9–1 The Act should provide that, for the plaintiff to 
have a cause of action, the court must be satisfied that the public interest in 
privacy outweighs any countervailing public interest. A separate public interest 
defence would therefore be unnecessary. 
9.7 Privacy is an important public interest, but of course there are other important 
public interests.1 Sometimes, these other interests should prevail over a person’s 
interest in privacy. There should be a clear process for balancing competing interests, 
to ensure the new action does not privilege privacy over other important public 
interests. 
9.8 Although there was some disagreement about how and when the balancing 
exercise should be carried out, stakeholders agreed that a broader public interest may 
sometimes justify an invasion of privacy, and that this should be recognised in any tort 
for serious invasion of privacy.2 
9.9 In Hosking v Runting, Gault P and Blanchard J of the New Zealand Court of 
Appeal discussed how the law should reconcile competing values: 
Few would seriously question the desirability of protecting from publication some 
information on aspects of private lives, and particularly those of children. Few would 
question the necessity for dissemination of information albeit involving information 
about private lives where matters of high public (especially political) importance are 
involved. Just as a balance appropriate to contemporary values has been struck in the 
law as it relates to defamation, trade secrets, censorship and suppression powers in the 
criminal and family fields, so the competing interests must be accommodated in 
respect of personal and private information.3 
9.10 The ALRC in 2008 recommended including a balancing exercise as an element 
of the tort. This was similar to the approach recommended by the New South Wales 
Law Reform Commission (NSWLRC) in 2009.4 
                                                        
1  For privacy as a public interest, see Ch 2. 
2  The point of disagreement was generally whether it should be an element of the tort, with the plaintiff 
having the legal onus of proof, or a defence, with the defendant bearing the onus. This is discussed further 
later in the chapter. 
3  Hosking v Runting (2005) 1 NZLR 1, [116]. 
4  Australian Law Reform Commission, For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice, 
Report 108 (2008) Rec 74–2; NSW Law Reform Commission, Invasion of Privacy, Report 120 (2009) 
26–29.  
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9.11 In Hogan v Hinch, French CJ said that the ‘term “public interest” and its 
analogues have long informed judicial discretions and evaluative judgments at 
common law’: 
Examples include the enforceability of covenants in restraint of trade, claims for the 
exclusion of evidence on grounds of public interest immunity, governmental claims 
for confidentiality at equity, the release from the implied obligation relating to the use 
of documents obtained in the course of proceedings, and in the application of the law 
of contempt.5 
9.12 What is the public interest? In Reynolds v Times Newspaper, Bingham CJ said 
that by ‘matters of public interest to the community’, he meant: 
matters relating to the public life of the community and those who take part in it, 
including within the expression ‘public life’ activities such as the conduct of 
government and political life, elections … and public administration, but we use the 
expression more widely than that, to embrace matters such as (for instance) the 
governance of public bodies, institutions and companies which give rise to a public 
interest in disclosure, but excluding matters which are personal and private, such that 
there is no public interest in their disclosure.6 
9.13 Some of the more notable public interest matters that a court might consider 
when applying the balancing test recommended by the ALRC are discussed further 
below. But it may be useful first to consider how this balancing exercise should be 
carried out. 
9.14 The ALRC recommends that Australian courts use a balancing approach similar 
to that identified by the House of Lords in Campbell.7 In the United Kingdom (UK), 
rights to privacy and to freedom of expression, in arts 8 and 10 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, have been incorporated into domestic law by the Human 
Rights Act 1998 (UK). Both must be considered when determining whether a cause of 
action for misuse of private information has been established. In making this 
determination, two questions are asked: 
First, is the information private in the sense that it is in principle protected by 
article 8? If ‘no’, that is the end of the case. If ‘yes’, the second question arises: in all 
the circumstances, must the interest of the owner of the private information yield to 
the right of freedom of expression conferred on the publisher by article 10?8 
9.15 It is in answering this second question that the balancing exercise is carried out. 
The correct approach to this balancing exercise, Baroness Hale said in Campbell, 
involves looking first at the comparative importance of the actual rights being claimed 
in the individual case; then at the justifications for interfering with or restricting each 
of those rights; and applying the proportionality test to each.9 
                                                        
5  Hogan v Hinch (2011) 243 CLR 506, [31] (French CJ). 
6  Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd [2001] 2 AC 127, [19]. This was cited with approval by Lord Phillips 
in Flood v Times Newspapers Ltd [2012] UKSC 12, [33]. 
7  Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers [2002] EWHC 499 (QB) (2002). 
8  McKennitt v Ash [2008] QB 73, [11]. 
9  Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers [2002] EWHC 499 (QB) (2002), [141]. Gavin Phillipson has 
written that he had advocated a ‘dual exercise in proportionality’ or ‘parallel analysis’ approach, which 
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9.16 In Re S, Lord Steyn said that four propositions emerge clearly from the opinions 
in the House of Lords in Campbell: 
First, neither article has as such precedence over the other. Secondly, where the values 
under the two articles are in conflict, an intense focus on the comparative importance 
of the specific rights being claimed in the individual case is necessary. Thirdly, the 
justifications for interfering with or restricting each right must be taken into account. 
Finally, the proportionality test must be applied to each. For convenience I will call 
this the ultimate balancing test.10 
9.17 The balancing exercise recommended by the ALRC above is similar to this UK 
approach. However, although freedom of expression may be the most common interest 
at stake in actions for serious invasion of privacy, a range of public interests may need 
to be considered when carrying out this balancing exercise. As recommended below, 
examples of these many public interests should be set out in the Act. 
9.18 Courts also ‘balance’ public interests for other purposes.11 The following section 
briefly outlines three other situations in which courts balance competing public 
interests. 
Other balancing tests 
Right to a fair trial 
9.19 A person’s right to a fair trial is another important public interest that must be 
balanced against freedom of expression. The classic statement of the relevant 
principles was made by Jordan CJ in the Bread Manufacturers case: 
It is of extreme public interest that no conduct should be permitted which is likely to 
prevent a litigant in a court of justice from having his case tried free from all matter of 
prejudice. But the administration of justice, important though it undoubtedly is, is not 
the only matter in which the public is vitally interested; and if in the course of the 
ventilation of a question of public concern matter is published which may prejudice a 
party in the conduct of a law suit, it does not follow that a contempt has been 
committed. The case may be one in which as between competing matters of public 
interest the possibility of prejudice to a litigant may be required to yield to other and 
superior considerations. The discussion of public affairs and denunciation of public 
abuses, actual or supposed, cannot be required to be suspended merely because the 
discussion or the denunciation may, as an incidental but not intended by-product, 
                                                                                                                                             
was used in Campbell, and under which, ‘rather than assigning one right a prior position as a mere 
exception to the other, the courts would have to consider the matter from the point of view of each 
Convention right in turn. Such an approach requires courts to assess the weight, in Convention terms, of 
both rights and ask not only whether the restriction that the applicant sought to lay on the press is greater 
than necessary to protect his or her legitimate privacy interests, but also, conversely, whether the story 
goes further, in terms of intrusive detail, than is necessary to fulfil the media’s legitimate function’: Gavin 
Phillipson, ‘The “Right” of Privacy in England and Strasbourg Compared’ in Andrew T Kenyon and 
Megan Richardson (eds), New dimensions in privacy law: international and comparative perspectives 
(Cambridge University Press, 2006) 184, 214.  
10  Re S [2005] 1 AC 593, [17]. 
11  Private interests must also sometimes be balanced by courts. For example, tort actions in private nuisance 
frequently require the courts to balance the interests of the plaintiff with those of the defendant in their 
respective use of their land. 
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cause some likelihood of prejudice to a person who happens at the time to be a 
litigant.12 
9.20 Australian civil and criminal courts balance competing public interests in 
proceedings for contempt of court. The public interest in fair trials is usually weighed 
against the public interest in freedom of speech. This was made clear by the High 
Court of Australia in Hinch v Attorney General (Vic), which concerned radio 
broadcasts about a man charged with various sexual offences, and whether the 
broadcasts were in contempt of court. There may have been an important public 
interest in the public being informed about the man’s prior conviction and 
imprisonment, but Toohey J said that these and other considerations ‘must in the end 
be placed in the balance against a precept quite fundamental to our society, that a 
person charged with an offence is entitled to receive a fair trial’: 
The Court is not the arbiter of good taste or literary merit but it must consider the 
entire content of the broadcasts and ask itself whether their prejudicial effect 
outweighs the public interest they seek to serve.13 
9.21 Wilson J said that this balancing exercise ‘does not leave editors and publishers 
at the mercy of discretionary decisions of individual judges’: 
[A] decision which is the outcome of the balancing process is not a discretionary 
judgment. It is the result of an evaluation, consistently with accepted judicial 
principle, of competing matters of fact.14 
9.22 Discussing Hinch, Spigelman CJ in the NSW Court of Appeal has said that the 
‘task of balancing conflicting public interests involves the making of a judgment by a 
process of evaluation’: 
It is distinguishable from the making of a finding of fact. It is also distinguishable 
from the exercise of a discretion, in the sense of a choice between alternative courses 
of action. Although distinguishable, a process of evaluation will be found, for many 
jurisprudential purposes, to have a close analogy with fact finding and the exercise of 
a discretion.15 
Nuisance 
9.23 Tort actions in private nuisance frequently require the courts to balance the 
interests of the plaintiff with those of the defendant in their respective uses of their 
                                                        
12  Ex parte Bread Manufacturers Ltd; Re Truth & Sportsman Ltd (1937) 37 SR (NSW) 242, 249–250. 
13  Hinch v Attorney-General (Vic) (1987) 164 CLR 15, [54] (Toohey J) (Gaudron and Deane JJ also 
favoured a balancing approach). 
14  Ibid [19] (Wilson J). (‘The criminal justice system supplies a number of situations where a similar process 
takes place; for example, the evaluation of negligent conduct causing death to determine whether the 
negligence is so gross as to justify a verdict of manslaughter, or the consideration of a defence of 
provocation to a charge of murder. These are not discretionary decisions, any more than the decision 
whether a publication which would otherwise constitute a contempt of court is saved from punitive 
consequences because of the circumstances in which it occurred. If the court is left with any reasonable 
doubt about the answer to that question then of course the prosecution will fail.’) 
15  Attorney General (NSW) v X (2000) 49 NSWLR 653. 
148 Serious Invasions of Privacy in the Digital Era 
land.16 Nuisance law famously rests on ‘a rule of give and take, live and let live’, 
according to the well-known aphorism of Baron Bramwell in Bamford v Turner in 
1860.17 
9.24 In Sedleigh Denfield v O’Callaghan, Lord Wright made a point that would be 
apt in many cases involving alleged invasions of privacy and the balancing of 
individuals’ rights: 
A balance has to be maintained between the right of the occupier to do what he likes 
with his own, and the right of his neighbour not to be interfered with. It is impossible 
to give any precise or universal formula, but it may broadly be said that a useful test is 
perhaps what is reasonable according to the ordinary usages of mankind living in 
society.18 
Breach of confidence in the UK 
9.25 In the UK, even before the enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK), the 
public interest in preserving confidences would be balanced with freedom of 
expression. In the Spycatcher case, Lord Goff said that, 
although the basis of the law’s protection of confidence is that there is a public 
interest that confidences should be preserved and protected by the law, nevertheless 
that public interest may be outweighed by some other countervailing public interest 
which favours disclosure. This limitation may apply... to all types of confidential 
information. It is this limiting principle which may require a court to carry out a 
balancing operation, weighing the public interest in maintaining confidence against a 
countervailing public interest favouring disclosure.19 
9.26 Lord Griffiths referred to cases in which it was found to be in the public interest 
that confidential information be disclosed: 
This involves the judge in balancing the public interest in upholding the right to 
confidence, which is based on the moral principles of loyalty and fair dealing, against 
some other public interest that will be served by the publication of the confidential 
material.20 
No trump card 
9.27 It is important to recognise that no one interest should have automatic priority 
over the privacy interest of the plaintiff. That there may be some important public 
interest in allowing a serious invasion of privacy should not mean that the plaintiff’s 
interest in privacy may then automatically be ignored. For example, there is an 
important public interest in a free media, particularly a free media that reports on 
                                                        
16  Compare ‘equitable principles are best developed by reference to what conscionable behaviour demands 
of the defendant not by “balancing” and then overriding those demands by reference to matters of social 
or political opinion’: Smith Kline and French Laboratories (Aust) Ltd v Secretary, Department of 
Community Services and Health 22 FCR 73, 111 (Gummow J).  
17  Bamford v Turner (1860) 3 B & S 62; 122 ER 25, [83]–[84]. 
18  Sedleigh Denfield v O’Callaghan [1940] AC 880, 903. See also, Rosalie Balkin and Jim Davis, Law of 
Torts (LexisNexis Butterworths, 5th ed, 2013) [14.19]. 
19  Attorney General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No 2) (1990) 1 AC 109, 282 (Lord Goff). 
20  Ibid 268–269 (Lord Griffiths).  
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matters of public concern. However, even when reporting on matters of public concern, 
the media must show some respect for privacy. 
9.28 For example, information about a government minister’s health will be private, 
but the minister’s interest in privacy may in some cases be outweighed by the public 
interest in being informed about the health of a person responsible for important public 
functions. However, even if there is a greater public interest in knowing about the 
minister’s health, this would not mean that a person should be free to use a surveillance 
device to follow the minister into their doctor’s room, or eavesdrop on conversations 
between the minister and her spouse about the minister’s health. There will be limits to 
how far a person may justifiably invade another person’s privacy, even for a genuine 
public purpose. 
9.29 In other words, even important public interests will not always outweigh a 
plaintiff’s privacy interest, because privacy itself is a public interest. 
No thumb on the scales 
9.30 Is the balance tilted, before the exercise starts? It was submitted by one 
stakeholder that, considering Australia does not have a right to free speech, then 
enacting a privacy tort, even with a balancing exercise, will favour privacy interests 
over freedom of expression. News Corp submitted that the statutory cause of action 
does in fact give ‘precedence’ to the right to privacy—as it is privacy that has the 
‘protected’ status—by virtue of the statute and the structure of such. Fundamental 
freedoms and matters of public interest—including freedom of speech and freedom of 
the press, will therefore be secondary considerations, regardless of the ‘balancing’ 
exercise that has been incorporated into the statute. It is therefore difficult to see how 
elements of a cause of action—for example privacy and freedom of speech—which 
don’t have the same legal status can be truly ‘balanced’.21 
9.31 The tort designed in this Report does not privilege privacy over other public 
interests. If anything, by requiring the plaintiff to satisfy the court that the public 
interest in privacy outweighs any countervailing public interest, the scales may be tilted 
slightly in favour of free expression and other public interests. In the presumably rare 
cases in which a court considers the competing interests are perfectly balanced, this 
element of the tort will not be satisfied. 
Criticisms of balancing 
9.32 There are some critics of the process of ‘balancing’ rights or interests, in the 
context of privacy claims and in other contexts. Some argued that certain rights and 
interests should not be qualified. In a paper on the principles of open justice, 
Spigelman CJ wrote: 
For persons who are advocates of particular interests, or hold a particular intellectual 
perspective, the terminology of balancing is not always acceptable. The reason is 
                                                        
21  News Corp Australia, Submission 112. 
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obvious. Balancing necessarily results in occasions when the particular interest or 
perspective takes second place to some other right or principle.22 
9.33 Calling something a right is of little value if the right is too readily ‘balanced 
away’. But it is inevitable that rights and values will sometimes clash, so there would 
seem to be no alternative to qualifying the rights in some respects. Once it is accepted 
that privacy and freedom of speech are both important rights and will sometimes clash, 
then it seems inevitable that each right must sometimes be qualified. 
9.34 Some also argue that the right balance between competing interests should be 
found by Parliament, not the courts. However, it is impossible for Parliament to 
legislate for every situation that may arise. Inevitably, courts will have to make value 
judgments when adjudicating disputes. In balancing privacy with other public interests, 
often much will depend on the particular circumstances of the case, so this must be 
considered by the courts. 
9.35 Finally, it should be noted that the balancing test is not an exercise in logic. 
Rather, it involves evaluating and weighing competing and often incommensurable 
rights, interests and values. 
Public interest matters 
Recommendation 9–2 The Act should include the following list of 
countervailing public interest matters which a court may consider, along with 
any other relevant public interest matter: 
(a) freedom of expression, including political communication and artistic 
expression; 
(b) freedom of the media, particularly to responsibly investigate and report 
matters of public concern and importance; 
(c) the proper administration of government; 
(d) open justice; 
(e) public health and safety; 
(f) national security; and 
(g) the prevention and detection of crime and fraud. 
9.36 The ALRC recommends that the Act include a non-exhaustive list of public 
interest matters that a court may consider when considering whether an invasion of the 
plaintiff’s privacy was justified, because it was in the public interest. The list would not 
be exhaustive, but may provide the parties and the court with useful guidance, making 
the cause of action more certain and predictable in scope (which may in turn reduce 
                                                        
22  James Spigelman, ‘The Principle of Open Justice: A Comparative Perspective’ (2006) 29 UNSWLJ 147, 
158. 
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litigation). This is preferable to including a restrictive definition of ‘public interest’ in 
the Act, and to not providing any statutory guidance. 
9.37 In Hogan v Hinch, French CJ stated that when ‘public interest’ is used in a 
statute, ‘the term derives its content from “the subject matter and the scope and 
purpose” of the enactment in which it appears. The court is not free to apply 
idiosyncratic notions of public interest’.23 
9.38 In a 2012 report, a UK Joint Committee on Privacy and Injunctions said that the 
‘worst excesses of the press have stemmed from the fact that the public interest test has 
been too elastic and has all too often meant what newspaper editors want it to mean’.24 
The Committee emphasised that ‘the decision of where the public interest lies in a 
particular case is a matter of judgment, and is best taken by the courts in privacy 
cases’.25 
9.39 Including a non-exhaustive list of public interest matters seems more helpful 
than attempting a definition of public interest, which might necessarily have to be 
overly general or overly confined and inflexible.26 
9.40 Community expectations of privacy change over time. This is another reason to 
include a non-exhaustive list of public interest matters for a court to consider, rather 
than a definition of public interest. It will allow the scope of public interest to develop 
in line with changing community attitudes and developments in technology. 
9.41 There is precedent in Australian law and in regulation for providing guidance on 
the meaning of ‘public interest’, for example in the public interest exemptions in the 
Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth).27 
9.42 A number of stakeholders expressed support for including a non-exhaustive list 
of factors in the Act.28 However, the Law Institute of Victoria submitted that the Act 
should not provide guidance on the meaning of public interest: 
This is a phrase commonly used in legislation and one with which courts are familiar. 
‘Public interest’ is a broad concept that is flexible enough to respond to the facts and 
                                                        
23  Hogan v Hinch (2011) 243 CLR 506, [31] (French CJ). This passage follows directly on from the passage 
quoted earlier in this chapter. 
24 Joint Committee on Privacy and Injunctions, Privacy and Injunctions, House of Lords Paper No 273, 
House of Commons Paper No 1443, Session 2010–12 (2012) 19. 
25 Ibid. The Committee also recommended that all relevant regulatory bodies ‘adopt a common definition of 
what is meant by the public interest that should be reviewed and updated regularly’. 
26  The Australian Press Council defines public interest as ‘involving a matter capable of affecting the people 
at large so they might be legitimately interested in, or concerned about, what is going on, or what may 
happen to them or to others’: Australian Press Council, General Statement of Principles. 
27  ‘Factors favouring access to the document in the public interest include whether access to the document 
would do any of the following: (a) promote the objects of this Act ...; (b) inform debate on a matter of 
public importance; (c) promote effective oversight of public expenditure; (d) allow a person to access his 
or her own personal information’: Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) s 11B(3). 
28  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Submission 66; ABC, Submission 46; Telstra, 
Submission 45; Electronic Frontiers Australia, Submission 44; Arts Law Centre of Australia, Submission 
43; Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 30. 
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circumstances of any particular case. Given that privacy is fact and context specific, it 
is appropriate to keep concepts such as ‘public interest’ broad and flexible.29 
9.43 Alternatively, broad concepts which go to the meaning of public interest could 
go in the objects section or the preamble of the Act. 
Which public interests should be listed? 
9.44 The ALRC recommends that the Act set out public interest matters that are both 
important and that might sometimes conflict with privacy interests. The list should 
include: freedom of expression, freedom of the media, the proper administration of 
government, open justice, public health and safety, national security, and the 
prevention and detection of crime and fraud. Freedom of expression and freedom of the 
media are perhaps the interests that will most commonly conflict with a privacy 
interest, so these are discussed further below. 
9.45 Many of these matters are also referred to in the list of exceptions to the right to 
respect for private and family life in art 8 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights. Article 8 provides that there should be no interference by a public authority 
with the exercise of this right: 
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society 
in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the 
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, 
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.30 
9.46 The following section discusses two public interests that may sometimes conflict 
with privacy. 
Freedom of expression 
9.47 The public interests that will perhaps most commonly conflict with privacy are 
freedom of expression and freedom of the media.31 
9.48 The vital importance of free speech and free expression is of course now rarely 
seriously disputed in democratic countries, and the subject of a vast legal and 
philosophical literature. Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights provides, in part: 
Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include 
freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of 
frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other 
media of his choice.32 
                                                        
29  Law Institute of Victoria, Submission 22. 
30  European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for 
signature 4 November 1950, 213 UNTS 221 (entered into force 3 September 1953) art 8(2). 
31  For many purposes, these may be the same. ‘… the traditional view in English law has been that freedom 
of the press and the freedom of individual writers are substantially the same. … However, this perspective 
may fail to do justice to the complexity of media freedom …’: Eric Barendt et al, Media Law: Text, Cases 
and Materials (Pearson, 2013) 18–19. 
32  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 
171 (entered into force 23 March 1976) Art 19(2). 
 9. Balancing Privacy with Other Interests 153 
9.49 Those who oppose the introduction of a new privacy tort commonly appeal to 
the fundamental right to freedom of expression, and argue that the tort will impede free 
speech and a free media. The ALRC is particularly concerned that the tort 
recommended in this Report does not have that effect. The public interest in freedom of 
speech and freedom of the press should be expressly recognised in an Act providing for 
a new privacy tort. This may be particularly important, given Australia has not 
enshrined a right to free speech in its law in the way other democracies have, such as 
the United States in the First Amendment to its Constitution, and the United Kingdom 
in its Human Rights Act 1988 (UK). 
9.50 That it will sometimes be justified to limit free speech to protect people’s 
privacy is implicit in a tort for invasion of privacy. But the public interest in free 
speech should not easily be outweighed by privacy interests. Lord Hoffmann has said 
that 
a freedom which is restricted to what judges think to be responsible or in the public 
interest is not freedom. Freedom means the right to publish things which government 
and judges, however well motivated, think should not be published. It means the right 
to say things which ‘right-thinking people’ regard as dangerous or irresponsible.33 
9.51 The public interest balancing exercise recommended in this chapter is designed 
to ensure that privacy interests give way to free speech, when this is in the public 
interest. 
9.52 Nevertheless, freedom of speech is not absolute, and must be balanced against 
certain other public interests, including the public interest in privacy.34 Chief Justice 
Mason of the High Court of Australia said in Australian Capital Television v 
Commonwealth: 
In most jurisdictions in which there is a guarantee of freedom of communication, 
speech or expression, it has been recognized that the freedom is but one element, 
though an essential element, in the constitution of ‘an ordered society’ or a ‘society 
organized under and controlled by law’. Hence, the concept of freedom of 
communication is not an absolute. The guarantee does not postulate that the freedom 
must always and necessarily prevail over competing interests of the public.35 
9.53 When balancing an interest in privacy with a public interest in freedom of 
expression, the nature of the expression will be relevant. Not all speech is of equal 
value to the public. In Campbell, Baroness Hale said that there are ‘undoubtedly 
different types of speech, just as there are different types of private information, some 
of which are more deserving of protection in a democratic society than others’: 
Top of the list is political speech. The free exchange of information and ideas on 
matters relevant to the organisation of the economic, social and political life of the 
                                                        
33  R (Mrs) v Central Independent Television Plc [1994] Fam 192, 202–203. 
34  Lord Hoffmann said that many impressive and emphatic statements about free speech in the law reports 
are ‘often followed by a paragraph which begins with the word “nevertheless”. The judge then goes on to 
explain that there are other interests which have to be balanced against press freedom.’ Lord Hoffmann 
suggests that these exceptions are sometimes made too hastily. But he also said freedom of speech is 
‘subject only to clearly defined exceptions laid down by common law or statute’. 
35  Australian Capital Television v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106, [45] (Mason J). 
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country is crucial to any democracy. Without this, it can scarcely be called a 
democracy at all. This includes revealing information about public figures, especially 
those in elective office, which would otherwise be private but is relevant to their 
participation in public life.36 
9.54 Professor Eric Barendt has said that there are dangers in discriminating between 
more and less worthy speech, but ‘lines and distinctions have to be drawn, unless the 
privacy right is to be altogether eviscerated’.37 
9.55 The speech that is most privileged in Australian law is political communication. 
It is, to use Baroness Hale’s words, ‘top of the list’ of speech deserving protection, 
because it is crucial to any democracy. The Australian High Court has found that 
freedom of political communication is implied in the Australian Constitution. In Lange 
v ABC, the High Court said: 
Freedom of communication on matters of government and politics is an indispensable 
incident of that system of representative government which the Constitution creates 
by directing that the members of the House of Representatives and the Senate shall be 
‘directly chosen by the people’ of the Commonwealth and the States, respectively. At 
federation, representative government was understood to mean a system of 
government where the people in free elections elected their representatives to the 
legislative chamber which occupies the most powerful position in the political system 
... Communications concerning political or government matters between the electors 
and the elected representatives, between the electors and the candidates for election 
and between the electors themselves were central to the system of representative 
government, as it was understood at federation.38 
9.56 It is clear that political communication should be given considerable weight in 
the balancing exercise recommended by the ALRC. It may be that only rarely will the 
public interest in privacy outweigh the public interest in free and open political 
discourse. The ALRC recommends that the Act make clear that the public interest in 
political communication is to be given considerable weight in the balancing exercise, 
by including the words ‘political communication’ after ‘freedom of expression’ in the 
list of public interest matters. In any case, courts would no doubt give particular weight 
to political communication. Chief Justice French of the High Court has said that 
freedom of expression 
can inform the construction and characterisation, for constitutional purposes, of 
Commonwealth statutes. It can also inform the construction of statutes generally and 
the construction of delegated legislation made in the purported exercise of statutory 
powers. As a consequence of its effect upon statutory construction, it may affect the 
scope of discretionary powers which involve the imposition of restrictions upon 
freedom of speech and expression.39 
                                                        
36  Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457, [148]. 
37  ‘It makes sense to say that free political speech is of prime importance and that, therefore, the media are 
entitled to report that a minister is having an extra-marital affair and so trump her privacy right. It makes 
much less sense to make this claim, when the claimant is a footballer or film star’: Eric Barendt, ‘Privacy 
and Freedom of Speech’ in Andrew T Kenyon and Megan Richardson (eds), New Dimensions in Privacy 
Law: International and Comparative Perspectives (Cambridge University Press, 2006) 11, 20.  
38  Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520, 559–60. 
39  Attorney-General (South Australia) v Corporation of the City of Adelaide (2013) 249 CLR 1, [44]. 
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9.57 What is political communication? In Theophanous v The Herald and Weekly 
Times, Mason CJ, Toohey and Gaudron JJ said that political discussion includes: 
discussion of the conduct, policies or fitness for office of government, political 
parties, public bodies, public officers and those seeking public office. The concept 
also includes discussion of the political views and public conduct of persons who are 
engaged in activities that have become the subject of political debate, eg, trade union 
leaders, Aboriginal political leaders, political and economic commentators. Indeed, in 
our view, the concept is not exhausted by political publications and addresses which 
are calculated to influence choices.40 
9.58 The judges then quoted Barendt, who wrote that 
‘political speech’ refers to all speech relevant to the development of public opinion on 
the whole range of issues which an intelligent citizen should think about.41 
9.59 It should be noted, however, that even freedom of political communication is not 
absolute in Australia. Legislation will only be invalid on account of the freedom 
‘where it so burdens the freedom that it may be taken to affect the system of 
government for which the Constitution provides and which depends for its existence 
upon the freedom’.42 
9.60 Politicians and others in public office are of course entitled to some degree of 
privacy. Not all invasions of the privacy of public figures can be characterised and 
justified as political speech. Much will depend on whether a particular communication 
can be properly characterised as political communication in the first place. 
9.61 Other types of expression are of course also very important, and should 
sometimes not be restricted, even where the expression invades someone’s privacy. 
Stakeholders including the ABC, the Arts Law Centre and the National Association for 
the Visual Arts submitted that ‘artistic expression’ be specifically mentioned in the list 
of public interest matters.43 In discussing the relative merits of different types of 
speech, Baroness Hale also referred to the importance of intellectual, educational and 
artistic expression.44 
                                                        
40  Theophanous v The Herald and Weekly Times (1994) 182 CLR 104, 124. 
41  Ibid, [14]. 
42  ‘In Lange, it was also said that the freedom of political communication is limited to what is necessary for 
the effective operation of the system of representative and responsible government provided for by the 
Constitution. … The Court was there explaining that the freedom is not absolute … In APLA Ltd v Legal 
Services Commissioner (NSW), Gleeson CJ and Heydon J observed that the freedom was not a general 
freedom of communication of the kind protected by the United States Constitution. The point sought to be 
made in Lange and in APLA was that legislation which restricts the freedom is not invalid on that account 
alone’: Unions NSW v State of New South Wales (2013) 88 ALJR 227, [18]–[19]. 
43  Arts Law Centre of Australia, Submission 113; ABC, Submission 93; National Association for the Visual 
Arts Ltd, Submission 78. 
44  ‘Intellectual and educational speech and expression are also important in a democracy, not least because 
they enable the development of individuals’ potential to play a full part in society and in our democratic 
life. Artistic speech and expression is important for similar reasons, in fostering both individual 
originality and creativity and the free-thinking and dynamic society we so much value. No doubt there are 
other kinds of speech and expression for which similar claims can be made’: Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 
2 AC 457, [148]. 
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Freedom of the media 
9.62 The ALRC recommends that the list of public interests should include the 
freedom of the media to investigate, and inform and comment on matters of public 
concern and importance. This is intended to highlight the vital public interest in 
responsible journalism on matters of genuine public interest. In his book on freedom of 
speech, Barendt wrote: 
The media provide readers, listeners, and viewers with information and that range of 
ideas and opinion which enables them to participate actively in a political democracy. 
Put shortly, the media perform a vital role as the ‘public watchdog’. As the ‘eyes and 
ears of the general public’ they investigate and report the abuse of power. So the 
argument from democracy, overall the most persuasive rationale for the free speech 
principle, justifies the coverage of mass media communications.45 
9.63 However, the public interest in a free press will not justify all invasions of 
privacy. In fact, invasions of privacy by the media may sometimes be harder to justify 
than a similar invasion by someone else, because of the harm that might come from the 
greater publicity. Barendt has written that ‘[m]edia gossip is quite different in its 
impact from village gossip’: 
I do not suggest that the argument for a free press and media is not a strong one, or 
that it is not entitled to great weight in privacy as in other civil and criminal 
proceedings. But press freedom is parasitic to some extent on the underlying free 
speech rights and interests of readers and listeners, and the role which the press and 
other media play in informing them. It is not the same as a free speech argument, and 
that should be borne in mind when we consider how much weight should be attached 
to the freedom when it conflicts with the right to privacy which certainly is a 
fundamental human right.46 
9.64 It is sometimes argued that, because freedom of speech and the media is so 
fundamental to democracy, anything that limits the media is necessarily harmful to 
democracy. However, modern day media organisations have a very wide spectrum of 
activities and interests. On the same website on which may be found news and analysis 
of important political and social matters, may often be found photos of celebrities at the 
beach. Publishing such photos may be justified on some grounds, but hardly in the 
name of democracy. Courts when balancing a person’s privacy interests with the public 
interest should naturally give relatively little weight to a newspaper’s interest in 
publishing entertaining gossip, but considerable weight to the importance of 
newspapers publishing material on matters of genuine public concern.47 
                                                        
45  Eric Barendt, Freedom of Speech (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2007) 417–8. 
46  Eric Barendt, ‘Privacy and Freedom of Speech’, in Andrew T Kenyon and Megan Richardson, New 
Dimensions in Privacy Law: International and Comparative Perspectives (Cambridge University Press, 
2006) 23. 
47  Des Butler expressed a related concern about ‘embellished’ reporting. He submitted that in ‘neither the 
case of a statutory cause of action nor uniform surveillance laws should free rein be given to sloppy or 
embellished reporting under the cover of the public interest’: D Butler, Submission 74. 
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Other matters 
9.65 Other matters that should be included in the non-exhaustive list of public interest 
matters are: the proper administration of government; open justice; public health and 
safety; national security; and the prevention and detection of crime and fraud. 
9.66 These matters attracted relatively little comment in submissions to the 
Discussion Paper. Some stakeholders said that the ‘proper administration of 
government’ is too broad’.48 The UNSW Cyberspace Law and Policy Community said 
that proper administration should ‘privilege key personal rights and interests such as 
privacy over mere administrative convenience’.49 The National Archives suggested 
instead: ‘the proper administration of government including administrative 
responsibilities pursuant to any laws’.50 
9.67 The ABC and the Law Institute of Victoria questioned whether ‘national 
security’ should be included, considering that invasions of privacy necessary for 
national security would be protected by the separate defence for ‘lawful activity’.51 
9.68 Guardian News and Media Limited and Guardian Australia also expressed 
concern about ‘national security’ and ‘economic wellbeing of the country’: 
While these are clearly important public interests, it is important to ensure that their 
recognition in this context does not permit avoidance by governments of other laws 
which require appropriate processes, such as the obtaining of valid search or 
surveillance warrants by police, to protect privacy and guard the important protections 
provided by due process. 52 
9.69 In the Discussion Paper, the ALRC included in the proposed list of public 
interest matters, ‘the economic wellbeing of the country’. Although no doubt this will 
sometimes be a public interest, it is perhaps too general, and therefore unhelpful, to 
include in the list.53 
9.70 The Australian Privacy Foundation expressed concern about the ‘excessive 
generality, scope and difficulty in definition of matters particularly around 
administration of government, the economic wellbeing of the country, and the defence 
of “legal authority”. These are not appropriate or appropriately narrowly limited, and 
so could seriously undermine the effectiveness of the proposed cause of action’.54 
                                                        
48  Australian Privacy Foundation, Submission 110; National Archives, Submission 100; UNSW Cyberspace 
Law and Policy Community, Submission 98. 
49  UNSW Cyberspace Law and Policy Community, Submission 98. 
50  National Archives, Submission 100. 
51  Law Institute of Victoria, Submission 96; ABC, Submission 93. 
52  Guardian News and Media Limited and Guardian Australia, Submission 80. 
53  See, eg, Australian Privacy Foundation, Submission 110; UNSW Cyberspace Law and Policy 
Community, Submission 98; Australian Human Rights Commission, Submission 75. Concerning ‘the 
economic wellbeing of the country’, the Australian Human Rights Commission said that depending on 
how it is interpreted, it ‘could be used to dismiss privacy for legitimate private information, commercial 
or others, or for potentially unjustified and perceived interest for the public that may not amount to 
legitimate public interest’. 
54  Australian Privacy Foundation, Submission 110. 
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9.71 Telstra submitted, with respect to ‘national security’ and ‘the prevention and 
detection of crime and fraud’, that they ‘should be extended to include all law 
enforcement activities, for example investigation, prevention, detection and 
prosecution of crime and fraud’.55 Telstra also said that ‘the protection of public 
revenue could also be considered’.56 
Private interests 
9.72 In the Discussion Paper, the ALRC proposed that a court should be satisfied that 
‘the plaintiff’s interest in privacy outweighs the defendant’s interest in freedom of 
expression and any broader public interest’.57 However, the ALRC now recommends 
that the focus be on balancing the public interest in privacy with any countervailing 
public interests. Privacy is not merely a private interest, but also an important public 
interest.58 The private interests of the parties, such as in privacy or free expression, will 
generally reflect the broader public interests at stake. But the focus of this element of 
the tort should be on the public interest—the question of whether this type of invasion 
of privacy may be justified on public interest grounds. 
Onus of proof 
Recommendation 9–3 The Act should provide that the defendant has the 
burden of adducing evidence that suggests there is a countervailing public 
interest for the court to consider. The Act should also provide that the plaintiff 
has the legal onus to satisfy the court that the public interest in privacy 
outweighs any countervailing public interest that is raised in the proceedings. 
9.73 Should the plaintiff be required to prove that the public interest in privacy 
outweighs any countervailing public interest? Or should the defendant be required to 
prove that the public interest outweighs the privacy interest? This was one of the more 
difficult questions raised in this Inquiry. 
9.74 The ALRC has concluded that, if a court considers that the privacy interests and 
public interests at stake in a particular case are evenly weighted, then the plaintiff 
should not have a cause of action. The plaintiff should be required to satisfy the court 
that the public interest in privacy outweighs any countervailing public interests. The 
ALRC agrees with the NSWLRC when it stated in its report: 
Legal principle requires that plaintiffs bear the onus of establishing their case. It is 
appropriate, in our view, that, as part of establishing an invasion of privacy, plaintiffs 
should demonstrate at the outset that their claim to privacy is not outweighed by a 
                                                        
55  Telstra, Submission 107. 
56  Ibid. 
57  Australian Law Reform Commission, Serious Invasions of Privacy in the Digital Era, Discussion Paper 
80 (2014) Proposal 8–1. 
58  See Ch 2. 
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competing public interest. Quite simply, privacy only needs protection if it is not 
outweighed, in the circumstances, by such a competing interest.59 
9.75 The alternative approach of making public interest a defence carries a risk that 
the cause of action would be used to stifle or ‘chill’ activities that are socially 
desirable, particularly the operations of the media. 
9.76 Some stakeholders said that the plaintiff should have the onus of proof. Telstra 
submitted that: 
given the seriousness of the cause of action and the potentially chilling effect it may 
have on business and service providers, the onus of proof should be on the plaintiff to 
ensure that their claim is sufficiently serious to outweigh public interest concerns at 
the outset.60 
9.77 To make this decision, a court must have some evidence before it. Although the 
ultimate legal burden will remain with the plaintiff, the ALRC recommends that the 
Act provide that the defendant has the burden of adducing any evidence of public 
interest.61 The defendant should usually be in a better position to provide evidence that 
the invasion of privacy was in the public interest.62 A newspaper, for example, will 
generally be better placed to bring evidence of the public interest in free speech than a 
person whose privacy the newspaper has invaded. The Law Institute of Victoria 
submitted that evidence will be required, for example, ‘about why the privacy breach 
occurred and why the defendant acted in the way they did—evidence that can only be 
provided by the defendant’.63 
9.78 In some cases, the public interest will be obvious or raised in the plaintiff’s 
pleadings. In other cases, where no evidence is raised of countervailing public interests, 
the court may not need to balance competing interests, and this element of the tort will 
                                                        
59  NSW Law Reform Commission, Invasion of Privacy, Report 120 (2009) 28. This was also the approach 
recommended by the ALRC in 2008: Australian Law Reform Commission, For Your Information: 
Australian Privacy Law and Practice, Report 108 (2008) [17.157]. 
60  Telstra, Submission 45. See also, SBS, Submission 59; ASTRA, Submission 47. 
61  This is the evidential burden—ie, ‘the obligation to show, if called upon to do so, that there is sufficient 
evidence to raise an issue as to the existence or non-existence of a fact in issue, due regard being had to 
the standard of proof demanded of the party under such obligation’: Dyson Heydon, Cross on Evidence 
(Lexis Nexis Butterworths, 9th ed, 2012) [7105] (citations omitted). The legal burden of proof, on the 
other hand, is ‘the obligation of a party to meet the requirement of a rule of law that a fact in issue be 
proved (or disproved) either by a preponderance of the evidence or beyond reasonable doubt, as the case 
may be’: Ibid [7010]. On the distinction between the legal onus of proof and the evidentiary or strategic 
onus of proof, see also Bob Williams, ‘Burdens and Standards in Civil Litigation’ (2003) 25 Sydney Law 
Review 165. 
62  Law Institute of Victoria, Submission 96. Dr Normann Witzleb: ‘the defendant will often be in a better 
position, and have the greater interest, to adduce the evidence necessary for establishing the weight of the 
public interest in his or her conduct’: Normann Witzleb, ‘A Statutory Cause of Action for Privacy? A 
Critical Appraisal of Three Recent Australian Law Reform Proposals’ (2011) 19 Torts Law Journal 104, 
121–122. See also Australian Privacy Foundation, Submission 39; Public Interest Advocacy Centre, 
Submission 30; D Butler, Submission 10. 
63  Law Institute of Victoria, Submission 96. However, in making this point, the LIV also said that ‘the 
defendant should not be required to put on evidence until the cause of action has been established; that is, 
as a defence to a serious invasion of privacy’. The ALRC considers that the evidentiary and legal burden 
can be separated, so that the defendant has the onus to adduce evidence, but the plaintiff the onus to prove 
on the balance of probabilities that the privacy interest outweighs any public interest. 
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be satisfied. The plaintiff will not have to separately plead and prove the non-existence 
of public interests that have not been raised. 
9.79 Although some stakeholders submitted that a balancing exercise should be 
carried out when determining actionability,64 as the ALRC has recommended, others 
submitted that there should instead be a public interest defence, and that the defendant 
should bear the burden of proof.65 Associate Professor Moira Paterson submitted: 
the plaintiff already has the onus of establishing that he or she had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy which was breached in a serious way. The requirement that a 
privacy breach needs to be serious to justify litigation itself acknowledges that there is 
a competing interest in transparency that should always trump where the privacy 
breach is trivial in nature. In those circumstances it is not unreasonable to require the 
defendant to prove that a serious breach was nevertheless in the public interest 
because of the strong public interest in freedom of expression (or some other 
competing interest).66 
9.80 The Victorian Law Reform Commission (VLRC) argued that the burden of 
proving the existence of a countervailing public interest should lie with the defendant. 
The VLRC argued that a plaintiff ‘should not have to prove a negative, such as the lack 
of a countervailing public interest’.67 
9.81 New Zealand has a defence of ‘legitimate public concern’ to invasions of 
privacy.68 The Court of Appeal of New Zealand stated, in Hosking v Runting, that it 
was ‘more conceptually sound’ for the absence of legitimate public interest to be 
treated as a defence, rather than as an element of the tort itself, ‘particularly given the 
                                                        
64  Arts Law Centre of Australia, Submission 113; S Higgins, Submission 82; I Turnbull, Submission 81; 
Guardian News and Media Limited and Guardian Australia, Submission 80; National Association for the 
Visual Arts Ltd, Submission 78; Google, Submission 54; ASTRA, Submission 47; ABC, Submission 46; 
Telstra, Submission 45. 
65  Women’s Legal Services NSW, Submission 115; Office of the Victorian Privacy Commissioner, 
Submission 108; UNSW Cyberspace Law and Policy Community, Submission 98; Australian Sex Party, 
Submission 92; Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Submission 66; NSW Young 
Lawyers, Submission 58; Electronic Frontiers Australia, Submission 44; Arts Law Centre of Australia, 
Submission 43; Australian Privacy Foundation, Submission 39; Public Interest Advocacy Centre, 
Submission 30; N Witzleb, Submission 29; B Arnold, Submission 28; Australian Bankers’ Association, 
Submission 27; Law Institute of Victoria, Submission 22; Pirate Party of Australia, Submission 18; 
D Butler, Submission 10; T Gardner, Submission 3. (Stakeholders generally did not distinguish between a 
legal and evidentiary burden). 
66  M Paterson, Submission 60. 
67  Victorian Law Reform Commission, Surveillance in Public Places, Report 18 (2010) recs 27, 28. 
68  In relation to the publication of private information, see: Hosking v Runting (2005) 1 NZLR 1, [129]. In 
relation to intrusion upon seclusion, see: C v Holland 3 NZLR 672, [96].  
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parallels with breach of confidence claims’.69 There are also public interest defences to 
privacy torts in Canada.70 
9.82 In supporting a public interest defence, the law firm Maurice Blackburn has 
noted that a similar approach has been used for other statutory causes of action in 
Australia. Under the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth), ‘it is for the defendant to 
show that their conduct should be exempted because it has been done reasonably and in 
good faith for particular specified purposes’; and ‘under the Racial and Religious 
Tolerance Act 2001 (Vic) the defendant must demonstrate that conduct which would 
otherwise be racial or religious vilification was justified because it was in the public 
interest’.71 
9.83 However, the ALRC considers that it is preferable to consider the public interest 
when determining actionability at the outset, and that the plaintiff should bear the legal 
onus of proof on matters going to actionability. This should better ensure that privacy 
interests are not unduly privileged over other important rights and interests. Privacy is 
an interest that is relative, and the context and circumstances of the conduct are critical 
factors: the balancing at this stage of the action reflects this. 
A discrete exercise 
9.84 The ALRC has recommended a discrete public interest balancing exercise. 
Another option is to have public interest matters considered when determining whether 
the plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of privacy.72 
9.85 Public interest matters will sometimes be relevant to the question of whether the 
plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of privacy. For example, if private information is 
published about a politician, the fact that the information is about a politician may be 
relevant both to the question of whether the politician had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy, and to whether the publication of the information is in the public interest. 
9.86 At other times, it may be artificial to consider public interest matters when 
determining whether the plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
9.87 The NSWLRC argued that the two issues of whether or not a matter is 
legitimately private, and the significance of competing interests, are not always clearly 
separable. 
                                                        
69  Hosking v Runting (2005) 1 NZLR 1, [129]. See, also, [130]: ‘Furthermore, the scope of privacy 
protection should not exceed such limits on the freedom of expression as is justified in a free and 
democratic society. A defence of legitimate public concern will ensure this. The significant value to be 
accorded freedom of expression requires that the tort of privacy must necessarily be tightly confined. In 
Douglas v Hello! Brooke LJ formulated the matter in the following way (at para [49]): “[A]lthough the 
right to freedom of expression is not in every case the ace of trumps, it is a powerful card to which the 
courts of this country must always pay appropriate respect.”’ 
70  Where the act of invasion was a publication, the four Canadian provinces that have enacted statutory 
causes of action for invasion of privacy provide a defence where the publication was in the public 
interest: see, eg Privacy Act, RSBC 1996, c 373 s 2(3)(a). 
71  Maurice Blackburn Lawyers, Submission No 45 to DPM&C Issues Paper, 2011 (citations omitted). 
72  That the plaintiff must have a reasonable expectation of privacy is another element of the cause of action: 
Rec 8–1. 
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Thus, a competing public interest may be of such force in the circumstances that the 
case will focus principally on it in reaching a conclusion that no reasonable 
expectation of privacy arises.73 
9.88 However, given the importance of considering competing public interests, the 
ALRC considers that there should be a clear and discrete public interest element in the 
cause of action. 
 
                                                        
73  NSW Law Reform Commission, Invasion of Privacy, Report 120 (2009) 19. 
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Summary 
10.1 This chapter considers a number of details in the legal design of the statutory 
cause of action for serious invasion of privacy, including the appropriate forums to 
hear the cause of action, costs orders, and limitation periods. 
10.2 The ALRC recommends that federal, state and territory courts should have 
jurisdiction to hear an action for serious invasion of privacy. 
10.3 There may often be alternatives to bringing an action under the new tort, such as 
making a complaint to the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner (OAIC). 
Failing to pursue such alternative dispute resolution processes should not bar a plaintiff 
from bringing an action under the new tort. However, the ALRC recommends that the 
Act provide that, in determining any remedy, courts may take into account whether or 
not a party took reasonable steps to resolve the dispute without litigation and the 
outcome of any alternative dispute resolution (ADR) process. 
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10.4 The chapter then discusses who should have standing to sue for a serious 
invasion of privacy. The ALRC recommends that the plaintiff must be a natural person, 
rather than a company or other organisation. The ALRC also recommends that the new 
tort should not survive in favour of a plaintiff’s estate or against a defendant’s estate. 
These recommendations reflect the fact that privacy is a matter of personal sensibility. 
10.5 The ALRC recommends a limitation period of either one year from the date on 
which the plaintiff became aware of the invasion of privacy or three years from the 
date on which the invasion of privacy occurred, whichever occurs first. In exceptional 
circumstances, the court may extend this limitation period, but the period should expire 
no later than six years from the date on which the invasion occurred. The ALRC also 
recommends that consideration be given to extending the limitation period where the 
plaintiff was under 18 years of age when the invasion of privacy occurred. 
10.6 The ALRC recommends that consideration should be given to enacting a ‘first 
publication rule’, also known as a ‘single publication rule’. This would limit the 
circumstances in which a person may bring an action in relation to the publication of 
private information, when that same private information had already been published in 
the past. 
Forums 
Recommendation 10–1 Federal, state and territory courts should have 
jurisdiction to hear an action for serious invasion of privacy under the Act. 
Consideration should also be given to giving jurisdiction to appropriate state and 
territory tribunals. 
10.7 The ALRC recommends that jurisdiction to hear actions for serious invasions of 
privacy under the Act should be conferred upon federal, state and territory courts. This 
position was widely supported by stakeholders. The ALRC considers it inappropriate 
to restrict the particular state and territory courts that may hear these actions. 
10.8 In reaching this recommendation, the ALRC has taken into account a range of 
factors, including: the importance of access to justice; the need to minimise confusion 
or inconsistency in the application of legislation across Australian jurisdictions; the 
range of available remedies; issues of costs of proceedings; relevant constitutional 
issues; and existing courts and tribunals. 
10.9 The plaintiff’s particular choice of court will likely depend on the jurisdictional 
limits of the various courts and the nature of the remedy sought by the plaintiff. The 
jurisdictions of the various courts are considered briefly below. 
Federal courts 
10.10 The power to vest judicial power in the Federal Court of Australia (FCA) and 
the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCCA) arises under s 71 of the Australian 
Constitution. The jurisdictions of the FCA and the FCCA are generally conferred by a 
wide range of Commonwealth Acts such as the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), the 
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Migration Act 1958 (Cth), the Australian Consumer Law,1 the Corporations Act 2001 
(Cth), the Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth) and the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) (Privacy 
Act). As the ALRC recommends in Chapter 4, the new tort should be located in a 
Commonwealth Act, and this statute could vest power to hear actions in the FCA and 
the FCCA. 
10.11 Given that many serious invasions of privacy may involve parties in different 
states or territories, vesting the power to hear privacy actions in courts with jurisdiction 
across the entire country—such as the FCA and the FCCA—may reduce the costs and 
burden for plaintiffs. 
10.12 Both the FCA and the FCCA have, in addition to jurisdiction granted to them by 
legislation, ‘associated jurisdiction’2 and ‘accrued jurisdiction’3 for matters, not 
otherwise within these courts’ respective jurisdictions, that are related to matters which 
are within their respective jurisdictions. For example, while no statute confers 
jurisdiction on these courts for breach of contract actions, either court is able to hear a 
claim for breach of contract that is brought alongside a claim for misleading or 
deceptive conduct under the Australian Consumer Law. While associated and accrued 
jurisdiction would potentially mean that matters not currently within the jurisdiction of 
the FCA or FCCA could be heard by these courts, if brought alongside a privacy 
action, the ALRC does not consider this to be particularly problematic. Many related 
matters can already be brought before these courts—actions for defamation and 
negligence might be brought alongside an action arising under the Privacy Act, for 
instance.4 
10.13 However, the ALRC considers that the FCA and the FCCA should not have 
exclusive jurisdiction5 to hear actions under the Act, as in many cases it would be less 
costly for litigants to use state local courts or district or circuit courts to hear 
proceedings. 
State and territory courts 
10.14 State and territory courts include supreme courts, district or county courts, and 
local or magistrates courts. The Act, as a Commonwealth law, could vest federal 
jurisdiction in state and territory courts to hear the new cause of action.6 
                                                        
1  Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) sch 2. 
2  Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 32; Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth) s 18. 
3  Stack v Coastal Securities (No 9) (1983) 154 CLR 261. 
4  See, eg, Dale v Veda Advantage Information Services and Solution Limited [2009] FCA 305 (1 April 
2009). 
5  The power to grant exclusive jurisdiction to federal courts is provided to the Commonwealth under 
s 77(ii) of the Australian Constitution. For an example of exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Court, see 
Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) s 86. 
6  This vesting of jurisdiction is possible under ss 71 and 77(iii) of the Australian Constitution and s 39 of 
the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) (in the cases of states), and s 122 of the Constitution (in the case of 
territories): James Crawford and Brian Opeskin, Australian Courts of Law (Oxford University Press, 4th 
ed) 57. A state or territory court will only have the power to exercise federal jurisdiction in line with ss 35 
and 122 of the Australian Constitution where that jurisdiction power derives from a Commonwealth Act, 
not a state or territory act. 
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10.15 Different powers are available to the different levels of state and territory courts. 
The supreme courts of the states and territories have general, unlimited jurisdiction.7 
10.16 District and county courts (and the ACT Magistrates Court) generally have 
similar powers to supreme courts, including powers to grant injunctions and equitable 
remedies.8 However, the jurisdiction of district and county courts is typically limited to 
certain values. For example, the County Court of Victoria may only hear claims up to 
$200,000; the District Courts of Queensland and Western Australia, may only hear 
claims up to $250,000; and the District Court of NSW may only hear claims up to 
$750,000.9 
10.17 The powers of local and magistrates courts with respect to civil actions are often 
restricted in certain ways. For example, the Local Court of NSW does not have 
jurisdiction to hear defamation proceedings;10 and the Magistrates Court of South 
Australia has powers limited to certain procedural functions, adjourning proceedings, 
certain statutory matters, and ‘minor civil actions’.11 Local and magistrates courts may 
have equitable jurisdiction and so may be able to hear breach of confidence actions, 
although this jurisdiction may be limited to cases where any relief claimed is an 
amount of money under a certain limit.12 Local and magistrates courts typically do not 
have the power to grant an injunction. 
10.18 While the jurisdictions of the local, magistrates, district and county courts of the 
states and territories may, in some cases, have restrictions that limit their effectiveness 
in dealing with some privacy actions, the ALRC does not consider that there is any 
reason to expressly exclude these courts as possible forums for privacy actions. There 
would also be considerable benefit in terms of providing wider access to justice in 
privacy claims if these courts could hear some privacy actions. 
Cost management in courts 
10.19 While proceedings in courts may result in substantial costs for parties, there are 
mechanisms available to minimise these costs. Courts are variously empowered to 
direct parties to mediation, conciliation and arbitration,13 which are designed to offer 
cheaper and faster dispute resolution than litigation. Courts also have the power to 
waive fees and, in certain cases, fees are not payable.14 While these mechanisms will 
not remove the costs for all litigants, they do temper the costs associated with court 
                                                        
7  See, eg, Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) s 23; Constitution Act 1975 (Vic) s 85(1). 
8  District Court Act 1973 (NSW) ss 44, 46; District Court of Queensland Act 1967 (Qld) ss 68, 69; District 
Court Act 1991 (SA) s 8; County Court Act 1958 (Vic) ss 37, 49; District Court Act 1969 (WA) ss 50, 55; 
Magistrates Court Act 1930 (ACT) ss 257, 258. 
9  County Court Act 1958 (Vic) ss 3, 37; District Court of Queensland Act 1967 (Qld) s 68; District Court 
Act 1969 (WA) s 50; District Court Act 1973 (NSW) s 44. 
10  Local Court Act 2007 (NSW) s 33. 
11  Magistrates Court Act 1991 (SA) ss 8, 10, 15. 
12  See, eg, Magistrates Court (Civil Proceedings) Act 2004 (WA) s 6. 
13  See, eg, the following provisions for the power to order mediation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 
(Cth) s 53; Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) s 26; Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic) s 48(2)(c); Supreme 
Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2005 (Vic) r 50.07. 
14  Civil Procedure Regulation 2012 No 393 (NSW) reg 11. 
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proceedings in some cases. The ALRC also suggests that courts be empowered to make 
a range of costs orders.15 
Tribunals 
10.20 Several states and territories have created tribunals that are able to hear civil 
matters, and which may be suitable forums for hearing privacy actions under the Act. 
These tribunals include the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal (ACAT); the NSW 
Civil and Administrative Tribunal (NCAT); the Queensland Civil and Administrative 
Tribunal (QCAT); the State Administrative Tribunal of Western Australia (SAT); and 
the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (VCAT).16 These tribunals have a 
range of powers including, in some cases the power to grant injunctions.17 
10.21 The appropriateness of these tribunals for dealing with privacy matters has been 
previously noted. For example, the Victorian Law Reform Commission recommended 
that jurisdiction for privacy actions should be vested exclusively in the VCAT: 
VCAT is designed to be more accessible than the courts. It seeks to be a speedy, low-
cost tribunal where legal costs do not outweigh the issues at stake. The experience in 
other jurisdictions demonstrates that any damages awards in cases of this nature are 
likely to be relatively small. The sums of money involved do not justify the level of 
legal costs usually associated with civil litigation in the courts.18 
10.22 There was general agreement among stakeholders that low-cost forums for 
hearing actions for serious invasions of privacy would be beneficial. Some 
stakeholders were in favour of state and territory tribunals being able to hear such 
cases. For example, the Redfern Legal Centre submitted that 
several states and territories have created tribunals that are able to hear civil matters. 
The advantage of these tribunals is that they provide a relatively efficient and cost-
effective way to resolve disputes and thereby allow a wider section of the community 
to access justice. We believe, for example, that the [Privacy and Personal Information 
Protection Act 1998 (NSW)] is much more effective in protecting the privacy rights of 
individuals in NSW because it includes a right of review in the NSW Civil and 
Administrative Tribunal (NCAT).19 
10.23 Other stakeholders were less supportive of state and territory tribunals being 
empowered to hear actions for serious invasions of privacy. The Law Institute of 
Victoria, for example, submitted that they 
would be wary of establishing jurisdiction for (VCAT) to hear claims about serious 
invasions of privacy, because there is likely to be complex legal argument as the tort 
                                                        
15  See Ch 12. 
16  South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA). This Act provides for the 
establishment of the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (SACAT). However, at the time 
of writing, the SACAT had not begun operation. 
17  ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT) s 22; Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal 
Act 1998 (Vic) s 123; State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) s 90 (interim injunctions only). 
18  Victorian Law Reform Commission, Surveillance in Public Places, Report 18 (2010) [7.226]. 
19  Redfern Legal Centre, Submission 94. 
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develops. Courts, and specifically judges, are best placed to hear and determine these 
types of disputes. Further, the rules of evidence do not apply in VCAT matters.20 
10.24 The Domestic Violence Legal Service and the North Australian Aboriginal 
Justice Agency were similarly cautious about empowering tribunals to hear actions 
under the Act, noting that 
There may be some advantages in terms of cost and less formality for disadvantaged 
litigants in approaching a Tribunal rather than a Court, however, currently in the 
Northern Territory the Administrative Appeals Tribunal sits infrequently and so is not 
as readily accessible as the courts.21 
10.25 The powers and nature of state and territory tribunals differ significantly, and 
any conferral of power on these tribunals would need to take these differences into 
account. State and territory governments would then be in a position to enact 
legislation, if necessary, to confer jurisdiction on appropriate tribunals. 
The role of government regulatory bodies 
10.26 The OAIC proposed that it should be able to hear complaints about serious 
invasions of privacy.22 The OAIC’s proposal received support from several 
stakeholders.23 
10.27 The OAIC’s proposal is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 16. The ALRC 
recommends that consideration be given to extending the powers of the Commissioner 
to allow investigations of complaints about serious invasions of privacy in general, in 
addition to the Commissioner’s existing power to hear complaints about breaches of 
the Privacy Act. 
Alternative dispute resolution processes 
10.28 An individual should be able to bring an action for serious invasion of privacy 
under the Act regardless of whether or not the individual has already taken steps to 
resolve the complaint through an ADR process. However, a court may take into 
account any reasonable steps taken by either party to resolve a dispute without 
litigation, and the outcome of any ADR process. Stakeholders were generally 
supportive of this position. 
10.29 Complaints about serious invasions of privacy may be made to statutory bodies. 
These include, in particular, to the OAIC, the Australian Communications and Media 
Authority (the ACMA), state and territory privacy commissioners and ombudsmen. 
The ALRC also recommends that the Australian Government give consideration to 
empowering the Privacy Commissioner to investigate complaints about invasions of 
                                                        
20  Law Institute of Victoria, Submission 96. 
21  Domestic Violence Legal Service and North Australian Aboriginal Justice Agency, Submission 120. 
22  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Submission 90; Office of the Australian Information 
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privacy beyond those invasions currently falling within the Privacy Act.24 Various 
industry bodies also provide ADR processes. 
10.30 ADR processes offer several advantages over judicial proceedings. In particular, 
they may be cheaper and faster than judicial proceedings, and they may be less 
emotionally burdensome on the parties involved. The use of ADR may also reduce the 
case load of courts, which is desirable for the efficient administration of justice. 
However, the speed and availability of ADR processes may vary, depending on the 
allocation of public resources. 
10.31 If a statutory cause of action for serious invasion of privacy were enacted, the 
availability of these existing dispute resolution processes should be recognised. Some 
possibilities include: requiring a complainant to pursue some other form of dispute 
resolution before commencing judicial proceedings; prohibiting judicial proceedings if 
ADR has been undertaken; or prohibiting ADR if judicial proceedings have been 
undertaken. 
10.32 For reasons set out below, the ALRC has concluded that a complainant should 
not be required to pursue ADR before initiating judicial proceedings. Nor should they 
be barred from initiating judicial proceedings where ADR has previously been pursued. 
The ADR and judicial processes should remain independent. However, the ALRC 
suggests that courts should have a wide discretion, when determining any amount of 
damages, to take into account whether parties took reasonable steps the to avoid 
litigation.25 
No requirement to pursue ADR 
10.33 That the use of some form of ADR should be encouraged is widely 
acknowledged. However, stakeholders took different views on whether or not ADR 
prior to judicial proceedings should be mandatory. Several stakeholders supported 
mandatory ADR,26 and a number supported only voluntary ADR.27 
10.34 There would be several difficulties in requiring plaintiffs to pursue ADR before 
initiating judicial proceedings. Although there is a range of ADR options available, the 
various options are often limited to specific types of matters. For instance, the OAIC 
may investigate complaints relating to data protection under the Privacy Act; state and 
territory commissioners and ombudsmen may investigate complaints relating to state 
and territory agencies; and the ACMA may investigate complaints relating to media 
and communications organisations. There is at present no single ADR forum that is 
empowered to deal with all types of complaints that might lead to proceedings under a 
statutory cause of action for serious invasion of privacy. A requirement that potential 
                                                        
24  See Ch 16. 
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plaintiffs pursue ADR before initiating judicial proceedings may therefore be too 
onerous, requiring them to research a complex and fragmented landscape to determine 
which ADR option would apply in their case. 
10.35 Moreover, barring plaintiffs from initiating ADR without first pursuing non-
judicial proceedings would present a significant restriction on plaintiffs’ access to 
justice. This would be particularly problematic where the individual wished to seek an 
injunction, or where the defendant would be unlikely to engage in ADR in good faith—
in either case, the plaintiff would be faced with additional time and financial costs with 
little chance of obtaining appropriate redress. 
10.36 Mandatory ADR may also be inappropriate in cases where one party poses a 
serious threat, including a serious psychological or emotional threat, to the other party. 
Several stakeholders argued that this would be a particular problem in many privacy 
cases involving domestic violence.28 
10.37 Rather than a general requirement that potential plaintiffs pursue ADR processes 
before initiating judicial proceedings, it is preferable to use existing court powers to 
refer matters to dispute resolution where appropriate (and other existing provisions 
relating to dispute resolution in court rules).29 This would allow the courts to take into 
account the urgency of a matter, the relationship between the parties, and any other 
factors relevant to whether such an order should be made. However, possible 
administrative dispute resolution providers, such as the OAIC and the ACMA, may 
require specific powers in order to receive court-referred disputes. As the OAIC noted, 
under the current Privacy Act, 
It would not be appropriate for the OAIC to take on an alternative dispute resolution 
role in the absence of a complaints model being adopted. For example, the OAIC 
suggests it would not be workable for a court to refer matters to the OAIC for 
conciliation. In particular, this is because the OAIC relies to some extent on the 
investigative powers in Part V of the Privacy Act in order to successfully conduct its 
conciliations, and those investigative powers would not be triggered in such 
circumstances.30 
No bar on judicial proceedings after ADR 
10.38 The ALRC does not recommend that a complainant who has received a 
determination from an ADR process should be barred from initiating judicial 
proceedings about the same matter. 
10.39 It is undesirable for individuals to ‘double-dip’ by receiving compensation 
through both court and ADR processes. However, a bar on individuals commencing 
court proceedings after ADR would present a serious limitation on access to justice and 
discourage the use of ADR processes. 
                                                        
28  Women’s Legal Services NSW, Submission 57; Women’s Legal Service Victoria and Domestic Violence 
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10.40 Furthermore, the risk of a complainant double-dipping is likely to be minimal. 
An unsuccessful ADR process would generally be a strong indicator that an action 
under the statutory cause of action would be unsuccessful as well. 
Cause of action limited to natural persons 
Recommendation 10–2 The new tort should only be actionable by natural 
persons. 
10.41 The ALRC recommends that the statutory cause of action for serious invasion of 
privacy be limited to natural persons.31 This means that corporations, government 
agencies or other organisations32 would not have standing to sue for invasions of 
privacy. This recommendation was unanimously supported by previous law reform 
inquiries.33 
Privacy action remedies a personal interest 
10.42 An action in privacy is designed to remedy a personal, dignitary interest. It 
would be incongruous, therefore, to assign this interest to a corporation or other body. 
In Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats, Gummow and Hayne JJ 
held that any common law tort of unjustified invasion of privacy (were one to develop 
in Australian law), should be confined to natural persons as corporations lack the 
‘sensibilities, offence and injury … which provide a staple value for any developing 
law of privacy’.34 
10.43 In support of this argument, Guardian News and Media Limited and Guardian 
Australia argued that 
Privacy is fundamentally an interest limited to natural persons. The parallel right for 
corporations and other non-natural entities is confidential information which is 
already sufficiently protected.35 
10.44 Similarly, PIAC argued that ‘it would be incongruous to assign this interest to a 
corporation or other body’.36 
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10.45 Actions in defamation, which are analogous to privacy actions, are also, 
generally speaking, limited to living, natural persons.37 Similarly, only individuals may 
bring a complaint under the Privacy Act.38 
Non-survival of the cause of action 
Recommendation 10–3 A cause of action for serious invasion of privacy 
should not survive for the benefit of the plaintiff’s estate or against the 
defendant’s estate. 
10.46 The ALRC recommends that an action for serious invasion of privacy should not 
survive the death of a plaintiff.  
10.47 This recommendation means that actions cannot survive for the benefit of a 
deceased person’s estate, whether or not proceedings had been commenced before the 
death of the plaintiff. Furthermore, actions cannot subsist against the estate of a 
deceased person, whether or not proceedings had commenced before the death of the 
defendant. This recommendation has a similar effect to the provisions of the Uniform 
Defamation Laws.39 
10.48 Several stakeholders supported this recommendation.40 All previous law reform 
inquiries into a new privacy action recommended that a cause of action be restricted to 
living persons.41 
Privacy action protects personal interests 
10.49 The new tort is intended to remedy a wrong committed against a person’s 
dignitary interests. The mischief to be remedied by a privacy action is the mental harm 
and hurt to feelings suffered by a living person.42 The ALRC therefore considers that 
only the individual who has suffered loss or damage should be able to sue for relief, 
and that the action should be limited to living persons.43 This position is in keeping 
with the common law rule of actio personalis moritur cum persona (a personal action 
dies with the plaintiff or the defendant).44 
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10.50 PIAC noted that 
Most existing statutory causes of action for invasion of privacy lapse with the death of 
the person whose privacy has allegedly been invaded. This can be seen as flowing 
from the fact that the right to privacy is generally seen as a personal right. It has also 
been justified on the basis that because the main mischief of an invasion of privacy is 
the mental harm and injured feelings suffered by an individual, only living individuals 
should be allowed to seek relief.45 
10.51 A statutory cause of action for serious invasion of privacy is analogous to an 
action in defamation, which does not survive the death of the person defamed, nor the 
person who published the defamatory matter.46 The Law Institute of Victoria made the 
distinction between actions in defamation and actions for breach of confidence, arguing 
that a duty of confidence can persist after death.47 However, breach of confidence 
actions protect quasi-proprietary interests, that is, the plaintiff’s interest in the 
confidential information, which will often be commercial information. By contrast, 
privacy actions protect a personal interest in the plaintiff’s privacy. 
10.52 Even where actions currently survive for the benefit of an estate, the relevant 
legislation generally restricts the damages recoverable to special damages for the 
precisely calculated pecuniary losses suffered as a result of actual damage from injuries 
received, such as medical expenses or loss of earnings before death. It is generally not 
possible to recover damages for pain, suffering and the mental harms that would be the 
most likely result of a serious invasion of privacy.48 
10.53 Some stakeholders submitted that the action could survive in some specific 
circumstances. For example, PIAC argued that the action should survive the death of a 
plaintiff where ‘important systemic issues are involved’.49 PIAC suggested that the 
value of privacy as a matter of public interest is akin to the public value in eliminating 
discrimination and should therefore survive the death of a complainant for the good of 
all society. 
10.54 Some areas of anti-discrimination law recognise the survival of certain interests 
in certain circumstances. For instance, s 93(1) of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 
(NSW) provides that a discrimination complaint survives the death of the complainant. 
It could be argued, however, that any damages payable to an estate for an invasion of 
the privacy of a deceased person, would amount to a windfall to that person’s estate to 
the benefit of beneficiaries who may not have been harmed in any way by an invasion 
of privacy. 
Actions by affected parties 
10.55 Given that a privacy action generates a personal right of action, it follows that an 
action should not be designed to remedy any secondary damage others might suffer—
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for example, a surviving family member who also suffered distress caused by the 
invasion of the deceased person’s privacy while the latter was alive.50 
10.56 There may be instances where the conduct of a defendant following the death of 
an individual may invade the privacy of surviving relatives or other parties who are 
closely involved. 
10.57 Dr Ian Turnbull argued that the action should survive for the benefit of 
immediate relatives or individuals within relevant organisations, that can establish 
prima facie loss or damage to themselves, as a result of the disclosure of the 
information.51 
10.58 However, in such cases it would be possible for family members or other parties 
to pursue their own actions for serious invasion of privacy where they meet the tests for 
actionability in their own right.52 These actions may arise out of conduct indirectly 
involving a deceased person, such as where the privacy of a family member or other 
relevant party is invaded in a private moment of grief or mourning,53 or in 
circumstances where a deceased’s medical record is published to disclose a condition 
affecting surviving relatives. This position is generally in line with defamation law, 
where a family member may only bring an action in respect of a defamatory slur 
against a deceased family member where he or she has been personally defamed.54 
10.59 PIAC and Dr Normann Witzleb argued that it may be appropriate to allow 
family members to pursue actions, but limit the remedies available. For instance, PIAC 
submitted that 
It is appropriate, however, to limit the remedies available to the estate. The Ireland 
Law Reform Commission proposed that the cause of action is extinguished only in 
relation to ‘the remedy of damages or an account of profits so that injunctive relief, 
delivery up and other relief remain available.55 
10.60 PIAC argued that an action should survive the death of a person in particularly 
egregious cases, such as where systemic issues are involved. In such cases, PIAC 
argued that the harm incurred extends beyond that experienced by the relevant 
individual or their family, and is therefore a societal harm: 
As an invasion of privacy is a societal (as well as an individual) wrong, the 
continuation of a cause of action for invasion of privacy after a person’s death may 
assist in achieving the societal objects of the proposed legislation, regardless of 
whether or not it results in a personal remedy.56 
10.61 Several stakeholders argued that privacy actions should survive the death of a 
plaintiff where the wrong involved an online invasion of privacy.57 Due to the nature of 
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the internet, online invasions of privacy may be ongoing, compounding the harm 
caused by the initial invasion of privacy. 
10.62 Witzleb argued that the 
The digital afterlife of a person can provide a fertile ground for disputes, including 
how a deceased person’s private information should be handled. The new privacy tort 
should provide redress in these and other cases involving the privacy interests of a 
deceased person.58 
10.63 To illustrate this problem, PIAC gave the example of the defacement of tribute 
pages on social media sites which are established in dedication of deceased persons.59 
10.64 This example was also used by UNSW Cyberspace Law and Police Community 
when highlighting two circumstances surrounding death and serious invasions of 
privacy: 
(1) the potential for breaches of privacy to be directly linked to a person’s cause of 
death through a variety of means, and (2) an increasing trend of harassment and 
defacement of on-line and off-line memorials which cause great distress and damage 
to families and loved ones. The outrage caused by the public defacement of online 
memorials in the Trinity Bates murder highlight the privacy tort as an additional or 
alternative avenue of legal redress. The suicide of Tyler Clementi in the US after 
secretly filmed footage of him kissing another man was posted online further 
emphasises the scope and impact of privacy threats in the digital era. For these 
reasons we consider it important that in line with earlier observations (ALRC Issues 
Paper 43 para [110]) that serious invasion of privacy action persist to the plaintiff’s 
estate.60 
10.65 The Arts Law Centre of Australia and the Law Institute of Victoria argued that 
an action should survive the death of the person whose privacy is invaded if that person 
identified as Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander, given the specific cultural beliefs of 
those communities associated with mourning and death.61 In these cases, it was 
suggested, a family or other affected party should be able to bring the claim on behalf 
of the deceased person. 
10.66 Similarly, the Domestic Violence Legal Service and the North Australian 
Aboriginal Justice Agency argued that 
Family members of the deceased should be able to bring an action, for example, 
children of a deceased parent who is the subject of sexually explicit material posted 
online.62 
10.67 The ALRC recommends a general principle of non-survival of the action, 
considering that in circumstances where a family member of an affected party 
experience an invasion of privacy in their own right, this will give rise to a separate 
action. 
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10.68 The Law Institute of Victoria submitted that remedies could be limited to ‘those 
that protect the deceased’s identity, for example, to allow corrective orders and 
declarations but not damages’.63 
10.69 The Australian Privacy Foundation argued that a court may consider the 
financial circumstances of a deceased defendant when awarding remedies against their 
estate.64 However these considerations would require valuation of a deceased’s estate, 
and may lead to lengthy and costly legal disputes over the administration and 
distribution of a defendant’s estate, tying up the estate and leaving creditors and 
beneficiaries waiting many years for distribution. 
International consistency 
10.70 Limiting the action for statutory invasion of privacy to living persons would, 
generally speaking, bring Australian law into line with international privacy law.65 
PIAC noted, however, the exception of French law which allows family members to 
bring civil privacy actions on behalf of a deceased relative.66 An example is the 2007 
case of Hachette Filipacchi Associés (Paris-Match) v France.67 German and Italian 
law also allow some protection for the privacy interests of deceased persons.68 
Representative and class actions 
10.71 Several stakeholders raised the issue of representative or class actions, arguing 
that the availability of these mechanisms in the new statutory tort would strengthen 
access to justice.69 
10.72 The ALRC makes no recommendations on the availability of representative or 
class actions, as the ALRC considers existing court mechanisms would apply to the 
statutory tort in the same way they apply to other civil actions. For instance, Part IVA 
of the Federal Court Act 1976 (Cth) provides a framework for representative 
proceedings to the Federal Court. Rules also exist relating to representative and class 
actions, as well as the appointment of litigation guardians in circumstances where an 
individual does not have the capacity to commence or defend legal proceedings.70 This 
would include the availability of litigation guardians for minors. 
10.73 The Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) provides 
for a court to make orders that apply to a class of ‘affected individuals’, even where 
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those individuals are not subject to the proceedings.71 In consumer class actions or data 
breaches where plaintiffs can be easily identified, such a provision may well be useful. 
However, in the highly personal context of invasions of privacy, identifying relevant or 
affected parties to a representative action may be difficult. 
10.74 The Law Society of NSW Young Lawyers’ Committee on Communication, 
Entertainment and Technology recommended vesting power in the OAIC to bring 
actions on behalf of a deceased person.72 This approach would require significant 
reform of the Privacy Act including, but not limited to, broadening the powers of the 
OAIC to consider privacy matters beyond information privacy and removing the 
various exemptions to the Act. It may also conflict with the independent and impartial 
role of the OAIC as conciliators of privacy complaints. 
10.75 The Office of the Public Advocate (Queensland) submitted that the ALRC 
should consider ways to accommodate a litigation guardian to conduct legal 
proceedings on behalf of an adult with impaired decision-making capacity.73 The 
ALRC also considers that this is an important issue concerning access to justice, but 
that it requires broader consideration than its application just to the new tort. At the 
same time as this Inquiry the ALRC is undertaking an inquiry into equality, capacity 
and disability in Commonwealth laws. That inquiry is considering, among other things, 
the role of litigation guardians in civil proceedings. Its recommendations will have 
relevance to any new statutory cause of action for serious invasion of privacy.74 
Limitation periods 
Recommendation 10–4 A person should not be able to bring an action 
under the new tort after the earlier of: 
(a)  one year from the date on which the plaintiff became aware of the 
invasion of privacy; or 
(b)  three years from the date on which the invasion of privacy occurred. 
Recommendation 10–5 In exceptional circumstances, the court may 
extend this limitation period, but the period should expire no later than six years 
from the date on which the invasion occurred. 
10.76 This recommendation aims to balance the interests of both parties to a 
proceeding, providing adequate time for a plaintiff to appreciate and manage the 
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emotional and financial repercussions of a serious invasion of privacy, while also 
providing certainty for defendants. 
10.77 In most cases, a person whose privacy has been invaded will become aware of 
the invasion of privacy soon after it occurs. Intrusions upon physical seclusion will 
often be known immediately. If private information is published in popular media, 
again the subject of the information will usually know of its publication quite soon. If 
they wish to bring an action, they should generally do so within one year from the date 
on which they became aware of the invasion of privacy. 
10.78 A reasonable but confined limitation period will protect defendants from claims 
relating to incidents that occurred years before and where witnesses may have 
difficulty recalling events. It would be burdensome on defendants if a longer limitation 
period led to uncertainty and anxiety as to whether they are likely to be sued. Preparing 
a defence case and calculating the likely cost of litigation and possible remedies may 
be more challenging the longer a plaintiff takes to initiate proceedings. 
10.79 Professor Peter Handford outlines three policy rationales for limitation periods: 
to protect defendants from claims relating to incidents which occurred years before 
about which witnesses may have difficulty recalling events or finding records; to 
encourage quick resolution of litigation; and to provide finality for defendants.75 
10.80 The recommendation is consistent with the one year limitation period prescribed 
for actions in defamation.76 Consistency with the position in defamation law may avoid 
the risk that plaintiffs will bring multiple actions at different times for overlapping 
harm. Defamation actions are based on damage to a person’s reputation, a harm which 
is complete on publication. In some cases, the same publication may be an invasion of 
privacy because it discloses private information. 
10.81 In contrast to actions in defamation, actions in personal injury, which generally 
have a longer limitation period of three years,77 are based on injury to the individual 
which may take longer to eventuate. 
10.82 This recommendation is also consistent with the limitation periods in the 
Privacy Act with respect to when the OAIC can hear complaints.78 A complaint of 
privacy interference by an APP entity can be made within 12 months from the date the 
applicant becomes aware of the relevant act or conduct.79 The OAIC then has 
discretion as to whether or not to investigate a complaint of privacy interference made 
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after this date. The OAIC supports the application of a similar limitation period to a 
statutory cause of action for serious invasion of privacy.80 
10.83 Several stakeholders supported a one year limitation period, although some said 
a court should be able to extend the limitation period beyond three years.81 The New 
South Wales Law Reform Commission proposed a one year limitation period.82 
Several stakeholders supported a one year limitation period, in line with defamation 
law.83 ASTRA argued that a one year limitation period would provide certainty to 
defendants and encourage the timely and proper administration of justice.84 
Furthermore, ASTRA argued that a short limitation period would prevent plaintiffs 
from delaying bringing proceedings in order to gain a windfall in damages caused by 
the accumulation of hurt or distress. 
10.84 In some circumstances, a person may not know for some time that their privacy 
has been breached.85 Where a plaintiff does not know of an invasion of privacy for 
some time, the ALRC recommends that they have three years from the date on which 
the invasion of privacy occurred to bring an action. 
10.85 A number of stakeholders said that a one year limitation period was too short,86 
and that the period should run from the date when the plaintiff first becomes aware of 
the action.87 The Victorian Law Reform Commission proposed a three year limitation 
period, consistent with actions for personal injury.88 Several stakeholders proposed a 
limitation period of three years from the date when the plaintiff becomes aware of the 
invasion, expiring no more than six years from the date on which the invasion occurs.89 
SBS said the limitation period should start from the ‘initial publication or disclosure’.90 
10.86 The limitation periods for the new tort should not start when damage accrued to 
the plaintiff. Commencing the limitation period from the date when a plaintiff 
experiences damage or harm as a result of the invasion of privacy, would require a 
plaintiff to demonstrate damage, thus conflicting with the ALRC’s recommendation 
that the new privacy tort be actionable per se. 
10.87 By way of comparison, defamation actions run from the date of publication.91 
Actions in personal injury commence from the date of discoverability. In NSW, 
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89  Law Institute of Victoria, Submission 96; Women’s Legal Service Victoria and Domestic Violence 
Resource Centre Victoria, Submission 48; N Witzleb, Submission 29. 
90  SBS, Submission 59. 
91  See, eg, Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) s 14. 
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‘discoverability’ is taken to be from when the plaintiff ‘ought to have known’ that the 
‘injury or death concerned has occurred’.92 
10.88 Some stakeholders argued for much longer limitation periods. One pointed to 
the six year limitation period for those seeking remedial relief for unlawful interception 
under s 107B of the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth). 
Some stakeholders suggested there should be no limitation period at all. However, the 
ALRC considers that it is important that there be a limitation period, and that concerns 
about unfairly denying a person the opportunity to bring an action may be met by 
allowing the court to extend the limitation period in exceptional circumstances. 
Extending limitation period 
10.89 The ALRC recommends that, in exceptional circumstances, the court should be 
able to extend the limitation period to six years, from the date when the serious 
invasion of privacy occurred. 
10.90 Several stakeholders also argued that individuals may be too distressed to turn 
their minds to bringing legal action to redress the invasion of their privacy.93 The Law 
Institute of Victoria (LIV) said that ‘it takes time for people to realise that they have a 
legal right that has been breached, especially where they have been seriously affected 
by the breach itself’.94 It was also submitted that victims of family violence may ‘find 
it hard to gain the necessary strength and resources to bring an action within a short 
period.95 These are some examples of the sort of exceptional circumstances in which a 
court may extend the limitation period. 
10.91 Some stakeholders submitted that a court should only be able to extend the 
limitation period to three years.96 Others said the court should be able to extend it 
further.97 Some suggested that applications for time extensions were expensive and 
vigorously fought, and that it would therefore be better simply to make the standard 
limitation period longer.98 
10.92 Limitation periods may be extended or postponed at the discretion of a court in a 
number of circumstances.99 The Limitation Acts in all Australian jurisdictions allow for 
the grant of an extension where the plaintiff is a person living with a disability or 
where there is fraud or mistake. In NSW, most actions are subject to an ultimate bar of 
30 years, with some exceptions for actions in wrongful death and personal injury.100 
                                                        
92  Ibid s 50D. 
93  Women’s Legal Services NSW, Submission 115; Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 105; Law 
Institute of Victoria, Submission 22. 
94  Law Institute of Victoria, Submission 96. 
95  Domestic Violence Legal Service and North Australian Aboriginal Justice Agency, Submission 120. 
96  ABC, Submission 93. 
97  Women’s Legal Services NSW, Submission 115; Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 105; N 
Witzleb, Submission 29. 
98  See, eg, Law Institute of Victoria, Submission 96. 
99  Handford, above n 75, [5.10.2150]. 
100  Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) s 51(2). 
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10.93 Defamation law provides that a court may allow an extension of up to three 
years from the date of publication of the defamatory matter, ‘if satisfied that it was not 
reasonable in the circumstances for the plaintiff to have commenced an action in 
relation to the matter complained of within 1 year from the date of the publication’.101 
10.94 There are many circumstances where courts are asked to consider extensions 
where it is ‘just and reasonable’ to both parties to a proceeding.102 Section 23A(3) of 
the Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) includes a non-exhaustive list of matters that a court 
may reconsider when extending a limitation period for actions in personal injury. The 
matters include: 
(a) the length of and reasons for the delay on the part of the plaintiff; 
(b)  the extent to which, having regard to the delay, there is or is likely to be prejudice 
to the defendant; 
(c) the extent, if any, to which the defendant had taken steps to make available to the 
plaintiff means of ascertaining facts which were or might be relevant to the cause of 
action of the plaintiff against the defendant; 
(d) the duration of any disability of the plaintiff arising on or after the date of the 
accrual of the cause of action; 
(e) the extent to which the plaintiff acted promptly and reasonably once he knew that 
the act or omission of the defendant, to which the injury of the plaintiff was 
attributable, might be capable at that time of giving rise to an action for damages; 
(f) the steps, if any, taken by the plaintiff to obtain medical, legal or other expert 
advice and the nature of any such advice he may have received. 
Young plaintiffs 
Recommendation 10–6 Consideration should be given to extending the 
limitation period where the plaintiff was under 18 years of age when the 
invasion of privacy occurred. 
10.95 This recommendation aims to assist plaintiffs who claim their privacy was 
invaded when they were under 18 years of age. Minors cannot generally be expected to 
make the difficult personal and financial decision to commence legal proceedings.103 
Limitation periods should therefore start from the date of their 18th birthday. 
                                                        
101  Ibid s 56A; Defamation Act 2005 (SA) 2005 s 56A. 
102  Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic) s 27K(2)(b). 
103  This recommendation is informed by the discussion in Ch 2 on the often acute effects of invasions of 
privacy on children and young people, particularly in the context of privacy invasions which occur online 
or through the use of mobile phones. 
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10.96 There are analogous provisions for the application of limitation periods on 
actions affecting minors in civil liability legislation in several Australian 
jurisdictions.104 
First publication rule 
Recommendation 10–7 Consideration should be given to enacting a ‘first 
publication rule’, also known as a ‘single publication rule’. This would limit the 
circumstances in which a person may bring an action in relation to the 
publication of private information, when that same private information had 
already been published in the past. 
10.97 Once private information has been wrongly published once, the subsequent 
publication of that information by the same person should not generally give rise to a 
new cause of action. The enactment of a ‘first publication rule’, also known as a ‘single 
publication rule’, would in effect focus the action on the first publication of the private 
information. It would also reduce the number of actions brought for serious invasions 
of privacy. 
10.98 This rule may be particularly important for organisations that publish archives of 
material. If a newspaper invaded someone’s privacy in 2014, the person generally 
should not be able to bring an action for invasion of privacy in 2020, merely because 
the material remains published in an archive on the newspaper’s website. 
10.99 Several stakeholders recommended the introduction of a single publication rule, 
but did not suggest a particular model or formulation of the principle.105 Were such a 
rule to be introduced, it would be desirable for it to be consistent across defamation law 
and the new tort. 
10.100 The ‘first publication rule’ diverges from the longstanding principle in 
defamation law that each publication of defamatory material gives rise to a separate 
cause of action, which is subject to its own limitation period (the ‘multiple publication 
rule’).106 This multiple publication rule has been said to raise 
significant problems due to the possibility of ‘continuous’ or ‘perpetual’ publication 
in online archives. While internet material remains online and available to be 
accessed, whether directly or in archives, the limitation period is effectively open-
ended, with a fresh limitation period starting to run each and every time defamatory 
material is accessed online.107 
                                                        
104  For example, in some Australian jurisdictions, an action for personal injury where an injury or death 
occasioned to a minor was caused by a parent or guardian is ‘discoverable’ by the victim when the victim 
turns 25 years of age: Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic) s 27I; Limitation Act 1969 (NSW) s 50E. 
105  Media and Communications Committee of the Law Council of Australia, Submission 124; ABC, 
Submission 93. 
106  See, eg, Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) 2005 s 4. See, also, Dow Jones & Co Inc v Gutnick (2002) 210 
CLR 575. 
107  Jennifer Ireland, ‘Defamation 2.0: Facebook and Twitter’ (2012) 56 Media & Arts Law Review 53, 66. 
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10.101 The UK legislature adopted a single publication rule in s 8 of the Defamation 
Act 2013 (UK), which may provide a useful model for such a provision for the new 
tort, as well as for defamation law in Australia. The UK Act provides for a ‘single 
publication rule’ to prevent an action being brought in relation to republication of the 
same material by the same publisher after one year from the date of first publication. 
The cause of action is therefore treated for limitation purposes as accruing from the 
date of first publication. The limitation period may be set aside under the discretion 
allowed to the court. 
10.102 The provision does not apply where the subsequent publication is ‘materially 
different’ from the first publication.108 A court may consider, among other things, ‘the 
level of prominence that a statement is given’ and ‘the extent of the subsequent 
publication’, when determining whether a publication is materially different from the 
first publication.109 The Explanatory Notes offer an example: 
where a story has first appeared relatively obscurely in a section of a website where 
several clicks need to be gone through to access it, but has subsequently been 
promoted to a position where it can be directly accessed from the home page of the 
site, thereby increasing considerably the number of hits it receives.110 
10.103 If a first publication rule were enacted in Australia, care should be taken in 
its application to minors. If the privacy of a minor is invaded, the limitation period 
should start when the minor turns 18, not when the material is first published. 
                                                        
108  Defamation Act 2013 (UK) s 8(4). 
109  Ibid s 8(5)(a)–(b). 
110  Explanatory Notes, Defamation Bill 2013 UK s 8. 
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Summary 
11.1 The ALRC recommends a number of defences that would limit a plaintiff’s right 
to succeed under the new tort. The defences reflect the need to protect, and in some 
cases privilege, important countervailing interests above a plaintiff’s expectation of 
privacy. Defendants will bear the onus of proving that their conduct is subject to a 
defence or exemption. The recommended defences are: 
• lawful authority to protect defendants from liability under the new privacy tort 
where their conduct was required or authorised by law; 
• conduct incidental to the exercise of a lawful right of defence of persons or 
property, where that conduct was proportionate, necessary and reasonable, and 
where the defendant reasonably believed that the conduct was necessary to 
protect persons or property; 
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• necessity where a defendant acts in a reasonable belief that they were preventing 
an imminent and greater harm; and 
• consent including express and implied consent. 
11.2 The ALRC also recommends a number of defences which are the same as, or 
analogous to, defamation defences: absolute privilege; publication of public 
documents; and fair and accurate reporting of public proceedings. 
11.3 This chapter discusses several matters that will not give rise to a defence 
because defences would be superfluous in view of the elements of the tort or 
actionability. Because the balancing test for actionability already protects public 
interest, a defence of public interest is unnecessary. There is also no need for a defence 
that the material was already in the public domain, because this issue will be 
considered when deciding at the outset whether the plaintiff has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy at the relevant time. 
11.4 Contributory negligence will not be a defence to an intentional or reckless 
invasion of privacy. 
11.5 The ALRC considers that a number of defences to defamation are inappropriate 
for an action for intentional or reckless invasion of privacy. These include the defences 
of qualified privilege, truth, innocent dissemination and comment. 
11.6 This chapter includes a recommendation for a safe harbour scheme for internet 
intermediaries to exempt internet hosts and platform providers from liability provided 
they meet certain conditions. 
Lawful authority 
Recommendation 11–1 The Act should provide for a defence that the 
defendant’s conduct was required or authorised by law. 
11.7 The defence of lawful authority protects a defendant from liability for serious 
invasions of privacy where the conduct was required or authorised by law.1 This 
defence will be especially important for government authorities that are required to 
maintain law, order, safety and governance in a manner consistent with their statutory 
powers. The exercise of their responsibilities will often, necessarily, encroach on 
private rights. 
                                                        
1  A number of stakeholders supported this defence: N Witzleb, Submission 116; T Butler, Submission 114; 
Office of the Victorian Privacy Commissioner, Submission 108; Telstra, Submission 107; Public Interest 
Advocacy Centre, Submission 105; Australian Sex Party, Submission 92; S Higgins, Submission 82; 
Guardian News and Media Limited and Guardian Australia, Submission 80; SBS, Submission 59; NSW 
Young Lawyers, Submission 58; Women’s Legal Service Victoria and Domestic Violence Resource 
Centre Victoria, Submission 48; ABC, Submission 46; Australian Bureau of Statistics, Submission 32; 
B Arnold, Submission 28. 
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11.8 Statutory bodies whose roles and responsibilities are prescribed by state, 
territory and federal legislation, include government agencies and departments, security 
and intelligence organisations and law enforcement agencies. This defence is necessary 
to protect organisations from civil liability for performing legitimate activities pursuant 
to statutory authority, such as law enforcement agencies intercepting telephone 
conversations under warrant. 
11.9 This defence is consistent with the principle that any licence for public bodies or 
officials to pursue conduct that may infringe the fundamental rights or interests of an 
individual must be clearly and unambiguously authorised in legislation. In Coco v R, a 
majority of the High Court of Australia explained this so-called principle of legality: 
Statutory authority to engage in what otherwise would be tortious conduct must be 
clearly expressed in unmistakeable and unambiguous language … The insistence on 
express authorisation of an abrogation or curtailment of a fundamental right, freedom 
or immunity must be understood as a requirement of some manifestation or indication 
that the legislature has not only directed its attention to the question of the abrogation 
or curtailment of such basic rights, freedoms and immunities, but also determined 
upon abrogation or curtailment of them.2 
11.10 The defence of statutory authority to intentional torts provides that public bodies 
and officials do not have a licence to commit acts, which would otherwise be unlawful 
or tortious—unless authorised by statute.3 This defence may protect individuals and 
agencies from civil suits where a defendant’s conduct was performed under statutory 
authority to prevent and detect crime; in exercise of powers of arrest; and in the 
provision of public utilities and services.4 
11.11 Areas of the criminal law also provide defences for lawful authority. For 
example, s 10.5 of the Commonwealth Criminal Code 1995 provides that a person ‘is 
not criminally responsible for an offence if the conduct constituting the offence is 
justified or excused by or under law’.5 
11.12 Previous law reform reports recommended a defence of lawful authority.6 The 
New South Wales Law Reform Commission (NSWLRC) noted that the defence of 
statutory authority is necessary to enable agencies, such as the Australian Federal 
Police (AFP), to carry out their functions in a manner consistent with the protection of 
public interests such as security and public order.7 Activities that may otherwise 
amount to an invasion of privacy have been shown to be very effective in the 
apprehension of offenders.8 
                                                        
2   Coco v R (1994) 179 CLR 427, [8]–[9] (Mason CJ, Brennan, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ). 
3  Rosalie Balkin and Jim Davis, Law of Torts (LexisNexis Butterworths, 5th ed, 2013) [6.49]. 
4  Ibid. 
5  The Criminal Code is set out as the schedule to the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth). 
6  Victorian Law Reform Commission, Surveillance in Public Places, Report 18 (2010) [7.194]; NSW Law 
Reform Commission, Invasion of Privacy, Report 120 (2009); Australian Law Reform Commission, For 
Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice, Report 108 (2008). 
7   NSW Law Reform Commission, Invasion of Privacy, Report 120 (2009) 43. 
8  For example, closed-circuit television (CCTV) and mobile phone records may be valuable sources of 
evidence in criminal investigations: The Queen v Bayley [2013] VSC 313 (19 June 2013). 
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11.13 The AFP provided examples of statutory obligations authorising the 
procurement of an individual’s private information.9 For example, the Australian 
Federal Police Act 1979 (Cth) requires the AFP to safeguard the interests of the 
Commonwealth, prevent crime and protect persons from injury, death and property 
damage. The AFP stated that 
undertaking these activities will inevitably involve interfering with an individual’s 
privacy on occasions. Where this does occur, every effort is made to respect an 
individual’s privacy by ensuring the information that is obtained is properly protected 
and dealt with whilst in the possession of the AFP. Indeed, the various Acts contain 
provisions which set out how the information can be used by law enforcement 
agencies and how it must be protected.10 
11.14 The AFP submitted that its activities are already subject to a range of existing 
internal and independent ‘accountability frameworks’.11 However, the ALRC considers 
it is appropriate for the statutory cause of action to provide civil redress for individuals 
whose privacy has been invaded, in the event that an agency acts outside any lawful 
authority.12 
11.15 The AFP raised the concern that any unmeritorious litigation could divert 
resources away from important law enforcement and security operations.13 However, 
the ALRC considers that the thresholds built into the statutory cause of action and the 
defence of lawful authority will prevent unmeritorious claims proceeding to trial. 
11.16 Similarly, the AFP was concerned that the process of having to adduce evidence 
of intelligence-gathering methods may disclose the lawful, covert practices of law 
enforcement and intelligence organisations and may reveal the identity of individuals 
under surveillance or investigation. 
11.17 The ALRC considers, however, that there are strong protections in the court 
system to mitigate this risk. These protections include closed court proceedings and 
other protective measures provided by federal, state and territory legislation.14 
Required by law 
11.18 In the Discussion Paper, the ALRC proposed ‘a defence of lawful authority’.15 
Several stakeholders submitted that any such defence should be extended to a defence 
                                                        
9  Australian Federal Police, Submission 67. 
10   Ibid. 
11  These frameworks include s 180F of the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth) 
(TIA Act), which requires the AFP to consider whether any interference with privacy may result through 
the disclosure of information, similarly s 46(2)(a) of the TIA Act requires a judge or member of the 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal to consider whether an individual’s privacy would be interfered with by 
interception through the use of a warrant. 
12  Or a person for whose conduct it is vicariously liable: Australian Federal Police Act 1979 (Cth) s 64B; 
Law Reform (Vicarious Liability) Act 1983 (NSW) Pt 4. See, further, Balkin and Davis, above n 3, 772. 
13  Australian Federal Police, Submission 67. 
14  See, eg, National Security Information (Criminal and Civil Proceedings) Act 2004 (Cth). 
15  Australian Law Reform Commission, Serious Invasions of Privacy in the Digital Era, Discussion Paper 
80 (2014) Proposal 10–1. 
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for actions ‘required by law’,16 in order to capture the activities of statutory agencies 
and their officers who are legally mandated to undertake certain activities. For 
example, the National Archives argued that including ‘required by law’ would broaden 
the defence to include the use and release of records pursuant to the Archives Act 1983 
(Cth). 
11.19 The term ‘authority’ includes circumstances where someone is empowered or 
has the discretion to pursue certain lawful conduct.17 The term ‘requires’ indicates an 
imperative to take some specific action, without the exercise of discretion, and is 
narrower. Arguably, conduct which is ‘required by law’ will also fall within the term 
‘authorised by law’. However it is important to ensure that government bodies and 
other entities and individuals are not sued for carrying out activities they are legally 
obliged to undertake. Therefore the ALRC recommends that the defence should 
include the phrase ‘required by law’. 
Authorised by law 
11.20 The term ‘lawful’ is intended to give effect to federal, state and territory 
legislative and non-legislative instruments. The defence should include authority given 
under: Commonwealth, state and territory acts and delegated legislation; an order of a 
court or tribunal; and documents that are given the force of law by an act, such as 
industrial awards.18 
11.21 Under the defence, any act or course of conduct committed under statutory 
authority will be protected from liability. That authority, as canvassed by the High 
Court in Coco v R, must be ‘express’.19 
11.22 ‘Lawful’ should also extend to documents which have the ‘force of the law’. A 
document may have the ‘force of law’ if it is an offence to breach its provisions, or if it 
is possible for a penalty lawfully to be imposed if its provisions are breached.20 
11.23 Dr Normann Witzleb argued that the defence of lawful authority is unnecessary: 
where an authorised person exercises their statutory authority, they are necessarily 
authorised to commit that action.21 However, the ALRC considers a clear defence will 
provide certainty to parties. 
11.24 The AFP also suggested that law enforcement agencies should have a total 
exemption from liability, because liability may inhibit the legitimate activities of law 
enforcement and intelligences agencies, causing agencies to change established and 
efficient modes of operation.22 In the digital era, there is increasing community concern 
                                                        
16  Office of the Victorian Privacy Commissioner, Submission 108; National Archives, Submission 100; 
Australian Bankers’ Association, Submission 84. 
17  Australian Law Reform Commission, For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice, 
Report 108 (2008) [16.72]. 
18  Ibid [13.44]. 
19  Coco v R (1994) 179 CLR 427.  
20  Australian Law Reform Commission, For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice, 
Report 108 (2008) [16.22]. 
21  N Witzleb, Submission 116; N Witzleb, Submission 29. 
22  Australian Federal Police, Submission 67. 
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and debate over the extent of surveillance and data collection carried out by public 
agencies. The ALRC considers that it is not appropriate that public agencies should be 
exempt or immune from liability for serious invasions of privacy. However, a defence 
for conduct required or authorised by law will give appropriate protection.23 
11.25 The Human Rights Committee of the Law Society of NSW was concerned that 
agencies could rely on the defence of lawful authority for the gathering of metadata. 
The Committee noted that the defence would mean that the new cause of action would 
not protect individuals from the collection of metadata or surveillance by security or 
other government agencies authorised by legislation—‘which would appear to be the 
majority of such data collection and surveillance’.24 Its concern was that legislation 
authorising the collection of metadata breaches Australia’s human rights obligations. 
Some of the legislation the Committee refered to is the subject of other current 
inquiries.25 
11.26 Some stakeholders argued that a qualification that the conduct was just, 
reasonable26 and/or necessary27 should attach to the defence to curb excesses of power. 
The UNSW Cyberspace Law and Policy Community argued that the defence is too 
‘broad’, suggesting it should be qualified by ‘elements of transparency, necessity, 
justification, effectiveness and proportionality’.28 However, the ALRC considers that 
the only relevant question should be whether or not the conduct was authorised by law. 
In some cases, the legislation authorising the conduct will already build in qualifying 
matters such as that the conduct was reasonable or necessary, for it to be considered 
lawful. 
11.27 It is also implicit in the defence that the conduct must have been for the 
purposes of the lawful authority and not for an ulterior purpose. This is illustrated by 
Donnelly v Amalgamated Television Services Pty Ltd, where Hodgson CJ in Eq said: 
If police, in exercising powers under a search warrant or of arrest, were to enter into 
private property and thereby obtain documents containing valuable confidential 
information... I believe they could in a proper case be restrained, at the suit of the 
owner of the documents, from later using that information to their own advantage, or 
to the disadvantage of the owner, or passing the information on to other persons for 
them to use in that way.29 
                                                        
23  N Witzleb, Submission 116; T Butler, Submission 114; Office of the Victorian Privacy Commissioner, 
Submission 108; Telstra, Submission 107; Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 105; Australian 
Sex Party, Submission 92; S Higgins, Submission 82; Guardian News and Media Limited and Guardian 
Australia, Submission 80; SBS, Submission 59; NSW Young Lawyers, Submission 58; Women’s Legal 
Service Victoria and Domestic Violence Resource Centre Victoria, Submission 48; ABC, Submission 46; 
Australian Bureau of Statistics, Submission 32; B Arnold, Submission 28. 
24  Law Society of NSW, Submission 122. 
25  See Ch 1. 
26  Australian Bankers’ Association, Submission 84. 
27  N Witzleb, Submission 29. 
28  UNSW Cyberspace Law and Policy Community, Submission 98. 
29  Donnelly v Amalgamated Television Services Pty Ltd (1998) 45 NSWLR 570, (Hodgson CJ in Eq). This 
was quoted by Gleeson CJ in Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 
208 CLR 199, 230 [53]. 
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11.28 The Business Law Committee of the Law Society of NSW referred to the 
concern of insolvency practitioners who are often met with objections on ‘privacy’ 
grounds when carrying out their investigations.30 Investigations or requests for, or 
disclosures of, information would generally be authorised by contractual rights 
underpinning the process or the defence of lawful authority. The latter would operate 
where legislation provided for the relevant process, such as the Corporations Act 2001 
(Cth), in the case of corporate insolvency and administration, or the Bankruptcy Act 
1966 (Cth) for personal insolvency, or pursuant to an order of a court—for example, 
for the appointment of a trustee, receiver or liquidator. 
Consequential amendments to existing legislation 
11.29 The enabling acts of all statutory bodies should not need to be amended to 
protect their actions from liability when done as required or authorised by those acts. In 
some circumstances, however, it may be appropriate to amend specific legislation so 
that existing exemptions from civil liability extend to the new tort. 
11.30 For example, s 57(1) of the Archives Act 1983 (Cth) provides: 
Where, in the ordinary course of the administration of this Act, access is given to a 
record as being a record required by this Part to be made available for public access: 
(a) no action for defamation, breach of confidence or infringement of copyright lies, 
by reason of the authorizing or giving of the access, against the Commonwealth or 
any person concerned in the authorizing or giving of the access. 
11.31 Although it may be unnecessary, given the defence of lawful authority, this 
provision could be amended by adding a reference to actions for serious invasion of 
privacy. While the defence that the conduct was authorised or required by law should 
be sufficient protection to authorised activities, consequential amendments to s 57 of 
the Archives Act may provide greater certainty and consistency. 
Incidental to the exercise of a lawful right of defence of 
persons or property 
Recommendation 11–2 The Act should provide a defence for conduct 
incidental to the exercise of a lawful right of defence of persons or property, 
where that conduct was proportionate, necessary and reasonable. 
11.32 The defence will arise in several circumstances: self-defence; defence of another 
person; and defence of property.31 
                                                        
30  Law Society of NSW, Submission 122. 
31  Similar defences were recommended by the VLRC, ALRC and NSWLRC: Victorian Law Reform 
Commission, Surveillance in Public Places, Report 18 (2010) rec 27b; NSW Law Reform Commission, 
Invasion of Privacy, Report 120 (2009) [6.2]; Australian Law Reform Commission, For Your 
Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice, Report 108 (2008) rec 74–4. 
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11.33 The requirement that the conduct be proportionate, necessary and reasonable is 
an important qualification. In tort law, the question of whether a defendant’s conduct 
was proportionate and reasonable is a question of fact.32 The qualification that conduct 
be ‘reasonable, proportionate and necessary’ will provide a court with the opportunity 
to balance competing interests.33 This qualification to the defence reflects concepts of 
proportionality and reasonableness found generally in tort law and in human rights 
jurisprudence.34 As noted in Chapters 2 and 9, privacy is an interest which must be 
viewed in the context of competing interests and assessments of proportionality. The 
balancing process in this defence is consistent with other elements of the cause of 
action, specifically the reasonable expectation of privacy and the public interest test.35 
11.34 The recommended defence to an invasion of privacy should arise only where the 
defendant has reasonable grounds for believing that the conduct was necessary, which 
is analogous to the position at common law in tort.36 The ALRC considers that the 
objectivity of this condition is desirable in view of the wide range of conduct that may 
be involved in an invasion of privacy. 
11.35  A defendant acting in an emergency would also have the defence of necessity in 
some of the circumstances that would come within this defence. 
11.36 The defence will also protect individuals from liability where their conduct 
protects a third party from harm. The conduct is more likely to be considered necessary 
and reasonable where that third party is under the individual’s care or responsibility, 
such as a member of their family, or where that third party is incapable of exercising 
self-defence, but the defence would not be limited to such circumstances. At common 
law, the defence extends to protection of an individual’s household, employer, family 
members and even, in some circumstances, strangers.37 
11.37 The defence would also protect individuals from liability where their conduct 
was in defence of property, although different weight is given to the defence of 
property compared with the defence of persons.38 This is analogous to the defence for 
intentional torts where a defendant’s conduct in response to a threat or harm to their 
property is reasonable.39 
                                                        
32  Balkin and Davis, above n 3, [6.15]. 
33  Law Institute of Victoria, Submission 22. 
34  The UN Human Rights Committee has stated that proportionality is a fundamental test which is necessary 
to justify any restriction on human rights under the ICCPR: UN Human Rights Committee, General 
Comment No 29, UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev1/Add11 (2001). 
35  The ABC submitted that the qualification of proportionality is ‘appropriate’ and consistent with media 
guidelines including their Editorial Policies and Code of Practice: ABC, Submission 46. 
36  Ashley v Chief Constable of Sussex Police [2008] 2 WLR 975. In that case, it was held that a reasonable, 
though mistaken belief, in a threat of danger is sufficient to ground self-defence. Cf Civil Liability Act 
2002 (NSW) s 52. 
37  Balkin and Davis, above n 3, [6.17]. The defence of another person in criminal law has been codified in 
some Australian jurisdictions: Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) cl 10.4; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) 
s 52. 
38  Balkin and Davis, above n 3, [6.18]. 
39  This defence in criminal law is codified in some Australian jurisdictions, for example: Criminal Code Act 
1899 (Qld) s 274. In tort law, civil liability legislation also applies to defences of property: see, eg, the 
Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 52.  
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11.38 The defence that conduct was incidental to the defence of persons or property 
operates in the statutory causes of action for ‘violation of privacy’ in a number of 
Canadian provinces. The precise provisions vary: 
• British Columbia,40 Saskatchewan, Newfoundland and Labrador include a 
defence where conduct was ‘incidental to the exercise of a lawful right of 
defence of person or property’;41 while 
• Manitoba includes a defence where 
the act, conduct or publication was reasonable, necessary for, and incidental to, the 
exercise or protection of a lawful right of defence of person, property, or other interest 
of the defendant or any other person by whom the defendant was instructed or for 
whose benefit the defendant committed the act, conduct or publication constituting the 
violation.42 
11.39 The ALRC considers that a specific defence is unnecessary to protect 
investigations into potential fraud or misrepresentation. The Insurance Council of 
Australia proposed such a defence.43 It is in the interests of all policy holders that 
insurers have safeguards against fraudulent claims. Where they have reasonable 
grounds for suspecting fraudulent conduct, they or others on their behalf may often 
carry out investigations that could be viewed as invasions of privacy. The defence that 
the conduct was required or authorised by law is wide enough to cover these 
circumstances. For example, such conduct may be authorised by the statutory scheme 
under which the risk is insured, as in s 116 of the Motor Vehicle Compensation Act 
1999 (NSW), which requires a licensed insurer to ‘take all such steps as may be 
reasonable to deter and prevent the making of fraudulent claims’. Alternatively, such 
conduct may already be expressly or impliedly authorised by the contract between the 
insurer and the insured. 
11.40 In addition, the ALRC considers that individuals or organisations that engage in 
such conduct may be protected from liability under the public interest balancing test 
recommended in Chapter 9. In that chapter, the ALRC recommends that ‘the 
prevention and detection of crime and fraud’ be included in a list of public interest 
factors to be considered by a court. 
Necessity 
Recommendation 11–3 The Act should provide for a defence of necessity. 
                                                        
40  A Canadian court dismissed this defence in Watts v Klaemnt (2007) BCSC 662, [31]. In that case, a judge 
held that interception, recording and publication of telephone calls went well beyond what could be 
regarded as incidental to the exercise of a lawful right of defence of persons or property. 
41  Privacy Act, RSBC 1996, c 373 (British Columbia) s 2(2)(b); Privacy Act, RSS 1978, c P-24 
(Saskatchewan) s 4(1)(b); Privacy Act, RSNL 1990, c P-22 (Newfoundland and Labrador) s 5(1)(b). 
42  Privacy Act, CCSM 1996, c P125 (Manitoba) s 5(c). 
43  Insurance Council of Australia, Submission 15. 
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11.41 The ALRC recommends a defence of necessity be available under the new tort 
to protect individuals and organisations from liability where they had a reasonable 
belief that their conduct in invading the plaintiff’s privacy was necessary to prevent an 
imminent and greater harm,44 and where that conduct was a reasonable response to the 
situation. This defence will usually arise where the conduct was a response to an 
imminent danger or emergency, but may also be based on a semi-permanent state of 
affairs, where no other action could reasonably be taken to prevent the harm. This 
defence should be in line with the common law defence of necessity. 
11.42 The defence of necessity operates in existing areas of Australian tort and 
criminal law45 and several stakeholders supported a defence of necessity.46 
11.43 Situations of public emergency, where emergency service professionals need to 
access the private information of at-risk or vulnerable persons, may give rise to this 
defence.47 This necessity may arise, for example, where an individual has indicated an 
intention to self-harm and mental health professionals or emergency services obtain or 
disclose private information. It may also arise where a doctor is called to a school and 
needs to reveal private information about a child’s vaccination record or a contagious 
disease or condition in dealing with an urgent situation. 
11.44 The Australian Subscription Television and Radio Association (ASTRA) argued 
that the defence should be formulated in the following way: that the conduct was 
‘considered by the person acting to be reasonably necessary to eliminate or reduce a 
possible health, safety or security risk to themselves or another person’.48 
11.45 Guardian News and Media Limited and Guardian Australia noted that, while a 
defence of necessity would be unlikely to apply to media organisations, there may be 
some situations where such a defence may be required: 
There are nevertheless some times when the appropriate public or private body does 
not disclose information which it may be in the public interest to disclose in aid of 
public safety and the media discloses.49 
11.46 Several stakeholders opposed the inclusion of a defence of necessity,50 or were 
concerned at what conduct it might excuse. Australian Pork submitted that the 
inclusion of such a defence would mean ‘that any person infringing the rights may do 
so on the basis of a value judgement rather than a legal or public good basis’.51 
                                                        
44  Balkin and Davis, above n 3, 150. 
45  R v Loughnan [1981] VR 443 [448]. 
46  T Butler, Submission 114; ABC, Submission 93; J Chard, Submission 88; S Higgins, Submission 82; 
Guardian News and Media Limited and Guardian Australia, Submission 80; News Limited and Special 
Broadcasting Service, Submission No 76 to DPM&C Issues Paper, 2011. 
47   Telstra suggested the availability of an exemption for emergency services: Telstra, Submission 45.  
 T Gardner, Submission 3 was in favour of a defence of necessity. 
48  ASTRA, Submission 99. 
49  Guardian News and Media Limited and Guardian Australia, Submission 80. 
50  Office of the Victorian Privacy Commissioner, Submission 108; Public Interest Advocacy Centre, 
Submission 105; Australian Pork Ltd, Submission 83. 
51  Australian Pork Ltd, Submission 83. 
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11.47 However, existing law on the defence of necessity indicates that the belief of the 
defendant as to the necessity of their actions must be reasonable.52 It has been 
suggested that the same latitude should be given to someone acting out of necessity as 
is given to someone acting in self-defence: that is, it will not matter if their belief in the 
necessity is mistaken, as long as it is reasonable.53 
11.48 In the new tort, as with other intentional torts, the defence of necessity may 
apply in both public and private settings. Public necessity may involve ‘invading the 
rights of private individuals in order to protect the community at large’,54 such as 
taking action to prevent a fire spreading. 
11.49 A defence of private necessity would operate when the defendant commits a tort 
towards the plaintiff in order to protect persons or property (either their own, or a third 
party’s) against the threat of imminent harm.55 It does not matter if the altruist fails to 
achieve the objective, as long as the attempt was reasonable: 
Everyone who acts reasonably in a real emergency for the purpose of saving the 
goods of another from damage or destruction, whether he derives or is likely to derive 
any pecuniary advantage from the action or not, or is fulfilling any legal obligation.56 
11.50 In the context of medical emergencies, courts have explained the proper function 
of the defence of necessity as justifying the administering of emergency procedures 
where a patient is not capable of providing consent.57 
11.51 Considerations relevant to the defence may also be relevant to whether the 
plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of privacy and in relation to the public interest 
test, but the ALRC considers that a complete defence of necessity should be available 
to defendants as in other torts. This will be particularly important for emergency 
services, law enforcement officers and health professionals.58 
Consent 
Recommendation 11–4 The Act should provide for a defence of consent. 
                                                        
52  Kit Barker et al, The Law of Torts in Australia (Oxford University Press, 2012) 63. 
53 Ibid. This is in reference to Ashley v Chief Constable of Sussex Police [2008] 2 WLR 975.  
54  Balkin and Davis, above n 3, [6.22]. 
55  Ibid. J Goudkamp argues that there is only public necessity and that private necessity is not a tort defence. 
He treats defence of others’ property as a public justification: James Goudkamp, Tort Law Defences (Hart 
Publishing, 2013) 116. 
56  Proudman v Allen [1954] SASR 336 [341] (Hannan AJ). 
57  Re F [1990] 2 AC 1 [66]. 
58  The defence of necessity is not available where the defendant’s negligence caused the situation: Simon v 
Condran [2013] NSWCA 338. 
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11.52 A defence of consent will provide protection and certainty to defendants where a 
plaintiff has provided consent to a particular act or conduct which would otherwise 
amount to a serious invasion of privacy.59 Consent may be express or implied. To be 
valid as a defence to an intentional tort, it is not necessary that consent be ‘fully 
informed’, but it must be actual consent by a person capable of giving consent and 
must be freely given.60 
11.53 In many instances, an individual will have manifested clear consent to conduct 
that may otherwise amount to a serious invasion of privacy. Like the defence of 
voluntary assumption of risk to a negligence claim, it reflects ‘good sense and justice 
[that] one who has … assented to an act being done towards him cannot, when he 
suffers from it, complain of it as a wrong’.61 
11.54 Consent is a defence to many intentional torts, including battery, trespass to land 
and defamation.62 It is a defence to the new action of misuse of personal information in 
the United Kingdom (UK).63 In actions for breach of confidence, consent to the release 
of an obligation of confidence may be either absolute or limited to certain recipients.64 
11.55 The Victorian Law Reform Commission (VLRC) recommended that consent be 
a defence.65 The NSWLRC, rather than including consent with other defences, 
recommended that express or implied consent would negate the cause of action: 
The function of clause [74(4) of the Draft Bill] is to deny plaintiffs an action 
that they may otherwise have mounted. It does so by making the issue of 
consent an essential element of the statutory cause of action, with the result 
that if there is consent, there is no invasion of privacy. While this puts the 
onus on the plaintiff to prove a negative (namely the absence of the plaintiff’s 
consent), forcing the plaintiff to make his or her case on consent at the outset 
allows the court to test whether the action has merit before it proceeds 
further.66 
                                                        
59   Several stakeholders support a defence of consent: Google, Submission 54; Australian Communications 
and Media Authority, Submission 52; ABC, Submission 46; Interactive Games and Entertainment 
Association, Submission 40; Australian Privacy Foundation, Submission 39; D Butler, Submission 10; 
I Turnbull, Submission 5. 
60  Contractual consent and similar terms will be subject to contract law and consumer protection laws. 
61  Smith v Baker 325 1981 AC. 
62  Barker et al, above n 52, 36. There is some debate in relation to battery as to whether absence of consent 
is an element of the cause of action that must be established by the plaintiff, or whether consent is a 
defence, that must be pleaded and proved by the defendant. Barker et al, take the view that it is as a 
defence. 
63  M Warby et al, Tugendhat and Christie: The Law of Privacy and The Media (OUP Oxford, 2011) 
[12.09]. 
64  Tanya Aplin et al, Gurry on Breach of Confidence (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2012) [14.16]. 
65  Victorian Law Reform Commission, Surveillance in Public Places, Report 18 (2010) recs 27(a) and 
28(a). 
66  NSW Law Reform Commission, Invasion of Privacy, Report 120 (2009) [5.51]. 
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11.56 The formulation of consent as a defence is consistent with the approach in four 
Canadian provinces which have enacted a statutory cause of action and included 
consent as either a defence67 or an exception.68 
11.57 In the Discussion Paper, the ALRC proposed that a plaintiff’s consent be 
included as a factor for a court’s consideration of whether the plaintiff had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.69 
11.58 Although the ALRC agrees that the plaintiff’s consent to the conduct is relevant 
to whether or not they had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the circumstances, the 
ALRC now considers that it is preferable for a plaintiff’s actual consent to specific 
conduct to be treated as a complete defence.70 This will provide greater certainty to 
defendants who may rely on having obtained a person’s consent prior to engaging in 
the specified conduct. 
11.59 Many industries and professional groups operate on the basis and necessity of 
participant consent, either as part of contracts or for voluntary services or licences, 
including banking and financial services; medical and allied health practitioners; and 
social media providers, including social networking and dating organisations. The 
National E-Health Transition Authority (NeHTA) explained that consent is central to 
the viability of online medical records.71 Without a complete defence of consent, such 
bodies would be exposed to uncertain liability. 
11.60 The issue of whether consent has been given can be complex. For instance, 
consent in some circumstances may be withdrawn, the scope of consent may be 
unclear, or consent may have been given to other behaviour of the defendant or to third 
parties for similar conduct, such as publishing similar or related information. The fact 
that a person has previously consented to other conduct of the defendant (not within 
the scope of the consent given), or of third parties, may be considered as part of the 
general circumstances that are relevant when determining whether the plaintiff had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy. However, the ALRC considers that if a defendant 
can prove, and the onus will be on the defendant to do so, that the plaintiff actually 
consented to the conduct that is the subject of the complaint, this should be a complete 
defence. 
                                                        
67  Privacy Act, CCSM 1996, c P125 (Manitoba) s 5(a); Privacy Act, RSS 1978, c P-24 (Saskatchewan) 
s 4(a); Privacy Act, RSNL 1990, c P-22 (Newfoundland and Labrador) s 5(a). 
68  Privacy Act, RSBC 1996, c 373 (British Columbia) s 2(a). 
69  Australian Law Reform Commission, Serious Invasions of Privacy in the Digital Era, Discussion Paper 
80 (2014) Proposal 6–2(h). This proposal stated that ‘the new Act should provide that, in determining 
whether a person in the position of the plaintiff would have had a reasonable expectation of privacy in all 
of the circumstances, the court may consider whether the plaintiff consented to the conduct of the 
defendant’. 
70  The ABC submitted that, while it is appropriate to look at the issue of consent in considering 
actionability, it is also appropriate for consent to be included as a complete defence where it is relevant to 
the circumstances of a particular case: ABC, Submission 46. 
71  National E-Health Transition Authority, Submission 8. 
198 Serious Invasions of Privacy in the Digital Era  
Express and implied consent 
11.61 Whether a plaintiff provided actual consent will be a matter of fact, which will 
depend on the construction of words and conduct. There are a number of conditions to 
be satisfied for the defence: 
• Consent must be given by the person whose privacy has been invaded, or by an 
individual who has legal capacity to consent on their behalf.72 
• Consent may be given expressly or inferred from conduct73 and the absence of 
written consent a defendant can rely on oral evidence,74 or conduct75or the 
circumstances.76 
• Consent must be freely given: consent obtained by duress will not be deemed to 
be free consent. 
• Consent must be to the particular disclosure or act complained of.77 Consent will 
be ineffective when the conduct performed by a defendant is of a materially 
different nature to the conduct to which the plaintiff consented.78 The plaintiff’s 
consent must relate to the extent of actual publication.79 
11.62 To be effective, consent need not be fully informed, in the sense that the plaintiff 
was told of all the risks and implications of the conduct before giving consent. It is 
sufficient if the plaintiff is advised and consents in broad terms to the conduct.80 
11.63 In relation to the publication of private information, English courts have shown 
caution in implying consent from the fact that the plaintiff engaged in earlier 
publicity.81 Passive non-objection is generally not sufficient to demonstrate implied 
consent in actions for breach of confidence in the UK.82 
11.64 Whether there was implied, actual consent to an actual publication is a distinct 
question from the issue of whether the plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy. The need to distinguish these issues may arise where the plaintiff had 
previously released or allowed similar information to enter the public domain. Courts 
                                                        
72  Warby et al, above n 63, [12.10]; Aplin et al, above n 64, [14.07].  
73  Giller v Procopets (2008) 24 VR 1. 
74  Aplin et al, above n 64, [12.06]. 
75  Implied consent will be found where there has been positive action by a plaintiff which involves 
disclosure of their private information to another party: Prout v British Gas plc and Another [1992] FSR 
478, (Ford J). The court in this case held that an application for a patent may be regarded as an implied 
release of the information into the public domain. This case was referred to in Aplin et al, above n 64, 
[14.15]. 
76  Halliday v Neville (1984) 155 CLR 1, [6] (Gibbs CJ, Mason, Wilson and Deane JJ). 
77  Balkin and Davis, above n 3, [6.5]. 
78  Ibid. 
79  Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457, [73]–[75] (Lord Hoffman). Lord Hoffman was referring to Peck v 
United Kingdom [2003] ECHR 44 (28 January 2003). See also, Warby et al, above n 63, [12.15]. 
80  Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479, [490] (Brennan, Dawson, Toohey and McHugh JJ). Failure to 
fully inform a person of the risks involved does not vitiate consent but may constitute breach of any legal 
duty of care. 
81  Warby et al, above n 63, [12.09]. 
82  Ibid [12.12]. 
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in UK tort actions for misuse of private information have stipulated that if an 
individual courts public attention, ‘they have less ground to object to the intrusion 
which follows’.83 However, there is increasing recognition that a more nuanced 
approach is appropriate than was arguably shown in older cases, and that the 
appropriate time to look at prior publicity or conduct is when determining whether the 
plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of privacy at the relevant time.84 
11.65 The digital era raises particular concerns in respect of consent to the publication 
of information. Commentators have questioned whether consent in online interactions 
and communications can be considered free and informed.85 Online contracts and terms 
and conditions for online services such as internet banking and social media sites are 
often long, complex and are prone to frequent revision. Terms and conditions are often 
‘bundled’86 without clear explanation of their meaning and consequences.87 A situation 
may arise where a plaintiff consented, by agreeing to broad terms and conditions, to 
general conduct: the question of whether the specific conduct comes within the consent 
given will be a matter for the courts to construe. 
11.66 Other stakeholders highlighted the difficulty for people to understand the nature, 
extent and legal effect of consent in intimate partner situations, both in ongoing 
relationships and in circumstances where the relationship breaks down.88 
11.67 The ALRC considers that Australian courts are experienced in determining the 
scope and validity of a plaintiff’s consent, whether express or implied, to particular 
conduct in a range of factual circumstances, such as online interactions and intimate 
partner situations. 
Onus of proof 
11.68 By classifying consent as a defence, the ALRC intends that a defendant will bear 
the onus of proving that a plaintiff consented to the defendant’s conduct. 
11.69 The question of who bears the onus of proving that a plaintiff consented to 
physical conduct for the tort of battery is contentious in English and Australian civil 
law. The plurality of opinions was highlighted in Marion’s case by McHugh J: 
In England, the onus is on the plaintiff to prove lack of consent. That view has the 
support of some academic writers in Australia but it is opposed by other academic 
writers in Australia. It is opposed by Canadian authority. It is also opposed by 
                                                        
83  A similar principle has been applied in breach of confidence cases: the court might hold that the 
information no longer has the quality of confidence if the plaintiff had previously spoken publicly about 
related matters: Theakston v MGN Ltd [2002] EMLR 398; Lennon  v News Group Newspapers Ltd [1978] 
FSR 573; Woodward v Hutchins [1977] 1 WLR 760. 
84  Warby et al, above n 63, 540. See, also, Ch 6. 
85  See, eg, Daniel J Solove, ‘Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma’ (2013) 126 Harvard Law 
Review 1880. 
86  Law Institute of Victoria, Submission 22. 
87  Australian Privacy Foundation, Submission 39. 
88 Women’s Legal Centre (ACT & Region) Inc, Submission 19. This submission highlights the increasing 
incidence of ‘revenge pornography’ where an individual discloses a compromising, sexually explicit 
photograph of a former partner which was obtained consensually during their relationship. See, also, 
Giller v Procopets (2008) 24 VR 1. 
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Australian authority. Notwithstanding the English view, I think that the onus is on the 
defendant to prove consent. Consent is a claim of ‘leave and licence’. Such a claim 
must be pleaded and proved by the defendant in an action for trespass to land. It must 
be pleaded in a defamation action when the defendant claims that the plaintiff 
consented to the publication. The Common Law Procedure Act 1852 also required any 
‘defence’ of leave and licence to be pleaded and proved. However, those who contend 
that the plaintiff must negative consent in an action for trespass to the person deny 
that consent is a matter of leave and licence. They contend that lack of consent is an 
essential element of the action for trespass to a person. I do not accept that this is so. 
The essential element of the tort is an intentional or reckless, direct act of the 
defendant which makes or has the effect of causing contact with the body of the 
plaintiff. Consent may make the act lawful, but, if there is no evidence on the issue, 
the tort is made out. The contrary view is inconsistent with a person’s right of bodily 
integrity. Other persons do not have the right to interfere with an individual’s body 
unless he or she proves lack of consent to the interference.89 
11.70 The ALRC considers that the defendant will be best placed to provide evidence 
and prove that the plaintiff consented to the conduct invading privacy. Consent is 
generally considered to be a defence to an invasion of privacy in the UK.90 
11.71 Despite not bearing the legal onus, the plaintiff may bear a provisional or 
tactical burden in relation to consent.91 However, this does not create a legal burden to 
disprove facts.92 In other words, where consent is a defence, a plaintiff has a non-legal, 
tactical obligation to show they did not provide consent. 
11.72 While the ALRC recommends that a defendant bear the legal onus of proving 
that a plaintiff consented to the invasion of their privacy, a plaintiff will clearly have a 
strategic onus of showing that that their consent did not extend to a defendant’s 
specific conduct, and may need to plead facts in reply.93 
Revocation and withdrawal of consent 
11.73 The legal effect of a revocation or withdrawal of consent may be an important 
consideration in cases involving disclosure of private information, and particularly so 
in the digital era where online publications remain active indefinitely. 
11.74 As a matter of law, it is clear that just as a person may consent expressly or 
impliedly to another’s conduct, so they may expressly or impliedly revoke that consent, 
                                                        
89  Secretary, Department of Health and Community Services v JWB and SMB (Marion’s case) (1992) 175 
CLR 218, [5] (McHugh J). (Citations omitted). 
90  Warby et al, above n 63. This is despite the position in battery cases: Freeman v Home Office (No 2) 
[1984] QB 524. The English Court of Appeal held that in actions for battery, the burden of providing 
absence of consent is on the plaintiff as the tort redresses the ‘unconsented to intrusion of anotherS’ 
bodily integrity’. 
91  This is a ‘tactical obligation to lead counter-evidence placed upon a party against whom evidence has 
been adduced’: J D Heydon, LexisNexis, Cross on Evidence, Vol 1 (at Service 164) [7005].  
92  Ibid [7015]. 
93  ‘A plaintiff ought not, in the statement of claim, anticipate the defence and plead so as to meet the 
anticipated defence. The defence might not take the course reflected in the statement of claim, and useless 
material might be introduced into the pleadings … The statement of claim is limited to stating whatever 
material facts and points of law are necessary to show that the plaintiff has a right to relief’: Bernard 
Cairns, Australian Civil Procedure (Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia, 8th ed, 2009) [7.100]. 
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provided reasonable notice is given to the other party.94 Generally speaking, consent 
may be withdrawn at any time before the relevant conduct, despite a plaintiff having 
provided prior express consent.95 However, it appears that a person cannot withdraw 
consent and expect the other party to act upon that revocation immediately if it would 
be unreasonable in the circumstances to expect them to do so.96 
11.75 To revoke a consent given under contract—for example, for the publication of 
certain information or to appear on a television program—may of course be a breach of 
that contract. However, the other party would be entitled to damages, assessed on the 
usual basis, and should not be disentitled to revoke their consent. It would be difficult 
for the other party to obtain relief by either the equitable remedy of specific 
performance of the contract, or an injunction to restrain the (probably implied) promise 
not to breach it. Most cases would involve the media or other commercial publishers 
for whom damages would usually be adequate to remedy the harm done by the breach 
(either expense wasted in reliance on the contract going ahead or loss of the profits 
expected).97 
11.76 In the UK, there is limited authority on the circumstances in which consent to 
the use or disclosure by the media of an individual’s private information may be 
revoked.98 Copyright law can provide some guidance here. A licence which is provided 
gratuitously can be revoked with notice at any time in circumstances where no 
stipulation for its duration has been made.99 
11.77 In the privacy context, there are some other scenarios where the effect of 
revocation of consent will not be straightforward. One would be the online disclosure 
of personal information by a defendant, with the plaintiff’s consent, during the course 
of an intimate relationship, which has subsequently ended and where the plaintiff no 
longer wants the information to be available to others. Another would be where a 
person has gratuitously consented to the publication of private facts by a journalist and 
then wishes to revoke the consent. 
11.78 Subject to public interest matters, a revocation may certainly be effective to 
control future disclosures or publications. It would not be effective to counteract a 
publication, based on the consent that has already happened, such as in a book, 
magazine, newspaper or documentary film. 
11.79 Another area of uncertainty is where prior consent was given to a publication of 
information, in the nature of a continuing publication. In a sense, all information 
available online is continually published: publication occurs every time the information 
is downloaded from a website.100 So the question arises as to whether a person can 
                                                        
94  Cowell v Rosehill Racecourse Co Ltd [1937] ALR 273. 
95  Balkin and Davis, above n 3, [6.13]. 
96  This seems the better explanation, in modern times, for cases like Herd v Weardale Steel Coal and Coke 
Co Ltd [1915] AC 67. See also, Barker et al, above n 52, 79. 
97  See further JW Carter, Contract Law in Australia (Lexis Nexis Butterworths, 6th ed, 2013) ch 40. 
98  Warby et al, above n 63, [12.19]. 
99  Ibid. 
100  Dow Jones & Co Inc v Gutnick (2002) 210 CLR 575. 
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effectively revoke actual consent that was given before or at the time of the posting, 
ask for the posting to be taken down, and if it is not, successfully assert that the 
continuing publication is a serious invasion of privacy.101 If the plaintiff’s actual 
consent is the only fact stopping the publication being an invasion of privacy, then it is 
arguable that the revocation should be effective. However, there are likely to be other 
considerations. While this issue will no doubt be argued, in Australia or elsewhere, the 
issue as it applies to privacy law is somewhat hypothetical and uncertain.102 
11.80 The ALRC suggests that the best way to approach this issue would be to deal 
with it as part of the question of whether or not the plaintiff has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy at the time of the action, taking into account the revocation of 
prior consent, the reasonableness of the revocation and of the request for the posting to 
be taken down, the reasonableness or otherwise of the defendant’s refusal or failure to 
do so, and the public interest in its continuing publication.103 
Absolute privilege 
Recommendation 11–5 The Act should provide for a defence of absolute 
privilege. 
11.81 The ALRC recommends that the defence of absolute privilege104 be available as 
a defence to the new tort to protect defendants from liability when their 
communications arise in a particular context.105 Absolute privilege protects individuals 
who reveal personal information about another person in the course of public forums 
such as parliament and proceedings in a court or tribunal.106 
                                                        
101  It should be noted that this scenario does not involve information posted by others without the subject’s 
consent, which is another scenario raising the contentious and topical issue of whether there is some legal 
‘right to be forgotten’, discussed in Ch 16. 
102 Warby et al, above n 63, 537–538. 
103  See Ch 6 
104  Several stakeholders supported the availability of this defence under the new privacy tort: N Witzleb, 
Submission 116; T Butler, Submission 114; Office of the Victorian Privacy Commissioner, Submission 
108; Australian Sex Party, Submission 92; J Chard, Submission 88; Australian Bankers’ Association, 
Submission 84; Guardian News and Media Limited and Guardian Australia, Submission 80; N Witzleb, 
Submission 29. 
105  The ALRC and the VLRC previously recommended a defence of privilege to a statutory cause of action: 
Australian Law Reform Commission, For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice, 
Report 108 (2008) rec 74–4(c); Victorian Law Reform Commission, Surveillance in Public Places, 
Report 18 (2010) rec 27(e).. Some stakeholders preferred the availability of a broad privilege defence: 
Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Submission 66. The NSWLRC recommended the 
defence of absolute privilege, qualified privilege to protect a duty or interest, qualified privilege to protect 
the fair reporting of public proceedings and innocent dissemination. Several stakeholders supported the 
inclusion of this defence: Telstra, Submission 107; NSW Young Lawyers, Submission 58; ABC, 
Submission 46; Arts Law Centre of Australia, Submission 43; Law Institute of Victoria, Submission 22; 
D Butler, Submission 10.     
106  Legislation provides a non-exhaustive list of occasions which attract absolute privilege, for eg, 
Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) 2005 s 27. 
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11.82 The ALRC considers that this defence should be co-extensive with the defence 
of absolute privilege to defamation, so that it includes both statutory and common law 
defences of absolute privilege,107 and so that the same principles would apply whether 
an action is brought for defamation or invasion of privacy by publication of private 
information. The rationale of absolute privilege is equally applicable to both actions. 
11.83 For example, under s 27(2) of the Defamation Act 2005 (NSW), a statement is 
published on an occasion of absolute privilege if: 
(a) the matter is published in the course of the proceedings of a parliamentary body, 
including (but not limited to): 
 (i)  the publication of a document by order, or under the authority, of the 
body, and 
 (ii)  the publication of the debates and proceedings of the body by or under the 
authority of the body or any law, and 
 (iii)  the publication of matter while giving evidence before the body, and 
 (iv)  the publication of matter while presenting or submitting a document to the 
body, or 
(b) the matter is published in the course of the proceedings of an Australian court or 
Australian tribunal, including (but not limited to): 
 (i)  the publication of matter in any document filed or lodged with, or 
otherwise submitted to, the court or tribunal (including any originating 
process), and 
 (ii)  the publication of matter while giving evidence before the court or 
tribunal, and 
 (iii)  the publication of matter in any judgment, order or other determination of 
the court or tribunal, or 
(c) the matter is published on an occasion that, if published in another Australian 
jurisdiction, would be an occasion of absolute privilege in that jurisdiction under a 
provision of a law of the jurisdiction corresponding to this section, or 
(d) the matter is published by a person or body in any circumstances specified in 
Schedule 1. 
11.84 This defence recognises the importance of protecting certain communications or 
statements from liability in the interests of free speech and transparency. Rigorous 
debate in such proceedings may reveal personal information. Privilege in this context 
can be understood as a necessary restriction on privacy interests in a democratic 
society. 
11.85 Wiztleb supported this principle, stating that 
the underlying rationale of all these defences is that a person should in that particular 
context be able to communicate freely and without fear of incurring civil liability … 
                                                        
107  See, eg, Defamation Act 2005 (SA) s 27; Des A Butler and Sharon Rodrick, Australian Media Law 
(Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Limited, 2011) 67. See, also, NSW Law Reform Commission, 
Invasion of Privacy, Report 120 (2009) [6.9] and Draft Bill, cl 75. 
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The privilege has the purpose of protecting and facilitating frank and fearless 
communication even if it is damaging to reputations because it is considered in the 
public interest to do so. This same reasoning can also be applied to the protection of 
privacy. It is therefore appropriate to create privileges for communications in which 
this rationale applies.108 
11.86 In the defamation case, Mann v O’Neill, a majority of the High Court of 
Australia stated that absolute privilege attaches to statements made in the course of 
parliamentary proceedings for reasons of inherent necessity or, as to judicial 
proceedings, as an indispensable attribute of the judicial process.109 This defence 
facilitates Australia’s democratic system by enabling the free and fair exchange of 
debate in certain circumstances and which may involve the disclosure of an 
individual’s private information. 
11.87 The defence is in addition to other forms of privilege such as parliamentary 
privilege, which attaches to statements made within the confines of a parliamentary 
chamber to protect members of parliament from liability.110 
11.88 Defences of privilege operate in Canadian privacy statutes.111 
Publication of public documents 
Recommendation 11–6 The Act should provide for a defence of 
publication of public documents. 
11.89 This defence provides protection from liability for the publication of public 
documents which are relevant to an open and transparent political and legal system. 
Access to public documents supports the principle of open justice and accountability in 
our public institutions. This recommendation is consistent with the ALRC’s Terms of 
Reference for this Inquiry which require consideration of the necessity of balancing 
privacy with fundamental values, including freedom of expression and open justice. 
11.90 The ALRC recommends that this defence should be co-extensive with the 
defence of publication of public documents in s 28 of the Uniform Defamation Law 
(UDL) which provides a comprehensive list of the types of documents protected from 
defamation actions.112 The use of this list will dispel any concerns about the scope of 
the defence by clearly defining the range of documents covered by the defence. Section 
28 defines ‘public document’ as 
                                                        
108  N Witzleb, Submission 29. 
109  Mann v O’Neill (1997) 191 CLR 204, 212 (Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ). 
110  Parliamentary Privileges Act 1987 (Cth) s 16 and parallel state acts. See, Butler and Rodrick, above n 34, 
[3.700]. 
111  Privacy Act, RSBC 1996, c 373 (British Columbia) s 2(b). 
112  The application of this provision in the new privacy tort was supported by the Office of the Victorian 
Privacy Commissioner, Submission 108. 
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(a) any report or paper published by a parliamentary body, or a record of votes, 
debates or other proceedings relating to a parliamentary body published by or under 
the authority of the body or any law, or 
(b) any judgment, order or other determination of a court or arbitral tribunal of any 
country in civil proceedings and including: 
 (i)  any record of the court or tribunal relating to the judgment, order or 
determination or to its enforcement or satisfaction, and 
 (ii)  any report of the court or tribunal about its judgment, order or 
determination and the reasons for its judgment, order or determination, or 
(c) any report or other document that under the law of any country: 
  (i)  is authorised to be published, or 
  (ii)  is required to be presented or submitted to, tabled in, or laid before, a 
parliamentary body, or 
(d) any document issued by the government (including a local government) of a 
country, or by an officer, employee or agency of the government, for the information 
of the public, or 
(e) any record or other document open to inspection by the public that is kept: 
 (i)  by an Australian jurisdiction, or 
 (ii)  by a statutory authority of an Australian jurisdiction, or 
 (iii) by an Australian court, or 
 (iv)  under legislation of an Australian jurisdiction, or 
(f) any other document issued, kept or published by a person, body or organisation of 
another Australian jurisdiction that is treated in that jurisdiction as a public document 
under a provision of a law of the jurisdiction corresponding to this section, or 
 (g) any document of a kind specified in Schedule 2.113 
11.91 The NSWLRC argued that the consideration of public interest in its public 
documents and fair report of proceedings of public concern.114 However, a complete 
defence would provide greater certainty. 
11.92 A number of stakeholders expressed their support for the availability of this 
defence, many of whom highlighted the need to promote a transparent and open 
government and judicial system.115 
                                                        
113  See, for example, Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) 2005 s 28(4). 
114  NSW Law Reform Commission, Invasion of Privacy, Report 120 (2009) [6.8]. 
115   T Butler, Submission 114; Office of the Victorian Privacy Commissioner, Submission 108; ASTRA, 
Submission 99; Australian Sex Party, Submission 92; Guardian News and Media Limited and Guardian 
Australia, Submission 80; SBS, Submission 59; D Butler, Submission 10. 
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Fair report of proceedings of public concern 
Recommendation 11–7 The Act should provide for a defence of fair 
report of proceedings of public concern. 
11.93 This recommendation provides a defence for individuals who publish or 
otherwise disclose fair reports of public proceedings which may, in the process, reveal 
an individual’s private information. This defence will be of particular significance for 
media organisations, court reporters and educational institutions. 
11.94 The ALRC recommends that this defence should be co-extensive with the 
defence of fair report of proceedings of public concern in the UDL.116 This statutory 
defence applies to the publication of defamatory matter contained in documents from 
proceedings of a parliamentary body, an international organisation, court or tribunal, 
inquiries including Royal Commissions, meetings of shareholders of a public company, 
and other public proceedings as outlined in the relevant provision of the UDL. 
11.95 The ALRC considers that the meaning of ‘fair’, as it has developed at common 
law and in the interpretation of the UDL, should apply to this recommendation. At 
common law, ‘fair’ refers to summaries of proceedings which intend to honestly 
convey to the reader the impression which the proceedings would have had if the 
reader had been present.117 Whether a report is fair will be a question of fact for a 
court, to be determined objectively by comparing the report to the events or facts it 
described. The impression conveyed in the report must not be substantially different 
from the impression that someone would have gleaned had they been present at the 
relevant event.118 
11.96 Several stakeholders supported this defence.119 While the National Association 
for the Visual Arts (NAVA) supported the availability of the defence, it argued that it 
should be expanded to include artistic representations.120 However, the ALRC 
considers that artistic expression is more appropriately considered in the public interest 
balancing test which is part of the actionability for the cause of action. 
11.97 Stacey Higgins argued that the defence is unnecessary as publications which are 
already in the public domain will not be subject to liability.121 The ALRC has 
recommended in Chapter 6 that, whether the material was already in the public domain 
should be taken into account when determining whether the plaintiff had a reasonable 
                                                        
116   See, for example, Defamation Act 2005 (SA) 2005 s 29(4). 
117  Bashford v Information Australia (Newsletters) Pty Ltd (2004) 218 CLR 366; Cook v Alexander [1974] 1 
QB 279; Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479. 
118  Waterhouse v Broadcasting Station TGB Pty Ltd (1985) 1 NSWLR 58, [62]–[63]. 
119  T Butler, Submission 114; Office of the Victorian Privacy Commissioner, Submission 108; ASTRA, 
Submission 99; Australian Sex Party, Submission 92; J Chard, Submission 88. 
120  National Association for the Visual Arts Ltd, Submission 78. 
121  S Higgins, Submission 82. 
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expectation of privacy. However, the ALRC considers that the interests of open 
government, transparency and open justice require a complete defence. 
11.98 The Public Interest Advocacy Centre (PIAC) argued that the publication of 
material which is already in the public domain, including public documents and reports 
of proceedings, should not be protected by a defence, as the publication of private 
information which is already publicly available can cause distress: 
the collection, use and disclosure of information about a person from publicly 
available sources can still have considerable privacy impacts. For example, 
information in the public domain would arguably include press clippings, which 
might contain inaccurate information, or accurate information that is open to 
misinterpretation. Information may still be private and personal to the plaintiff, 
despite the fact that it has been published, or is contained in a public record (for 
example, a person’s criminal record, their HIV status, or the fact that they are a rape 
victim).122 
11.99 The ALRC considers that this concern is addressed by the inclusion of the 
explanation that the defence is co-extensive with the defence to defamation. The 
definition of public documents in s 29 of the UDL provides a clear list of the 
proceedings which are subject to this defence. It also provides that the defence may be 
defeated if the matter was not published honestly for the information of the public or 
the advancement of education. The publication of some private information that is 
revealed in the course of open proceedings is also the subject of other specific 
legislation such as Judicial Proceedings Acts in the states and territories that prohibit 
the publication of private information in certain court proceedings. This includes the 
identity of protected classes of people such as jury members, children and the victims 
of sexual assault.123 Publication would also be subject to any suppression order of the 
court.124 
Safe harbour scheme for internet intermediaries 
11.100 Internet intermediaries125 should not be liable under the tort for invasions of 
privacy committed by third parties using their services, where they have no knowledge 
                                                        
122  Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 105. 
123  See, eg, the Judicial Proceedings Report Act 1985 (Vic). Provisions in this Act restrict the publication of 
certain information in specific judicial proceedings. 
124  See, eg, Court Suppression and Non-Publication Orders Act 2010 (NSW) s 8. This provision empowers a 
court to make a suppression order ‘where the order is necessary to avoid causing undue distress or 
embarrassment to a party to or witness in criminal proceedings involving an offence of a sexual nature 
(including an act of indecency)’. 
125  The broad term ‘internet intermediary’ is commonly used to cover: carriage service providers, such as 
Telstra or Optus; content hosts, such as Google or Yahoo!; and search service and application service 
providers, such as Facebook, Flickr and YouTube: Peter Leonard, ‘Safe Harbors in Choppy Waters-
Building a Sensible Approach to Liability of Internet Intermediaries in Australia’ (2010) 3 Journal of 
International Media and Entertainment Law 221, 226. There is also a comprehensive definition of 
‘carriage service provider’ in the Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth) s 87. For the purposes of that Act, 
the provision defines a ‘listed carriage service provider’ as someone who provides carriage service to the 
public using a network owned by one or more carriers. This definition excludes online search engines and 
online vendors as they provide a platform for their customers, but not for the public. This definition 
restricts the scope of the safe harbour scheme. 
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of the invasion of privacy. Where they do have knowledge, there does not seem to be 
any justification to provide a complete exemption from liability. The ALRC therefore 
sees no need to recommend the enactment of a ‘safe harbour’ scheme, to protect 
internet intermediaries from liability under the tort. 
11.101 There are two reasons why intermediaries are unlikely to be liable under this 
tort. First, the tort is targeted at positive conduct on the part of the defendant. It is 
difficult to characterise a failure to act as an ‘invasion’ of privacy. It is not intended to 
impose liability for mere omissions—that is, failing to act to stop an invasion of 
privacy by a third party.126 Secondly, the tort is confined to intentional or reckless 
invasions of privacy. 
11.102 A mere intermediary will rarely have this level of intent, when third parties 
use their service to invade someone’s privacy. The operators of a social networking 
platform, for example, do not intend to invade someone’s privacy, when one of its 
customers posts private information about another person on the platform. 
11.103 In some circumstances, an intermediary may be found to have the requisite 
fault after they have been given notice of an invasion of privacy. They may be found to 
have intended an invasion of privacy, or been reckless, if they know that their service 
has been used to invade someone’s privacy, and they are reasonably able to stop the 
invasion of privacy, but they choose not to do so.127 
11.104 Considering these two reasons, the ALRC does not think it necessary to 
recommend that safe harbour schemes for internet intermediaries be extended to 
protect intermediaries from liability under the new tort. 
11.105 However, if such a scheme were necessary, amending cl 91 of sch 5 of the 
Broadcasting Services Act 1991 (Cth) may be one way of protecting intermediaries 
from liability under the tort. Clause 91 does not currently refer to laws under 
Commonwealth statutes. It provides that any law of a state or territory, or a rule of 
common law or equity has no effect to the extent to which it subjects an internet 
content host to liability in respect of hosting particular internet content.128 
11.106 In copyright law, s 116AG of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) limits the 
remedies a court may grant against carriage service providers for infringements of 
copyright that relate to their carrying out certain online activities. In order to access this 
scheme, a carriage service provider must meet conditions in s 116AH. 
                                                        
126  Defamation is not limited to positive conduct in this way. The Court of Appeal of England and Wales, in 
Byrne v Deane, found the proprietors of a golf club liable for defamation, when someone anonymously 
posted a defamatory poem to the wall of the club. The club knew the defamatory poem was posted on the 
wall and could have taken it down, but did not: Byrne v Deane [1937] 1 KB 818. This principle has been 
applied to hold internet intermediaries liable as publishers in defamation where they have been given 
notice of defamatory matter present on their website, but fail to remove it within a reasonable time: 
Godfrey v Demon Internet Ltd [2001] QB 201; Tamiz v Google Inc [2013] 1 WLR 2151; Trkulja v 
Google Inc LLC [2012] VSC 533; Rana v Google Australia Pty Ltd [2013] FCA 60. 
127  Byrne v Deane [1937] 1 KB 818. 
128  Broadcasting Services Act 1992 (Cth) Sch 5 cl 91(a). 
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11.107 In the Discussion Paper, the ALRC proposed the introduction of a safe 
harbour scheme, to protect internet intermediaries from liability under the new tort for 
which a third party was primarily responsible.129 To rely on the defence, the 
intermediary might be required to meet certain conditions. The defence would not 
apply to invasions of privacy that intermediaries themselves intentionally or recklessly 
commit. 
11.108 In the US, § 230 of the Communications Decency Act 1996 (US) contains a 
broad safe harbour scheme.130 The scheme exempts ‘interactive computer services’ 
from civil liability under US state and federal law where 
(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of 
material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, 
excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such 
material is constitutionally protected; or 
(B) any action taken to enable or make available to information content providers or 
others the technical means to restrict access to material described in paragraph (1). 131 
11.109 The provision also imposes a series of obligations on interactive computer 
service providers: 
A provider of an interactive computer service shall, at the time of entering an 
agreement with a customer for the provision of interactive computer service and in a 
manner deemed appropriate by the provider, notify such customer that parental 
control protections (such as computer hardware, software, or filtering services) are 
commercially available that may assist the customer in limiting access to material that 
is harmful to minors. Such notice shall identify, or provide the customer with access 
to information identifying, current providers of such protections.132 
11.110 The EU safe harbour scheme provides that service providers are not under 
any ‘general obligation to monitor’ for illegal content.133 Services will not be liable for 
third party content where the internet intermediary had no ‘actual knowledge of illegal 
activity or information knowledge’ and, ‘upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, 
acts expeditiously to remove or to disable access to the information’.134 
11.111 In the UK, the Defamation Act 2013 (UK) provides a defence for ‘operators 
of websites’.135 It is a defence for the operator to show that it was not the operator who 
posted the statement on the website.136 An operator of a website is understood as a 
                                                        
129  A safe harbour exemption was recommended by some stakeholders in response to the DPM&C’s 2011 
Issues Paper: Peter Leonard and Michael Burnett, Submission No 77 to DPM&C Issues Paper, 2011. 
130  M Lemley, ‘Rationalizing Internet Safe Harbors’ (2007) 6 Journal on Telecommunications and High 
Technology Law 101, 102. 
131  Communications Decency Act 1996, Title V of the Telecommunications Act 1996, 47 USC. 
132  Ibid s 230(c)(d). 
133  EU Directive on Electronic Commerce (2000/31/EC) art 15. 
134  Ibid art 14. 
135  Defamation Act 2013 (UK) s 5. This defence is defeated if the defendant showed malice: Ibid s 5(11). The 
Explanatory Memorandum to the Act explain that malice may arise in circumstances where the operator 
of a website had ‘incited the poster to make the posting or had otherwise colluded with the poster’: 
Explanatory Notes, Defamation Bill 2013 (UK) [42]. 
136  Defamation Act 2013 (UK) s 5(2). 
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person with effective control over the content of a website who is not the author, editor 
or publisher of the matter. There are differing degrees of control depending on the form 
and size of a platform. 
11.112 Section 5(12) provides that the act of merely ‘moderating’ a site is not, in 
and of itself, sufficient to defeat the defence. 
11.113 The defence is defeated if the claimant shows that 
(a)  it was not possible for the claimant to identify the person who posted the 
statement, 
(b) the claimant gave the operator a notice of complaint in relation to the statement, 
and 
(c)  the operator failed to respond to the notice of complaint in accordance with any 
provision contained in regulations. 
11.114 The provision sets out in some detail the scope of UK privacy regulations137 
that an internet service provider must adhere to, as well as the nature of a complaints 
system.138 
11.115 This detailed defence is complemented by s 10 which provides that a court 
does not have jurisdiction to hear and determine an action for defamation brought 
against a person who was not the author, editor or publisher of the statement 
complained of unless the court is satisfied that it is not reasonably practicable for an 
action to be brought against the author, editor or publisher. 
Conditions 
11.116 If a safe harbour scheme were enacted, internet intermediaries should be 
required to comply with certain conditions to rely on the defence. Examples of such 
conditions might include requiring internet intermediaries to 
• remove, or take reasonable steps to remove, material that invades a person’s 
privacy, when given notice; 
• provide consumer privacy education or awareness functions, such as warnings 
about the risk of posting private information; and 
• comply with relevant industry codes and obligations under the Privacy Act 1988 
(Cth). 
11.117 Stakeholders suggested other conditions, including requiring internet 
intermediaries to 
• reasonably cooperate with and assist the relevant regulator with locating and 
pursuing a wrongdoer;139 
                                                        
137  Ibid s 5(5). 
138  Ibid s 5(6). 
139  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Submission 90. 
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• take action against individuals who are found liable for serious invasion of 
privacy, such as blocking their social media accounts;140 
• block users who contravene these terms and conditions from uploading future 
content;141 and 
• show warnings about the risks and potential consequences of posting private 
information.142 
11.118 While the ALRC recommends that a safe harbour scheme is unnecessary, if 
such a defence were to be enacted consideration should be given to these conditions. 
Exemption or defence for children and young persons 
Recommendation 11–8 The Act should provide for an exemption for 
children and young persons. 
11.119 The ALRC recommends that the statutory cause of action should contain an 
exemption or defence where the invasion of privacy occurred when the defendant was 
a child or a young person under an age to be specified by the legislature. 
11.120 This defence was not proposed in the Discussion Paper and the ALRC has 
not therefore received stakeholder comments. The ALRC nevertheless makes this 
recommendation in this Report, for a number of reasons. 
11.121 In the digital era there is a significant potential for a child or a young person 
to misuse digital communications technology to invade the privacy of another child or 
young person while joining in with increasingly common forms of behaviour and 
social interaction. Although the ALRC recognises that substantial emotional distress 
may be caused by an invasion of privacy committed by a child or young person, the 
ALRC considers that education on the risks and ethical dimensions of such behaviour 
is more appropriate than the imposition of civil liability on children and young people 
below a specified age. 
11.122 Available research indicates that age is a factor in how children and young 
people navigate online spaces.143 Age plays a role in the risks that young people face, 
the risks they are willing to take, and in their understanding of the implications of the 
risks, from engaging in online platforms and other communications using apps and 
mobile phones. Research indicates that young people are generally aware of privacy 
                                                        
140  Women’s Legal Services NSW, Submission 115. 
141  Domestic Violence Legal Service and North Australian Aboriginal Justice Agency, Submission 120. 
142  S Higgins, Submission 82. Other stakeholders also recommended possible conditions: UNSW Cyberspace 
Law and Policy Community, Submission 98; Australian Sex Party, Submission 92; Interactive Games and 
Entertainment Association, Submission 86; S Higgins, Submission 82; I Turnbull, Submission 81. 
143  B Nansen et al, ‘Children and Digital Wellbeing in Australia: Online Regulation, Conduct and 
Competence’ (2011) 6 Journal of Children and Media 237, 237. 
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risks associated with some behaviour, such as sexting.144 However this awareness 
varies significantly—and perhaps unsurprisingly—depending on their age and 
capacity. 
11.123 Given the increased affordability, capacity and usage of digital and mobile 
technology, children and young persons may therefore be more likely than in previous 
eras to engage in intentional or reckless behaviour which could expose them to liability 
under the new tort. 
11.124 At common law, a child or young person can be liable in tort. There are rare 
examples of successful action in the case of personal injury inflicted by a child.145 
Negligence law takes account of the age of a child in determining the standard of care 
that can be expected of a child of a similar age, experience and level of intellectual 
development.146 There is usually no point suing children or young people where the 
injury is minor or because of their lack of assets, but different considerations apply if 
the conduct caused lasting or significant injury and if liability for negligence is covered 
by household or other insurance policies. 
11.125 For intentional torts, a child must be of sufficient age to form the relevant 
intent. This principle would be relevant to the new tort if the recommended defence 
were not included. 
11.126 Unlike liability for negligence, insurance does not usually cover liability for 
intentional wrongs, so there may be little point suing a minor at the time. Liability for a 
tort endures until the expiration of the relevant limitation period, which in the case of a 
plaintiff who is a minor may be some years after the conduct. The ALRC considers it 
would be undesirable for the legislation to allow a young person to be sued for 
something done, potentially, years before when they were under the specified age. 
11.127 Parents of a child who has committed a tort are not vicariously liable to the 
plaintiff for the child’s conduct. They can be liable if their lack of supervision amounts 
to a breach of their own duty of care in negligence to supervise or control their child,147 
or if they have failed to secure goods to which the child should not have had access, 
particularly dangerous goods.148 Liability in negligence only arises where the plaintiff 
suffers actual damage. As the new tort of invasion of privacy is limited to intentional or 
reckless conduct, negligence by a parent in supervising a child would not give rise to 
liability under the new tort. 
                                                        
144  S Walker, L Sanci and M Temple-Smith, ‘Sexting: Young Women’s and Men’s Views on Its Nature and 
Origins’ (2013) 52 Journal of Adolescent Health 697. 
145  Balkin and Davis, above n 3, 830. 
146  Twelve year old not liable in negligence for throwing a dart which hit the plaintiff child in the eye: 
McHale v Watson (1964) 111 CLR 384.  
147  Smith v Leurs (1945) 70 CLR 256; Curmi v McLennan [1994] 1 VR 513. 
148  Plaintiff injured in eye by another teenager using an airgun after defendant had left it in an unlocked 
cupboard on a houseboat which he allowed his teenage son and friends to occupy: Curmi v McLennan 
[1994] 1 VR 513. 
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11.128 Standards and provisions in other legislation provide a useful model for 
legislators when considering an appropriate age at, or under which, liability under the 
new tort should not exist. 
11.129 Commonwealth criminal law provides that a child under 10 years of age 
cannot be liable for a criminal offence.149 A child aged between 10 and 14 will only be 
liable if that child knows their conduct is wrong.150 Other legislation assumes differing 
levels of understanding and capacity depending on a young person’s age, for example, 
in NSW, the consent of a young person over the age of 14 years is effective consent to 
medical treatment to prevent which would otherwise be a battery.151 
11.130 There is evidence in recent Australian literature and government inquiries 
that legislatures and others are concerned about criminalising the behaviour of children 
and young persons, with long term effects on a young person’s record of behaviour. 
A number of other recent or current inquiries are being conducted into the age at which 
young people should be held liable for offences involving the use of communications 
networks or other criminal offensive or harmful behaviour.152 
11.131 The ALRC recommendation does not specify an age under which a young 
person should not be liable but suggests that it should be consistent with other 
legislation reflecting analogous rationales. The ALRC’s tentative view is that 16 would 
be an appropriate age under which a young person should not have a civil liability. 
Defences unsuited to a privacy action 
Other defamation defences 
11.132 The ALRC considers that some defences to defamation are inappropriate or 
unnecessary for a privacy action, due to the differences in the nature, rationale and 
elements of the two causes of action. 
11.133 Truth. The defence of truth or justification153 is not relevant to a privacy 
tort. Most cases involving invasions of privacy by disclosure of information are 
brought to prevent or seek redress for disclosure of true information. 
11.134 Fair comment. A defence of fair comment154 is inappropriate for a privacy 
tort. The right to speak freely, that is protected by the defence of fair comment in 
defamation law, both under common law and the UDL, is limited to comment or 
opinions on matters of public interest. In the new tort, public interest will already have 
been considered as part of actionability, so that a defence is unnecessary. Further, the 
relevant wrong in the invasion of privacy tort is the disclosure of private information. 
                                                        
149  Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 4M. 
150  Ibid s 4N(1).  
151  See, eg, Minors (Property and Contracts) Act 1970 (NSW) s 49(2). 
152  For example, the Victorian Parliament’s Law Reform Committee undertook an inquiry into sexting in 
2013 that considered the impact of legislation that criminalises consensual criminalising sexting on 
minors: Parliament of Victoria Law Reform Committee, ‘Report of the Law Reform Committee for the 
Inquiry into Sexting’ (Parliamentary Paper 230, 2013). 
153  See, for example, Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) 2005 s 25.  
154  Privacy Act, RSBC 1996, c 373 s 2 includes the defence of fair comment. 
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Outside matters of public interest, a person should not be able to disclose private 
information about another under the guise of making a comment or opinion.155 
11.135 Qualified privilege. The ALRC has decided not to recommend a defence 
akin to that of qualified privilege in defamation law. Qualified privilege at common 
law protects defamatory statements where they are made without malice on an 
occasion of qualified privilege, that is, where a person has a legal, social or moral duty 
or interest in making the statement to someone with a reciprocal duty or interest in 
receiving it. The defence is lost if the defendant was actuated by an improper motive. 
The common law defence very rarely benefited the media, who had instead to rely on 
extended statutory or constitutional forms of the defence.156 Although a defence similar 
to qualified privilege at common law was discussed and proposed in the Discussion 
Paper,157 and some stakeholders supported it,158 other expert commentators and legal 
practitioners, in consultations with the ALRC, questioned the need for or desirability of 
such a defence, given the elements of the cause of action and other defences.159 
11.136 A number of considerations underpin the ALRC’s decision not to 
recommend a defence of qualified privilege. First, the new tort would apply only to 
intentional or reckless invasions of privacy, so there is a need for compelling reasons to 
justify the invading conduct. Defamation, by contrast, is a tort of strict liability, 
therefore necessitating a greater range of defences for conduct in good faith to alleviate 
the potential harshness of the liability. 
11.137 Secondly, commentators also pointed to the fact that complex questions arise 
as to the elements and operation of qualified privilege in defamation law. If there were 
a need for a similar defence to the common law defence, it would be undesirable to 
burden the new tort with that complexity and risk extended legal argument about how 
common law principles relevant to the defamation defence applied to the new tort. An 
                                                        
155  N Witzleb, Submission 29. The VLRC recommended a defence of fair comment but such a defence was 
not recommended by the ALRC previously or by the NSWLRC. NSW Law Reform Commission, 
Invasion of Privacy, Report 120 (2009) [6.8]; Victorian Law Reform Commission, Surveillance in Public 
Places, Report 18 (2010) rec 27(e). 
156  As set out in Discussion Paper 80 at [10.40]—[10.52], there are three categories of qualified privilege in 
defamation: qualified privilege at common law, qualified privilege under the UDL (see, eg, s 30 in the 
Defamation Act 2005 (NSW)) and the Lange qualified privilege encompassing implied freedom of 
political communication. 
157  Australian Law Reform Commission, Serious Invasions of Privacy in the Digital Era, Discussion Paper 
80 (2014). 
158  Office of the Victorian Privacy Commissioner, Submission 108; Public Interest Advocacy Centre, 
Submission 105; Telecommunications Industry Ombudsman, Submission 103; ASTRA, Submission 99; 
UNSW Cyberspace Law and Policy Community, Submission 98; Australian Sex Party, Submission 92; 
J Chard, Submission 88; S Higgins, Submission 82; I Turnbull, Submission 81; Guardian News and Media 
Limited and Guardian Australia, Submission 80; Telstra, Submission 45; N Witzleb, Submission 29. 
159  Office of the Information Commissioner Queensland, Submission 127; Public Interest Advocacy Centre, 
Submission 105; UNSW Cyberspace Law and Policy Community, Submission 98; Australian Privacy 
Foundation, Submission 39; T Gardner, Submission 3. The ALRC considers that the requirement for the 
plaintiff to have a reasonable expectation of privacy, the fault element of intentional or reckless conduct, 
the public interest balancing process as part of actionability and the defence of reasonable defence of 
persons, others or property will provide overall sufficient protection to conduct that would fall within a 
defence of qualified privilege. 
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entirely new defence would need to be drafted to deal with the situations intended to be 
protected. 
11.138 Thirdly, a plaintiff would arguably not satisfy the actionability requirements 
for bringing an action in any of the circumstances that would attract the defence. 
Where a defendant acted in circumstances commonly included within occasions of 
qualified privilege at common law, the plaintiff would not usually have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in relation to the information. Alternatively, any invasion of 
privacy would arguably be outweighed by public interest considerations relating to the 
circumstances.160 Lastly, the defences of necessity or defence of persons or property 
may excuse the defendant. If not, an intentional and reckless invasion of privacy should 
be actionable. 
11.139 Innocent dissemination. The defence of innocent dissemination161 is 
inappropriate, as the statutory cause of action is limited to intentional acts. While 
several stakeholders supported the inclusion of a defence of innocent dissemination, 
this may have been on the basis that the fault elements of the action were not 
confirmed at that time. 
11.140 Innocent dissemination is a defence to defamation in which liability is strict. 
A defendant has the defence if they published the defamatory material merely in the 
capacity of a ‘subordinate distributor’, and neither knew, nor ought reasonably to have 
known, that the matter was defamatory.162 The defence of innocent dissemination may 
be considered a type of safe harbour.163 
11.141 Triviality. The defence of triviality is unnecessary as the statutory cause of 
action is confined to serious invasions of privacy.164 
11.142 Information in the public domain. The ALRC considers that a complete 
defence of ‘information in the public domain’—or the application of the doctrine of 
waiver165—would be inappropriate, as the effect of a prior disclosure of an individual’s 
(prima facie) private information is variable. 
11.143 Private information does not necessarily lose its quality of privacy once it 
has been disclosed. PIAC argued that information may still be private in nature, despite 
the fact that it has been published.166 
                                                        
160  Witzleb notes that: ‘The  privilege  has  the  purpose  of  protecting  and  facilitating  frank  and  fearless 
communication even if it is damaging to reputations because it is considered in the public interest to do 
so. This same reasoning can also be applied to the protection of privacy. It is therefore appropriate to 
create privileges for communications in which this rationale applies’: N Witzleb, Submission 29.  
161  Some stakeholders supported the inclusion of a defence of innocent dissemination, eg, Office of the 
Australian Information Commissioner, Submission 66; SBS, Submission 59. However the necessity of the 
defence flows from the fault element of the cause of action.  
162  See, eg, Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) 2005 s 32. 
163  Leonard, above n 125, 235. 
164  SBS, above n 21 supported the availability of the defence of triviality. 
165  Warby et al, above n 63, 539–542. 
166   Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 30. 
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11.144 Several stakeholders supported the inclusion of a defence that the 
information disclosed by the defendant was already in the public domain.167 
11.145 However the ALRC recommends that, whether and to what extent 
information is in the public domain at the relevant time, as well the plaintiff’s prior 
conduct in having a role in the earlier disclosure, will be a relevant factor to be 
considered by a court when determining whether a plaintiff had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy. This factor is discussed more fully in Chapter 6. 
11.146 In making this recommendation, the ALRC recognises that there may be 
some circumstances where the previous widespread dissemination of an individual’s 
private information may diminish their reasonable expectation of privacy, even if the 
facts do not support implied consent to that publication.168 On the other hand, the fact 
that private information was once publicly or broadly known may not justify the 
defendant’s revealing it at a later time. These matters are best considered by the court 
when determining whether the plaintiff has a cause of action.169 
11.147 Public interest. A defence of public interest would be redundant because the 
ALRC recommends in Chapter 9 that a plaintiff only has a cause of action for serious 
invasion of privacy where a court is satisfied that the plaintiff’s interest in privacy 
outweighs any countervailing public interest. A separate public interest defence would 
therefore not be needed.170 
11.148 The ALRC considers that a balancing exercise is a more appropriate way to 
determine whether there is a public interest in the disclosure of the private information 
or the intrusion into an individual’s seclusion. Expressly incorporating public interest 
into the actionability of a statutory cause of action will ensure that privacy interests are 
not unduly privileged over other rights and interests, particularly given that Australia 
does not have express human rights law protection for freedom of speech. The 
balancing of public interests is discussed more fully in Chapter 9. 
Contributory negligence 
11.149 A defence of contributory negligence is not appropriate for the new tort, 
which is limited to intentional or reckless conduct. This approach is consistent with the 
law relating to other intentional torts, such as conversion, battery and assault.171 
11.150 Opening the new privacy tort up to defendant claims of contributory 
negligence would confuse the fault element of the tort by introducing consideration of 
negligent conduct. Contributory negligence now acts as a partial defence only to claims 
                                                        
167   SBS, Submission 59; ABC, Submission 46; D Butler, Submission 10; T Gardner, Submission 3. 
168  See the discussion of the defence of consent above. 
169  This is also the case in breach of confidence actions where information must have the quality of 
confidence to be protected in equity. This may be lost if the information becomes known to a substantial 
number of people. Contractual obligations of confidence may endure even where the information has 
been publicly revealed. See, further, Aplin et al, above n 64, ch 5. 
170  Several stakeholders supported this model: Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, 
Submission 66; Google, Submission 54; ASTRA, Submission 47; ABC, Submission 46; Telstra, 
Submission 45; Arts Law Centre of Australia, Submission 43. 
171  Cf New South Wales v Riley (2003) 57 NSWLR 496, [104]. 
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in negligence, and statute authorises the reduction of damages where the plaintiff’s 
own negligence was a material factor in the loss or harm suffered.172 
11.151 The ALRC considers that, where a defendant intentionally or recklessly and 
unjustifiably invades another person’s privacy, and cannot rely on one of the available 
defences, such conduct should not be excused or mitigated by mere carelessness on the 
part of the plaintiff. The plaintiff’s conduct may be a consideration when the court is 
deciding whether the plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
Other defences and exemptions 
11.152 The ALRC considers that, other than in the case of young people, no activity, 
individual or organisation should be exempt from liability under the new tort. 
A number of stakeholders agreed, arguing that defences would be sufficient to protect 
serious invasions of privacy which are nonetheless warranted.173 
11.153 Other stakeholders raised a number of other possible exemptions or defences 
to the new tort. However, the ALRC considers that many of these are appropriately 
captured by the recommended defences, such as lawful authority or necessity, or by the 
elements of the tort, including the requirement of a reasonable expectation of privacy 
and the public interest balancing process. 
11.154 Telstra advocated an emergency services exemption.174 The Australian 
Bureau of Statistics (ABS) sought an exemption for the use of official data for 
statistical and related purposes.175 
11.155 SBS suggested an exemption for journalists and media organisations, 
provided the serious invasion of privacy occurs while they are engaged in 
journalism.176 This would operate in a similar fashion to the journalism exemption in 
the Privacy Act. However, the fault requirement and the public interest balancing 
process already provide significant protection for the media. 
11.156 The Australian Bankers’ Association argued that compliance with the 
Privacy Act should be a complete exemption to a statutory cause of action for serious 
invasion of privacy.177 This may have been more appropriate if the statutory cause of 
action could rest on negligence, where whether or not an entity had failed to follow 
proper practice would be relevant. However, a plaintiff would be unlikely to make out 
the elements of the tort where an entity’s conduct complied with the requirements of 
the Privacy Act. 
11.157 The Arts Law Centre of Australia (supported by NAVA and the Australian 
Institute of Professional Photography) favoured the following exemptions: 
                                                        
172  See, eg, Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1965 (NSW). 
173  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Submission 66; NSW Young Lawyers, Submission 
58; Queensland Council of Civil Liberties, Submission 51; ABC, Submission 46; Australian Privacy 
Foundation, Submission 39; N Witzleb, Submission 29; Law Institute of Victoria, Submission 22. 
174   Telstra, Submission 45. 
175   Australian Bureau of Statistics, Submission 32. 
176   SBS, Submission 59. 
177   Australian Bankers’ Association, Submission 27. 
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photography or filming in a public place; documentary film-making or photography; 
journalistic or investigative photography, film-making or reporting; photography or 
filming of privately owned land or premises, or people on those premises, where the 
premises are accessible to the public; and photography or filming of people on private 
premises for purposes such as education, journalism, artistic expression and 
documentary.178 However, the reasonable expectation of privacy, the limited fault 
element and the public interest balancing test for actionability should provide 
significant protection for photographers in the range of situations for which exemptions 
are sought. 
11.158 Voiceless and the Barristers’ Animal Welfare Panel Ltd submitted that there 
should be a defence for activities carried out ‘for the purpose of, or resulted in, the 
procuring of evidence of an iniquity’.179 The ALRC considers that such a defence 
would be extremely wide, could extensively curtail and infringe civil liberties in a wide 
range of circumstances and would undermine the protection that the tort is designed to 
provide from invasive conduct exceeding lawful authority. The balancing test and the 
defences of lawful authority, necessity and for conduct incidental to the exercise of a 
lawful right of defence of persons or property, recommended above, more 
appropriately balance competing interests. 
 
 
                                                        
178   Arts Law Centre of Australia, Submission 43. 
179  Barristers’ Animal Welfare Panel and Voiceless, Submission 64. 
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Summary 
12.1 This chapter considers the remedies for an action for serious invasion of privacy. 
The ALRC recommends that courts be empowered to award any one or more of a 
range of remedies—monetary and non-monetary—to plaintiffs who successfully bring 
proceedings under the new privacy tort. One benefit of a cause of action being enacted 
by statute is the capacity and freedom of parliament to provide for a range of remedies, 
in contrast to the common law which is constrained by precedent and opportunity. 
12.2 Serious invasions of privacy may have diverse consequences for plaintiffs. The 
range of remedies the ALRC recommends in this chapter are appropriate to the 
different objectives, experiences and circumstances of plaintiffs who may pursue 
privacy actions. Some plaintiffs may seek monetary compensation, some may wish the 
offending behaviour to cease, some will seek to deter similar conduct in the future, 
while others may seek public vindication of their interests. In some cases, non-
monetary remedies may provide a more appropriate response for the often 
immeasurable effects occasioned by invasions of privacy, or a more effective means to 
prevent invasions in the future. 
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12.3 This chapter begins with the ALRC’s recommendation that courts be 
empowered to award damages, including general damages for any emotional distress 
suffered by the plaintiff. Most actions for invasion of privacy will concern harm to 
dignitary interests or emotional distress. 
12.4 The ALRC recommends that a separate award of aggravated damages should 
not be made. Rather, the ALRC recommends that a court be empowered to consider a 
range of factors that may aggravate or mitigate the assessment of damages. 
12.5 The ALRC also recommends that a court should have the discretion to award 
exemplary damages in exceptional circumstances. 
12.6 The ALRC recommends a cap on damages. The cap should apply to the sum of 
both damages for non-economic loss and any exemplary damages. This cap should not 
exceed the cap on damages for non-economic loss in defamation. 
12.7 The ALRC recommends that a court be empowered to award an account of 
profits in circumstances where a defendant has profited from an invasion of privacy. 
12.8 Finally, the ALRC recommends that courts be empowered to award a range of 
non-monetary remedies where they would be appropriate in the circumstances: 
injunctive relief; an order requiring the defendant to apologise; a correction order; an 
order for the delivery up, destruction or removal of material; and declaratory relief. 
These remedies are not mutually exclusive, and may be awarded in addition to 
monetary remedies. It will be at the discretion of a court to award appropriate relief in 
all the circumstances of a case. A non-monetary order such as injunctive or declaratory 
relief will not necessarily reduce an award of damages. 
Damages 
Recommendation 12–1 The Act should provide that courts may award 
damages, including damages for emotional distress. 
12.9 The ALRC recommends that damages, including general damages for emotional 
distress, be available as a remedy for serious invasions of privacy. Previous law reform 
inquiries made similar recommendations.1 Several stakeholders supported this 
recommendation.2 
                                                        
1  Australian Law Reform Commission, For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice, 
Report No 108 (2008) rec 74–5; NSW Law Reform Commission, Invasion of Privacy, Report No 120 
(2009) cl 76(1)(a); Victorian Law Reform Commission, Surveillance in Public Places, Report No 18 
(2010) rec 29(a). 
2  Domestic Violence Legal Service and North Australian Aboriginal Justice Agency, Submission 120; 
Women’s Legal Services NSW, Submission 115; T Butler, Submission 114; Office of the Victorian 
Privacy Commissioner, Submission 108; Redfern Legal Centre, Submission 94; Public Interest Advocacy 
Centre, Submission 105; Australian Sex Party, Submission 92; S Higgins, Submission 82; Guardian News 
and Media Limited and Guardian Australia, Submission 80; N Witzleb, Submission 29. 
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12.10 Damages are said to be the ‘prime remedy’ in tort actions.3 This is so even 
where the tort, as the ALRC recommends in the case of the new tort of serious invasion 
of privacy, is actionable per se in the sense that the plaintiff need not prove any ‘actual 
damage’ (personal or psychiatric injury, material damage or financial loss). 
12.11 There are four types of damages that may be awarded in a tort action: nominal 
damages, compensatory damages, aggravated damages and exemplary or punitive 
damages. 
12.12 It is likely that nominal damages will only rarely, if ever, be appropriate where 
the new tort is made out, because of the requirement of seriousness as an element of the 
tort. Nominal damages, usually of a token sum,4 are awarded where a tort is actionable 
per se and where the plaintiff is unable to prove any injury, loss or damage.5 It provides 
mere recognition that the wrong has occurred but where the wrong was not a serious 
infringement of the plaintiff’s rights. 
12.13 The most important damages are compensatory damages. How compensatory 
damages should be assessed in cases of serious invasions of privacy is discussed 
below. 
Damages to compensate a plaintiff 
12.14 Compensation is recognised as the dominant purpose of civil actions.6 The 
ALRC’s recommendation that the statutory cause of action be described as an action in 
tort7 will allow a court, when determining damages for a serious invasion of privacy, to 
draw on principles that have been well settled and applied by the courts in analogous 
common law actions. 
12.15 The purpose of compensatory damages in tort law is to place a plaintiff as far as 
possible in the position in which they would have been, had the wrong not occurred.8 It 
has been argued that this purpose is not commensurate with the nature of a privacy tort 
as the harm caused by an invasion of privacy is irreversible.9 However, in most civil 
actions, where the loss is other than purely financial, damages will not be able to 
restore a plaintiff to the position they would have been in had the wrong not occurred. 
Damages cannot undo personal or psychiatric injury. They can however compensate 
                                                        
3  New South Wales v Stevens (2010) 82 NSWLR 106, [14] (McColl JA).  McColl JA was quoting from 
Cassell & Co Ltd v Broome [1971] AC 1027, [1070] (Lord Hailsham). 
4  John Mayne and Harvey McGregor, Mayne & McGregor on Damages (Sweet & Maxwell, Limited, 12th 
ed, 1961) [10–006]. See, also, Maule J’s statement that ‘nominal damages means a sum of money that 
may be spoken of, but that has no existence in point of quantity’: Beaumont v Greathead (1846) 2 CB 
494, [444]. 
5  Mayne and McGregor, above n 4, [10–001]. Nominal damages are available in trespass cases: Rosalie 
Balkin and Jim Davis, Law of Torts (LexisNexis Butterworths, 5th ed, 2013) [27.3]. 
6  Robyn Carroll, ‘Apologies as a Legal Remedy’ (2013) 35 Sydney Law Review 317, 340. 
7  See Ch 4. 
8  Livingstone v Rawyards Coal Co (1880) 5 App Cas 25 (Lord Blackburn). 
9  Siewert Lindenbergh in Katja Ziegler (ed), Human Rights and Private Law: Privacy as Autonomy (Hart 
Publishing, 2007) 93. 
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for the financial losses flowing from the injury and provide a measure of solace for the 
wrong that has occurred.10 
12.16 Compensatory damages may include special and general damages. Special 
damages refer to ‘those items of loss which the plaintiff has suffered prior to the date 
of trial and which are capable of precise arithmetical calculation—such as hospital 
expenses’.11 General damages refer to all injuries which are not capable of precise 
calculation.12 
Compensation for actual damage 
12.17 An award of damages compensates for actual damage to the plaintiff. Actual 
damage can consist of physical or psychiatric injury, property damage13 or other 
economic loss. Plaintiffs must prove that the damage was caused by the tort and fell 
within the relevant principles of ‘remoteness of damage’.14 
Compensation in the absence of actual damage 
12.18 The recommendation that the new tort be actionable per se means that a plaintiff 
need not prove that he or she has suffered personal injury or another form of actual 
damage in order to bring the action.15 However, this does not mean that the plaintiff is 
not entitled to damages for the wrong. As explained in Chapter 8, in a sense the 
invasion of privacy is both the wrong and the injury, and the plaintiff is entitled to be 
compensated because it happened. 
12.19 The action for invasion of privacy essentially protects a dignitary interest. It is 
closely analogous to actions like assault and false imprisonment, and other forms of 
trespass which are actionable per se. The courts deciding actions for invasion of 
privacy are likely to draw on the principles of damages as developed by the courts in 
these torts. 
12.20 Because the wrong must be serious to be actionable, it is likely that, in the 
absence of any actual damage, the court will award general damages in order to: 
• vindicate the plaintiff; 
• compensate the plaintiff for any emotional distress or injury to feelings. 
Vindicatory effect of damages awards 
12.21 In torts which are actionable per se, such as trespass to the person in the form of 
battery, assault or false imprisonment, trespass to land, and also in defamation where 
                                                        
10  Ibid 98. 
11  Balkin and Davis, above n 5, [27.5]. 
12  Ibid. 
13  For example, damage to stock or the cost of repairs to property occasioned by trespass to land or trespass 
to goods: Ibid [5.15]. 
14  For an intentional tort, the plaintiff may claim any damage which is a natural and probable consequence 
of the tort: Palmer Bruyn & Parker Pty Ltd v Parsons (2001) 208 CLR 388.  
15  See Rec 8–2. 
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harm to the plaintiff’s reputation from a defamatory statement is presumed,16 an award 
of general compensatory damages may vindicate a plaintiff’s interest.17 
12.22 While vindication will have a role in compensating people for a serious invasion 
of privacy, by the acknowledgment that a serious wrong has been a committed, the 
assessment may be more analogous to other torts protecting privacy—such as trespass 
to land. 
12.23 In Plenty v Dillon, Gaudron and McHugh JJ of the High Court of Australia 
characterised an award of general damages, for what they described as a ‘serious’ 
trespass to land, as fulfilling vindicatory purposes: 
True it is that the entry itself caused no damage to the appellant’s land. But the 
purpose of an action for trespass to land is not merely to compensate the plaintiff 
for damage to the land. That action also serves the purpose of vindicating the 
plaintiff's right to the exclusive use and occupation of his or her land. The appellant 
is entitled to have his right of property vindicated by a substantial award of damages 
... If the occupier of property has a right not to be unlawfully invaded, then ... the 
‘right must be supported by an effective sanction otherwise the term will be just 
meaningless rhetoric’.18 
12.24 Vindication may be one of multiple aims of compensatory damages in a specific 
case. However, each aim does not need to be separately compensated.19 An award of 
general damages can have several purposes or effects. As the High Court recognised in 
relation to damages for defamation in Carson v John Fairfax & Sons Limited & Slee, 
‘the amount of a verdict is the product of a mixture of inextricable considerations’.20 
12.25 A related and unresolved issue is whether a plaintiff may claim harm to 
reputation in a claim for invasion of privacy. To decide this matter would require a 
detailed analysis of the new and developing privacy rights and their interaction with 
defamation. Refusing to strike out such a claim, Mann J in the High Court of England 
and Wales described this point as ‘a serious one, capable of going to the heart of the 
                                                        
16  Balkin and Davis, above n 5, [18.17]. 
17  Robyn Carroll and Normann Witzleb, ‘It’s Not Just about the Money: Enhancing the Vindicatory Effect 
of Private Law Remedies’ (2011) 37 Monash University Law Review 216, 219. 
18  Plenty v Dillon (1991) 171 CLR 635, 655.  
19  In a recent case of invasion of privacy in the UK, Eady J commented that ‘It is accepted in recent 
jurisprudence that a legitimate consideration is that of vindication to mark the infringement of a right ... If 
other factors mean that significant damages are to be awarded, in any event, the element of vindication 
does not need to be reflected in an even higher award’: Mosley v News Group Newspapers [2008] EWHC 
1777 (QB) (Eady J). See, also, Kit Barker, ‘The Mixed Concept of Vindication’ in Jason Neyers, Erika 
Chamberlain and Stephen Pitel (eds), Tort Law: Challenging Orthodoxy (Hart Publishing, 2013). 
20  Carson v John Fairfax & Sons Limited & Slee (1993) 178 CLR 44, [60]. See, also, Ell v Milne (No 8) 
[2014] NSWSC 175 (7 March 2014) 66. In Carson v John Fairfax, the High Court cite Triggell v 
Pheeney (1951) 82 CLR 513. There has been some reference by UK courts when hearing actions for 
misuse of personal information, to vindicatory damages as a separate head of damages: Lumba (WL) v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] 1 AC 245 [97]. However, in a 2014 UK case, 
Dingemans J stated that: ‘the effect of an award might be said in general terms to ‘vindicate’ the 
Claimant.  However the use of the phrase “vindicatory damages” in this area of law is in my judgment 
unhelpful and liable to mislead, by creating a consequential risk of either overcompensation because of 
double counting, or under compensation because relevant features about the conduct are not considered’: 
Weller v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2014] EWHC 1163 (QB). 
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cause of action in confidence and the newly developing wrong relating to the invasion 
of privacy’.21 He acknowledged that a disclosure might well cause embarrassment and 
harm to reputation, but the latter would not be actionable where the information was 
true. He went on: 
It is not clear to me why, as a matter of principle, damage to reputation of this sort 
should not be within the sort of thing that privacy rights should protect against.22 
12.26 If this issue arises under the new tort, it will be a matter for the courts to decide. 
Damages for emotional or mental distress 
12.27 The ALRC recommends that an award of damages under the new tort may, 
where appropriate, include general damages for emotional distress. This accords with 
the purpose of a privacy action: 
to promote and protect the physical, psychological and social development of 
individuals, and their autonomy to decide how they wish to be presented to the 
world.23 
12.28 Damages for intangible losses—such as injury to feelings—may provide 
compensation and solace to a plaintiff.24 The availability of damages for emotional 
distress is consistent with the recommendation that only serious invasions of privacy 
would be actionable and that, in determining seriousness, the court may consider 
whether the invasion was likely to be highly offensive, distressing or harmful to a 
person of ordinary sensibilities in the position of the plaintiff. 
12.29 It is highly probable that serious invasions of privacy will commonly cause 
emotional distress or harm to a plaintiff’s dignitary interests.25 As the High Court of 
England and Wales recognised in Mosley, ‘it is reasonable to suppose that damages for 
such an infringement may include distress, hurt feelings and loss of dignity’.26 
12.30 This recommendation is consistent with the availability of damages for 
emotional distress in limited areas of tort law. For instance, damages in trespass cases 
involving assault, battery and false imprisonment commonly include a component for 
injury to feelings or mental distress caused by the tort, as do cases of malicious 
prosecution and defamation.27 
12.31 The ability to award damages for emotional distress under the new tort will 
partly fill a significant gap in redress available under existing common law for the 
                                                        
21  Hannon v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2014] EWHC 1580 (Ch) [27]. 
22  Ibid [29]. 
23  John Hartshorne, ‘The Value of Privacy’ (2010) 2 Journal of Media Law 67, 70. 
24  Carolyn Sappideen and Prue Vines (eds), Fleming’s The Law of Torts (Lawbook Co, 10th ed, 2011) 
[10.110]. 
25  Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 105. See, also, Michael Tilbury, ‘Coherence, Non-
Pecuniary Loss and the Construction of Privacy’ in Jeffrey Berryman and Rick Bigwood (eds), The Law 
of Remedies: New Directions in the Common Law (Irwin Law, 2010) 127, 161. 
26  Mosley v News Group Newspapers [2008] EWHC 1777 (QB), [216] (Eady J). 
27  Tilbury, above n 25, 143.  
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intentional infliction of emotional distress outside actions such as trespass.28 As 
discussed in Chapters 3 and 13, the limitations in the common law are increased by 
uncertainty about whether compensation for emotional distress is available in equitable 
actions for breach of confidence.29 
12.32 Several stakeholders expressed strong support for this recommendation.30 
Redfern Legal Centre argued that 
it is essential that courts also be given the power to award damages for an 
individual’s emotional distress as a result of a serious invasion of privacy. As the 
ALRC recognises, serious invasions of privacy commonly cause emotional distress 
or harm to a person’s dignitary interests irrespective of whether there was also an 
economic loss. For our clients, many of who are socio-economically disadvantaged 
or marginalised, there may be little economic loss arising from a breach of their 
privacy as they are unemployed and/or have incapacitating disabilities and rely 
solely on government benefits for support. Nor may they experience an injury that 
is either physical or amounting to a psychological disorder. It is the emotional 
damage or loss to their dignity and the hurt and loss of trust caused by the privacy 
breach that is their greatest concern and one that in our view often necessitates an 
award of damages to compensate for this loss.31 
12.33 Dr Normann Witzleb also supported the recommendation, arguing that 
the harm caused by an invasion of privacy will often also be intangible so that any 
provable loss is likely to be small. An award limited to compensating material loss 
will therefore often be insufficient to counteract the wrong. Effective redress 
requires that the plaintiff can also claim compensation for intangible losses, such as 
injury to feelings.32 
The likely range of general damages in privacy actions 
12.34 The ALRC does not suggest a monetary range for general damages in actions 
for serious invasion of privacy. Courts will be likely to look at damages awarded in 
comparable cases for other torts. 
12.35 Case law in the UK suggests that the amount of general damages awarded in 
actions for misuse of personal information for hurt feelings and distress may be 
‘modest’.33 Associate Professor Paul Wragg comments: 
What can be achieved by a monetary award in the circumstances is limited. Any 
award must be proportionate and avoid the appearance of arbitrariness.34 
                                                        
28  Telstra argued against allowing damages for mental distress on the basis that it is not recoverable in other 
areas of tort: Telstra, Submission 107. 
29  The only Australian appellate authority on the award of damages for emotional distress in a breach of 
confidence case is Giller v Procopets (2008) 24 VR 1. See Ch 13 for further discussion. 
30  Domestic Violence Legal Service and North Australian Aboriginal Justice Agency, Submission 120; 
Women’s Legal Services NSW, Submission 115; T Butler, Submission 114; Office of the Victorian 
Privacy Commissioner, Submission 108; Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 105; Women’s 
Legal Service Victoria and Domestic Violence Resource Centre Victoria, Submission 97; Redfern Legal 
Centre, Submission 94; Australian Sex Party, Submission 92; S Higgins, Submission 82; N Witzleb, 
Submission 29. 
31  Redfern Legal Centre, Submission 94. 
32  N Witzleb, Submission 29. 
33  Applause Store Productions Ltd v Raphael [2008] EWHC 1781 (QB). 
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12.36 The amount awarded in Mosley (£60,000) represents the highest award in a 
privacy case in the UK to date. In Weller v Associated Newspapers Ltd, Dingemans J 
noted the relatively modest awards in privacy cases: 
Analysis of the cases ... shows that, with the exception of Mosley, very substantial 
awards have not been made in this area. There was an award of £2,500 (and 
aggravated damages of £1,000) for the publication of the photographs in Campbell 
v MGN; an award of £2,500 for the publication of medical information in Archer v 
Williams; £3,500 for each Claimant for the publication of the photographs in 
Douglas v Hello! (No 3); and £2,000 for the publication of private information 
about protected characteristics in Applause Store Productions Limited v Raphael. 
In Mosley the award of damages was for £60,000, and in AAA the award of damages 
was for £15,000 ... for publication on three separate occasions. 
It should be noted in Spelman v Express Newspapers Tugendhat J recorded that the 
sums awarded in the early cases for misuse of private information were very low, 
and that those levels were not the limit of the Court’s powers.35 
12.37 Australian courts may take some guidance from European human rights 
jurisprudence as to the appropriate award of non-pecuniary damages. Article 41 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights allows damages to be awarded to the ‘just 
satisfaction’ of the injured party.36 This principle was applied in the case of Peck v UK, 
where the plaintiff was awarded £7,500 for non-pecuniary loss owing to the ‘distress, 
anxiety, embarrassment and frustration’ suffered as a consequence of CCTV footage of 
him attempting to commit suicide being broadcast on national television.37 
12.38 Wragg suggests that the qualitative difference between the two types of privacy 
invasions in the new tort—intrusion upon seclusion and misuse of private 
information—may mean that the damages awarded in different cases are assessed 
differently.38 
12.39 In other jurisdictions, courts have developed different approaches to assessing 
damages. In Jones v Tsige, Sharpe JA assessed damages based on a number of factors 
in that case, including whether the plaintiff suffered ‘public embarrassment or harm to 
her health, welfare, social, business or financial position’.39 He suggested that damages 
for intrusion should be modest.40 
Factors relevant to the assessment of damages 
Recommendation 12–2 The Act should set out the following non-
exhaustive list of factors that a court may consider when determining the amount 
of damages: 
                                                                                                                                             
34  P Wragg, Submission 73. 
35  Weller v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2014] EWHC 1163 (QB), [193]–[195]. 
36  European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for 
signature 4 November 1950, 213 UNTS 221 (entered into force 3 September 1953). 
37  Peck v United Kingdom [2003] ECHR 44 (28 January 2003) [117]. 
38  P Wragg, Submission 73. 
39  Jones v Tsige (2012) ONCA 32, [90]. 
40  Ibid [87]. 
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(a)  whether the defendant had made an appropriate apology to the plaintiff; 
(b)  whether the defendant had published a correction; 
(c)  whether the plaintiff had already recovered compensation, or has agreed 
to receive compensation in relation to the conduct of the defendant; 
(d)  whether either party took reasonable steps to settle the dispute without 
litigation; and 
(e)  whether the defendant’s unreasonable conduct following the invasion of 
privacy, including during the proceedings, had subjected the plaintiff to 
particular or additional embarrassment, harm, distress or humiliation. 
12.40 The ALRC recommends that in assessing damages in an action for serious 
invasion of privacy, a court may consider a number of factors as mitigating or 
aggravating general damages. 
12.41 These factors are designed to encourage parties to resolve a matter before 
litigation or before litigation proceeds to a hearing. This is a non-exhaustive list. It is 
intended to guide a court when determining the assessment of damages. It will be for 
the court to decide whether particular factors are relevant. 
12.42 Mitigating factors will have the effect of reducing the harm of a serious invasion 
of privacy and will therefore reduce the amount of compensatory damages awarded to 
a plaintiff. Aggravating factors such as whether the plaintiff suffered particular 
embarrassment or humiliation due to the nature of the defendant’s conduct will 
increase the award of general damages. The consideration of a defendant’s conduct up 
to and including conduct at trial is relevant in the assessment of damages in other 
intentional torts, particularly for false imprisonment41 and defamation.42 
12.43 The Uniform Defamation Law contains similar factors for a court to consider in 
the award of damages. For instance, s 38 of the Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) sets out 
mitigating factors for a court to consider when assessing damages, including whether 
the defendant has made an apology to the plaintiff or has published a correction of the 
defamatory matter. 
12.44 In actions for misuse of personal information in the UK, courts have considered 
the effect of mitigating or aggravating conduct or circumstances in the award of 
damages. While there was no separate award of aggravated damages in Mosley for 
instance, aggravating conduct was relevant to the assessment of the award of general 
damages. Eady J commented: 
It must be recognised that it may be appropriate to take into account any 
aggravating conduct in privacy cases on the part of the defendant which increases 
                                                        
41  Spautz v Butterworth (1996) 41 NSWLR 1. 
42  Mayne and McGregor, above n 4, [7–009]. 
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the hurt to the claimant’s feelings or ‘rubs salt in the wound’. As Lord Reid said, in 
the context of defamation, in Cassell v Broome: 
‘It has long been recognised that in determining what sum within that bracket 
should be awarded, a jury, or other tribunal, is entitled to have regard to the conduct 
of the defendant. He may have behaved in a highhanded, malicious, insulting or 
oppressive manner in committing the tort or he or his counsel may at the trial have 
aggravated the injury by what they there said. That would justify going to the top of 
the bracket and awarding as damages the largest sum that could fairly be regarded 
as compensation’.43 
12.45 Several stakeholders supported this list of factors.44 Telstra underscored their 
particular support for factors (a) and (d).45 Detail about some of the factors is provided 
below. 
(a) and (b) whether the defendant issued an apology or correction 
12.46 Where a defendant has made an apology or issued a clear correction of false 
information about an individual, a court may consider these as mitigating factors in an 
award of damages. These two factors will be particularly relevant to invasions that 
occur through the publication of an individual’s private information. 
12.47 Defamation law includes apologies or corrections as mitigating factors in the 
assessment of damages.46 Apologies are not a remedy at common law for intentional 
torts, instead they are often a factor mitigating an award of damages.47 The Canadian 
Privacy Acts also include apologies as a mitigating factor in the assessment of 
damages.48 
12.48 Several stakeholders argued that this practice should be encouraged to promote 
the resolution of matters prior to or during litigation.49 Guardian News and Media 
Limited and Guardian Australia argued that ‘the nature of invasions of privacy is that 
in many instances an apology, freely given, may be sufficient to resolve the matter.50 
12.49 Research into the role of apologies on the settlement decision-making processes 
of litigants in America suggests that apologies influence claimants’ perceptions, 
judgments and decisions in ways that make settlement more likely.51 Resolving privacy 
                                                        
43  Mosley v News Group Newspapers [2008] EWHC 1777 (QB), [222] (Eady J). Eady J cited Cassell & Co 
Ltd v Broome [1971] AC 1027, 1085. In Mosley, Eady J also considered that damages may be mitigated 
by reference to the conduct of a plaintiff. In obiter, he questioned to what extent a plaintiff’s conduct prior 
to the invasion of their privacy could be considered in the assessment of damages, if their conduct 
contributed to their distress: Mosley v News Group Newspapers [2008] EWHC 1777 (QB), [224]–[226]. 
44  T Butler, Submission 114; Arts Law Centre of Australia, Submission 113; Telstra, Submission 107; 
Australian Sex Party, Submission 92; Guardian News and Media Limited and Guardian Australia, 
Submission 80. 
45  Telstra, Submission 45. 
46  See, eg, Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) 2005 s 38(1)(a)–(b). 
47  See, eg, Ibid s 38(1)(a). 
48  See, eg, Privacy Act, CCSM 1996, c P125 (Manitoba) s 4(2)(e). 
49  Guardian News and Media Limited and Guardian Australia, Submission 80; Telecommunications 
Industry Ombudsman, Submission 103. 
50  Guardian News and Media Limited and Guardian Australia, Submission 80. 
51  Carroll, above n 6, 319. 
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disputes prior to the commencement of costly legal proceedings will, generally 
speaking, be advantageous to both parties. 
12.50 The Insurance Council of Australia argued that an apology or correction should 
not be included as a factor to mitigate damages as these remedies are inconsistent with 
the aim of protecting a person’s privacy.52 The issuing of a public correction or 
apology for publication of false private information may compound the emotional 
distress, hurt or embarrassment occasioned by the initial invasion of privacy. 
12.51 Some stakeholders argued that the term ‘apology’ should be qualified to ensure 
they are given in a genuine or sincere fashion.53 The ALRC considers that a court will 
necessarily take the relevant circumstances into account when assessing the nature and 
effectiveness of any apology or correction made prior to the commencement of legal 
proceedings. 
(c) whether the plaintiff has already recovered compensation, or has agreed to 
receive compensation in relation to the conduct of the defendant 
12.52 This factor recognises that it would be unfair for a plaintiff to be compensated 
more than once in relation to the same invasion of privacy. Where a plaintiff has 
pursued alternative dispute resolution (ADR) or some other complaints mechanism 
prior to undertaking legal proceedings under the new privacy tort, a court should 
consider any compensation or other remedy obtained when assessing damages. 
12.53 There are several legal or regulatory avenues that a plaintiff may be able to 
pursue as an alternative to taking action under the new privacy tort. These may result in 
the payment of compensation or an award of damages. For example, the Office of the 
Australian Information Commissioner (OAIC) has the power to make determinations 
that an APP entity must provide compensation to an individual where it is found that 
APP entity breached an Australian Privacy Principle.54 In Chapter 16, the ALRC 
supports the OAIC’s proposal to broaden the complaints mechanism. In Queensland, 
the Information Privacy Act empowers the Privacy Commissioner to refer complaints 
to the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal (QCAT).55 
12.54 Were a plaintiff to pursue either of these avenues prior to commencing legal 
proceedings under the new privacy tort, a court should take into account any 
compensation already awarded, agreed upon, or received, when assessing damages. 
12.55 However, the ALRC does not recommend a bar on legal proceedings under the 
new privacy tort where a plaintiff has already pursued the matter through another 
mechanism. 
                                                        
52  Insurance Council of Australia, Submission 102. 
53  S Higgins, Submission 82; I Turnbull, Submission 81. 
54  Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) s 42. 
55  QCAT can hear those complaints in its original jurisdiction and may make an order for compensation of 
up to $100, 000: Information Privacy Act 2009 (Qld) s 176(1)–(2). 
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(d) whether either party took reasonable steps to settle a dispute 
12.56 This factor is intended to encourage the parties, in appropriate circumstances, to 
attempt to resolve their dispute without litigation, if it would be reasonable to expect 
them to do so.56 This factor may be read as a mitigating or an aggravating factor in the 
assessment of an award of damages, depending on whether a party took ‘reasonable 
steps’ to settle a dispute prior to legal proceedings. 
12.57 In determining the ‘reasonableness’ of either party’s conduct, a court may 
consider whether either party had made attempts at ADR; whether a complaint had first 
been made to the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, the Australian 
Communications and Media Authority (the ACMA) or another body, and the outcome 
of any determination. 
12.58 Whether a defendant has made an offer of amends—and whether that offer has 
been accepted—may be considered by a court when assessing whether either party has 
taken reasonable steps to settle a dispute prior to legal proceedings. 
12.59 When determining reasonableness, a court may consider whether the nature of 
the invasion of privacy—particularly where it is ongoing—as well as the relationship 
between the parties, is conducive to pre-litigation resolution. 
12.60 Given the highly personal nature of some invasions of privacy, there may be 
many circumstances where pre-trial negotiations are inappropriate. Advocates for 
persons experiencing domestic violence were concerned by the inclusion of this factor 
in the list of mitigating and aggravating factors.57 The Office of the Victorian Privacy 
Commissioner argued that ADR can sometimes lead to inequitable outcomes for some 
plaintiffs, particularly in situations where there is a perceived power imbalance 
between two parties to a proceeding; a lack of trust between the parties; or where the 
plaintiff may be too emotionally distressed to approach the plaintiff.58 
12.61 The ALRC agrees that the circumstances of some invasions of privacy will be 
inappropriate for pre-trial ADR. The ALRC also agrees that failure by a plaintiff to 
engage with a defendant who shows a willingness to settle a dispute prior to legal 
proceedings should only be used against a plaintiff in an award of damages, where it 
would be reasonable to do so in the circumstances. 
12.62 The ALRC has not proposed that ADR be compulsory before pursuing an action 
for serious invasion of privacy, but instead considers that including this factor will 
encourage parties to engage in ADR where appropriate. 
                                                        
56  This is consistent with the policy intent behind the Civil Dispute Resolution Act 2011 (Cth). Its objects 
clause encourages ‘as far as possible, people taking genuine steps to resolve disputes before certain civil 
proceedings are instituted’: Ibid s 3. 
57  Domestic Violence Legal Service and North Australian Aboriginal Justice Agency, Submission 120; 
Office of the Victorian Privacy Commissioner, Submission 108; N Henry and A Powell, Submission 104. 
58  Office of the Victorian Privacy Commissioner, Submission 108. 
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Contributory negligence should not be considered in assessing damages 
12.63 The ALRC recommends that contributory negligence not be included as a factor 
to be considered by a court to reduce an award of damages. Under state apportionment 
legislation, a court may reduce an award of damages in certain claims to the extent that 
the plaintiff was at fault,59 but only where the defence of contributory negligence 
would have been a complete defence at common law. Contributory negligence is not a 
defence at common law to intentional torts and the apportionment legislation therefore 
does not apply to such claims.60 As discussed in Chapter 11, contributory negligence is 
not recommended as a defence to the new tort. 
12.64 Including contributory negligence as a factor in the assessment of damages 
would be inconsistent with the fault element of the proposed statutory cause of action 
which limits liability to intentional or reckless conduct. However, as Eady J pointed out 
in Mosley, 
there is no doctrine of contributory negligence. On the other hand, the extent to 
which his own conduct has contributed to the nature and scale of the distress might 
be a relevant factor on causation. Has he, for example, put himself in a predicament 
by his own choice which contributed to his distress and loss of dignity?61 
Other factors 
12.65 The ALRC has not recommended that the defendant’s state of mind at the time 
of the invasion of the privacy should be considered. However, it will be a matter for the 
court whether this should be considered in a particular case. In some circumstances, a 
high level of malice may be more appropriately considered as grounds for an award of 
exemplary damages, because exemplary damages focus on the defendant’s motives.62 
12.66 Several stakeholders proposed additional factors in mitigation or aggravation of 
damages. The ABC proposed that ‘whether the defendant reasonably believed that the 
actions comprising the invasion were carried out in the public interest’ should be 
considered.63 However, the ALRC considers the public interest balancing test is 
already a sufficient protection of legitimate and reasonable claims for public interest 
disclosure of an individual’s private information. 
12.67 The Australian Bankers’ Association (ABA) proposed that if the defendant acted 
‘honestly and reasonably’, they ‘ought fairly to be excused’.64 This is similar to a 
provision in the Australian Consumer Law (ACL) which provides a defence where a 
person ‘acted honestly and reasonably and, having regard to all the circumstances of 
the case, ought fairly to be excused, the Court may relieve the person either wholly or 
partly from liability to any penalty or damages on such terms as the Court thinks fit’.65 
                                                        
59  See, eg, Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1965 (NSW) s 9. 
60  Horkin v North Melbourne Football Club (1983) 1 VR 153.  
61  Mosley v News Group Newspapers [2008] EWHC 1777 (QB), [244]. 
62  Mayne and McGregor, above n 4, [11–009]. 
63  ABC, Submission 93. 
64  Australian Bankers’ Association, Submission 84. 
65  Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) s 85. 
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However, the fault element of the new tort makes such relief from liability to pay 
damages less appropriate than in the case of the ACL which imposes strict liability. 
No separate award of aggravated damages 
Recommendation 12–3 The Act should provide that the court may not 
award a separate sum as aggravated damages. 
12.68 The ALRC recommends that the Act should not empower a court to make a 
separate award for aggravated damages.66 
12.69 At common law, aggravated damages are a form of general damages, ‘given by 
way of compensation for injury to the plaintiff, which may be intangible, resulting 
from the circumstances and manner of the wrongdoing’.67 
12.70 Aggravated damages comprise an additional sum to take account of the special 
humiliation suffered by the plaintiff due to the nature of the defendant’s conduct in the 
commission of a wrong.68 Aggravated damages are awarded where the defendant’s 
conduct was so outrageous that an increased award is necessary to appropriately 
compensate injury to a plaintiff’s ‘proper feelings of dignity and pride’.69 
12.71 Rather than recommending that aggravated damages may be awarded, the 
ALRC recommends that a court may consider whether a defendant’s unreasonable 
conduct following the invasion of privacy, or prior to or during legal proceedings, 
subjected the plaintiff to special or additional embarrassment, harm, distress or 
humiliation when assessing damages.70 
12.72 The ALRC considers that listing such conduct as a factor to be considered when 
assessing damages will provide sufficient opportunity for the court to take into account 
circumstances where a defendant has caused additional and unreasonable distress or 
humiliation to a plaintiff prior to commencing legal proceedings.71 Moreover, the 
ALRC recommends that exemplary damages may be awarded where a court believes it 
is appropriate in all the circumstances. 
12.73 The ALRC recommends that aggravated damages not be awarded as a separate 
sum to avoid the risk of overlap between an ordinary award of general damages for 
injury to the plaintiff’s feelings and an award of aggravated damages.72 
                                                        
66  Several stakeholders supported this recommendation: Domestic Violence Legal Service and North 
Australian Aboriginal Justice Agency, Submission 120; Office of the Victorian Privacy Commissioner, 
Submission 108; Australian Sex Party, Submission 92; S Higgins, Submission 82. 
67  Uren v John Fairfax & Sons (1966) 117 CLR 118, 129–130 (Taylor J). 
68  ‘[A]ggravated damages are given to compensate the plaintiff when the harm done to him by a wrongful 
act was aggravated by the manner in which the act was done’: Ibid 149 (Windeyer J). 
69  Rookes v Barnard [1964] AC 1129 [1221] (Lord Devlin). 
70  Rec 12–2(e).  
71  The Australian Sex Party agreed with this point: Australian Sex Party, Submission 92. 
72  New South Wales v Riley (2003) 57 NSWLR 496, [129]. This passage was quoted by Sackville AJA in 
New South Wales v Radford (2010) 79 NSWLR 327, [96].  
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12.74 There is also a risk of overlap between the award for aggravated damages and 
that for exemplary damages, considered later in this chapter, which are intended to 
punish or deter the defendant because of the nature of his or her conduct. As Taylor J 
said in Uren v John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd, ‘in many cases, the same set of 
circumstances might well justify either an award of exemplary or aggravated 
damages’.73 Both risks are avoided if aggravated damages cannot be awarded. 
12.75 The ALRC’s approach is consistent with that of the New South Wales Law 
Reform Commission (NSWLRC) on this issue. The NSWLRC explained that 
aggravating circumstances would already form some part of an assessment for general 
damages, stating: 
To the extent to which the conduct of the defendant has increased the damage to the 
plaintiff, the plaintiff’s loss is simply the greater—a fact that will, obviously, be 
reflected in the size of the award.74 
Exemplary damages 
Recommendation 12–4 The Act should provide that a court may award 
exemplary damages in exceptional circumstances. 
12.76 The ALRC recommends that a court be given the discretion to award exemplary 
damages in exceptional circumstances, where a defendant’s conduct was outrageous 
and in contumelious disregard of a plaintiff’s rights.75 An award for exemplary 
damages is considered separately from other heads of damages.76 Exemplary damages 
are intended to punish a defendant and deter similar conduct in the future. 
12.77 The ALRC considers that the award of exemplary damages should only be made 
in exceptional circumstances or, for example, where the court considers that the other 
damages or remedy awarded would not provide a sufficient deterrent against similar 
conduct in the future. The deterrent function of exemplary damages is arguably more 
valuable than the punitive function. The aim of awarding exemplary damages to deter 
similar conduct by others in the future has been recognised by Australian courts.77 
12.78 When assessing whether the exceptional circumstances of the case call for an 
award of exemplary damages, the court will also consider whether the other damages 
                                                        
73  Uren v John Fairfax & Sons (1966) 117 CLR 118, 129–130 (Taylor J). 
74  NSW Law Reform Commission, Invasion of Privacy, Report 120 (2009) [7.10]. 
75  Several stakeholders supported the availability of an award of exemplary damages in exceptional 
circumstances: Women’s Legal Services NSW, Submission 115; T Butler, Submission 114; Office of the 
Victorian Privacy Commissioner, Submission 108; Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 105; 
Australian Sex Party, Submission 92; J Chard, Submission 88; S Higgins, Submission 82; I Turnbull, 
Submission 81; P Wragg, Submission 73; Australian Privacy Foundation, Submission 39; N Witzleb, 
Submission 29; Law Institute of Victoria, Submission 22; Women’s Legal Centre (ACT & Region) Inc, 
Submission 19; T Gardner, Submission 3.  
76  Henry v Thompson (1989) 2 Qd R 412. 
77  Lamb v Cotogno (1987) 164 CLR 1, [13]. 
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already awarded against the defendant are sufficient to fulfil the retributive, punitive or 
deterrent purposes of exemplary damages.78 
12.79 The ALRC considers that a court should be able to award exemplary damages 
under the new privacy tort, given that it is confined to invasions of privacy that are 
both serious and intentional or reckless.79 The ALRC intends that any award of 
exemplary damages should be included in the cap on damages for non-economic loss, 
as outlined in Recommendation 12–5 later in this chapter. 
12.80 Exemplary damages are available in Australia at common law for a wide range 
of intentional torts.80 They are not available in defamation claims.81 They are also not 
available for breach of equitable obligations such as breach of confidence,82 or in 
actions for breach of a contractual duty of confidence,83 and are limited in personal 
injury actions.84 
12.81 Exemplary damages are available in privacy actions in other jurisdictions. In the 
UK, the Leveson Inquiry recommended that courts be able to award exemplary or 
punitive damages for actions in breach of confidence, defamation and the tort of 
misuse of personal information.85 
12.82 Similarly, the Joint Committee of the House of Lords and House of Commons 
on Privacy and Injunctions recommended in 2012 that courts be empowered to award 
exemplary damages in privacy cases, arguing that compensatory damages were too low 
to act as an effective deterrent.86 This recommendation led to the enactment of the 
Crime and Courts Act 2013 (UK), which provides for the award of exemplary damages 
against a defendant who is a news organisation in misuse of information cases.87 Under 
this provision, a court may only award exemplary damages where the defendant’s 
conduct has shown a deliberate or reckless disregard of an outrageous nature for the 
                                                        
78  New South Wales v Ibbett (2006) 229 CLR 638, [34]. 
79  See Chs 7 and 8. The ALRC notes that there is some divergence of opinion whether exemplary damages 
should be available for a civil action: see Balkin and Davis, above n 5, [11–001]. 
80  Lamb v Cotogno (1987) 164 CLR 1; Balkin and Davis, above n 5, [11–001]. They have been excluded for 
defamation and for negligence claims, but claims under the new tort for invasions of privacy will be more 
analogous to other intentional torts. 
81  See, eg, Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) 2005 s 35. 
82  Giller v Procopets (2008) 24 VR 1. In that case, the Victorian Court of Appeal denied the plaintiff an 
award of exemplary damages for breach of confidence, however the court did award damages for 
emotional distress. See, also, Mosley v News Group Newspapers [2008] EWHC 1777 (QB), [172]–[197]. 
These decisions are in contrast to the NSW Supreme Court's decision in Harris v Digital Pulse Pty Ltd 
(2003) 56 NSWLR 298. In that case, the court overturned an award of exemplary damages for breach of 
fiduciary duty.  
83  This is in contrast to the UK approach: Attorney General v Blake [2001] 1 AC 268. 
84  See, eg, Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 21. This provision abolishes exemptions for negligently 
inflicting personal injury. 
85  Lord Justice Leveson, An Inquiry into the Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press, House of Commons 
Paper 779 (2012) vol 4, [5.12]. 
86  Joint Committee on Privacy and Injunctions, Privacy and Injunctions, House of Lords Paper No 273, 
House of Commons Paper No 1443, Session 2010–12 (2012) 134. 
87  Crime and Courts Act 2013 (UK) s 34. The Guardian News noted that this provision has been the subject 
of some criticism in the UK: Guardian News and Media Limited and Guardian Australia, Submission 80. 
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claimant’s rights;88 or the conduct is such that the court should punish the defendant for 
it;89 and other remedies would not be adequate to punish that conduct.90 Canadian 
privacy statutes also provide that courts may award punitive damages.91 
12.83 PIAC supported the recommendation to allow the award of exemplary damages, 
arguing that 
there are a number of circumstances where an invasion of privacy may be of such a 
malicious or high-handed manner that it warrants an award of exemplary damages. 
PIAC also supports the award of exemplary damages where other damages awarded 
would be an insufficient deterrent.92 
12.84 Posting on the internet of so-called ‘revenge pornography’—intimate 
photographs or video of an ex-partner or ex-spouse without their consent—may be an 
example of an outrageous invasion of privacy that may justify an award of exemplary 
damages. 
12.85 An award of exemplary damages may also be appropriate where a gain-based 
remedy is unavailable, such as in circumstances where a defendant had attempted to 
procure some financial gain from the intentional invasion of privacy but did not in fact 
make a profit.93 
12.86 Women’s legal services generally welcomed the availability of an award of 
exemplary damages,94 with Women’s Legal Services NSW arguing that 
using exemplary damages in the context of violence against women would send a 
powerful message that violence against women is unacceptable in our society.95 
12.87 There is some concern that exemplary damages provide a windfall to plaintiffs.96 
Courts, however, are conscious of this concern and the High Court has ruled that 
awards of exemplary damages should be moderate.97 
12.88 Several stakeholders opposed the availability of an award of exemplary 
damages.98 The OAIC submitted that remedies for a privacy action should be directed 
                                                        
88  Crime and Courts Act 2013 (UK) s 34(6)(a). 
89  Ibid s 34(6)(b). 
90  Ibid s 34(6)(c).  
91  See, eg, Privacy Act, RSBC 1996, c 373 (British Columbia). 
92  Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 105. 
93  N Witzleb, Submission 29. Witzleb noted that another value of an award of exemplary damages may be 
that it will be a means of stripping a defendant of any profit made from an invasion of privacy. 
94  Women’s Legal Centre (ACT & Region) Inc, Submission 19; Women’s Legal Services NSW, Submission 
115. 
95  Women’s Legal Services NSW, Submission 115. 
96  Insurance Council of Australia, Submission 102. 
97  Xl Petroleum (NSW) Pty Ltd v Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty Ltd [1985] HCA 12 (28 February 1985). 
98  Insurance Council of Australia, Submission 102; ABC, Submission 93; Guardian News and Media 
Limited and Guardian Australia, Submission 80; SBS, Submission 59; Telstra, Submission 45; Arts Law 
Centre of Australia, Submission 43. 
236 Serious Invasions of Privacy in the Digital Era 
at compensating a plaintiff, while exemplary damages are targeted at punishing a 
defendant.99 
12.89 There is some concern that if exemplary damages were available, this may stifle 
important and legitimate activities like investigative journalism, and as such may 
restrict freedom of expression.100 Guardian News argued that the legal costs associated 
with defending analogous civil actions, such as defamation suits, act as a sufficient 
deterrent for media organisations to avoid publishing defamatory matter.101 They argue 
that this principle would apply to actions brought under the new privacy tort. 
12.90 While the ALRC acknowledges the concern that potential defendants would 
have about the availability of exemplary damages, it considers that the courts should be 
able to award them in exceptional circumstances. 
Cap on damages 
Recommendation 12–5 The Act should provide for a cap on damages. 
The cap should apply to the sum of both damages for non-economic loss and 
any exemplary damages. This cap should not exceed the cap on damages for 
non-economic loss in defamation. 
12.91 The ALRC recommends a cap on damages for all damages other than for 
economic loss. Any award for exemplary damages should be included in the amount of 
damages subject to this cap. The total amount of general damages for non-economic 
loss and exemplary damages awarded should be capped at the same amount as the cap 
on damages for non-economic loss in defamation awards.102 
12.92 This recommendation provides equal protection to privacy and reputational 
interests and may avoid the risk of plaintiffs cherry-picking between causes of action 
based on the availability of higher awards of damages.103 
12.93 Several stakeholders agreed with this recommendation.104 PIAC opposed the 
imposition of a cap on damages for non-economic loss, fearing that ‘if the ceiling is set 
too low, it will be inadequate to redress unlawful conduct’. However, if a cap were to 
be introduced, they supported an alignment with defamation law.105 Similarly, Barker 
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argued that, while he was unconvinced by the need for a cap on damages, any cap 
should be set at the same level as defamation: 
since such caps now apply in personal injury and defamation claims in Australia, it 
would be anomalous and unfair from a distributive point of view if similar caps did 
not apply. A cap similar to that applied in defamation cases for non-economic loss 
would seem appropriate.106 
12.94 Associate Professor David Rolph has argued that a cap on damages for a 
statutory cause of action should not be lower than that for defamation.107 He argued 
that a lower cap on damages for non-economic loss in privacy actions would be 
‘undesirable, failing to reflect the relative importance Australia should now prescribe 
to privacy’.108 
12.95 The ABC supported a cap on damages for non-economic loss, arguing however 
that the cap should be lower than that in defamation law.109 The ALRC considers that, 
while the cap on damages for non-economic loss in defamation is arguably too high, it 
is nevertheless desirable that the caps be the same for both actions. 
12.96 The Redfern Legal Centre supported the proposal, arguing that other statutory 
privacy schemes provide ‘inadequate compensation’.110 For instance, under the Health 
Records and Information Privacy Act 2002 (NSW), the NSW Civil and Administrative 
Tribunal (NCAT) can award a maximum of $40,000 where the respondent is a body 
corporate and $10,000 where the case involves any other party.111 According to 
Redfern Legal Centre, the maximum amount ‘is rarely (if ever) awarded, meaning that 
a victim is insufficiently compensated for serious breaches of their privacy under this 
regime’.112 
12.97 Some stakeholders argued against capping damages.113 The OAIC submitted 
that setting a cap ‘may have the effect of focusing attention on that upper limit and 
implying that serious privacy invasions should result in a payout of that magnitude’.114 
12.98 The Office of the Victorian Privacy Commissioner argued that not imposing a 
cap on damages would ‘reflect the growing importance placed on privacy rights in 
Australia’.115 
12.99 The ALRC is of the view that an appropriate cap will not undervalue privacy 
interests, in the same way that a cap on damages for non-economic loss in defamation 
has not eroded the protection of reputational interests in Australia. 
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12.100 Moreover, the ALRC does not consider that a cap—combined with the 
threshold requirement that actions be sufficiently ‘serious’—poses a risk that courts 
will automatically award the upper limit in every case. Courts are equipped to assess 
appropriate awards of damages based on the context in which each case arises. For 
example, in Jones v Tsige, Sharpe JA stated that 
in determining damages, there are a number of factors to consider. Favouring a 
higher award is the fact that Tsige’s actions were deliberate and repeated and arose 
from a complex web of domestic arrangements likely to provoke strong feelings and 
animosity. Jones was understandably very upset by the intrusion into her private 
financial affairs. On the other hand, Jones suffered no public embarrassment or 
harm to her health, welfare, social, business or financial position and Tsige has 
apologized for her conduct and made genuine attempts to make amends. On 
balance, I would place this case at the mid-point of the range I have identified and 
award damages in the amount of $10,000. Tsige’s intrusion upon Jones’ seclusion, 
this case does not, in my view, exhibit any exceptional quality calling for an award 
of aggravated or punitive damages.116 
12.101 While the ALRC recommends that a cap be included, it has not 
recommended a threshold for damages. It will be for the court to decide the appropriate 
awards in an individual case, taking into account awards for analogous torts. 
Account of profits 
Recommendation 12–6 The Act should provide that a court may award an 
account of profits. 
12.102 The ALRC recommends that a court be empowered to award an account of 
profits as a remedy for the new tort.117 This award would be an alternative to damages. 
The gains-based remedy of an account of profit has the aim of deterring defendants 
who are commercially motivated to invade the privacy of another for profit, by 
removing any unjust gain made from a serious invasion of privacy.118 
12.103 An award of an account of profits may be appropriate where the financial 
benefit derived to a defendant from an invasion of privacy exceeds the loss incurred to 
a plaintiff.119 This remedy may also provide redress to plaintiffs where compensatory 
damages would be difficult to calculate. 
12.104 The availability of an account of profits may also have a deterrent effect on 
the behaviour of potential defendants when they are considering the commercial 
benefit to be gained from publishing an individual’s private information. It is distinct 
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from an award of damages in that it responds to the gain of the wrongdoer rather than 
the loss of the wronged party.120 To that end, PIAC argued that 
Orders of this nature will prevent unjust enrichment of respondents and will also act 
as a deterrent in the case of ‘serial respondents’, or respondents who are unlikely to 
be particularly adversely affected by being ordered to pay compensatory 
damages.121 
12.105 Similarly, Witzleb argued that ‘commercially motivated defendants can only 
be effectively prevented from invading people’s privacy where profit-stripping 
remedies are made available’.122 
12.106 An account of profits is an established remedy in actions for breach of 
confidence.123 It is also available in some limited types of tort actions, such as passing 
off.124 
12.107 An account of profits will deter defendants who calculate that the gain to be 
made from publishing an individual’s private information exceeds the cost of any 
compensatory damages they may incur if the matter goes to court. An alternative way 
to achieve the same result would be to award exemplary damages to strip the defendant 
of any gain made from the unauthorised use of the plaintiff’s information.125 
12.108 It may be difficult for a plaintiff to prove that the defendant has made a profit 
or gain from the invasion of privacy. Calculating the profit to be attributed to the 
publication of private information may be complex where it forms only part of a larger 
publication. In these cases, a court will determine the reasonableness of the connection 
between the invasion of privacy and the profit obtained.126 
12.109 An account of profits was recommended as a remedy for a serious invasion 
of privacy in ALRC Report 108.127 The NSWLRC also recommended an account of 
profits, at least in exceptional cases.128 Both noted the concerns of some stakeholders 
that it would in many cases be difficult to determine the profits arising from a serious 
invasion of privacy, but neither considered that this should preclude an account of 
profits being available, if appropriate. 
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12.110 ASTRA argued that an account of profits is a very narrow and particular 
remedy, which is 
likely to be more effective against a large, established company than against a 
fledgling web-based media outlet which is more concerned with generating ‘likes’ 
or ‘followers’ than generating profit.129 
12.111 Some stakeholders argued that an account of profits is an inappropriate 
remedy for a privacy action as it attaches commercial value to a dignitary interest.130 
However the ALRC considers that, unlike other remedies—such as the calculation of 
damages based on a notional licence fee—an account of profits is designed to strip a 
defendant of the benefit of an invasion of privacy rather than to vindicate any 
commercial interest a plaintiff may wish to pursue. 
No recommendation on notional licence fee 
12.112 In the Discussion Paper, the ALRC proposed the availability of damages 
based on the calculation of a notional licence fee. After further consideration and 
discussion with relevant stakeholders, the ALRC has decided not to make a 
recommendation that a court may award damages based on a notional licence fee. The 
ALRC considers that an assessment of damages based on a notional licence fee is 
primarily aimed at protecting commercial rights rather than personal, dignitary interests 
such as privacy. As a result, it makes no recommendation that it be available as a 
remedy for the new tort. Nonetheless, the ALRC considers that it would be a matter for 
the courts to decide whether this remedy is appropriate in any particular case. 
12.113 Damages assessed on the basis of a notional licence fee would require the 
defendant to pay to the plaintiff any sum that the plaintiff would have received if the 
defendant had asked prior permission to carry out the activity that invaded the 
plaintiff’s privacy. This remedy seeks to target the value to the defendant of 
deliberately invading the plaintiff’s privacy. 
12.114 Damages assessed on the basis of notional licence fees have been considered 
by courts in the UK in actions for breach of confidence and breach of contract. In 
Irvine v Talksport,131 a radio station used the image of a well-known racing driver in its 
publicity material, without the driver’s knowledge or agreement. The Court granted the 
driver damages equal to the driver’s minimum endorsement fee at the time the image 
was used. In Douglas v Hello!(No 3), the Court of Appeal of England and Wales 
recognised that an award based on a notional licence fee was available in situations 
where a plaintiff had permitted the invasive act in question (in this case, publication of 
wedding photographs) but had not been compensated for it.132 
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12.115 There is debate about the applicability of gains-based relief for an invasion 
of privacy. Dr Sirko Harder has argued that gain-based remedies are appropriate to 
remedy invasions of privacy, given that 
the right to privacy constitutes a right to exclude others from one’s private sphere 
and thus an exclusive entitlement against the whole world … Gain-based relief is 
the natural consequence of the unauthorised use of an exclusive entitlement.133  
12.116 ASTRA submitted that this remedy was not appropriate for an invasion of 
privacy, arguing that, 
if an individual is willing to grant a licence for an invasion of privacy (especially 
when subject to payment of a fee), this should not be actionable under the proposed 
tort.134 
12.117 Australian law does not recognise a right of publicity. However, the 
misappropriation and unauthorised commercial use of an individual’s image is 
protected by the tort of passing off, where that individual has a trading reputation,135 
and other aspects of intellectual property law. The tort of passing off aims to prevent 
economic loss by redressing misrepresentation which occurs when one party ‘passes 
off’ their goods or services as the goods or services of another party.136 Remedying the 
commercial consequences of unauthorised publication of private information may be 
better pursued through the development of the tort of passing off, if available, than 
through a notional licence fee. 
Injunctions 
Recommendation 12–7 The Act should provide that the court may at any 
stage of proceedings grant an interlocutory or other injunction to restrain the 
threatened or apprehended invasion of privacy, where it appears to the court to 
be just or convenient and on such terms as the court thinks fit. 
Recommendation 12–8 The Act should provide that, when considering 
whether to grant injunctive relief before trial to restrain publication of private 
information, a court must have particular regard to freedom of expression and 
any other matters of public interest. 
12.118 In privacy actions, plaintiffs are highly likely to seek a court order or 
injunction to prevent the commission or continuance of a serious invasion of privacy. 
For example, a plaintiff may seek to prevent the disclosure or publication of their 
private information to or by another person or a media entity. 
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12.119 The power of the courts to order injunctions is usually set out in the enabling 
statute for the court,137 and is subject to a substantial body of equitable principles or 
specific statutory provisions.138 As with all court orders, the ultimate efficacy of an 
injunction will depend on the jurisdiction of the court over the apprehended conduct, as 
well as the location of the respondent.139 The court will not grant an injunction where it 
would be futile to do so: one ground for futility may be the wide publicity already 
given to the relevant information. Previous law reform inquiries recommended that 
courts be able to order injunctive relief in relation to the new cause of action.140 
12.120 In some cases, a final and permanent injunction may be sought at the trial of 
the action. However, in most privacy cases, the most significant remedy will be an 
interlocutory injunction to prevent a threatened invasion of privacy—such as the 
broadcast or publication of private information. An interlocutory injunction is sought 
prior to the trial, sometimes ex parte in cases of great urgency, to maintain the status 
quo. In the case of a privacy action against the media for example, the status quo would 
usually be the non-publication of the material. 
12.121 In a privacy case, perhaps even more so than in other cases such as 
defamation cases,141 the stakes are high for both parties at the interlocutory stage. For 
the plaintiff, privacy in information, once lost, may be lost forever,142 and no amount of 
compensation will render the information entirely private again.143 For the defendant, 
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on the other hand, there is the consideration that by the time the entitlement to publish 
is adjudicated in a final hearing, the appropriate opportunity to reveal the relevant 
information or to contribute to a public debate may be lost as the information’s novelty, 
relevance or interest is overtaken by other events. As Lord Nicholls noted in Reynolds 
v Times Newspapers: ‘News is a perishable commodity’.144 
12.122 This means that, of all remedies, an interlocutory injunction restraining 
publication is arguably the most significant restriction on freedom of speech and the 
freedom of the media to report on matters of public interest and concern. There is 
therefore a strong and justifiable concern that unmeritorious claims to prevent the 
disclosure of allegedly ‘private’ information, in which there is a legitimate public 
interest, might chill freedom of speech and the freedom of the press. 
12.123 The Terms of Reference for this Inquiry require the ALRC to make 
recommendations as to ‘the necessity of balancing privacy with other fundamental 
values including freedom of expression and open justice’. The most significant 
recommendation reflecting this necessity is the requirement that the court must be 
satisfied that, for the plaintiff to have a cause of action, the public interest in privacy 
outweighs any countervailing public interest.145 
12.124 In addition, the ALRC recommends that courts should be specifically 
directed by the legislation to consider freedom of expression and other matters of 
public interest when considering whether to grant an interlocutory injunction to restrain 
the publication of private information. This recommendation is based on s 12(4) of the 
Human Rights Act 1998 (UK), discussed below. 
12.125 In view of the ordinary principles governing the grant of an interlocutory 
injunction, discussed below, and the requirement for actionability set out in Chapter 8, 
it may be argued that an additional provision directing courts to consider any matters of 
public interest when considering an injunction application is unnecessary. 
12.126 According to equitable principles, as set out by the High Court of Australia 
in Beecham Group v Bristol Laboratories Pty Ltd146 and reaffirmed in ABC v 
O’Neill,147 before the court will exercise its discretion to award an interlocutory 
injunction, an applicant must satisfy the court that: 
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• there is a prima facie case, in the sense that there is a serious question to be tried 
as to the plaintiff’s entitlement to relief, and a sufficient148 likelihood of success 
to justify the preservation of the status quo pending trial; 
• the plaintiff is likely to suffer injury for which damages will not be an adequate 
remedy;149 and 
• the balance of convenience favours the granting of an injunction.150 
12.127 In satisfying the first requirement of a prima facie case and sufficient 
likelihood of success, the plaintiff will already have needed to address the balancing 
process as part of the actionability requirements of the new tort. The public interest in 
freedom of expression and any other public interest would need to be addressed by the 
plaintiff to make out a prima facie case and to show a likelihood of success at trial on 
the claimed cause of action. However, the ALRC nevertheless considers that it would 
be valuable for the legislation to indicate the clear parliamentary intention that courts 
considering injunctive relief should carefully weigh the strength of the competing 
interests of the parties in relation to that remedy. In particular, such a provision would 
give added assurance to members of the media, who may be concerned that a statutory 
cause of action would unduly chill their ability to report on matters of public concern. 
12.128 The ALRC is not suggesting that the legislation entrench a particular 
approach or weight to the competing interests of the parties. As the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights recognises, both the individual and public 
interests in the protection of privacy and the individual and public interests in freedom 
of speech are important values and neither is absolute nor always in conflict with the 
other.151 In particular, the ALRC is not suggesting any rigid or default rule that courts 
should be exceptionally reluctant, as in defamation cases, nor ready, as in breach of 
confidence cases, to grant an injunction. Those two differing types of case protect and 
balance different interests than those that will be protected under the new tort, even 
though sometimes the interests may overlap. Rather, the recommendation confirms that 
competing public interests are to be considered when considering an injunction 
application. 
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Injunctions in defamation and breach of confidence 
12.129 An applicant for an interlocutory injunction in defamation cases faces an 
additional hurdle in the application of the rules set out in Beecham.152 This hurdle may 
be described as the rule in Bonnard v Perryman, which derives from Lord Coleridge 
CJ’s statement that defamation cases require ‘exceptional caution in exercising the 
jurisdiction to interfere by injunction before the trial of an action to prevent an 
anticipated wrong’.153 In particular, if a defendant asserts that it will defend the 
defamatory statement as true, then, ‘in all but exceptional cases’,154 the courts will 
exercise their discretion to refuse the injunction, leaving the defendant to publish and 
risk liability for damages. 
12.130 This caution in defamation cases is well-established in Australian law, 
although the defendant must go further than merely raising the defence.155 In ABC v 
O’Neill, Gleeson CJ and Crennan J noted that, in defamation cases, particular attention 
will be given to the public interest in free speech when considering whether an 
interlocutory injunction should be granted.156 Gummow and Hayne JJ referred to the 
need for the judge to consider ‘the … general and … profound issue involved in the 
policy of the law respecting prior restraint of publication of allegedly defamatory 
matter’.157 
12.131 Gummow and Hayne JJ also emphasised that claims for interlocutory 
injunctions in defamation in Australia, although reflecting the principle in Bonnard, are 
‘but one of a species of litigation to which the principles in Beecham apply’.158 The 
broader species to which their Honours were referring presumably comprises those 
cases where the disposal of the interlocutory application would effectively determine 
the case in its entirety, but might possibly include applications for interlocutory 
injunctions in the auxiliary jurisdiction in general. 
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154  Bonnard v Perryman (1891) 2 Ch 269, 285. 
155  National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Ltd v GTV Corpn Pty Ltd [1989] VR 747; Chappell v 
TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd (1988) 14 NSWLR 153; Clarke v Queensland Newspapers Pty Ltd [2000] 1 
Qd R 233; Jakudo Pty Ltd v South Australian Telecasters Ltd (1997) 69 SASR 440, [442]–[443]. 
However, Heydon J in dissent in ABC v O’Neill went so far as to say that one proposition flowed from the 
appeal in that case: ‘That is that as a practical matter no plaintiff is ever likely to succeed in an application 
against a mass media defendant for an interlocutory injunction to restrain publication of defamatory 
material on a matter of public interest, however strong that plaintiff's case, however feeble the defences, 
and however damaging the defamation’: Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill (2006) 227 CLR 
57, [170]. 
156  Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill (2006) 227 CLR 57, [19]. 
157  Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill has been applied in several cases: AAMAC Warehousing 
& Transport Pty Limited v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Limited [2009] NSWSC 1030 (28 September 
2009); Crisp v Fairfax Media Ltd [2012] VSC 615 (19 December 2012); Allan v The Migration Institute 
of Australia Ltd [2012] NSWSC 965 (13 August 2012); cf Tate v Duncan-Strelec [2013] NSWSC 1446 
(27 September 2013).   
158  Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O'Neill (2006) 227 CLR 57, [75].  
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12.132 In direct contrast to defamation cases, courts considering injunctions to 
restrain a breach of confidence do not exercise any special caution in the interests of 
free speech or other broadly defined public interests. The courts in both equitable and 
contractual cases emphasise that, when granting an injunction to restrain a breach of 
confidence, they are holding the defendant to his or her pre-existing commitment or 
obligation, usually voluntarily undertaken, not to disclose the plaintiff’s confidential 
information. In the case of a third party, the third party is bound when they know that 
the information was imparted in such circumstances.159 On many occasions, the courts 
have strongly emphasised the public interest in the law’s upholding of confidences: if a 
person cannot rely on confidentiality being upheld, he or she is unlikely to impart the 
information. In many circumstances, withholding the information would have a 
deleterious effect on a range of social problems, such as public health or the prevention 
and detection of criminal conduct. For example, immunity from disclosure of the 
identity of individuals who give information to authorities about suspected neglect or 
ill-treatment of children is given because of the public interest served in having such 
conduct reported.160 
12.133 Both in claims for breach of an equitable obligation of confidence, which lie 
in equity’s exclusive jurisdiction,161 and perhaps even more so in claims to restrain the 
breach of a contractual obligation of confidence,162 which lie in the auxiliary 
jurisdiction,163 authority in Australia takes a narrow approach to public interest 
considerations that would justify a breach. Public interest is confined to the exposure of 
‘iniquity’. The principle of general application, where the court is considering an 
injunction to restrain the breach of an equitable obligation of confidence, was stated by 
Gummow J in Re Corrs Pavey Whiting and Byrne v Collector of Customs of Victoria 
and Alphapharm Pty Ltd: 
That principle, in my view, is no wider than one that information will lack the 
necessary attribute of confidence if the subject matter is the existence or real 
likelihood of the existence of an iniquity in the sense of a crime, civil wrong or 
serious misdeed of public importance, and the confidence is relied upon to prevent 
disclosure to a third party with a real and direct interest in redressing such crime, 
wrong or misdeed.164 
                                                        
159  Earl v Nationwide News Pty Ltd [2013] NSWSC 839 (20 June 2013) 17. 
160  D v NSPCC [1978] AC 171. Another example, and a rare exception to the principle of open justice, is the 
protection of the identity of victims of blackmail and similar offences: R v Socialist Worker Printers and 
Publishers Ltd [1975] 1 QB 637. In blackmail and analogous cases, the basic principle of open justice 
may be qualified if it is positively established that, without giving anonymity to an informant, justice 
could not be done because of the grave difficulty in having the witnesses come forward: R v His Honour 
Judge Noud; Ex parte MacNamara (1991) 2 Qd R 86, 106. 
161  The exclusive jurisdiction arises where a court of equity is dealing with equitable claims: Meagher, 
Heydon and Leeming, above n 124, [21–015]. 
162  Re Corrs Pavey Whiting and Byrne v Collector of Customs of Victoria and Alphapharm Pty Ltd [1987] 
FCA 266 (13 August 1987) [57]. Contractual claims attract equity’s auxiliary jurisdiction to restrain the 
breach of a negative covenant. Meagher, Heydon and Leeming, above n 124, [21–195]. 
163  The auxiliary jurisdiction of equity arises where the court is considering equitable remedies in aid of 
common law wrongs or to prevent the unconscionable reliance on common law rights: Meagher, Heydon 
and Leeming, above n 18, [21–345]. 
164  Re Corrs Pavey Whiting and Byrne v Collector of Customs of Victoria and Alphapharm Pty Ltd [1987] 
FCA 266 (13 August 1987) [57]. 
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12.134 The current Australian approach differs from the much broader approach to 
public interest taken in the UK in such cases.165 In a later case, Gummow J stated: 
(i) an examination of the recent English decisions shows that the so-called ‘public 
interest’ defence is not so much a rule of law as an invitation to judicial 
idiosyncrasy by deciding each case on an ad hoc basis as to whether, on the facts 
overall, it is better to respect or to override the obligation of confidence, and (ii) 
equitable principles are best developed by reference to what conscionable behaviour 
demands of the defendant not by balancing and then overriding those demands by 
reference to matters of social or political opinion.166 
12.135 More recently, it has been said that, ‘[i]t is true that the existence of, and/or 
the extent of any public interest defence to a breach of confidentiality is by no means 
clear and settled in Australia’.167 Breach of confidence claims arise in a wide range of 
social and commercial contexts and the ALRC is not concerned with considering 
whether a broader public interest test should be introduced in breach of confidence 
actions in general. The issue is relevant only in relation to the impact the approach may 
have on the way that the courts deal with privacy claims. 
Injunctions to restrain disclosure of private information 
12.136 If the statutory cause of action were enacted, questions will inevitably arise 
as to what approach the courts should take where they are considering a claim for 
misuse or disclosure of private (rather than confidential) information.168 Should 
‘private information’ cases be seen as more analogous to defamation cases or as more 
analogous to breach of confidence cases? Should a similar caution as in defamation 
cases be exercised when considering applications for interlocutory injunctions to 
restrain publication of private information? 
12.137 In many cases where there is a potential for inconsistency between different 
causes of action, or between common law and statutory regimes, the High Court of 
Australia has emphasised the need for coherence in the development of the common 
                                                        
165  Australian Football League v The Age Company Ltd (2006) 15 VR 419, [72]–[94]; Re Corrs Pavey 
Whiting and Byrne v Collector of Customs of Victoria and Alphapharm Pty Ltd [1987] FCA 266 (13 
August 1987), [41]; AG Australia Holdings Ltd v Burton 58 NSWLR 464, [173]; Meagher, Heydon and 
Leeming, above n 18, [41–115]–[41–125]. Cf Aplin et al, above n 19, [16.05]–[16.57] on the more 
expansive approach. 
166  Smith Kline and French Laboratories (Aust) Ltd v Secretary, Dept of Community Services and Health 
[1990] FCR 73, 111. See further, Australian Football League v The Age Company Ltd (2006) 15 VR 419, 
[72]–[94]. 
167  Australian Football League v The Age Company Ltd (2006) 15 VR 419, [75]. If there is a defence of 
public interest to disclosure of confidential information, it may be limited in scope: Commonwealth v 
John Fairfax and Sons (1980) 147 CLR 39, 56–57. 
168  ‘There is some uncertainty as to whether, and if so when, a court should refuse an injunction on the basis 
of Bonnard v Perryman when it is sought by a claimant who advances his cases only on the basis of 
privacy’: Spelman v Express Newspapers [2012] EWHC 355 (QB) (24 February 2012) [64]. See, also, 
Godwin Busuttil and Patrick McCafferty, ‘Interim Injunctions and the Overlap between Privacy and 
Libel’ (2010) 2 Journal of Media Law 1. 
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law.169 It is important, therefore, that actions for invasion of privacy be treated 
consistently with other actions where rationales are similar.170 
12.138 Depending on their facts, actions for invasion of privacy under the new tort 
would sit somewhere between defamation and breach of confidence actions. They may 
share some of the characteristics of both actions but differ in other ways. Like 
confidential information, the privacy of information once lost, may be lost forever. 
This is particularly so in the digital era where it is often simply not possible to erase all 
disclosures of private information on the internet, despite attempts and even court 
directions to do so.171 A refusal to give injunctive relief to restrain the publication of 
private information would therefore, like that to prevent a breach of confidence, 
‘substantially determine the plaintiff’s claim for final injunctive relief’.172 Unlike a 
breach of confidence claim, however, the claim is not necessarily based on a pre-
existing obligation or commitment to maintain privacy. And, in contrast to the current 
Australian law on breach of confidence, the new statutory cause of action would 
require the court to consider a broader range of public interest matters than matters 
which may come within the description of an ‘iniquity’. 
12.139 Unlike a defamation case, a defendant in a privacy case cannot assert the 
truth of the disclosed information as a complete defence.173 The complaint in 
defamation is that the defendant has published false defamatory statements. Nearly all 
cases of invasion of privacy by wrongful disclosure in other jurisdictions involve 
information which might be assumed to be true.174 
12.140 There is, however, just as strong and justifiable a concern that a chilling 
effect upon freedom of speech and the freedom of the press may be achieved by 
unmeritorious claims to prevent the disclosure of allegedly ‘private’ information in 
which there is a legitimate public interest. It may therefore be strongly arguable that 
similar considerations to those in defamation cases should apply where the defendant 
                                                        
169  Sullivan v Moody (2001) 207 CLR 562. See further Rolph, ‘Irreconcilable Differences? Interlocutory 
Injunctions for Defamation and Privacy’, above n 29, 187–190. 
170  Given that the plaintiff under the new tort would be asserting a statutory wrong rather than an ‘equitable’ 
one, the court would be exercising its auxiliary or concurrent jurisdiction, rather than its exclusive 
jurisdiction. See Meagher, Heydon and Leeming, above n 124, 708, 714. The principles as to injunctions 
vary. 
171  Google Spain SL, Google Inc v Agencia Espanola de Proteccion de Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja 
Gonzalez (CJEU) C‑131/12 (13 May 2014). 
172  Earl v Nationwide News Pty Ltd [2013] NSWSC 839 (20 June 2013) [18]. 
173  In the past, many claimants in Australia used the action for defamation to protect their privacy against 
disclosure of embarrassing private facts, because in some states, the defendant could not defend the 
defamation merely on the basis that the imputations were true, but also had to show a public interest or 
public benefit in their publication. This is no longer the case due to changes to the law by the uniform 
state Defamation Acts of 2005: Sappideen and Vines, above n 24, 635–639.  
174  Just as the fact that the information is true is not a defence to an action for misuse of private information, 
a claimant against the misuse of private or confidential information cannot defend a claim by 
demonstrating that the matter is untrue.  Unlike a case in defamation, the issue in such a case is whether 
the information is private, not whether it is true or false: McKennitt v Ash [2008] QB 73, [80], [86]. 
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asserts a defence of sufficient strength to justify the court taking a cautious 
approach.175 
12.141 The ALRC recommendation reflects that concern, and, without suggesting 
that the same approach to defamation cases should prevail, suggests that at least the 
courts should be directed to consider countervailing public interests when dealing with 
an application for an injunction to restrain the publication of private information. It 
will be a matter for the courts as to how the balance of protection should be struck in 
particular cases, in the light of technological and social conditions very different from 
1891 when Bonnard v Perryman was decided.176 As mentioned above, the existence of 
such a provision would indicate a clear intention that public interest should be 
considered and would provide considerable assurance to media and other stakeholders 
concerned that the new tort would unduly impinge on freedom of speech. 
12.142 The ALRC’s recommendation has a similar intent to s 12(4) of the Human 
Rights Act 1998 (UK), although it is in more general terms. Section 12(4) reinforces 
the requirement of the European Convention on Human Rights that the right to privacy 
in art 8 be balanced with the right to freedom of expression in art 10, when determining 
whether there has been an actionable invasion of privacy at all. While this balancing 
already takes place when determining whether there is an actionable misuse of private 
information,177 s 12 provides the added protection of art 10 rights:178 
s 12 Freedom of expression 
This section applies if a court is considering whether to grant any relief which, if 
granted, might affect the exercise of the Convention right to freedom of expression. 
... 
(4) The court must have particular regard to the importance of the Convention right 
to freedom of expression and, where the proceedings relate to material which the 
respondent claims, or which appears to the court, to be journalistic, literary or 
artistic material (or to conduct connected with such material), to— 
                                                        
175  There is also a concern that, if the applicable considerations or approach to be applied by the courts in 
defamation cases and privacy cases differed, a claimant may attempt to avoid the cautious approach in 
defamation cases, by framing or pleading his or her case, inappropriately, as a privacy case: Lord Browne 
of Madingly v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 295, [28] (Eady J). This concern motivated 
Tugendhat J in Terry v Persons Unknown [2010] to note that ‘it is a matter for the court to decide whether 
the principle of free speech prevails or not, and that it does not depend solely upon the choice of the 
claimant as to his cause of action’: Terry v Persons Unknown [2010] EWHC 119 (QB), [88]. He 
dismissed the claimant’s application for an injunction to restrain the publication of confidential and 
private information: ‘Having decided that the nub of this application is a desire to protect what is in 
substance reputation, it follows that in accordance with Bonnard v Perryman no injunction should be 
granted’[123]. Witzleb argues that this approach is inconsistent with the requirements of the Human 
Rights Act 1998 (UK): Normann Witzleb, ‘Interim Injunctions for Invasions of Privacy: Challenging the 
Rule in Bonnard v Perryman?’ in Normann Witzleb et al (eds), Emerging Challenges in Privacy Law: 
Comparative Perspectives (Cambridge University Press, 2014). Cf the Australian position outlined in 
Rolph, ‘Irreconcilable Differences? Interlocutory Injunctions for Defamation and Privacy’, above n 141, 
29. See, also, Busuttil and McCafferty, above n 168. 
176  Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill (2006) 227 CLR 57, [269]–[280] (HeydonJ).  
177  Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457. 
178  Joint Committee on Privacy and Injunctions, Privacy and Injunctions, House of Lords Paper No 273, 
House of Commons Paper No 1443, Session 2010–12 (2012) 19–22.  
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(a) the extent to which— 
  (i)  the material has, or is about to, become available to the public; or 
  (ii)  it is, or would be, in the public interest for the material to be published; 
(b) any relevant privacy code. 
12.143 Section 12(4) of the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) has been considered in a 
number of cases since its enactment and by a Joint Committee of the House of Lords 
and House of Commons in 2012. The courts have rejected an interpretation that the 
sub-section requires them to give greater weight to the Convention rights to freedom of 
expression than to the plaintiff’s interest in privacy. Lord Hope in Campbell v MGN 
Ltd noted 
[A]s Sedley LJ said in Douglas v Hello! Ltd you cannot have particular regard to 
article 10 without having equally particular regard at the very least to article 8: see 
also Re S (A Child) (Identification: Restrictions on Publication) where Hale LJ said 
that section 12(4) does not give either article pre-eminence over the other. These 
observations seem to me to be entirely consistent with the jurisprudence of the 
European court.179 
12.144 Similarly, the House of Lords and House of Commons Joint Committee’s 
Report stated: 
We do not think that section 12(4) of the Human Rights Act 1998 ... means that 
article 10 has precedence over article 8 ... However, we support the decision of 
Parliament to make clear in law the fundamental importance of freedom of 
expression and would be concerned that removing section 12(4) might suggest that 
this is no longer the case.180 
12.145 Section 12(2) and (3) of the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) provide: 
(2)  If the person against whom the application for relief is made (the respondent) is 
neither present nor represented, no such relief is to be granted unless the court is 
satisfied— 
(a) that the applicant has taken all practicable steps to notify the respondent; or  
(b) that there are compelling reasons why the respondent should not be notified. 
(3)  No such relief is to be granted so as to restrain publication before trial unless the 
court is satisfied that the applicant is likely to establish that publication should not 
be allowed. 
12.146 However, in the light of established principles concerning ex parte 
applications,181 and the strength of the defendant’s case in interlocutory proceedings, 
                                                        
179  Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457, [488] (citations omitted). 
180  Joint Committee on Privacy and Injunctions, Privacy and Injunctions, House of Lords Paper No 273, 
House of Commons Paper No 1443, Session 2010–12 (2012), [59]. David Price QC was quoted at [58] as 
having told the committee: ‘If the purpose of section 12 was to give the benefit of the doubt to freedom of 
expression then it has certainly failed’. Professor Gavin Phillipson of Durham Law School, quoted at 
[55], considered that s 12(4) was not intended ‘to establish priority for freedom of expression ... [and] it 
made more sense to read it as requiring judges to give as much weight to freedom of expression as the 
Convention itself allows’. 
181  See, further, Meagher, Heydon and Leeming, above n 18, [21–425]. 
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set out in ABC v O’Neill,182 it is not suggested that provisions similar to s 12(2) and (3) 
of the Human Rights Act (UK) are necessary or desirable in Australia.183 
Delivery up, destruction or removal of material 
Recommendation 12–9 The Act should provide that courts may order the 
delivery up and destruction or removal of material. 
12.147 Orders for the delivery up, destruction or removal of material will be an 
appropriate remedy for serious invasions of privacy where a defendant has obtained 
private information about a plaintiff and has exhibited an intention to disclose that 
information to a third party. This may be appropriate in many contexts involving both 
print information and online information where two people in an intimate relationship 
share images or text of a highly personal nature and one party intends to, or does, 
publish or disclose those images to a third party. In such a case, courts may order that 
the material be delivered to a court and destroyed or taken off the internet. Several 
stakeholders supported this recommendation.184 
12.148 Women’s Legal Services NSW argued that 
it is important that power extend to orders to take down online content. It 
is essential that this order bind third parties such as internet providers and 
organisations that run social media websites.185 
12.149 This power should extend to orders for the take down of online content 
which amounts to a serious invasion of privacy. A court may order that an online 
provider or an individual who controls their own website (such as a blogger) must 
remove or take down specific content. An analogous provision exists in the Copyright 
Act 1968 (Cth), empowering a court to order the delivery up and destruction of material 
which violates copyright law.186 
12.150 Australian courts have existing powers to issue similar orders. For instance, 
Anton Pillar orders are a form of mandatory injunction, issued by a court to prevent the 
                                                        
182  Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill (2006) 227 CLR 57; Beecham Group v Bristol 
Laboratories Pty Ltd (1968) 118 CLR 618.  
183  On the meaning of ‘likely’ in s 12(3), see Cream Holdings Ltd v Banerjee (2004) 1 AC 253, [22]. In that 
case, Lord Nicholls stressed that ‘likely’ could mean different things depending upon its context: ETK v 
News Group Newspapers Ltd (Unreported, [2011] EWCA Civ, 19 April 2011) 439, [6], [24]. In that case, 
the court explained, it meant ‘likely in the sense of more likely than not’.  
184  T Butler, Submission 114; Office of the Victorian Privacy Commissioner, Submission 108; Women’s 
Legal Service Victoria and Domestic Violence Resource Centre Victoria, Submission 97; Australian Sex 
Party, Submission 92; S Higgins, Submission 82; Guardian News and Media Limited and Guardian 
Australia, Submission 80; Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 30; N Witzleb, Submission 29; 
T Gardner, Submission 3. 
185  Women’s Legal Services NSW, Submission 115. 
186  Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 133. 
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destruction of evidence.187 Anton Pillar orders are issued when a court considers that a 
defendant is likely to destroy documents or property necessary for proceedings.188 
12.151 The NSWLRC and ALRC189 previously recommended that courts be 
empowered to make an order for the delivery up and destruction of material. The 
NSWLRC recommended that courts be empowered to order a defendant to deliver to a 
plaintiff any ‘articles, documents or material (and any copies), that were made or 
disclosed as a result of the invasion’.190 
12.152 Women’s Legal Services NSW also submitted that, in order to facilitate 
access to justice, local courts should be given the power to grant stand-alone injunctive 
orders such as take down orders and/or deliver up orders.191 However, there are 
jurisdictional difficulties and wider implications with local courts being given these 
powers. 
12.153 The OAIC and PIAC suggested that, in an action under the new tort, courts 
be able to make an order requiring a defendant to rectify its business or IT practices to 
redress systemic problems with the way it stores private information.192 The ALRC has 
not proposed such an order, because such systemic problems would generally be the 
result of negligent acts or omissions and be more appropriately dealt with by the 
regulator. The new tort is confined to intentional or reckless invasions of privacy. 
Chapter 16 discusses ideas for a wider complaints mechanism for serious invasions of 
privacy that would allow the Privacy Commissioner to recommend the take down of 
material. 
Correction orders 
Recommendation 12–10 The Act should provide that courts may, where 
false private information has been published, order the publication of a 
correction. 
12.154 The ALRC recommends that courts be given the power to order defendants 
to publish, in appropriate terms, a correction where false private information is 
published or otherwise disclosed.193 Such an order can set the record straight, and may 
                                                        
187  Bernard Cairns, Australian Civil Procedure (Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia, 8th ed, 2009) 
[13.80]. 
188  Long v Specifor Publications Pty Ltd (1988) 44 NSWLR 545, [547] (Powell JA). 
189  Australian Law Reform Commission, For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice, 
Report 108 (2008) Rec 74–5(f). 
190  NSW Law Reform Commission, Invasion of Privacy, Report 120 (2009) NSWLRC Draft Bill, cl 
76(1)(d). 
191  Women’s Legal Services NSW, Submission 115. 
192  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Submission 66. The OAIC suggested this power 
would be similar in nature to the OAIC’s power to instigate an own-motion investigation under the 
Privacy Act 1988 (Cth). 
193  Australian law provides discretion to a court to issue coercive correction orders, for example, Australian 
Consumer Law (Cth) 246(2)(d). In defamation law, a court does not have the discretion to issue a 
correction order, however whether a defendant has made an apology or a correction order can be taken 
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be necessary where, for example, the defendant disclosed untrue private information 
about the plaintiff. This acknowledges the harm and distress which may be occasioned 
where false information on a personal or private nature is published. 
12.155 As discussed in Chapter 5, the disclosure of private information may amount 
to a serious invasion of privacy despite the information being untrue.194 Private 
information can include information which is true or false so long as it has a quality of 
privacy, that is, the subject matter of the information is sufficiently private or personal 
in nature so that its disclosure would cause emotional distress to a relevant individual. 
In the Canadian case of Ash v McKennit, Longmore J noted: 
The question in a case of misuse of private information is whether the information 
is private, not whether it is true or false. The truth or falsity of the information is an 
irrelevant inquiry in deciding whether the information is entitled to be protected and 
judges should be wary of becoming side-tracked into that irrelevant inquiry.195 
12.156 Correction orders may reduce the need for a plaintiff’s interests to be 
vindicated through an award of damages.196 Some plaintiffs may be primarily 
concerned with correcting the public record, in which case correction orders should 
target the same audience. Carroll and Witzleb have made the point that in actions to 
restore personality interests, monetary remedies may be ill-suited.197 Instead, coercive 
methods such as public corrections may be more appropriate to reverse or reduce the 
effect of an invasion of privacy which has demeaned and distressed the plaintiff in a 
public forum. 
12.157 ASTRA opposed any remedies which would compel corrections, arguing 
that media organisations are already subject to similar provisions in ASTRA Codes, 
which are registered with the ACMA.198 However, there may be instances where a 
plaintiff is awarded a range of remedies as part of the cause of action including 
damages and an order for apology. In such cases, the availability of those remedies in a 
single cause of action will provide simplicity for all parties to a proceeding. A plaintiff 
would not need to pursue a defendant through both a regulatory scheme and through 
the courts in relation to the same serious invasion of privacy. Furthermore, if a 
defendant has already made a statement involving a correction, this will mitigate an 
award of damages.199 
12.158 Guardian News raised the concern that correction orders will ‘constitute a 
further and unnecessary restriction on free speech’.200 Similarly, the ABC was 
concerned that court-ordered apologies and correction orders could inhibit the editorial 
independence of journalists.201 These news organisations were concerned that the 
                                                                                                                                             
into account when assessing the ‘reasonableness’ of any offer of amends, for example in Defamation Act 
2005 (NSW) 2005 s 14. 
194  See Ch 5. 
195  McKennitt v Ash [2008] QB 73, 86. 
196  Carroll and Witzleb, above n 17, 236. 
197  Ibid, 233. 
198  ASTRA, Submission 47. 
199  See Rec 12–2. 
200  Guardian News and Media Limited and Guardian Australia, Submission 80. 
201  ABC, Submission 93. 
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availability of these remedies will chill media activities, causing journalists to become 
reluctant to publish news items which may contain private information. However, the 
availability of a correction order will only arise in instances where the defendant 
published private information which was false and which was a serious invasion of 
privacy. This is consistent with anti-discrimination law. For instance, in Eatock v Bolt 
Bromberg J noted that the purposes a corrective notice can serve to facilitate are: 
redressing the hurt felt by those injured; restoring the esteem and social standing 
which has been lost as a consequence of the contravention; informing those 
influenced by the contravening conduct of the wrongdoing involved.202 
12.159 There may be instances where a plaintiff would not wish a public correction 
of false private information to be made—in circumstances where that plaintiff feels the 
order would compound the hurt, distress or embarrassment occasioned by the original 
publication. This will be a matter for the plaintiff in a given case. 
Apology orders 
Recommendation 12–11 The Act should provide that courts may order the 
defendant to apologise. 
12.160 The purpose of a plaintiff seeking an order for the defendant to apologise—
either in private or public—will differ depending on the circumstances of the case. The 
availability of an order requiring a defendant to apologise may, in some circumstances, 
vindicate the hurt and distress caused to a plaintiff by a serious invasion of privacy.203 
Given the aim of the new tort is to redress harm done to a personal, dignitary interest, 
an apology may assist in rectifying a plaintiff’s feelings of embarrassment and distress. 
12.161 In many cases, a plaintiff may only seek a public acknowledgment of 
wrongdoing as a remedy for a serious invasion of privacy. The publicity garnered by a 
public statement of apology may help to ‘restore the esteem and social standing which 
has been lost as a consequence of the contravention’.204 
12.162 Carroll and Witzleb have argued that orders for apology help to ‘redress the 
injury by restoring the plaintiff’s dignity and personality’.205 Similarly, Professor Prue 
Vines has argued: 
Apologies are also a tool of communication and of emotion. Apologies may redress 
humiliation for the victim, shame the offender and help to heal the emotional 
wounds associated with a wrong.206 
                                                        
202  Eatock v Bolt (No 2) (2011) 284 ALR 114, [15]. 
203  Several stakeholders supported this proposal: N Witzleb, Submission 116; T Butler, Submission 114; 
Office of the Victorian Privacy Commissioner, Submission 108; Australian Sex Party, Submission 92; 
S Higgins, Submission 82; Insurance Council of Australia, Submission 15; I Pieper, Submission 6; 
I Turnbull, Submission 5. 
204  Eatock v Bolt (No 2) (2011) 284 ALR 114, [15]. 
205  Carroll and Witzleb, above n 17, 237. 
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12.163 Orders for apologies also serve a public interest in focusing on the 
defendant’s wrongdoing. In this way, public apologies provide an opportunity for a 
defendant to acknowledge their wrongdoing. Public apologies will therefore carry 
some deterrent effect and may also serve to educate the public about privacy.207 
12.164 The ALRC previously recommended that courts be empowered to order a 
defendant to apologise.208 The NSWLRC recommended that the defendant’s conduct—
including whether they had apologised or made an offer of amends prior to 
proceedings—should be taken into account when determining actionability.209 The 
Victorian Law Reform Commission (VLRC) did not recommend such an order be 
available to a court, however the VLRC’s final report stated: 
Sometimes it may be appropriate to direct a person to publish an apology in 
response to the wrongful publication of private information or to apologise 
privately, for an intrusion into seclusion.210 
12.165 Australian law recognises the significance of apologies where there has been 
damage to personality or reputation, in a range of actions at statute, equity and at the 
common law.211 For example, a court may order an apology under Commonwealth and 
state anti-discrimination legislation.212 This area of law is analogous to privacy actions 
in that anti-discrimination law aims to remedy damage to feelings. Similarly, in 
defamation law, a court may take a publisher’s apology for defamatory matter into 
account when assessing damages.213 In Burns v Radio 2UE Sydney Pty Ltd (No 2), the 
NSW Anti-Discrimination Tribunal defined a court-ordered apology as an 
acknowledgement of ‘wrongdoing’ that is distinguished from a personal apology which 
is ‘sincere and which is incapable of being achieved by a court order’.214 
12.166 Apology orders are available in some Australian jurisdictions under existing 
privacy legislation, for example under s 55(2)(e) of the Privacy and Personal 
Information Protection Act 1998 (NSW). In NZ v Director, Department of Housing,215 
the NSW Administrative Appeals tribunal ordered—under s 55(2)(e)—the Department 
of Housing to provide written apology to the claimant for disclosing private 
information to a third party without consent. 
                                                                                                                                             
206  Prue Vines, ‘The Power of Apology: Mercy, Forgiveness or Corrective Justice in the Civil Liability 
Arena?’ (2007) 1 Public Space 1, 15. 
207  Carroll, above n 6, 339. 
208  Australian Law Reform Commission, For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice, 
Report No 108 (2008) Rec 74–5(d). 
209  NSW Law Reform Commission, Invasion of Privacy, Report 120 (2009) NSWLRC Draft Bill, cl 
74(3)(a)(vi). 
210  Victorian Law Reform Commission, Surveillance in Public Places, Report 18 (2010) [7.207]. 
211  Carroll, above n 6, 213. 
212  See, eg, Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 23. The Anti-Discrimination Tribunal of NSW is 
empowered to issue an order requiring a respondent to publish or issue an apology or retraction: Anti-
Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW) s 108. Analogous provisions exist in other jurisdictions: Anti-
Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) s 209. Apologies made by respondents in personal injury matters are not 
treated as evidence of admission of fault: Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 69. 
213  See, eg, Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) 2005 s 38. 
214  Burns v Radio 2UE Sydney Pty Ltd (No 2) [2005] NSWADTAP 69 (6 December 2005). 
215  NZ v Director, Department of Housing [2006] NSWADT 173 (7 June 2006). 
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12.167 Several media organisations and representative groups opposed this 
proposal.216 ASTRA opposed any remedy that would allow for apologies or 
corrections, arguing that existing provisions in the ASTRA Codes, which are subject to 
enforcement by the ACMA offer sufficient remedies in the context of subscription 
broadcasting. However, they argued that this remedy could be applied to non-media 
defendants who are not subject to the ACMA’s code of conduct.217 ASTRA and 
Guardian News also argued that, where there has been a serious invasion of an 
individual’s privacy, discussion of the relevant information may result in further harm 
to the individual concerned rather than being an effective remedy. However, if this 
were the case, the plaintiff would not seek the remedy. 
12.168 As with correction orders, the ABC and Guardian News were concerned that 
apology orders would inhibit editorial independence.218 Similarly, Guardian News 
argued that ‘requiring media organisations to correct or apologise will constitute a 
further and unnecessary restriction on free speech’.219 However, the remedy would 
only be one of many available remedies and in any event it can only be considered 
where the plaintiff has made out a serious, unjustifiable, intentional or reckless 
invasion of privacy. 
12.169 A court may order a public or private apology, depending on the 
circumstances of a case. For an apology to be sincere and meaningful, a court will not 
compel an apology where a defendant makes clear they offer no remorse and therefore 
their apology will not come freely.220 
12.170 Apology orders, like all court-ordered remedies, are coercive in nature and, if 
breached, constitute contempt of court. Some legislation anticipates breaches of 
apology orders by providing that orders must be met within a specified period subject 
to a fine.221 
Declarations 
Recommendation 12–12 The Act should provide that courts may make a 
declaration. 
12.171 The availability of declaratory relief will provide plaintiffs with a sense of 
certainty and may avoid lengthy and costly court proceedings.222 Several stakeholders 
                                                        
216  ASTRA, Submission 99; ABC, Submission 93; Guardian News and Media Limited and Guardian 
Australia, Submission 80. 
217  ASTRA, Submission 99. 
218  ABC, Submission 93. 
219  Guardian News and Media Limited and Guardian Australia, Submission 80. 
220  Eatock v Bolt (No 2) (2011) 284 ALR 114, [50] (Bromberg J). 
221  See, eg, Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW) s 108(7). 
222  Meagher, Heydon and Leeming, above n 124, [19–180]. 
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supported the availability of declaratory relief in an action for serious invasion of 
privacy.223 
12.172 In a declaration in an action for serious invasion of privacy a court may state 
the nature of the interests, rights or duties of the applicant to an action.224 A declaration 
may provide both parties to a proceeding with clarity as to their obligations and rights 
to avoid litigation. A declaration may establish that a plaintiff has enforceable rights 
which may be upheld at a later date if the wrong continues. Similarly, a declaration 
may declare that future conduct by a defendant (or possible defendant) will not be a 
‘breach of contract or law’.225 
12.173 Declarations are available in a variety of areas of Australian law.226 
Section 21 of the Federal Court Act 1976 (Cth) provides that the court may make a 
declaration on the legality of another party’s conduct.227 The Australian Competition 
and Consumer Commission has sought declarations under this provision in numerous 
cases to determine whether a party has violated Australian consumer law.228 
Declarations are also available in anti-discrimination law.229 
12.174 The ALRC, NSWLRC and VLRC previously proposed that courts be able to 
make declarations.230 
12.175 ASTRA opposed the availability of declarations, arguing that the ACMA’s 
existing powers provide it with the power to require a licensee to acknowledge a 
finding of the ACMA on the licensee’s website. Section 205W of the Broadcasting 
Services Act 1992 (Cth) provides the ACMA with the power to accept undertakings 
from broadcasters on a range of matters. 
12.176 However, the ALRC considers that the availability of declaratory relief could 
have a significant impact on the conduct of a defendant, given the risk of monetary 
remedies if legal rights which have been the subject of a judicial pronouncement are 
contravened. 
                                                        
223  T Butler, Submission 114; Office of the Victorian Privacy Commissioner, Submission 108; Australian Sex 
Party, Submission 92; J Chard, Submission 88; S Higgins, Submission 82; Public Interest Advocacy 
Centre, Submission 30; N Witzleb, Submission 29. 
224  Cairns, above n 187, [1.20]. 
225  Bass v Permanent Trustee Co Ltd (1999) CLR 198 334, [356] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, 
Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ). 
226  Meagher, Heydon and Leeming, above n 124, [19–075]. 
227  ‘The Court may, in civil proceedings in relation to a matter in which it has original jurisdiction, make 
binding declarations of right, whether or not any consequential relief is or could be claimed’: Federal 
Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 21.  
228  Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v Black on White Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 187. 
229  For example, declaratory relief was issued in Eatock v Bolt (No 2) (2011) 284 ALR 114. 
230  Australian Law Reform Commission, For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice, 
Report 108 (2008) rec 74–5(g); NSW Law Reform Commission, Invasion of Privacy, Report 120 (2009) 
NSWLRC Draft Bill, cl 76(1)(c); Victorian Law Reform Commission, Surveillance in Public Places, 
Report 18 (2010) rec 29(c). 
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Costs 
12.177 Generally, a successful plaintiff is entitled to receive party and party costs, in 
the absence of countervailing circumstances.231 The ALRC considers that a court 
hearing a claim for serious invasions of privacy should have discretion in relation to 
awards of costs. The ALRC considers that two options would be appropriate for 
inclusion in legislation enacting the new tort on the court’s power with respect to 
awards of costs. 
12.178 The first option would for the legislation to include a provision similar to 
s 43(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1970 (Cth), which provides that, ‘[e]xcept 
as provided by any other Act, the award of costs is in the discretion of the Court or 
Judge’.  
12.179 Section 43 then provides for a range of orders that a judge may make, 
including: 
(3)   Without limiting the discretion of the Court or a Judge in relation to costs, the 
Court or Judge may do any of the following: 
make an award of costs at any stage in a proceeding, whether before, during or after 
any hearing or trial; 
make different awards of costs in relation to different parts of the proceeding; 
order the parties to bear costs in specified proportions; 
award a party costs in a specified sum; 
award costs in favour of or against a party whether or not the party is successful in 
the proceeding; 
order a party’s lawyer to bear costs personally; 
order that costs awarded against a party are to be assessed on an indemnity basis or 
otherwise. 
12.180 This recommendation relates to party and party costs which are those costs 
that a court may order a party to a proceeding to pay to the other party.232 Party and 
party costs must be reasonable and necessary for the proper conduct of a case.233 
12.181 In its report, Costs Shifting—Who Pays for Litigation, Report 75 (1995) 
(Costs Shifting), the ALRC identified several reasons for the award of costs to a 
successful plaintiff: 
• to compensate successful litigants for at least some of the costs they incur in 
litigating; 
• to allow people without means to litigate; 
• to deter vexatious or frivolous or other unmeritorious claims or defences; 
                                                        
231  Hughes v Western Australian Cricket Association (Inc) [1986] FCA 382. 
232  Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) s 98; Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic) s 24; Rules of the Supreme Court 
1971 (WA) O 66 r 1; Court Procedure Rules 2006 (ACT) r 1721; Local Court Rules (NT) r 63.03.  
233  Cairns, above n 187, [17.80]. 
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• to encourage settlement of disputes by adding to the amount at stake in the 
litigation; and 
• to deter delay and misconduct by making the responsible party pay for the costs 
his or her opponent incurs as a result of that delay or misconduct. 
12.182 The second option would be for the legislation to provide that awards of 
costs should be determined according to the enabling act of each court or tribunal that 
is given jurisdiction to hear the action. This would have the advantage that plaintiffs 
could consider the court or tribunal’s particular powers with respect to costs when 
deciding on an appropriate forum to bring their action. 
12.183 The manner in which costs are awarded is critical to providing appropriate 
access to justice—a principle that informs the work of this Inquiry.234 Access to justice 
was raised by several stakeholders who argued that the principle should underscore 
much of the ALRC’s formulation of the new tort.235 
12.184 The forum in which a statutory cause of action is to be heard will impact on 
the potential award of costs. The ALRC deals with the matter of forums for the cause 
of action in Chapter 10, recommending that federal courts and appropriate state and 
territory courts would have jurisdiction to hear actions under the new tort. The ALRC 
has not recommended that the new tort be heard in state tribunals such as VCAT,236 
although the ALRC leaves this possibility open. 
12.185 Several submissions raised the concern that many plaintiffs may be deterred 
from starting proceedings due to the risk of an adverse costs order.237 PIAC suggested 
that, if the cause of action were to be vested in a federal court, the ALRC should 
propose that courts be empowered to make orders protecting litigants from adverse 
costs orders. PIAC argued that, 
in the absence of such a costs rule, there is a risk that privacy-related litigation 
would become the sole preserve of those wealthy enough to afford to pay for legal 
representation and to run the risk of incurring an adverse costs order in the event 
they are unsuccessful. In PIAC’s experience, even where pro bono legal 
representation or representation on a conditional fee basis is secured, many 
meritorious cases do not proceed due to the risk of an adverse costs order. This is 
especially the case in matters where there is a great disparity in resources between 
the applicant and respondent.238 
                                                        
234  The OAIC’s submission raised costs as an issue which influences the accessibility of civil proceedings: 
Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Submission 66. 
235  ACCAN, Submission 106; Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 105; Office of the Australian 
Information Commissioner, Submission 90. 
236  The VLRC recommended that costs be dealt with in accordance with s 130 of the Victorian Civil and 
Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic). That section provides that each party should bear their own costs 
in a proceeding, unless the Tribunal orders one party to pay all or a part of the costs of the other party, if 
that would be fair to do so. This recommendation is consistent with the VLRC’s recommendation that 
their proposed privacy actions be heard in the VCAT. This approach was supported by the Office of the 
Victorian Privacy Commissioner in their submission to the Discussion Paper.   
237  Redfern Legal Centre, Submission 46; Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 30. 
238  Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 105. 
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12.186 Similarly, Redfern Legal Centre proposed the adoption of an adverse costs 
model similar to that operating in employment law in Australia.239 Under s 570(2)(a) of 
the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), costs incurred in a proceeding in any court will only be 
awarded against an unsuccessful plaintiff if the proceedings are vexatious or 
unreasonable. Redfern Legal Centre argued that privacy complaints were analogous to 
proceedings under that Act rather than any commercial proceedings.240 
12.187 The ALRC notes stakeholder concerns about the deterrent effect of 
potentially adverse costs orders. The ALRC supports the principle of broad access to 
justice, but notes that costs orders are also designed to deter vexatious or unmeritorious 
claims.241 The ALRC considers that actions for serious invasion of privacy should be 
dealt with consistently with actions brought in the forum for other intentional torts or 
other analogous actions. 
12.188 Women’s Legal Services NSW and the Australian Institute of Professional 
Photography (AIPP) suggested a court should be empowered to award indemnity costs 
where a defendant has demonstrated malice or vindictiveness.242 Unlike party-party 
costs which operate as a partial indemnity for the successful party against liability for 
legal costs,243 indemnity costs, which fully compensate the successful party for the 
inappropriate conduct of another party to the proceedings, are only awarded in 
exceptional circumstances.244 Most courts have the power to award indemnity costs in 
lieu of party-party costs in appropriate circumstances. 
                                                        
239  Redfern Legal Centre, Submission 94. 
240  Ibid. 
241  Insurance Council of Australia, Submission 102. 
242  Women’s Legal Services NSW, Submission 115; Australian Institute of Professional Photography 
(AIPP), Submission 95. 
243  Cairns, above n 187, [17.80]. 
244  Ibid [17.190]. 
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Summary 
13.1 In addition to the detailed legal design of a statutory cause of action for serious 
invasion of privacy, the Terms of Reference require the ALRC to make 
recommendations as to other legal remedies to redress serious invasions of privacy and 
as to innovative ways in which the law may reduce serious invasions of privacy. 
13.2 In the event that the statutory cause of action is not enacted, the ALRC 
recommends that courts be empowered by legislation to award compensation for 
emotional distress in cases involving disclosure of private information.1 
13.3 The recommendation aims, first, to address existing uncertainty as to whether 
Australian law provides a remedy for emotional distress suffered as a result of the 
                                                        
1  With regard to intrusion into seclusion, the other type of invasion included in the statutory tort, the ALRC 
considers that if a statutory cause of action for serious invasion of privacy is not enacted, a statutory 
action for protection against harassment would be a more targeted or limited way for the law to be 
developed: this is discussed in Ch 15. Ch 3 considers the possibility of the common law developing a tort 
of harassment or a tort of invasion of privacy by intrusion into seclusion. It would be necessary for the 
courts to identify its elements, including whether it: was actionable per se, by analogy with trespass to the 
person; required damage in the usual sense of psychiatric or physical illness; or required damage but 
included emotional distress. 
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disclosure or misuse of private information,2 and secondly, to ensure that the law does 
provide such a remedy. 
13.4 This would be a limited and targeted way in which the law could be amended to 
provide greater redress for serious invasions of privacy and to fill a significant gap in 
the existing law. 
13.5 This chapter begins with a brief section on the likely future development of the 
breach of confidence action. It then sets out the case for the recommendation. It 
concludes with an explanation of why the ALRC does not proceed with a proposal 
made in the Discussion Paper which related to public interest considerations in 
applications for injunctions to restrain the publication of private information. 
The likely future development of the action for breach of 
confidence 
13.6 In Chapter 3, the ALRC sets out the existing legal protection of an individual’s 
privacy, and notes the consensus of both courts and commentators that the course of 
the likely future development of the common law in this area is still uncertain. 
13.7 In ABC v Lenah Game Meats, the court suggested that existing legal actions may 
be extended to protect against invasions of privacy. Gummow and Hayne JJ, with 
whom Gaudron J agreed, considered a broad range of privacy invasions and left open 
the direction that the future development of the law protecting privacy may take: 
In the present appeal Lenah encountered … difficulty in formulating with acceptable 
specificity the ingredients of any general wrong of unjustified invasion of privacy. 
Rather than a search to identify the ingredients of a generally expressed wrong, the 
better course … is to look to the development and adaptation of recognised forms of 
action to meet new situations and circumstances … 
Lenah’s reliance upon an emergent tort of invasion of privacy is misplaced. Whatever 
development may take place in that field will be to the benefit of natural, not artificial, 
persons. It may be that development is best achieved by looking across the range of 
already established legal and equitable wrongs. On the other hand, in some respects 
these may be seen as representing species of a genus, being a principle protecting the 
interests of the individual in leading, to some reasonable extent, a secluded and 
private life, in the words of the Restatement, ‘free from the prying eyes, ears and 
publications of others’. Nothing said in these reasons should be understood as 
foreclosing any such debate or as indicating any particular outcome.3 
13.8 Gleeson CJ appeared to foreshadow that the equitable action for breach of 
confidence may be the most suitable legal action for protecting people’s private 
information from disclosure, stating: 
                                                        
2  This recommendation would not, therefore, apply to cases involving commercial information or the like. 
In this chapter, the ALRC intends ‘private’ information to mean information as to which a person in the 
position of the plaintiff has a reasonable expectation of privacy in all of the circumstances. 
3  Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 199, [110], [132]. 
Citing the American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law of Torts (Second) (1977), 2d § 652A, 
Comment b. 
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[E]quity may impose obligations of confidentiality even though there is no imparting 
of information in circumstances of trust and confidence. And the principle of good 
faith upon which equity acts to protect information imparted in confidence may also 
be invoked to ‘restrain the publication of confidential information improperly or 
surreptitiously obtained’. The nature of the information must be such that it is capable 
of being regarded as confidential. A photographic image, illegally or improperly or 
surreptitiously obtained, where what is depicted is private, may constitute confidential 
information … 
If the activities filmed were private, then the law of breach of confidence is adequate 
to cover the case … There would be an obligation of confidence upon the persons 
who obtained [images and sounds of private activities], and upon those into whose 
possession they came, if they knew, or ought to have known, the manner in which 
they were obtained … 
The law should be more astute than in the past to identify and protect interests of a 
kind which fall within the concept of privacy. 
For reasons already given, I regard the law of breach of confidence as providing a 
remedy, in a case such as the present, if the nature of the information obtained by the 
trespasser is such as to permit the information to be regarded as confidential.4 
13.9 Despite the influential and open invitation by the High Court to the lower courts 
to develop further protection, there has been only isolated development of further 
privacy protection in Australia at common law, as discussed in Chapter 3, making it 
difficult to predict the precise direction of future developments.5 
13.10 Nevertheless, this chapter assumes that, in the absence of a statutory cause of 
action, the development of the equitable action for breach of confidence is the most 
likely way in which the common law may, in time, develop greater protection of 
privacy in relation to misuse and disclosures of private information.6 
Compensation for emotional distress 
Recommendation 13–1 If a statutory cause of action for serious invasion 
of privacy is not enacted, appropriate federal, state, and territory legislation 
should be amended to provide that, in an action for breach of confidence that 
concerns a serious invasion of privacy by the misuse, publication or disclosure 
of private information, the court may award compensation for the plaintiff’s 
emotional distress. 
                                                        
4  Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 199, [34], [39], [40], 
[55]. 
5  ‘The recent High Court of Australia decision in Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game 
Meats Pty Ltd does little to clarify the future direction of Australian jurisprudence’: Hosking v Runting 
(2005) 1 NZLR 1, [56]–[59] (Gault P and Blanchard J). 
6  The alternative way for the common law to develop greater protection would be to recognise a new tort, 
as in New Zealand. See further Ch 3.  
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13.11 There are several arguments in favour of the ALRC’s recommendation for 
compensation for emotional distress. First, if legislation clarified or confirmed that 
equitable compensation7 could be awarded for emotional distress, the existing action 
for breach of confidence would more readily be seen as a useful response to serious 
invasions of privacy, and be more attractive to potential plaintiffs.8 This is particularly 
important in the event that the statutory cause of action is not enacted. 
13.12 Secondly, the effectiveness and availability of the remedy may deter invasions 
of privacy involving disclosures of private information. 
13.13 Thirdly, this recommendation would be an effective way of addressing a 
significant gap in existing legal protection of privacy while being more limited and 
directed than the introduction of a new statutory cause of action. 
13.14 Fourthly, this provision would indicate that Australian legislatures intended that 
the action for breach of confidence could be relied on to remedy these kinds of 
invasions of privacy. 
Remedies for breach of confidence 
13.15 In traditional claims for breach of confidence in Australia, plaintiffs have 
generally sought one of three remedies: an injunction to restrain an anticipated or 
continuing breach of confidence; an account of the anticipated profits derived from a 
breach; or compensation for economic loss due to a breach. 
13.16 An injunction to restrain publication or misuse is the most valuable and effective 
remedy in respect of all kinds of information: commercial, governmental or personal 
information. The remedies of an account of profits or equitable compensation are usual 
in cases involving commercial information. Beginning with Prince Albert suing to 
restrain the publication of a catalogue of Queen Victoria’s family etchings in 1849,9 
breach of confidence actions in equity have long been used to protect personal 
information, but the cases invariably concerned applications for injunctions.10 
                                                        
7  The term ‘equitable compensation’ here is used to refer to an award of monetary compensation in an 
equitable action. ‘Equitable compensation’ has become the standard term for equitable monetary relief 
awarded for loss suffered by reason of breach of a purely equitable obligation—that is, in the exclusive 
jurisdiction’: Dyson Heydon, Mark Leeming and Peter Turner, Meagher, Gummow and Lehane’s Equity: 
Doctrines and Remedies (LexisNexis Butterworths, 5th ed, 2014) [23–015]. The authors distinguish 
‘damages’ which are awarded in common law actions, including under Lord Cairns’ Act. See also the 
‘Remedies’ section of Chapter 42 ‘Confidential Information’ of the same book; and The Salvation Army 
(South Australia Property Trust) v Rundle [2008] NSWCA 347. 
8  Normann Witzleb, ‘Giller v Procopets: Australia’s Privacy Protection Shows Signs of Improvement’ 
(2009) 17 Torts Law Journal 121, 123–124: ‘Considering that breach of confidence will, until more 
specific protection is in place, continue to act as Australia’s quasi-privacy tort, courts need to afford 
adequate protection against emotional distress.’ 
9  Prince Albert v Strange (1849) 1 Mac G 25. 
10  Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 105. See also Stephens v Avery [1988] Ch 449, 454; Argyll v 
Argyll (1965) 1 ER 611; Lennon  v News Group Newspapers Ltd [1978] FSR 573. 
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Compensation for breach of confidence 
13.17 While the general entitlement to compensation for breach of confidence is now 
well-established, issues about assessment remain unresolved. In 1982, IE Davidson 
noted that, even in commercial cases, assessment of loss was difficult: 
The ‘protean quality of information’ makes it difficult to estimate what is required to 
finally restore a plaintiff to his position prior to the breach of his confidence. 
Nevertheless, relief based on the value for which the information would be sold 
between a willing buyer and a willing seller seems to be a satisfactory general 
criterion. There may be more serious difficulties in using Equity’s compensatory 
jurisdiction to remedy breaches of personal confidence where the damage suffered by 
the discloser through the confidant's breach of duty will rarely be directly measurable 
in financial terms. Compensation, being based on specific restitution for the value of 
what has been lost, seems more appropriate for recovering identifiable financial loss 
or specific property than for granting solatium for personal suffering or loss of 
reputation caused by breach of a personal confidence. Whilst compensation may have 
a role, the major scope for a principled development of techniques with which to 
remedy losses due to breach of this equitable duty will be where the confidential 
information had a commercial value.11 
13.18 In 1999, the New South Wales Court of Appeal was still describing equitable 
compensation as ‘a developing area of the law’.12 In 2014, the authors of Meagher 
Gummow and Lehane’s Equity: Doctrines and Remedies state: 
Monetary awards for loss, or something like loss, are awarded in a variety of contexts 
in equity. ‘Equitable compensation’ has come to denote many of these. It has become 
a category of concealed multiple reference: no single formulation can accurately 
describe all the applications of this relief.13 
13.19 In cases involving confidential personal or private information, the plaintiff’s 
economic losses or the defendant’s profits would seem to be readily recoverable where 
the private information had a commercial value. Where it does not have a commercial 
value, the plaintiff may nevertheless have suffered economic loss, such as the cost of 
hiring a public relations consultant to manage resultant publicity, or loss of 
employment. A plaintiff may also suffer some other type of harm such as personal 
injury or psychiatric injury but there is a dearth of authority on whether such damage is 
recoverable.14 
                                                        
11  Ian Davidson, ‘The Equitable Remedy of Compensation’ [1982] Melbourne University Law Review 349, 
396. 
12  Beach Petroleum NL v Kennedy (1999) 48 NSWLR 1, [431]. See also, Heydon, Leeming and Turner, 
above n 7, [23–020]. 
13  Heydon, Leeming and Turner, above n 7. 
14  Authorities denying claims for personal injury based on fiduciary duties turn on the absence of a fiduciary 
obligation to protect that type of interest. See also, Ibid [23–605]. Recovery of common law damages in 
contractual cases depends on remoteness principles: see eg, Cornelius v de Taranto [2001] EMLR 12; 
Archer v Williams [2003] EWHC 1670 (QB). 
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Emotional distress: a common result of misuse of private information 
13.20 Where a breach of confidence in relation to personal confidential or private 
information has already occurred and an injunction is futile, the consequence that a 
plaintiff is most likely to suffer is emotional distress. Professor Michael Tilbury has 
noted that ‘the very object of the action [for invasion of privacy] will be to protect 
plaintiffs against [mental or emotional distress], at least in part’.15 
13.21 The Law Institute of Victoria submitted that ‘harm caused by breaches of 
privacy is more likely to be harm such as embarrassment, humiliation, shame and guilt. 
Given the centrality of privacy to identity, these harms should not be seen as 
insignificant, even though they are not physical or financial’.16 
13.22 It is well-established that tort law allows recovery of compensation for ‘mere’ 
emotional distress, even intentionally caused, in only limited circumstances.17 The 
issue of whether compensation for emotional distress can be awarded in equity was 
first raised in Australia in Giller v Procopets.18 Neave JA of the Supreme Court of 
Victoria Court of Appeal noted: ‘[t]he Australian position appears to be at large on this 
issue. I am not aware of any appellate court decision which has considered it.’19 
13.23 Allowing the plaintiff’s appeal, the court in Giller v Procopets held that the 
plaintiff could recover damages for emotional distress in her equitable claim for breach 
of confidence. The claim was clearly one for breach of confidence, as the material that 
had been disclosed by the defendant, a videotape of intimate activities, had been 
created by the plaintiff and defendant while in a de facto relationship. The court 
unanimously agreed that the plaintiff could recover compensation for her consequent 
emotional distress as equitable compensation.20 An application by the defendant to the 
High Court for leave to appeal was rejected.21 
                                                        
15  Michael Tilbury, ‘Coherence, Non-Pecuniary Loss and the Construction of Privacy’ in Jeffrey Berryman 
and Rick Bigwood (eds), The Law of Remedies: New Directions in the Common Law (Irwin Law, 2010) 
127, 140. Note also: Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) s 52(1) provides that the Information Commissioner 
investigating a complaint concerning a breach of that Act may make a determination that the complainant 
is entitled to compensation for loss, which is defined to include injury to the complainant’s feelings or 
humiliation suffered by the complainant. 
16  Law Institute of Victoria, Submission 22. 
17  Unlike the position in the United States, Australian courts, like those in the United Kingdom and 
elsewhere, do not recognise a cause of action for wilful infliction of emotional distress. The tort action for 
wilful infliction of nervous shock, known as the action under Wilkinson v Downton (1897) 2 QB 57 is an 
‘action on the case’, and like an action in negligence, requires proof of actual damage such as recognised 
psychiatric illness: Giller v Procopets (2008) 24 VR 1, (Neave JA & Ashley JA, Maxwell P dissenting); 
Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Naidu (2007) 71 NSWLR 417; Wainwright v Home Office [2004] 2 AC 406. 
See further, Barbara McDonald, ‘Tort’s Role in Protecting Privacy: Current and Future Directions’ in 
J Edelman, J Goudkamp and S Degeling (eds), Torts in Commercial Law (Thomson Reuters, 2011). 
18  Giller v Procopets (2008) 24 VR 1.   
19  Ibid [419]. See also Ashley JA at [133]. 
20  Neave JA, with whom Maxwell JA agreed, also supported the award as damages under the Victorian 
equivalent of Lord Cairns’ Act: s 38 of the Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic). Ashley JA in Giller v 
Procopets (2008) 24 VR 1 at [141] did not agree that s 38 empowered the award: ‘I should next say that, 
upon the question of the availability of damages for mental distress, the common law would provide no 
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Why the law needs clarification 
13.24 It is desirable for legislation to clarify the courts’ powers to award compensation 
for emotional distress, notwithstanding the judgment in Giller v Procopets, for several 
reasons. 
13.25 First, at the time of this Report, Giller v Procopets remains the sole appellate 
authority for the recovery of compensation for emotional distress in a breach of 
confidence action. The position reached in that case has not been further tested or 
applied in Australia. Prior to that decision, a County Court judge in Victoria, in the 
2007 case of Doe v Australian Broadcasting Corporation, awarded equitable 
compensation of $25,000 for breach of confidence, for ‘hurt, distress, embarrassment, 
humiliation, shame and guilt’, as part of a larger award for other wrongs.22 The case 
was settled before appeal. 
13.26 Secondly, the basis on which equity can award compensation, by way of 
common law compensatory damages and aggravated damages, for emotional distress 
arising from the breach of a purely equitable wrong remains unclear, even if Lord 
Cairns’ Act or s 38 of the Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic) does apply. It is problematic 
to have a grant of equitable compensation or ‘damages’ by analogy with tort law, 
when, as Ashley JA pointed out, ‘with few exceptions, the common law has turned its 
face against awards of damages for distress’.23 This is even more so when, as the 
majority held, tort law would not have provided a remedy in the circumstances. This 
point is not an argument that the judgment undesirably fuses law and equity,24 although 
that argument could also be made.25 Rather it is an argument that the law would be 
                                                                                                                                             
assistance to the appellant even if s 38 was treated as making common law remedies available in a case 
within the exclusive jurisdiction. With few exceptions, the common law has turned its face against awards 
of damages for distress.’ Later at [148]: ‘But that does not mean that equity must do so’. He supported the 
award of compensation under the exercise of equity’s inherent jurisdiction. Section 38 of the Supreme 
Court Act 1986 (Vic), relied upon to justify the award of compensation in Giller v Procopets, differs from 
the form of Lord Cairns’ Act in other jurisdictions, where there is still controversy as to whether Lord 
Cairns’ Act applies in aid of purely equitable rights such as breach of confidence: Supreme Court Act 
1970 (NSW) s 68; Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) s 30; Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA) s 25; Supreme 
Court Civil Procedure Act 1932 (Tas) s 11; Judicature Act 1876 (Qld) s 4; RP Meagher, JD Heydon and 
MJ Leeming, Meagher, Gummow and Lehane’s Equity: Doctrines and Remedies (LexisNexis 
Butterworths, 4th ed, 2002), [23–030]. The authors in Tanya Aplin et al, Gurry on Breach of Confidence 
(Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2012) [19.11] state that some courts ‘have taken the view that Lord 
Cairns’ Act could, and should, apply to confidence claims’, but that ‘leading commentators continue to 
argue that Lord Cairns’ Act had no effect on causes of action which were purely equitable (such as breach 
of confidence), rather in such cases equitable compensation should be awarded’. See also [19.15] and 
Cadbury Schweppes v FBI Foods [2000] FSR 491. 
21  Procopets v Giller (M32/2009) [2009] HCASL 187. 
22  Doe v Australian Broadcasting Corporation [2007] VCC 281, [186].  
23  Giller v Procopets (2008) 24 VR 1, [141]. 
24  ‘[A]cceptance by the courts in most common law jurisdictions that (in relation to remedies at least) the 
rules of equity and law can be moulded to do practical justice means that the availability of remedies for 
breach of confidence are not, and should not be, confined by the nature of the jurisdiction upon which the 
claim is based. Rather the approach the court adopts should be flexible with the full panoply of remedies 
being available in appropriate cases. Nevertheless, this approach is not at present acknowledged by the 
Australian courts, and there is some indication that fusion has not been fully embraced elsewhere.’: Aplin 
et al, above n 20, [17.13].  
25  Meagher, Heydon and Leeming, above n 20, [2–145] 59.   
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more coherent if there was legislative clarification that equitable compensation could 
be awarded for emotional distress where private information was misused, published or 
disclosed. 
13.27 Thirdly, there is an unsettling lack of precedent for the award of equitable 
compensation for emotional distress decision, other than the decision in Giller v 
Procopets. The ALRC has been unable to find any other precedent for the award of 
compensation for emotional distress in a purely equitable claim.26 Further, the decision 
is arguably inconsistent with another decision in which a state appellate court rejected a 
claim in an equitable action for punitive damages, previously only given at common 
law.27 The courts of the United Kingdom, starting with Campbell v MGN Ltd in 2004, 
have routinely awarded damages for emotional distress in the so-called ‘extended’ 
action of breach of confidence which protects against disclosures of private 
information. However, these awards are clearly underpinned by the requirements of the 
Human Rights Act 1998 (UK), which provides a very different remedial framework 
from that in the Australian legal system. 
13.28 It may be argued that the remedial flexibility of equity allows the award of 
compensation for emotional distress without the need for a precedent, provided that the 
award consistent with broad equitable principles and doctrines.28 Gummow J has 
contrasted the approach of equity to the common law: 
The common law technique … looks to precedent and operates analogically as a 
means of accommodating certainty and flexibility in the law. Equity, by contrast, 
involves the application of doctrines themselves sufficiently comprehensive to meet 
novel cases. The question of a plaintiff ‘what is your equity?’[as posed by Gleeson CJ 
in ABC v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd29] thus has no common law counterpart.30 
13.29 In a similar vein, Meagher, Gummow and Leeming refer to equity’s ‘inherent 
flexibility and capacity to adjust to new situations by reference to mainsprings of the 
equitable jurisdiction.’31 
13.30 Notwithstanding these general statements, the ALRC considers that legislative 
clarification is desirable, as it would make the basis for an award clear and certain. 
Stakeholder views 
13.31 Most stakeholders who responded to the Discussion Paper commented on issues 
relating to the statutory cause of action or regulatory reforms rather than on the 
proposals that dealt with limited ways to supplement the common law. Comments on 
                                                        
26  Cf cases based on a contractual obligation: Cornelius v de Taranto [2001] EMLR 12. See further, 
B McDonald, ‘Defences to Privacy: Transformation, Fault, and Public Interest’ in J Goudkamp, 
F Wilmott-Smith and A Dyson (eds), Tort Defences (Hart Publishing, 2014). 
27  Harris v Digital Pulse Pty Ltd (2003) 56 NSWLR 298. 
28  Harris v Digital Pulse Pty Ltd (2003) 56 NSWLR 298, 304 (Spigelman CJ), quoted in Giller v Procopets 
(2008) 24 VR 1, [436] (Neave JA). 
29  Australian Broadcasting Commission v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 199, 216. 
30  Roads and Traffic Authority of New South Wales v Dederer (2007) 324 CLR 330, [57] (emphasis added). 
31  Meagher, Heydon and Leeming, above n 20, 415 [12–045]. 
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this proposal varied. Those stakeholders who saw no gaps in existing law or regulation, 
or who considered that their industry was already over regulated, opposed the 
proposal,32 or argued that such a development should be left to the courts.33 
13.32 Guardian News and Media Limited and Guardian Australia, for example, 
submitted that 
[I]t would be preferable for the proposed statutory cause of action to be introduced 
rather than the modification of an existing cause of action. Attempts to ‘shoehorn’ an 
established action to cover an adjacent or similar situation result in the twisting of the 
original cause of action and fail to appropriately balance the relevant interests.34 
13.33 The Australian Privacy Foundation supported the proposal. It submitted that it 
would be desirable whether or not the statutory cause of action were enacted, and that 
it should not be confined to private information but extend to any breach of confidence 
action.35 The ALRC does not agree with these additional points. A recommendation 
that extended to non-private confidential information would exceed the ALRC’s Terms 
of Reference, and would have far–reaching implications for commercial actions 
generally. If the cause of action for serious invasions of privacy is enacted, the 
recommendation, which is aimed at filling a gap in the existing law, would be 
unnecessary. 
13.34 Other stakeholders supported the proposal in the event that the statutory cause of 
action was not enacted.36 The Office of the Victorian Privacy Commissioner supported 
the proposal, submitting that 
This would clarify the current common law position and strengthen an action for 
breach of confidence.37 
13.35 David Day also submitted that the proposal should not be seen as an alternative 
to a statutory cause of action, but as a ‘minor amendment to existing law that would 
offer limited improvement to privacy protection’.38 
                                                        
32  ASTRA, Submission 99; Australian Bankers’ Association, Submission 27. ASTRA also noted in its 
submission that public interest should be considered when assessing compensation for emotional distress. 
As noted above, there is currently no broad ‘public interest’ defence to breach of confidence actions in 
Australia.   
33  Free TV, Submission 109. In its submission to the Discussion Paper, Telstra stated: ‘Consistent with our 
previous submission, we do not believe damages should be awarded for emotional distress.’ In its 
submission to Issues Paper 43, Telstra commented: ‘if a significant increase in invasion or breach of 
privacy claims does occur in the future, as Gummow and Hayne JJ noted in Lenah, the adaptation and 
development of recognised causes of action to meet new situations and circumstances may be the most 
appropriate method of addressing this issue.’ From this the ALRC infers that Telstra thinks the issue 
should be left to the courts to decide: Telstra, Submission 107; Telstra, Submission 45. 
34  Guardian News and Media Limited and Guardian Australia, Submission 80.  
35  Australian Privacy Foundation, Submission 110. 
36  Domestic Violence Legal Service and North Australian Aboriginal Justice Agency, Submission 120; 
T Butler, Submission 114; Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 105; Australian Sex Party, 
Submission 92; J Chard, Submission 88; S Higgins, Submission 82; Women’s Legal Services NSW, 
Submission 76. 
37  Office of the Victorian Privacy Commissioner, Submission 108. 
38  D Day, Submission 72. 
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The case for compensation for emotional distress 
13.36 Compensation for emotional distress should be part of the armoury of remedies 
available to a court of equity when determining a claim for breach of confidence 
through the disclosure of private information. As Neave JA has noted, ‘[a]n inability to 
order equitable compensation to a claimant who has suffered distress would mean that 
a claimant whose confidence was breached before an injunction could be obtained 
would have no effective remedy’.39 
13.37 A remedy for emotional distress may have a powerful normative effect in the 
prevention of serious invasions of privacy by way of misuse or disclosure of private 
information. This is particularly relevant in light of the ease with which private 
information may be disclosed or distributed using new communication technologies. 
13.38 Internet and other digital communication technology has enabled widespread 
and sometimes irreversible disclosures of private information causing continuing and 
serious harm and distress. As Gleeson CJ said in ABC v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd, 
citing the significant privacy concerns raised by advances in technology, ‘[t]he law 
should be more astute than in the past to identify and protect interests of a kind which 
fall within the concept of privacy’.40 
13.39 It may well be that courts will arm themselves with the power by following the 
lead of Giller v Procopets. However, the position would be rendered more certain, and 
there would be less room for ‘doctrinal angst’,41 argument and costly or risky litigation 
along the way, if legislation were the source of that power. Some stakeholders agreed 
that the issue of recovery of compensation for emotional distress ‘remains 
unnecessarily complex and uncertain’.42 It is therefore highly desirable that there be 
legislative clarification. 
13.40 Legislation also has the advantage over common law development that it may be 
carefully crafted, if thought necessary, to deal with only the most egregious cases of 
breach of confidence concerning misuse, disclosure or publication of private 
information. While equitable liability for breach of confidence is conscience-based, a 
breach of confidence can be committed without any intent to harm, once the defendant 
has knowledge of the confidential nature of the information.43 The same approach may 
be taken with regard to private information, whether or not it is also confidential. 
13.41 The ALRC notes also that it may be appropriate to limit the remedy of 
compensation for emotional distress caused by disclosures of private information to the 
most egregious cases, such as where the disclosure was done intentionally, recklessly 
or even maliciously. 
                                                        
39  Giller v Procopets (2008) 24 VR 1, [424]. Cf Ibid [168]–[169] (Gillard J). 
40  Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 199, 225, [40]. 
41  D Butler, Submission 74. ‘[A]ny discussion of the application of the remedy of damages in breach of 
confidence cases is fraught with difficulty at the outset’: Aplin et al, above n 20, [19.02]. 
42  Australian Privacy Foundation, Submission 110. 
43  Vestergaard Frandsen A/S v Bestnet Europe Ltd [2013] 1 WLR 1556. See also, McDonald, ‘Defences to 
Privacy: Transformation, Fault, and Public Interest’, above n 26. 
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Public interest and injunction applications 
13.42 In the Discussion Paper, the ALRC proposed that legislation be enacted to 
require a court to give particular consideration to countervailing public interests, 
including freedom of expression, when considering an application for an injunction to 
prevent publication of private information, where there was not an added element of 
confidentiality.44 
13.43 It was suggested that such a proposal would be desirable if the statutory tort 
were not enacted, and if, instead, greater protections against disclosure of (merely) 
private information were to develop at common law by way of the extension of the 
equitable action for breach of confidence. 
13.44 To a certain extent, the proposal rested on an assumption that the likely 
development of the law would be along the lines of the development in the United 
Kingdom. The proposal suggested a way of directing the future development of the 
law. It assumed familiarity with the differences between the current law in the United 
Kingdom, which includes a similar provision in its Human Rights Act 1998 (UK), and 
the current Australian law on breach of confidence. 
13.45 The background to the proposal was the lack of clarity, which persists, about the 
principles that should govern the exercise of the court’s discretion in any action to 
protect private information: would a court take an approach similar to that in breach of 
confidence cases or to that in defamation cases? 
13.46 Australian case law provides only a very limited role for public interest 
considerations as a justification for restraining publication in breach of an obligation of 
confidence.45 Injunctions are readily awarded to restrain the breach of a negative 
covenant, such as a promise not to breach confidence by revealing confidential 
information. The courts stress in such cases that there is an important public interest in 
the law holding a person to an obligation of confidence that they undertook or knew 
about: people will not volunteer information, even where it is in the public interest that 
they should do so,46 if they feel the confidence will not be respected and enforced. 
13.47 By contrast, defamation law incorporates well-established principles that protect 
freedom of speech, so that it is very difficult to obtain an injunction to restrain a 
defamatory publication if the defendant puts up a serious argument that it can be 
justified.47 
13.48 The ALRC did not propose any legislative change to the way in which courts 
approach traditional breach of confidence cases. Rather, the ALRC’s proposal was that 
                                                        
44  Australian Law Reform Commission, Serious Invasions of Privacy in the Digital Era, Discussion Paper 
80 (2014) Proposal 12–2. 
45  This is in contrast to the law of the United Kingdom on breach of confidence which accepts a broader 
defence of public interest. Yet even in the UK, there is debate about how privacy and defamation cases 
intersect: see further Ch 12. 
46  For example, about contagious diseases or substance abuse or suspicions of abuse or corruption. 
47  See Ch 12. 
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there should be explicit consideration required of freedom of speech and other public 
interests in applications to prevent the publication of information which is deemed to 
be private—but which was not subject to an obligation of confidence. 
13.49 Some stakeholders were in favour of the proposal, expressing concern at the 
narrow defence of public interest in Australia to breach of confidence actions or at the 
chilling effect of injunctions on freedom of speech. However, most stakeholders 
concentrated on other issues in the Discussion Paper. After discussions and 
consultations with members of the legal profession and the judiciary about this 
proposal, the ALRC concludes that it may be premature to attempt to direct the 
approach of the common law as proposed. Therefore, the ALRC does not make any 
recommendation in the Final Report with respect to injunctions where the plaintiff 
relies on the common law to protect private information.48 
13.50 The ALRC considers the desirability of a legislative provision with respect to 
injunction applications under the new tort in Chapter 12. 
                                                        
48  See further, Australian Law Reform Commission, Serious Invasions of Privacy in the Digital Era, 
Discussion Paper 80 (2014) 158–193. 
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Summary 
14.1 In this chapter, the ALRC sets out recommendations regarding the surveillance 
device laws and workplace surveillance laws of the Australian states and territories. 
These surveillance device laws provide important privacy protection by creating 
offences for the unauthorised use of listening devices, optical surveillance devices, 
tracking devices, and data surveillance devices. 
14.2 However, there is significant inconsistency in the laws with respect to the types 
of devices regulated and with respect to the offences, defences and exceptions. This 
inconsistency results in uncertainty and complexity, reducing privacy protection for 
individuals and increasing the compliance burdens for organisations. 
14.3 A key recommendation in this chapter is that the surveillance device laws should 
be the same throughout Australia. The ALRC recommends that this be achieved 
through Commonwealth legislation. The ALRC also recommends that workplace 
surveillance laws be made uniform throughout Australia. 
14.4 Surveillance legislation should also be technology neutral, so that it can apply to 
new devices, such as unmanned aerial vehicles (drones), as well as to surveillance 
technologies which are not ‘devices’ in the traditional sense, such as software or 
networks of devices. 
14.5 The ALRC recommends the repeal of ‘participant monitoring’ exceptions. These 
exceptions allow the use of a surveillance device without the consent of the individuals 
under surveillance, so long as the person conducting the surveillance is also a party to 
the activity or conversation under surveillance. 
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14.6 Recognising that the participant monitoring exceptions provide protection for 
several important activities, the ALRC recommends a ‘responsible journalism’ defence 
that would protect journalists and media groups making appropriate use of a 
surveillance device for certain matters in the public interest. 
14.7 Further recommendations include that compensation be available to victims of 
surveillance offences, and that avenues should be made available for residential 
neighbours to have disputes about the use of surveillance devices heard by appropriate 
lower courts and tribunals. The latter recommendation recognises that criminal 
offences may be inappropriate for some uses of surveillance devices, and that a 
quicker, cheaper and less onerous process may achieve the desired result of preventing 
invasions of privacy. 
Existing surveillance device laws 
14.8 Laws exist in each state and territory to regulate the use of surveillance devices.1 
These laws provide criminal offences for conducting surveillance and for related 
activities, in particular for communicating information obtained under surveillance. 
The laws also provide for the application for, and issue of, warrants to conduct 
surveillance by law enforcement officers; monitoring and oversight mechanisms; 
public interest exceptions; conditions for the admissibility of information obtained 
under surveillance as evidence; and restrictions on the manufacture and supply of 
surveillance devices. Other laws in the ACT, NSW and Victoria regulate the use of 
surveillance in the workplace.2 
14.9 Surveillance device laws provide important privacy protection. The legislation 
offers some protection against intrusion into seclusion and against the collection of 
some information, such as recordings of private conversations. Consistency in these 
laws is important both for protecting individuals’ privacy and for reducing the 
compliance burden on organisations that use surveillance devices in multiple 
jurisdictions. 
                                                        
1  Surveillance Devices Act 2007 (NSW); Invasion of Privacy Act 1971 (Qld); Listening and Surveillance 
Devices Act 1972 (SA); Listening Devices Act 1991 (Tas); Surveillance Devices Act 1999 (Vic); 
Surveillance Devices Act 1998 (WA); Listening Devices Act 1992 (ACT); Surveillance Devices Act (NT). 
At the Commonwealth level, the Surveillance Devices Act 2004 (Cth) makes provision for the use of 
surveillance devices by federal law enforcement officers. However, it does not provide for offences 
applicable to general members of the public. Other laws provide related protections, without necessarily 
being designed to control the use of surveillance devices per se. For example, s 227A of the Queensland 
Criminal Code provides for a misdemeanour where a person observes or visually records another person 
‘in circumstances where a reasonable adult would expect to be afforded privacy’, if the second person is 
in a private place or engaged in a private act and has not provided consent. A similar offence exists in 
s 91K of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), where the recording is obtained for the purpose of obtaining 
‘sexual arousal or sexual gratification’. While a surveillance device could be used in a way that 
contravened one of these laws, surveillance may occur in other situations. Surveillance is also included as 
a form of stalking: eg, s 21A(f) of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic). 
2  Workplace Surveillance Act 2005 (NSW); Surveillance Devices Act 1999 (Vic) pt 2A; Workplace Privacy 
Act 2011 (ACT). 
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14.10 Protection from surveillance is a fundamental form of protection of privacy, 
particularly in the digital era. General Comment 16 of the UN Human Rights 
Committee specifically refers to surveillance, stating that: 
Surveillance, whether electronic or otherwise, interceptions of telephonic, telegraphic 
and other forms of communication, wire-tapping and recording of conversations 
should be prohibited. 
… 
The gathering and holding of personal information on computers, databanks and other 
devices, whether by public authorities or private individuals or bodies, must be 
regulated by law. Effective measures have to be taken by States to ensure that 
information concerning a person’s private life does not reach the hands of persons 
who are not authorized by law to receive, process and use it, and is never used for 
purposes incompatible with the [International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights].3 
14.11 Sir Garfield Barwick, in the second reading speech for the Telephonic 
Communications (Interception) Bill 1960 (Cth), expressed a similar view: 
eavesdropping is abhorrent to us as a people. Not one of us, I am sure, would fail to 
recoil from the thought that a citizen’s privacy could lightly be invaded. Indeed, many 
citizens no doubt feel that far too many intrusions into our privacy are permitted to be 
made in these times with complete impunity. Many things which might fairly be 
regarded as personal and of no public consequence appear in print without the 
citizen’s permission and without his encouragement; but in particular all of us, I think, 
dislike the feeling that we may be overheard and that what we wish to say may reach 
ears for which we did not intend the expression of our thoughts. Much of our normal 
life depends on the confidence we can repose in those to whom we lay bare our 
sentiments and opinions, with and through whom we wish to communicate.4 
14.12 As well as presenting a threat to privacy, surveillance threatens other important 
freedoms and liberties. Unauthorised surveillance may interfere with freedom of 
speech, freedom of movement and freedom of association. Professor Neil Richards 
identifies a chilling effect that surveillance may have on civil liberties: 
surveillance is harmful because it can chill the exercise of our civil liberties. With 
respect to civil liberties, consider surveillance of people when they are thinking, 
reading, and communicating with others in order to make up their minds about 
political and social issues. Such intellectual surveillance is especially dangerous 
because it can cause people not to experiment with new, controversial, or deviant 
ideas.5 
14.13 Associate Professor Moira Paterson has described this chilling effect as 
occurring ‘where people self adjust their behaviour even if they are not doing anything 
wrong’: 
                                                        
3  Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 16: Article 17 (The Right to Respect of Privacy, Family, 
Home and Correspondence, and Protection of Honour and Reputation), 35th sess, UN Doc A/43/40 
(28 September 1988) 16. 
4  Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 5 May 1960 1 (Sir Garfield Barwick, 
Attorney-General). 
5  Neil M Richards, ‘The Dangers of Surveillance’ [2013] Harvard Law Review 1934, 1935. 
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The knowledge that their actions may be recorded and judged by unknown others may 
make individuals more self conscious about how they interact and what they say to 
other people, and even less willing to enter specific public places (for example, if they 
feel that they are not suitably dressed to be photographed or uncomfortable about 
others knowing that they frequent such places).6 
14.14 Surveillance device laws protect individuals against invasions of privacy carried 
out through the use of various types of surveillance devices. The laws are therefore 
narrower in scope than the statutory tort set out in Part 2 of this Report. However, the 
possible consequences of a contravention of the surveillance device laws—conviction 
for a criminal offence—are potentially more significant than liability to pay damages 
for a serious invasion of privacy under the statutory tort. 
A Commonwealth Act 
Recommendation 14–1 The Commonwealth Government should enact 
surveillance legislation to replace existing state and territory surveillance device 
laws. 
14.15 There are significant inconsistencies between existing state and territory 
surveillance device laws. There are differences between the laws with respect to the 
types of surveillance devices covered, the types of activities which amount to an 
offence, and the defences and exceptions that apply. 
14.16 Existing surveillance device laws apply, variously, to listening devices, optical 
surveillance devices, data surveillance devices and tracking devices. However: 
• optical surveillance devices are not regulated by the surveillance device laws of 
the ACT, Queensland, SA or Tasmania; 
• data surveillance devices are not regulated by the surveillance device laws of the 
ACT, Queensland, SA, Tasmania, or WA, and are only regulated by the 
Victorian and NT surveillance device laws when used, installed or maintained 
by law enforcement officers; and 
• tracking devices are not regulated by the surveillance device laws of the ACT, 
Queensland, SA, or Tasmania. 
14.17 The offences for carrying out surveillance are also inconsistent. For example: 
• the offence for optical surveillance of a private activity in Victoria does not 
apply to activities carried on outside a building. This means that optical 
                                                        
6  Moira Paterson, ‘Surveillance in Public Places and the Role of the Media: Achieving an Optimal Balance’ 
(2009) 14 Media and Arts Law Review 241, 249. 
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surveillance of activities in a person’s backyard, for example, is not an offence 
under the Victorian Act;7 
• the offences for optical and data surveillance in NSW do not depend on the 
nature of the activity or information placed under surveillance, but only on 
whether the installation, use or maintenance of the surveillance device required 
entry onto premises or interference with a car, computer or other object;8 and 
• the offences for data surveillance in Victoria and the NT provide a more general 
offence for using a data surveillance device to monitor information input to, or 
output from, a computer system, but these offences only apply to law 
enforcement officers.9 
14.18 There are also some significant differences between the defences and exceptions 
under existing surveillance device laws: 
• some jurisdictions provide a ‘participant monitoring’ exception, allowing the 
surveillance of a private conversation or activity by a party to the conversation 
or activity, even if the other participants have not provided consent;10 
• some jurisdictions provide an exception if the surveillance has the consent of all 
‘principal parties’ to a conversation, being those parties that speak or are spoken 
to in a private conversation or who take part in a private activity;11 
• some jurisdictions provide an exception if the surveillance has the consent of 
one principal party to a conversation and is reasonably necessary for the 
protection of a lawful interest of that principal party;12 
• some jurisdictions provide an exception if the surveillance has the consent of 
one principal party and is not carried out for the purpose of communicating the 
recording, or a report of the recording, to anyone who was not a party to the 
conversation or activity;13 and 
                                                        
7  Surveillance Devices Act 1999 (Vic) s 3(1) (definition of ‘private activity’). The Victorian Law Reform 
Commission has previously recommended removing the exception for activities carried on outside a 
building; see Victorian Law Reform Commission, Surveillance in Public Places, Report 18 (2010) rec 11. 
8  Surveillance Devices Act 2007 (NSW) ss 8, 10. 
9  Surveillance Devices Act (NT) s 14; Surveillance Devices Act 1999 (Vic) s 9. 
10  Invasion of Privacy Act 1971 (Qld) s 43(2)(a); Surveillance Devices Act 1999 (Vic) ss 6(1), 7(1); 
Surveillance Devices Act (NT) ss 11(1)(a), 12(1)(a). 
11  Surveillance Devices Act 2007 (NSW) s 7(3)(a); Listening Devices Act 1991 (Tas) s 5(3)(a); Surveillance 
Devices Act 1998 (WA) ss 5(3)(c), 6(3)(a); Listening Devices Act 1992 (ACT) s 4(3)(a). 
12  Surveillance Devices Act 2007 (NSW) s 7(3)(b)(i); Listening and Surveillance Devices Act 1972 (SA) 
s 7(1) (but note that this does not require that the person is a principal party, merely a party); Listening 
Devices Act 1991 (Tas) s 5(3)(b)(i); Surveillance Devices Act 1998 (WA) ss 5(3)(d), 6(3)(b)(iii); 
Listening Devices Act 1992 (ACT) s 4(3)(b)(i). 
13  Surveillance Devices Act 2007 (NSW) s 7(3)(b)(ii); Listening Devices Act 1991 (Tas) s 5(3)(b)(ii), (ACT) 
s 4(3)(b)(ii). 
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• some jurisdictions provide an exception where the use of a surveillance device is 
in the public interest.14 
14.19 Due to these inconsistencies, the legal rights and interests of an individual who 
is under surveillance, and the legal liabilities of an individual or organisation that uses 
a surveillance device, are highly contingent upon their location. 
14.20 Other inconsistencies exist with respect to issues such as the use of surveillance 
devices by law enforcement, the issuing of warrants, and cross-border investigations. 
These inconsistencies have been considered by the Standing Committee of Attorneys-
General and the Australasian Police Ministers Council Working Group on National 
Investigation Powers.15 This process resulted in the passage of the Surveillance Device 
Act 2004 (Cth), which regulates the use of surveillance devices by federal law 
enforcement officers, but does not regulate the use of surveillance devices by 
individuals more generally. 
14.21 There was widespread agreement from stakeholders about the desirability of 
surveillance device laws applying in the same way across Australia. Several 
stakeholders noted the benefits in protecting the privacy of individuals.16 
14.22 Many stakeholders also noted the benefits to businesses, particularly where a 
business operates in multiple states or territories. The Australian Bankers’ Association, 
for instance, submitted that: 
Banks and many other businesses operate on a national basis and are able to conduct 
their businesses more efficiently, with better convenience for their customers and in 
order to comply with consumer protection type laws if those laws are nationally 
uniform or consistent. National consistency contributes to national productivity and 
better outcomes for consumers.17 
14.23 The Media and Communications Committee of the Law Council of Australia 
similarly submitted that: 
The Federal, State and territory laws governing surveillance devices, tracking devices, 
listening devices laws and unlawful surveillance are an inconsistent patchwork with 
no unifying principles of operation. 
This is an existing ‘red tape’ cost to business. National laws should operate in this 
area and those laws should be based upon a coherent rationale for regulation.18 
                                                        
14  Surveillance Devices Act 1998 (WA) s 24 (definition of ‘public interest’); Surveillance Devices Act (NT) 
s 41 (definition of ‘public interest’). 
15  Standing Committee of Attorneys-General and the Australasian Police Ministers Council Working Group 
on National Investigation Power, Cross-Border Investigative Powers for Law Enforcement, Report 
(November 2003). 
16  See, for example, Australian Privacy Foundation, Submission 110. 
17  Australian Bankers’ Association, Submission 84. See also Telstra, Submission 107; AMTACA, 
Submission 101. 
18  Media and Communications Committee of the Law Council of Australia, Submission 124. 
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14.24 Free TV also noted the benefits for media organisations of having the same law 
throughout Australia,19 while the Australian Institute of Professional Photography 
submitted that ‘uniform Commonwealth laws are essential so that individual small 
photography businesses have some level of certainty about how they can operate 
anywhere in Australia’.20 
14.25 While there was wide agreement on the need for removing inconsistencies, a 
number of stakeholders were concerned about the basis on which this might be 
achieved. The Australian Privacy Foundation, for example, submitted that 
uniformity should not be achieved at the expense of watering down Australians’ rights 
to be free from unauthorised surveillance and any standardisation should be based on 
‘best practice’ protection of privacy and not on ‘lowest common denominator’ 
protection.21 
14.26 SBS supported uniformity, ‘provided that the legislation allows for broad public 
interest concerns to permit both the creation of a recording, and the subsequent 
communication of that recording by the media’.22 
14.27 The ALRC recommends that Commonwealth legislation should be introduced to 
cover the field with respect to surveillance devices. This legislation would effectively 
replace the existing state and territory surveillance device laws, and ensure that the law 
of surveillance devices was the same throughout Australia. Stakeholders were 
generally supportive of the introduction of federal legislation to cover the field of 
surveillance device law.23 
14.28 Commonwealth surveillance devices legislation would likely be supported by 
the external affairs power of the Australian Constitution, as a means of giving effect to 
Australia’s obligation under art 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights to protect privacy.24 The external affairs power allows the federal government to 
enact legislation that may be reasonably considered appropriate and adapted to 
fulfilling an obligation under an international treaty.25 Since the primary purpose of 
surveillance legislation is the protection of privacy, it is likely that this requirement 
would be met. 
14.29 Commonwealth legislation would likely be subject to some constitutional 
limitations with respect to state law enforcement agencies. The Melbourne Corporation 
                                                        
19  Free TV, Submission 109. Other media organisations expressing support for uniformity in surveillance 
device laws included SBS, Submission 123; ABC, Submission 93; Guardian News and Media Limited and 
Guardian Australia, Submission 80. 
20  Australian Institute of Professional Photography (AIPP), Submission 95. 
21  Australian Privacy Foundation, Submission 110. 
22  SBS, Submission 123. 
23  Australian Information Security Association (AISA), Submission 117; Australian Privacy Foundation, 
Submission 110; AMTACA, Submission 101; Australian Institute of Professional Photography (AIPP), 
Submission 95; Australian Sex Party, Submission 92; S Higgins, Submission 82; D Butler, Submission 74. 
However, the Office of the Victorian Privacy Commissioner stated a preference for states and territories 
retaining jurisdiction over surveillance devices: Office of the Victorian Privacy Commissioner, 
Submission 108. 
24  The external affairs power and the ICCPR are discussed further in Ch 4. 
25  Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983) 158 CLR 1; Victoria v Commonwealth (1996) 187 CLR 416. 
282 Serious Invasions of Privacy in the Digital Era  
doctrine prevents the Commonwealth from enacting laws interfering with the capacity 
of the states to function as governments.26 Due to this doctrine, it may be necessary for 
federal surveillance devices legislation to include provisions either exempting state law 
enforcement agencies from the federal surveillance devices legislation or providing a 
defence for surveillance carried out in accordance with a state law. 
14.30 As an alternative to the Commonwealth enacting surveillance legislation to 
cover the field, states and territories could develop uniform or mirror surveillance 
legislation. However, some stakeholders expressed reservations about this approach. 
The Australian Privacy Foundation submitted that ‘requiring agreement among the 
States and Territories is likely to lead to a protracted law reform process’.27 Professor 
Des Butler noted that 
Near uniformity was achieved in defamation laws through the actions of [the Standing 
Committee of Attorneys-General], but only after over 20 years of debate. While the 
experience with defamation laws serves as an example where uniformity is possible, 
the position regarding surveillance devices would appear to reflect such disparate 
agendas among the jurisdictions that it may be preferable for the Commonwealth to 
legislate to cover the field in this instance.28 
14.31 Given such concerns, the ALRC considers that it would be preferable for the 
Commonwealth Government to enact surveillance legislation which would apply in the 
same way throughout Australia. 
Technology neutral surveillance legislation 
Recommendation 14–2 Surveillance legislation should be technology 
neutral. It should regulate surveillance through the use of listening devices, 
optical devices, tracking devices, data surveillance devices, and other devices 
and systems. 
14.32 The ALRC recommends that surveillance legislation be technology neutral. This 
would mean that surveillance legislation could more readily be applied to any existing 
or emerging technology that could be used for surveillance. The ALRC is not 
recommending particular technology neutral definitions. However, the ALRC 
considers that the surveillance legislation should apply, at least, to the types of devices 
recognised under existing laws: listening devices, optical surveillance devices, tracking 
devices and data surveillance devices. The legislation should also apply to technologies 
that may be considered to fall outside the ordinary meaning of ‘device’, such as 
software or networked systems. 
14.33 The existing, technology-specific laws lead to inadequate protections from 
surveillance. For example: 
                                                        
26  Melbourne v Commonwealth (1947) 74 CLR 31; Austin v Commonwealth (2003) 215 CLR 185; Clarke v 
Commissioner of Taxation (2009) 240 CLR 272. 
27  Australian Privacy Foundation, Submission 110. 
28  D Butler, Submission 74. 
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• A whispered conversation in a public place may be a ‘private conversation’ and 
yet not a ‘private activity’, since the parties ought reasonably to expect to be 
observed, but ought reasonably expect not to be heard. Optical surveillance 
offences would therefore not apply, yet an optical recording of the conversation 
could be used in conjunction with lip-reading software to determine the words 
spoken.29 
• An optical recording of someone’s smart phone screen in a public place may not 
amount to surveillance of a private activity. It would also not amount to data 
surveillance, since the surveillance device laws that define ‘data surveillance 
device’ exclude optical surveillance devices from that definition.30 
• Tracking the movements of an individual using their mobile phone does not 
amount to an offence under the Surveillance Devices Act 1999 (Vic), since a 
‘tracking device’ under that Act is ‘an electronic device the primary purpose of 
which is to determine the geographical location of a person or an object’.31 By 
excluding devices with tracking capabilities that are not a primary purpose—
such as mobile phones—such a definition is limited in its application. 
14.34 In addition to recognising existing types of surveillance devices, surveillance 
legislation should also recognise emerging technologies that may be used for carrying 
out surveillance. Four technologies, in particular, have generated some degree of 
community concern: 
• unmanned aerial vehicles (drones) capable of being fitted with listening devices 
or optical surveillance devices;32 
• wearable surveillance devices;33 
• data surveillance devices in addition to those that can monitor information 
passing into or out of a computer system, such as radio frequency identification 
(RFID) readers;34 and 
                                                        
29  A similar point was made by the Victorian Law Reform Commission in Victorian Law Reform 
Commission, Surveillance in Public Places, Report 18 (2010) [6.11]. 
30  Surveillance Devices Act 2007 (NSW) s 4(1) (definition of ‘data surveillance device’); Surveillance 
Devices Act 1999 (Vic) s 3(1) (definition of ‘data surveillance device’); Surveillance Devices Act (NT) s 4 
(definition of ‘data surveillance device’). 
31  Surveillance Devices Act 1999 (Vic) s 3(1) (definition of ‘tracking device’) (emphasis added). 
32  At the time of writing, the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Social Policy and Legal 
Affairs was conducting an inquiry into the use of drones: House of Representatives Standing Committee 
on Social Policy and Legal Affairs, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into a Matter Arising from the 2012–
13 Annual Report of the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Namely the Regulation of 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (2013). Several stakeholders expressed concerns about drones: Electronic 
Frontiers Australia, Submission 44; Arts Law Centre of Australia, Submission 43; Australian Privacy 
Foundation, Submission 39; Office of the Information Commissioner, Queensland, Submission 20. The 
use of drones in farming contexts was a specific concern: Barristers’ Animal Welfare Panel and 
Voiceless, Submission 64; National Farmers’ Federation, Submission 62; RSPCA, Submission 49; 
Australian Lot Feeders’ Association, Submission 14. 
33  Electronic Frontiers Australia, Submission 44; Australian Privacy Foundation, Submission 39; D Butler, 
Submission 10; P Wragg, Submission 4. 
34  M Paterson, Submission 60. 
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• tracking devices other than more traditional self-contained devices, such as 
networks that can locate an individual moving through an area over time.35 
14.35 In many cases, these emerging technologies will fall within an existing 
definition. A drone fitted with an optical surveillance device, for example, will fall 
within the existing definitions of ‘optical surveillance device’, and a wearable 
microphone will fall within the existing definitions of ‘listening device’. In other cases, 
however, a method of surveillance may not fall within any of the existing definitions. 
A technology neutral approach would avoid this limitation. 
14.36 Submissions were generally supportive of a technology neutral approach to 
surveillance device laws.36 For example, Free TV submitted that ‘[a] technologically 
neutral definition of “surveillance device” would further promote consistency across 
devices’.37 
14.37 However, some stakeholders expressed concerns that technology neutral 
legislation may fail to capture important distinctions between different types of 
devices. The Australian Privacy Foundation submitted that 
there may well be particular technologies which give rise to specific concerns. Where 
this is the case, or where it is necessary to avoid doubt about whether or not a type of 
device is subject to the law, there may be an inescapable need for definitions to refer 
to particular technologies.38 
14.38 Similarly, the UNSW Cyberspace Law and Policy Community agreed that 
The ‘technology neutral’ idea for surveillance device is a good one in principle, but 
also needs to distinguish between very different technologies, eg drones with cameras 
and data surveillance by software, to the extent they raise different issues. In practice 
such neutrality is difficult to achieve, and may omit or overlook some of the potential 
for new or divergent technology to raise particular issues not considered previously.39 
14.39 On balance, the ALRC considers that the benefits of a technology neutral 
approach outweigh the risks. Moreover, the risks can be reduced through appropriate 
framing of other legislative provisions. First, certain types of devices, such as the four 
types falling within the existing definitions, could be explicitly defined as surveillance 
devices. This would help to ensure that such devices did not fall outside the scope of 
surveillance legislation. Secondly, many of the distinctions between different types of 
devices can be adequately reflected in the surveillance offences themselves. The ALRC 
agrees, for example, that optical surveillance devices and data surveillance devices may 
raise different issues and lend themselves to different forms of surveillance. However, 
these differences can be adequately reflected in offences that distinguish between, for 
                                                        
35  Ibid; Electronic Frontiers Australia, Submission 44. 
36  Australian Information Security Association (AISA), Submission 117; T Butler, Submission 114; Office 
of the Victorian Privacy Commissioner, Submission 108; Telstra, Submission 107; Australian Sex Party, 
Submission 92; Australian Bankers’ Association, Submission 84; Australian Pork Ltd, Submission 83; 
S Higgins, Submission 82; Guardian News and Media Limited and Guardian Australia, Submission 80; 
Women’s Legal Services NSW, Submission 76; D Butler, Submission 74. 
37  Free TV, Submission 109. 
38  Australian Privacy Foundation, Submission 110. 
39  UNSW Cyberspace Law and Policy Community, Submission 98. 
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example, recording a private activity (which might be carried out with an optical 
surveillance device) and monitoring the information entered into an information system 
(which might be carried out with a data surveillance device). The ALRC considers it 
undesirable to restrict offences to surveillance carried out using particular devices, as is 
the case under existing laws. 
14.40 The Australian Institute of Professional Photography expressed a concern that a 
technology neutral definition may be overly broad: 
‘surveillance’ and ‘surveillance devices’ need to be defined with great precision, so 
that a commercial photographer is not prevented merely from capturing activity in 
public.40 
14.41 Technology neutral legislation may be broad in scope and may capture many 
devices that can be used for legitimate purposes, such as cameras. However, although a 
broad range of devices may be captured by technology neutral laws, an offence would 
only be made out where the particular use of the device is inappropriate. Existing 
surveillance device laws require various conditions to be met for an offence to be made 
out. For example, under the Surveillance Devices Act 1998 (WA), optical surveillance 
is only an offence where it involves recording or observing a ‘private activity’ defined 
as: 
any activity carried on in circumstances that may reasonably be taken to indicate that 
any of the parties to the activity desires it to be observed only by themselves, but does 
not include an activity carried on in any circumstances in which the parties to the 
activity ought reasonably to expect that the activity may be observed.41 
14.42 Under this definition, an activity carried on in public would generally not be a 
‘private activity’, to the extent that the parties ought reasonably to expect that the 
activity may be observed. Such a definition would clearly exclude activities taking 
place, for example, in public streets, on public beaches, or at public events. It would 
not be sufficient that the activity was of a private, personal or intimate nature. 
Telecommunications surveillance 
Recommendation 14–3 The Commonwealth Government should consider 
consolidating telecommunications surveillance laws with the new 
Commonwealth surveillance legislation. 
14.43 The ALRC recommends that, if the Commonwealth enacts surveillance 
legislation, consideration be given to integrating surveillance device laws with the 
related restrictions on telecommunications surveillance under the Telecommunications 
(Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth) (the TIA Act). 
                                                        
40  Australian Institute of Professional Photography (AIPP), Submission 95. Several stakeholders expressed 
related concerns that surveillance legislation may make unlawful the legitimate activities of film makers, 
photographers, and other artists whose work involves surveillance devices: Arts Law Centre of Australia, 
Submission 113; National Association for the Visual Arts Ltd, Submission 78. 
41  Surveillance Devices Act 1998 (WA) s 3(1) (definition of ‘private activity’). 
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14.44 The existing surveillance device laws do not regulate or address the entire range 
of activities that might be thought of as ‘surveillance’. In particular, the surveillance 
device laws do not regulate surveillance of telecommunications systems. Australian 
law recognises a distinction between, on the one hand, surveillance carried out using 
devices such as cameras or listening devices and, on the other hand, surveillance 
carried out through the interception of communications. The use of the latter type of 
surveillance is primarily regulated under the TIA Act. Collection and surveillance of 
communications data (‘metadata’) is also regulated by the TIA Act. 
14.45 Although the distinction between the two types of surveillance may become less 
clear as communication technologies continue to develop, the High Court has 
established that the TIA Act ‘covers the field’ of communications surveillance.42 Thus, 
while a tape recorder placed next to the speaker of a telephone handset to record a 
private telephone conversation would engage a surveillance device law, unauthorised 
interception of that private telephone conversation would engage the TIA Act. 
14.46 The distinction between interception and surveillance is likely to become 
increasingly artificial as the convergence of computer systems and telecommunications 
systems increases. This may result in some surveillance activities being over-regulated, 
while other surveillance activities fall outside the scope of either regulatory regime. 
There may therefore be merit in integrating a federal surveillance device law with 
federal law regulating surveillance of telecommunications systems. Such integration 
may provide increased certainty to individuals, and may have the additional benefit of 
reducing the complexity of these laws for businesses and organisations that must deal 
with them. 
14.47 However, in considering any integration of these laws, it would be important to 
ensure that privacy protections of individuals were not weakened, that compliance 
burdens on businesses and organisations were not increased, and that appropriate 
oversight and monitoring mechanisms were put in place applying to all forms of 
surveillance. Differences between different types of surveillance would also need to be 
considered. For example, while surveillance with a listening device may involve an 
intention on the part of the person carrying out the surveillance to record the 
conversation of a specific individual, telecommunications surveillance may involve the 
collection or processing of data about many individuals simultaneously. On the other 
hand, special defences or exceptions may be required for surveillance-like activities—
such as the determination of individuals’ locations—that may be technologically 
necessary for the proper operation of telecommunications networks. 
Participant monitoring 
Recommendation 14–4 Surveillance legislation should not contain a 
defence or exception for participant monitoring. 
                                                        
42  Miller v Miller (1978) 141 CLR 269. 
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14.48 Existing state and territory surveillance laws differ as to whether a party to a 
private conversation or activity may record that conversation or activity without the 
consent of the other participants. Such recording is referred to as ‘participant 
monitoring’. The surveillance device laws of Queensland, Victoria and the Northern 
Territory contain participant monitoring exceptions.43 The surveillance device laws in 
the remaining jurisdictions do not contain such exceptions. This is a significant 
divergence in the protection of individuals’ privacy across Australia. 
14.49 The ALRC considers that surveillance legislation should not contain defences or 
exceptions for participant monitoring. The protections offered by surveillance device 
laws are significantly undermined if a party to a private activity (including a private 
conversation) may record the activity without the knowledge or consent of other 
parties. Where individuals take part in an activity under the reasonable belief that the 
activity is private, their privacy should not be undermined by covert surveillance by 
other parties to that activity. If individuals cannot enter such activities secure in the 
assumption that they will not be placed under surveillance by other parties, there may 
be a chilling effect that discourages individuals from taking part in some private 
activities and from speaking freely in private conversations. This is an increasing risk 
given the readily-available consumer technologies that allow for surreptitious 
recording. 
14.50 A number of stakeholders supported the removal of participant monitoring 
exceptions.44 
14.51 This recommendation is consistent with recommendations made by other law 
reform inquiries. The Victorian Law Reform Commission in its 2009 report on 
surveillance also recommended the removal of the participant monitoring exception 
from the Surveillance Devices Act 1999 (Vic): 
It is strongly arguable that it is offensive in most circumstances to record a private 
conversation or activity to which a person is a party without informing the other 
participants. Without this knowledge, those people cannot refuse to be recorded or 
alter their behaviour. These concerns apply even more strongly in the case of 
activities or conduct in private places.45 
14.52 The NSW Law Reform Commission (NSWLRC) considered, and ultimately 
rejected, a participant monitoring exception in its 1998 interim report on surveillance.46 
14.53 The ALRC’s recommendation is consistent with the approach under the TIA 
Act, which, along with the surveillance device laws, is the primary regulation of 
surveillance activities in Australia. Under s 7 of the TIA Act, the offence of 
intercepting telecommunications does not include a participant monitoring exception. 
                                                        
43  Invasion of Privacy Act 1971 (Qld) s 43(2)(a); Surveillance Devices Act 1999 (Vic) ss 6(1), 7(1); 
Surveillance Devices Act (NT) ss 11(1)(a), 12(1)(a). 
44  Australian Privacy Foundation, Submission 110; Office of the Victorian Privacy Commissioner, 
Submission 108; Australian Sex Party, Submission 92; S Higgins, Submission 82; Guardian News and 
Media Limited and Guardian Australia, Submission 80. 
45  Victorian Law Reform Commission, Surveillance in Public Places, Report 18 (2010) [6.57], rec 18. 
46  NSW Law Reform Commission, Surveillance: An Interim Report, Report 98 (2001) rec 14, [2.99]–
[2.107]. 
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14.54 Several stakeholders suggested that surveillance legislation should contain a 
participant monitoring exception, and that the focus should instead be on restricting the 
disclosure of information obtained through surveillance. For example, the ABC 
submitted that: 
it is arguable that the recording by a participant is not the problem and that it is the 
further communication of the recorded private activity which should be proscribed, 
subject to relevant defences.47 
14.55 It may be possible to develop a model of surveillance regulation based on 
restricting communication of information obtained through surveillance, rather than 
restricting the surveillance itself. On balance, however, the ALRC considers that it is 
preferable to regulate the act of surveillance itself. Surveillance, even without further 
communication of the information obtained, may in itself cause harm to the individuals 
under surveillance. The New Zealand Law Commission, for example, identified a 
range of harms that surveillance may cause an individual, regardless of whether the 
information obtained through the surveillance is communicated further. These harms 
include: 
• a chilling effect on the exercise of civil liberties; 
• loss of anonymity; 
• stress and emotional harm; 
• insecurity and loss of trust; 
• use for voyeuristic or other questionable purposes; 
• discrimination and misidentification; and 
• desensitisation to surveillance, leading to a narrowing of people’s reasonable 
expectations of privacy.48 
14.56 There may be cases where participant monitoring of a private activity, without 
the knowledge or consent of other parties, is justifiable. In particular, surveillance 
without the consent of other parties may be justified where it is reasonably necessary 
for the protection of the lawful interests of the person conducting the surveillance or 
where it is for the purposes of recording a threat or abuse.49 
14.57 The ALRC considers that these cases are more appropriately addressed through 
specific defences or exceptions, rather than through a general participant monitoring 
exception. Many such defences and exceptions are provided under existing surveillance 
device laws. A participant monitoring exception would allow surveillance even in 
                                                        
47  ABC, Submission 93. 
48  New Zealand Law Commission, Invasion of Privacy: Penalties and Remedies Report 113 (2010) 11; New 
Zealand Law Commission, Invasion of Privacy: Penalties and Remedies: Review of the Law of Privacy 
Stage 3, Issues Paper No 14 (2009) 201–204. 
49  Domestic Violence Legal Service and North Australian Aboriginal Justice Agency, Submission 120; 
Australian Privacy Foundation, Submission 110; Office of the Victorian Privacy Commissioner, 
Submission 108; J Chard, Submission 88. 
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cases where surveillance was not being used for the protection of lawful interests or for 
recording a threat or abuse. 
Responsible journalism and the public interest 
Recommendation 14–5 Surveillance legislation should provide a defence 
for responsible journalism relating to matters of public concern and importance. 
14.58 Surveillance will sometimes be necessary and justified when conducted in the 
course of responsible journalistic activities. The ALRC recommends that surveillance 
legislation include a defence for responsible journalism, particularly if participant 
monitoring exceptions are not included in surveillance legislation. Media and 
journalistic activities offer significant public benefit, and these activities may at times 
justify the use of surveillance devices without the notice or consent of the individuals 
placed under surveillance. The removal of participant monitoring exceptions, as 
recommended above, would restrict the ability of journalists to use surveillance devices 
in this way. 
14.59 For example, a journalist who records a private conversation in which a public 
figure is expected to reveal evidence of corruption would, absent a participant 
monitoring exception or other defence, have committed an offence under surveillance 
legislation. The ALRC considers that this is, generally speaking, an undesirable 
outcome that could be avoided through the introduction of a defence of responsible 
journalism. 
14.60 At the same time, the ALRC considers that a defence of responsible journalism 
should be suitably constrained. The defence should not, for example, allow unrestricted 
freedom to carry out surveillance in circumstances which are not journalistic in nature, 
where the public interest in a matter is trivial, or where the matter is merely of interest 
to the public or for the purposes of gossip. 
14.61 Consideration should be given to providing distinct responsible journalism 
defences for the distinct offences of, first, the installation or use of a surveillance 
device, and second, the communication of information obtained through surveillance. 
The circumstances that justify communication of information obtained through 
surveillance may be different from those that justify the installation or use of a 
surveillance device. A journalist is unlikely to know what information will be obtained 
under surveillance before the surveillance is completed—for example, a public official 
may or may not make a comment that suggests corruption during a particular 
recording. 
14.62 A responsible journalism defence to the installation or use of a surveillance 
device should therefore depend whether it was reasonable for the journalist to believe 
that the use of the surveillance device was in the public interest, and not on whether the 
information obtained through surveillance was, in hindsight, information in the public 
interest. However, considerations of whether the information obtained was in the 
public interest may be relevant if a responsible journalism defence is to be applied to 
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the use or communication of information obtained through surveillance, rather than the 
act of surveillance itself. 
14.63 The proposed defence of responsible journalism was supported by several 
stakeholders, although some stakeholders noted that the nature of the defence required 
further discussion and detail.50 The Australian Privacy Foundation submitted that ‘care 
would need to be exercised in defining who was entitled to an exception, as well as 
precisely limiting the circumstances in which surveillance might be permissible’ and 
noted ‘the potential for existing and emerging technologies to allow for widespread 
surveillance as part of ‘fishing expeditions’.51 
14.64 The ALRC is not recommending specific elements of such a defence, and 
further consideration would be required before such a defence was drafted. However 
some possible elements, drawn from other laws, include: 
• the surveillance should be carried out for the purposes of investigating matters 
of significant public concern, such as corruption; 
• the defendant must have reasonably believed that conducting the surveillance 
was in the public interest;52 
• the surveillance was necessary and appropriate for achieving that public interest, 
and the public interest could not have been satisfied through other reasonable 
means; and 
• the defendant must have been an employee or member of an organisation that 
had publicly committed to observing standards dealing adequately with the 
appropriate use of surveillance devices by media and journalists.53 
14.65 Historically, ‘responsible journalism’ was developed as a defence to defamation 
in Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd.54 Despite being crafted in the context of 
defamation, several of the matters listed by Nicholls LJ are relevant in the context of 
surveillance. For example, the seriousness of the conduct being investigated by a 
journalist, the likely strength of the individual under surveillance as a source of 
information, the likely nature of the information obtained, and the urgency of the 
matter may be relevant considerations.55 
14.66 The Reynolds defence was considered further in Jameel (Mohammed) v Wall 
Street Journal Europe Sprl.56 There, Lord Hoffman observed that 
                                                        
50  Office of the Victorian Privacy Commissioner, Submission 108; Guardian News and Media Limited and 
Guardian Australia, Submission 80. 
51  Australian Privacy Foundation, Submission 110. 
52  See, for example, s 4 of the Defamation Act 2013 (UK), discussed below. 
53  A similar requirement can be found in the media exemption under the Privacy Act: Privacy Act 1988 
(Cth) s 7B(4); Australian Law Reform Commission, For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and 
Practice, Report 108 (2008) Rec 42–3. 
54  Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd [2001] 2 AC 127. 
55  Ibid 205 (Nicholls LJ). 
56  Jameel (Mohammed) v Wall Street Journal Europe Sprl [2006] UKHL 44. 
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opinions may reasonably differ over which details are needed to convey the general 
message. The fact that the judge, with the advantage of leisure and hindsight, might 
have made a different editorial decision should not destroy the defence. That would 
make the publication of articles which are, ex hypothesi, in the public interest, too 
risky and would discourage investigative reporting.57 
14.67 The Reynolds defence to defamation was abolished and replaced by s 4 of the 
Defamation Act 2013 (UK). That section provides: 
4 Publication on matter of public interest 
(1) It is a defence to an action for defamation for the defendant to show that— 
(a)  the statement complained of was, or formed part of, a statement on a matter of 
public interest; and 
(b) the defendant reasonably believed that publishing the statement complained of 
was in the public interest. 
… 
(4) In determining whether it was reasonable for the defendant to believe that 
publishing the statement complained of was in the public interest, the court must 
make such allowance for editorial judgement as it considers appropriate. 
14.68 Media policies also provide some guidance on where the use of surveillance by 
media or journalists may be appropriate in the public interest. In its submission to the 
Issues Paper, the ABC noted clause 5.8 of its editorial policy, which provides guidance 
on the use of surveillance by ABC journalists: 
Secret recording and other types of deception 
5.8 Secret recording devices, misrepresentation or other types of deception must not 
be used to obtain or seek information, audio, pictures or an agreement to participate 
except where: 
a justified in the public interest and the material cannot reasonably be obtained by 
any other means; or 
b consent is obtained from the subject or identities are effectively obscured; or 
c the deception is integral to an artistic work and the potential for harm is taken into 
consideration. 
14.69 Clause 5.8(a), in particular, requires that the recording must not only be in the 
public interest but must be the only reasonable way to obtain the material. 
14.70 An alternative to a specific defence of responsible journalism is a defence of 
public interest. Such a defence would be broader than a responsible journalism 
defence, and the limits of such a defence would need to be clearly circumscribed. 
14.71 Several existing surveillance device laws include exceptions to offences where 
surveillance is carried out in the public interest. Under the Surveillance Devices Act 
1999 (Vic), the offence for communicating information obtained through surveillance 
does not apply ‘to a communication or publication that is no more than is reasonably 
                                                        
57  Ibid [51] (Lord Hoffmann). 
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necessary … in the public interest’.58 The Listening and Surveillance Devices Act 1972 
(SA) permits the use of a listening device by a party to a private conversation if the use 
is in public interest,59 and permits the communication of information obtained through 
surveillance in the public interest.60 
14.72 The Surveillance Devices Act 1998 (WA) and the Surveillance Devices Act (NT) 
each allow for emergency use of surveillance devices in the public interest,61 and each 
define ‘public interest’ to include ‘the interests of national security, public safety, the 
economic well-being of Australia, the protection of public health and morals and the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of citizens’.62 
14.73 Section 31 of the Surveillance Devices Act 1998 (WA) allows a judge to make 
an order allowing information obtained through surveillance to be published. Such an 
order requires that a person make an application for such an order and that ‘the judge is 
satisfied … that the publication or communication should be made to protect or further 
the public interest’. However, such applications have met with ‘mixed success’.63 
14.74 In Channel Seven Perth v ‘S’ (A Company),64 Channel Seven Perth appealed 
against a decision dismissing its application for an order under s 31 of the Surveillance 
Devices Act 1998 (WA). Channel Seven had asked a woman (‘M’) to secretly record a 
meeting with her manager about her dismissal due to pregnancy, and sought an order 
allowing broadcast of the recording. The Western Australian Court of Appeal 
dismissed the appeal, finding that: 
• there was public interest in the matter, relating to equal opportunity and unfair 
dismissal; 
• the circumstances of the recording indicated that the meeting between M and her 
manager was a private conversation and a private activity; 
• the manager’s purpose in explaining the reasons for M’s dismissal was to be 
encouraged, and the possibility of that explanation being recorded would act as a 
disincentive; 
• the same public interest issues could have been raised without the use of 
surveillance, notwithstanding that a recording may ‘more effectively stimulate 
audience interest in the issues’;65 and 
                                                        
58  Surveillance Devices Act 1999 (Vic) s 11(2)(b). 
59  Listening and Surveillance Devices Act 1972 (SA) s 7(1). 
60  Ibid s 7(3)(c). 
61  Surveillance Devices Act 1998 (WA) ss 5(2)(d), 6(2)(d), part 5; Surveillance Devices Act (NT) ss 
11(2)(c), 12(2)(d), 43, 44. 
62  Surveillance Devices Act 1998 (WA) s 24 (definition of ‘public interest’); Surveillance Devices Act (NT) 
s 41 (definition of ‘public interest’). 
63  David Rolph, Matt Vitins and Judith Bannister, Media Law: Cases, Materials and Commentary (Oxford 
University Press, 2010) 646. 
64  Channel Seven Perth Pty Ltd v ‘S’ (A Company) [2007] WASCA 122. 
65  Ibid [40] (McClure JA). 
 14. Surveillance Devices 293 
• if the matters relied on by Channel Seven Perth were sufficient to meet the 
public interest test of s 31, there could be ‘widespread use by the media of 
covertly obtained private information’,66 inconsistent with the language and 
purpose of the Surveillance Devices Act 1998 (WA). 
14.75 The decision in Channel Seven Perth v ‘S’ (A Company) recognises that 
surveillance may not be the only way that a particular public interest goal could be 
achieved. It may be appropriate for a defence of responsible journalism to apply only 
where the surveillance was necessary. 
14.76 The ALRC considers that a more restricted responsible journalism defence is 
preferable to a broader public interest defence. Journalists and media groups will 
typically have standards in place, such as the editorial policy of the ABC referred to 
above, and compliance with such a standard may be an important limitation of the 
defence. Furthermore, a broader public interest test may allow for wider use of 
surveillance, with defendants attempting to justify their use of surveillance devices 
based on their own subjective views about what is in the public interest. 
Workplace surveillance 
Recommendation 14–6 Workplace surveillance laws should be made 
uniform throughout Australia. 
14.77 Workplace surveillance legislation is inconsistent across jurisdictions. 
Workplace surveillance laws recognise that employers are justified in monitoring 
workplaces for the purposes of protecting property, monitoring employee performance 
or ensuring employee health and safety. However, the interests of employers must be 
balanced against employees’ reasonable expectations of privacy in the workplace. 
14.78 The ALRC received few submissions discussing workplace surveillance laws. 
The recommendations in this chapter therefore focus on the more general surveillance 
device laws. However, stakeholders who did refer to workplace surveillance laws 
supported uniformity in those laws.67 
14.79 Specific workplace surveillance laws (the workplace surveillance laws) exist 
only in NSW,68 the ACT69 and, to some extent, in Victoria.70 As with general 
surveillance device laws, uniformity in workplace surveillance laws would promote 
certainty, particularly for employers and employees located in multiple jurisdictions. 
14.80 The Surveillance Devices Act 1999 (Vic) provides an offence for the use of an 
optical device or listening device to carry out surveillance of the conversations or 
                                                        
66  Ibid. 
67  Pirate Party of Australia, Submission 119; Australian Privacy Foundation, Submission 110; Redfern Legal 
Centre, Submission 94; Guardian News and Media Limited and Guardian Australia, Submission 80. 
68  Workplace Surveillance Act 2005 (NSW). 
69  Workplace Privacy Act 2011 (ACT). 
70  Surveillance Devices Act 1999 (Vic) pt 2A. 
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activities of workers in workplace toilets, washrooms, change rooms or lactation 
rooms.71 Workplace surveillance in Victoria is otherwise subject to the same 
restrictions as general surveillance devices. 
14.81 The Workplace Privacy Act 2011 (ACT) applies to optical devices, tracking 
devices and data surveillance devices, but not to listening devices.72 The Act requires 
an employer to provide particular forms of notice to employees if one of these types of 
surveillance devices is in use in the workplace, and to consult with employees in good 
faith before surveillance is introduced.73 The Act also provides for ‘covert surveillance 
authorities’, allowing an employer to conduct surveillance without providing notice 
upon receiving an authority from a court. A covert surveillance authority will be issued 
only for the purpose of determining whether an employee is carrying out an unlawful 
activity, and is subject to various safeguards.74 The ACT Act also prohibits 
surveillance of employees in places such as toilets, change rooms, nursing rooms, first-
aid rooms and prayer rooms, and surveillance of employees outside the workplace.75 
14.82 The Workplace Surveillance Act 2005 (NSW) similarly applies only to ‘optical 
surveillance’, ‘computer surveillance’ and ‘tracking surveillance’.76 The NSW Act 
contains similar restrictions to those in the ACT. Surveillance devices must not be used 
in a workplace without sufficient notice being provided to employees,77 must not be 
used in a change room, toilet, or shower facility,78 and must not be used to conduct 
surveillance of the employee outside work.79 Covert surveillance must not be used 
unless a covert surveillance authority is obtained.80 The NSW Act also places 
limitations on the restriction of employee email and internet access while at work.81 
14.83 The inconsistencies between these workplace surveillance laws are relatively 
minor—for example, slightly different definitions apply, and the types of rooms that 
may not be put under surveillance differ slightly between each law. A more significant 
need for reform arises because specific workplace surveillance laws exist only in three 
jurisdictions. The ALRC therefore recommends that there be uniform workplace 
surveillance laws across Australia. 
                                                        
71  Ibid s 9B. 
72  Workplace Privacy Act 2011 (ACT) s 11(1) (definition of ‘surveillance device’). 
73  Ibid pt 3. 
74  Ibid pt 4. 
75  Ibid pt 5. 
76  Workplace Surveillance Act 2005 (NSW) s 3. The definition of ‘tracking surveillance’ refers to a device 
‘the primary purpose of which is to monitor or record geographical location or movement’. This is 
arguably another inconsistency in surveillance laws. The definition of ‘tracking device’ in s 4 of the 
Surveillance Devices Act 2007 (NSW) does not require that tracking be the primary purpose of the device, 
but the definition of ‘tracking device’ in s 3 of the Workplace Surveillance Act 2005 (NSW) does require 
that tracking be the primary purpose. 
77  Ibid pt 2. 
78  Ibid s 15. 
79  Ibid s 16. An exception applies where the surveillance is computer surveillance on equipment provided at 
the employer’s expense. 
80  Ibid pt 4. 
81  Ibid s 17. 
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14.84 Establishing uniform workplace surveillance laws in each of the states and 
territories would provide greater privacy protections for employees and greater 
certainty for employers operating in multiple jurisdictions. These laws could be 
contained in specific workplace surveillance laws, as they are in the ACT and NSW, or 
integrated into the more general surveillance device laws, as they are in Victoria.82 
Remedial relief and compensation 
Recommendation 14–7 Surveillance legislation should provide that a 
court may order remedial relief, including compensation, for a person subjected 
to unlawful surveillance. 
14.85 The ALRC recommends that surveillance legislation allow a court to make a 
compensation order or provide remedial relief to an individual who has been the 
subject of unlawful surveillance. This proposal was supported by several 
stakeholders.83 
14.86 A similar mechanism for compensation can be found in s 107A of the 
Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth) (the TIA Act). Under 
this section, an aggrieved individual may apply to the court for remedial relief if a 
defendant is convicted of intercepting or communicating the contents of a 
communication.84 If surveillance legislation were enacted by the Commonwealth, there 
would be merit in both surveillance legislation and the TIA Act providing similar 
options for compensation and redress. 
14.87 Criminal law generally punishes the offender without necessarily providing 
redress to the victim. While an individual who has been subjected to unlawful 
surveillance may gain some satisfaction from seeing the offender fined, and while the 
fine may dissuade the offender and others from conducting further unlawful 
surveillance in the future, the victim will generally not receive any compensation or 
other personal remedy. 
14.88 Guardian News and Media Limited and Guardian Australia did not support this 
proposal, arguing that a tort for serious invasions of privacy would be the more 
appropriate mechanism for a victim of surveillance to obtain compensation.85 
However, in order to obtain compensation in this way, the individual would be required 
                                                        
82  The latter, integrated approach was recommended by the NSWLRC: NSW Law Reform Commission, 
Surveillance: An Interim Report, Report 98 (2001) rec 57. 
83  T Butler, Submission 114; Australian Privacy Foundation, Submission 110; Office of the Victorian 
Privacy Commissioner, Submission 108; Australian Sex Party, Submission 92; S Higgins, Submission 82; 
D Butler, Submission 10. 
84  The remedies available under this section include, but are not limited to: a declaration that the 
interception or communication was unlawful; an order for payment of damages; an order, similar to or 
including, an injunction; and an order that the defendant pay the aggrieved person an amount not 
exceeding any income derived by the defendant as a result of the interception or communication: 
Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth) s 107A(7). 
85  Guardian News and Media Limited and Guardian Australia, Submission 80. 
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to undertake civil proceedings in addition to seeking a prosecution under surveillance 
legislation. The ALRC recommendation would provide a quicker, cheaper and easier 
means of redress where an offence has occurred. 
14.89 All states and territories have established victims’ compensation schemes that 
provide for compensation to be paid to victims of crimes.86 Unlike an order for 
compensation to be paid by an offender, a victims’ compensation scheme does not 
depend on an offender’s ability for compensation to be paid. However, victims’ 
compensation schemes are generally only available for serious physical crimes such as 
assault, robbery, or sexual assault,87 and surveillance is therefore unlikely to give rise 
to compensation under these schemes. 
Alternative forums for complaints about surveillance 
Recommendation 14–8 State and territory governments should give 
jurisdiction to appropriate courts and tribunals to hear complaints about the 
installation and use of surveillance devices that can monitor neighbours on 
residential property. 
14.90 The ALRC recommends that jurisdiction be conferred on appropriate courts and 
tribunals to allow residential neighbours’ disputes about the use of surveillance devices 
to be heard by appropriate courts and tribunals. A number of submissions to this 
Inquiry have raised concerns regarding CCTV cameras, installed for security in homes 
and offices that may also record the activities of neighbours. A low cost option for 
resolving disputes about surveillance devices is desirable, particularly where 
prosecution under surveillance legislation is inappropriate, undesirable or unsuccessful. 
While such a dispute might also be settled by one neighbour seeking an injunction 
against the other under the law of nuisance, as in Raciti v Hughes,88 such a process 
involves proceedings in superior courts. It would be desirable for a lower cost forum to 
be made available. 
14.91 Courts and tribunals—such as the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal 
(ACAT); the NSW Land and Environment Court (LEC); the Queensland Planning and 
Environment Court (QPEC); the State Administrative Tribunal of Western Australia 
(SAT); and the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (VCAT)—have 
                                                        
86  For a general discussion of these schemes, see Australian Law Reform Commission and NSW Law 
Reform Commission, Family Violence: A National Legal Response, ALRC Report No 114, NSWLRC 
Report 128 (October 2010) ch 4. The ABC noted the existence of these schemes in its submission to the 
Discussion Paper: ABC, Submission 93. 
87  Victims Rights and Support Act 2013 (NSW) s 5; Victims of Crime Assistance Act 1996 (Vic) ss 7–13. 
88  Raciti v Hughes (1995) 7 BPR 14, 837. The plaintiffs in this case successfully obtained an injunction to 
prevent the use of motion-triggered lights and surveillance cameras aimed at their backyard. 
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jurisdiction to hear a wide range of civil disputes and disputes relating to planning and 
development,89 as well as disputes between neighbours.90 
14.92 Many of the types of disputes that may currently be heard in these tribunals 
involve an element of privacy, and in particular the protection of privacy in disputes 
between neighbours. For example, in Walnut Tree Development v Hepburn SC91 the 
VCAT required that additional fencing be included in a development plan in order to 
enhance the privacy of a neighbouring building. In Des Forges v Kangaroo Point 
Residents Association, the QPEC set aside development approval for three residential 
towers because ‘insufficient regard has been paid to the actual intensity of the 
development, to boundary clearances, separation, privacy and the consequential effects 
on views’.92 In Meriton v Sydney City Council,93 the NSW LEC found that a building 
proposal would not have an unacceptable impact on privacy because of the particular 
angle of its windows. In Szann v Council of the City of Sydney,94 the NSW LEC 
dismissed an appeal against a council decision rejecting the use of two security 
cameras with the ability to pan and zoom, noting that a fixed lens camera would have 
provided adequate surveillance. In Szann, the Court observed that: 
The presence of the dome camera, high on the rear elevation immediately adjacent to 
the shared boundary, is a menacing panoptic mechanism, positioned to give the 
neighbours the impression of being constantly observed in their own, private rear 
courtyard. Any camera, where the lens is visible from an adjoining property or the 
public domain, gives the perception that you are under surveillance, regardless of 
whether ‘privacy masks’ are enabled to veil unwanted zones, because you cannot see 
whether a privacy mask is enabled by looking at the camera. The barrel camera body 
of the fixed lens camera provides an assurance than when you are not in front of the 
cone view of the lens, you are not under surveillance.95 
14.93 In the Discussion Paper, the ALRC asked whether local councils should be 
empowered to regulate the installation and use of surveillance devices by private 
individuals. Stakeholders were generally not supportive of local councils holding such 
a power. Concerns expressed in submissions included: 
• inconsistency and fragmentation of surveillance laws;96 
• weakening of ‘strong national standards’ of surveillance device regulation;97 
                                                        
89  The South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA) provides for the establishment of 
the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (SACAT). However, at the time of writing, the 
SACAT has not begun operation. 
90  See, for example, the Trees (Disputes Between Neighbours) Act 2006 (NSW). Many lower courts have 
jurisdiction over fencing disputes: see, eg, Fences Act 1975 (SA). 
91  Walnut Tree Development Pty Ltd v Hepburn SC [2003] VCAT 1271 (16 September 2003). 
92  Des Forges v Kangaroo Point Residents Association [2001] QPEC 61 (21 September 2001) [213]. 
93  Meriton v Sydney City Council [2004] NSWLEC 313. 
94  Szann v Council of City of Sydney [2012] NSWLEC 1168 (21 June 2012). 
95  Ibid [32]. 
96  Arts Law Centre of Australia, Submission 113; Office of the Victorian Privacy Commissioner, 
Submission 108; T Hobson, Submission 85. 
97  Australian Privacy Foundation, Submission 110. 
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• a risk of over-regulation, such as restrictions placed on photography during 
public events at public beaches;98 and 
• the limited experience of local council officers in regulating surveillance.99 
14.94 Noting these concerns about the regulation of surveillance devices by local 
councils, the ALRC considers that there remains a benefit in having complaints about 
certain types of surveillance dealt with in forums that may provide resolution with less 
cost, less time, and less impact on parties. 
14.95 The ALRC also considers that the resolution of neighbourhood disputes about 
surveillance device in courts and tribunals would avoid the concerns expressed by 
stakeholders about local council regulation: 
• courts and tribunals operate at the state and territory level, ensuring consistency 
at that level—these powers would not be to the exclusion of the Commonwealth 
surveillance legislation; 
• over-regulation of the type envisaged by stakeholders would be limited, since 
the powers would be limited to residential neighbour disputes and provided for 
under legislation; and 
• courts and tribunals have existing experience in dealing with privacy issues in 
the context of neighbour disputes. 
 
                                                        
98  Australian Institute of Professional Photography (AIPP), Submission 95. 
99  Arts Law Centre of Australia, Submission 113; Guardian News and Media Limited and Guardian 
Australia, Submission 80; National Association for the Visual Arts Ltd, Submission 78. 
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Summary 
15.1 Many serious invasions of privacy also amount to harassment. Harassment 
involves a pattern of behaviour or a course of conduct pursued by an individual with 
the intention of intimidating and distressing another person. Harassment often involves 
intruding into someone’s private space and affairs, and perhaps misusing their personal 
information. Laws that target harassment will therefore often also serve to protect 
people’s privacy. 
15.2 In this chapter, the ALRC recommends that if a privacy tort is not enacted, the 
states and territories should enact a statutory tort of harassment, to provide those 
subjected to harassment with a means of civil redress. 
15.3 Harassment legislation would provide Australians with protection similar to that 
in other countries, including the United Kingdom, New Zealand and Singapore. 
15.4 Further consideration of the detailed design of a harassment tort will be 
necessary. Generally, a new harassment tort should capture a course of conduct that is 
genuinely oppressive and vexatious, not merely irritating or annoying. The tort should 
be confined to conduct that is intentionally designed to harm or demean another 
individual. 
15.5 A harassment tort should also be the same throughout the country. The states 
and territories should therefore enact uniform legislation, if the Commonwealth does 
not have the Constitutional power to enact a harassment tort. 
15.6 This chapter also highlights some gaps and inconsistencies in existing criminal 
laws concerning harassment, as well as some challenges for their enforcement. 
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Statutory tort of harassment 
Recommendation 15–1 If a statutory cause of action for serious invasion 
of privacy is not enacted, state and territory governments should enact uniform 
legislation creating a tort of harassment. 
15.7 A serious invasion of privacy may often also amount to harassment. Harassment 
involves deliberate conduct. It may be done maliciously, to cause anxiety or distress or 
other harm, or it may be done for other purposes. Regardless of the intention, 
harassment will often cause anxiety or distress. Harassment also restricts the ability of 
an individual to live a free life. 
15.8 In some instances, harassment will clearly amount to an interference with 
someone’s privacy. For example, the following conduct—where it is repeated, 
unwanted and intended to distress and demean an individual—may amount to 
harassment and an invasion of privacy: 
• following or keeping someone under surveillance; 
• eavesdropping and wiretapping; 
• reading private letters and other private communication;1 
• using surveillance devices to monitor, intimidate or distress someone;2 
• publishing private information; 
• taking photos of someone in a private context, without their permission; and 
• making persistent and unwanted contact, such as by telephone or email.3 
15.9 The ALRC has received submissions from numerous stakeholders outlining 
different forms of behaviour that would seem to amount to both harassment and a 
serious invasion of privacy.4 
15.10 If a new tort for serious invasions of privacy is not enacted, the ALRC 
recommends the enactment of a statutory cause of action for harassment. This will help 
deter and redress some egregious types of invasion of privacy that are not currently the 
subject of effective legal protection. 
                                                        
1  Ruth Gavison, ‘Privacy and the Limits of the Law’ (1979) 89 Yale Law Journal 421, 429. 
2  In Howlett v Holding, an injunction was granted to restrain aerial surveillance under the Protection from 
Harassment Act 1997 (UK). This case involved the defendant flying banners from private aircraft 
addressed to, and referring to, the plaintiff in derogatory terms, and dropping leaflets containing 
information about the plaintiff: Howlett v Holding [2006] EWHC 41 (QB) (25 January 2006). 
3  Some of these are examples of conduct that has been the subject of claims under the Protection from 
Harassment Act 1997 (UK). 
4  Domestic Violence Legal Service and North Australian Aboriginal Justice Agency, Submission 120; 
Women’s Legal Services NSW, Submission 115; National Children and Youth Law Centre, Submission 
61; Women’s Legal Service Victoria and Domestic Violence Resource Centre Victoria, Submission 48. 
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Existing civil remedies 
15.11 There are gaps and limitations in existing civil remedies for persons subjected to 
harassment. 
15.12 Australian courts have not recognised a common law cause of action for 
harassment. In Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd, 
Gummow and Hayne JJ referred to ‘what may be a developing tort of harassment’,5 
citing the work of Professor Stephen Todd from New Zealand.6 New Zealand has now 
enacted the Harassment Act 1997 (NZ) and the courts have recognised a tort of 
intrusion into seclusion.7 
15.13 In Grosse v Purvis,8 a Queensland District Court judge recognised an actionable 
right to privacy after a finding that the defendant had persistently and intentionally 
stalked and harassed the plaintiff for six years. Because of his conclusion on the 
actionable right to privacy, there was no need to decide whether a tort of harassment 
should be recognised. 
15.14 At present, Australian law does not provide civil redress to the victims of 
harassment. There is some protection in defamation law, as well as the torts of battery 
or trespass to the person where conduct becomes physically threatening or harmful. If 
bullying or harassment, including cyber-bullying, occurs on school property within 
school hours, a school may be liable under the law of negligence on the basis of a non-
delegable duty of care.9 
15.15 However, many instances of harassment will involve a serious invasion of 
privacy and yet not give rise to an existing tort. As discussed in Chapter 3, this is a 
significant gap in the protection of privacy in the common law.10 For example, the tort 
of trespass to land can be used only where there has been an unlawful intrusion onto 
property.11 Surveillance or harassment from outside the property would not come 
within the tort. Further, the harassment may occur on property where the victim is not 
the occupier with the required title to sue for trespass.12 
15.16 Harassment may not involve any physical contact amounting to battery, or threat 
of physical contact amounting to assault.13 
                                                        
5  Australian Broadcasting Commission v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 199, [123]. 
6  Stephen Todd, ‘Protection of Privacy’ in Nicholas Mullany (ed), Torts in the Nineties (LBC Information 
Services, 6th ed, 1997). 
7  C v Holland [2012] 3 NZLR 672. The New Zealand provision is discussed further below. 
8  Grosse v Purvis [2003] QDC 151 (16 June 2003); Des A Butler, ‘A Tort of Invasion of Privacy in 
Australia?’ (2005) 29 Melbourne University Law Review 352. Doubt has been expressed about the 
correctness of Grosse v Purvis: see Ch 3. The case was settled before the defendant’s appeal was heard. 
9  Commonwealth v Introvigne (1982) 150 CLR 258. 
10  See Barbara McDonald, ‘Tort’s Role in Protecting Privacy: Current and Future Directions’ in J Edelman, 
J Goudkamp and S Degeling (eds), Torts in Commercial Law (Thomson Reuters, 2011). 
11  Plenty v Dillon (1991) 171 CLR 635. 
12  Kaye v Robertson [1991] FSR 62. 
13  Rosalie Balkin and Jim Davis, Law of Torts (LexisNexis Butterworths, 5th ed, 2013) [3.16]. 
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15.17 The tort of nuisance requires an interference with the lawful occupier’s use and 
enjoyment of land.14 Nuisance has been useful in limited cases, such as where a CCTV 
camera was erected at a neighbour’s backyard, prohibiting their use and enjoyment of 
the garden.15 However, again, a person’s right to sue is limited.16 
15.18 The tort of wilful infliction of nervous shock17 is an inadequate remedy for 
many instances of harassment, as a plaintiff must prove actual physical or psychiatric 
injury. Harassment, however, will often result only in emotional distress. 
A harassment tort 
15.19 Given these gaps, the ALRC recommends the enactment of a new tort to provide 
civil remedies, including damages, to persons subjected to harassment. Several 
stakeholders supported a statutory tort of harassment.18 The tort would be actionable 
where there is a course of conduct, linked by a common purpose and subject-matter, 
intentionally committed to cause distress and intimidation. Further work is necessary 
on the detailed design of the tort, but these might be the key elements. 
15.20 It is important that the threshold is not set too low, so the new tort does not 
capture behaviour which is merely irritating or slightly disturbing. A new tort for 
harassment would provide for a targeted avenue of civil redress where the conduct is 
not redressed by existing torts. Civil remedies, particularly compensatory damages, can 
vindicate a plaintiff’s interests.19 
15.21 Several stakeholders opposed the introduction of a statutory tort of harassment.20 
For example, the Australian Mobile Telecommunications Association and 
Communications Alliance argued that the existing privacy regulatory framework is 
adequate to prevent and redress conduct amounting to harassment.21 However, the 
ALRC considers the gaps identified above demonstrate the need for a civil action in 
privacy or harassment. 
15.22 Guardian News and Media Limited and Guardian Australia submitted that it 
would be preferable to introduce the new privacy tort than modify existing laws 
relating to harassment.22 Their submission raises the concern that a harassment tort 
does not involve a public interest balancing test, unlike the new privacy tort. Given 
                                                        
14  Ibid [14.1]. 
15  Raciti v Hughes (1995) 7 BPR 14, 837. 
16  Hunter and Others v Canary Wharf Ltd; Hunter and Others v London Docklands Corporation [1997] 
UKHL 14. 
17  Wilkinson v Downton (1897) 2 QB 57; Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Naidu (2007) 71 NSWLR 417. 
18  Domestic Violence Legal Service and North Australian Aboriginal Justice Agency, Submission 120; 
Office of the Victorian Privacy Commissioner, Submission 108; Public Interest Advocacy Centre, 
Submission 105; N Henry and A Powell, Submission 104; Australian Sex Party, Submission 92. The 
Australian Sex Party preferred a model whereby civil remedies were available for breaches of the 
criminal law. 
19  Uren v John Fairfax & Sons (1966) 117 CLR 118, 150 (Windeyer J). 
20  News Corp Australia, Submission 112; Free TV, Submission 109; AMTACA, Submission 101; ASTRA, 
Submission 99. 
21  AMTACA, Submission 101. 
22  Guardian News and Media Limited and Guardian Australia, Submission 80. 
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this, they consider that there is ‘[s]ignificant potential for an harassment style of action 
or crime to significantly impact on bona fide journalistic activities’.23 
15.23 Suitable defences would be needed for a harassment tort. The ALRC considers 
that in designing such defences, consideration should be given to ensuring the tort does 
not unreasonably affect responsible journalism on matters of public importance. 
15.24 Describing the statutory harassment action as a tort action will provide certainty 
on a number of ancillary issues that will inevitably arise. However, further work would 
need to be done on the detailed design of a cause of action for harassment. The design 
of the statutory cause of action for serious invasion of privacy in this Report may 
provide some guidance on the design of a new harassment tort, as will harassment 
actions in other countries, discussed below. 
Uniform state and territory legislation 
15.25 The ALRC recommends that the states and territories enact uniform legislation 
providing for a tort of harassment. 
15.26 It is unclear whether the Commonwealth has the power to enact a general tort of 
harassment. The Commonwealth has the power to legislate with respect to 
communications made over the internet or other electronic communications—under the 
communications power in section 51(v) of the Australian Constitution. However, the 
Constitutional basis of a more general harassment Act—covering harassment which 
occurs ‘offline’—is less certain. 
15.27 Although it is not clear, the Commonwealth’s external affairs power might also 
support a new Commonwealth harassment Act.24 It may be argued that harassment 
constitutes ‘an arbitrary or unlawful interference with … privacy, family, home or 
correspondence’,25 under art 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) to which Australia is a party. At its broadest, a person’s privacy could 
be considered to be interfered with by some forms of harassment. However, unlike 
surveillance (for example), harassment in general does not appear to be clearly 
recognised as involving interference with ‘privacy’ within the meaning of art 17 of the 
ICCPR. Article 17 has not been interpreted in General Comments of the Human Rights 
Committee, nor in case law, as involving protection from harassment. 
15.28 By way of comparison, the sexual harassment provisions in the Sex 
Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) seem to be supported by the external affairs power 
through giving effect to provisions of the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms 
of Violence against Women.26 
                                                        
23  Ibid. 
24  Australian Constitution s 51(xxix). 
25  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 
171 (entered into force 23 March 1976). 
26  Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, opened for signature 
18 December 1980, 1249 UNTS (entered into force 3 September 1981). 
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15.29 The states may also refer matters to the Commonwealth under s 51(xxxvii) of 
the Australian Constitution. 
15.30 If the Commonwealth were to enact a cause of action for harassment, the 
relevant statute might include a ‘reading down’ provision, to attempt to ensure the 
validity of the law to the extent it would operate in cases that are clearly within power. 
Another option might be for the Commonwealth to enact more limited causes of action 
for harassment. For example, a tort of harassment using internet or telecommunications 
technology would seem to be more clearly within the Commonwealth’s legislative 
powers. 
Criminal offences for harassment 
15.31 This section outlines a range of Commonwealth, state and territory criminal 
offences for conduct that amounts to harassment. There appear to be some gaps in state 
laws, and it seems Commonwealth cyber-harassment laws could be clearer and more 
actively enforced. 
State stalking and harassment laws 
15.32 State and territory laws criminalise stalking. These offences often target 
behaviour amounting to harassment.27 For example, under the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) 
s 21A, a person (the offender) stalks another person (the victim) 
if the offender engages in a course of conduct [which includes any of a wide range of 
types of conduct] with the intention of causing physical or mental harm to the victim, 
including self-harm, or of arousing apprehension or fear in the victim for his or her 
own safety or that of any other person. 
15.33 There are also state and territory offences that capture harassment at work, in 
family or domestic contexts, and in schools and other educational institutions. For 
example, the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 60E provides that it is an offence to ‘assault, 
stalk, harass or intimidate any school student or member of staff of a school, while the 
student or member of staff is attending a school’. 
15.34 Section 8(1) of the Crime (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW) 
defines stalking as ‘the following of a person about or the watching or frequenting of 
the vicinity of, or an approach to a person’s place of residence, business or work or any 
place that a person frequents for the purposes of any activity’. This Act is confined to 
persons experiencing domestic or family violence. 
15.35 Some types of serious harassment may not be caught by existing criminal 
offences. State and territory stalking offences, for example, are limited in their ability 
to protect individuals from harassment which does not involve the apprehension of 
actual violence. Stalking offences usually capture threatening conduct and require the 
                                                        
27  Criminal Code (Cth) s 189; Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW) s 13; Criminal 
Code Act 1899 (Qld) s 395B; Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 19AA; Criminal Code Act 
1924 (Tas) s 192; Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 21A; Criminal Code Act Compilation Act 1913 (WA) s 338D; 
Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) s 35. 
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victim to apprehend actual violence or to fear harm.28 However, persistent unwanted 
attention, communication or contact which does not meet this threshold could 
undoubtedly still cause significant harm and distress, and disrupt a person’s life. 
15.36 Differences between state and territory stalking offences may also undermine 
their effectiveness. For example, in many states, stalking requires a course of conduct 
covering at least two incidents,29 but in Tasmania, stalking may be based upon one 
incident.30 
15.37 Several stakeholders supported the consolidation and clarification of existing 
state and territory stalking criminal offences.31 The National Children’s and Youth Law 
Centre highlighted the need to ‘address the gaps’ in the current legal frameworks for 
cyber-bullying and harassment.32 The Public Interest Advocacy Centre and Women’s 
Legal Services NSW both supported a uniform approach to the criminalisation of 
harassment while cautioning against any consolidation process which may adopt a 
‘lowest common denominator’ approach.33 Uniformity in state and territory stalking 
provisions may deserve further consideration. 
Commonwealth cyber-harassment laws 
15.38 Commonwealth law criminalises cyber-harassment, but does not provide for a 
general offence of harassment. The Commonwealth Criminal Code, set out in the 
schedule to the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), provides for an offence of ‘using a 
carriage service to menace, harass or cause offence’34 and ‘using a carriage service to 
make a threat’.35 These would capture conduct amounting to harassment, for example, 
via the internet, including social media, and telephone.36 Examples of prosecutions 
under this offence include posting offensive pictures and comments on Facebook 
tribute pages;37 posting menacing messages on Facebook;38 and sending repeated 
menacing emails.39 The maximum penalty under s 474.17 is currently three years 
imprisonment. The maximum fine is $19,800 for a natural person and $99,000 for a 
body corporate. 
                                                        
28  See for example, Criminal Code Act (NT) s 189(1A). 
29  Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) s 359A; Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) s 35. 
30  Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas) s 192. 
31  Women’s Legal Services NSW, Submission 115; Free TV, Submission 109; Public Interest Advocacy 
Centre, Submission 105; ASTRA, Submission 99; Australian Sex Party, Submission 92; S Higgins, 
Submission 82; National Children and Youth Law Centre, Submission 61. 
32  National Children and Youth Law Centre, Submission 61. 
33  Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 105. 
34  Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) sch, s 474.17. 
35  Ibid sch, s 474.15. 
36  At the Bullying, Young People and the Law Symposium hosted by the Alannah and Madeline Foundation 
in Sydney in July 2013, delegates recommended that Australian governments introduce a specific, and 
readily understandable, criminal offence of bullying, including cyber-bullying, involving a comparatively 
minor penalty to supplement existing laws which are designed to deal with more serious forms of 
conduct. 
37  R v Hampson [2011] QCA 132. 
38  Agostino v Cleaves [2010] ATSC 19. 
39  R v Ogawa [2009] QCA 307. 
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15.39 There are also Commonwealth laws to protect victims of family violence from 
harassment, including harassment via electronic communications. For example, 
stalking is included in the definition of ‘family violence’ in the Family Law Act 1975 
(Cth).40 
15.40 Some have suggested that the Commonwealth criminal offences for cyber-
harassment might be more actively enforced, and perhaps made clearer. At the time of 
writing this Report, the federal Department of Communications was conducting a 
review into online safety for children.41 Among other issues, the Department has been 
asked to consider simplifying the meaning and application of s 474.17 of the Criminal 
Code, although some stakeholders have suggested the law is appropriate. For example, 
the Australian Federal Police said the section was ‘more than adequate to facilitate 
prosecution of cyber-bullying cases where appropriate’, and argued that ‘the breadth of 
section 474.17 is its strength, capturing a wide range of behaviours in a rapidly 
evolving online environment’.42 
15.41 Some suggested that the law only needs to be more widely known or actively 
enforced, and that an education campaign might be necessary. Some commentators 
claim that, despite a high rate of parental reporting of cyber-bullying, there appears to 
be a lack of adequate knowledge or training about the applicability of the provision.43 
Facebook also supported education and awareness-raising measures to explain the 
application of the offence.44 Google submitted that the problem ‘is not that the laws 
don’t exist, but rather that there is a general lack of awareness of the existing criminal 
and civil laws that are available’.45 
15.42 Since the commencement of the relevant provision in 2005, and January 2014, 
there were 308 successful prosecutions under s 474.17 of the Commonwealth Criminal 
Code including eight prosecutions involving defendants under the age of 18.46 The 
ALRC was advised by the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecution that 74% of 
convictions were the result of referrals from state and territory police.47 Only 22.6% of 
successful convictions were made by the Australian Federal Police. In consultations the 
ALRC heard concerns raised that state and territory police may be unwilling or unable 
to enforce criminal offences due to a lack of training and expertise in Commonwealth 
procedure which often differs significantly from state and territory police procedures. 
                                                        
40  Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 4AB(2)(c). 
41  Australian Government, ‘Enhancing Online Safety for Children: Public Consultation on Key Election 
Commitments’ (Department of Communications, January 2014). The Government has founded an Online 
Safety Consultative Working Group to provide advice to government on online safety issues. 
42  Australian Federal Police, Submission 67. 
43  Aashish Srivastava, Roger Gamble and Janice Boey, ‘Cyberbullying in Australia: Clarifying the Problem, 
Considering the Solutions’ (2013) 21 International Journal of Children’s Rights 25. 
44  Facebook, Submission to Department of Communication’s Enhancing Online Safety for Children Report 
2014. 
45  Google, Submission to Department of Communication’s Enhancing Online Safety for Children Report 
2014. 
46  Australian Government, above n 41, 21. 
47  Advice correspondence, CDPP, 2 May 2014. 
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15.43 The Department of Communications outlined three options for reform to 
s 474.17. First, to retain the existing provision and implement education programs to 
raise awareness of its potential application. Second, to create a cyber-bullying offence 
with a civil penalty regime for minors. Third, to create a take-down system and 
accompanying infringement notice scheme to regulate complaints about online content. 
Harassment laws in other countries 
15.44 The Protection from Harassment Act 1997 (UK) creates criminal offences when 
a person engages in a ‘course of conduct’ that amounts to harassment.48 It is an offence 
for a person to pursue a course of conduct which amounts to harassment of another and 
which they know or ought to know amounts to harassment.49 Harassment is defined as 
having occurred if ‘a reasonable person in possession of the same information would 
think the course of conduct amounted to harassment’.50 
15.45 Importantly, the UK Act also provides for the award of civil remedies, including 
injunctions and damages to victims of harassment. Courts are empowered to issue a 
civil non-harassment order. Where a person is convicted of the offence of harassment, 
a prosecutor may apply to the court to make a non-harassment order against the 
offender requiring them to refrain from ‘such conduct in relation to the victim as 
specified in the order for such periods may be specified’.51 
15.46 New Zealand’s Harassment Act 1997 empowers a court to issue civil 
harassment restraining orders and provides for a criminal offence of harassment where 
a person intends to cause fear to another person.52 A person who is prosecuted for 
harassment can face up to two years imprisonment.53 Plaintiffs can also apply to a court 
for a civil restraining order to prevent conduct amounting to harassment, breach of 
which will lead to penalties.54 Where the Act does not provide for compensation for 
victims, the common law in New Zealand has developed a tort of intrusion upon 
seclusion, which has been used to provide compensation for victims of harassment.55 
15.47 A range of behaviours amounting to harassment have been successfully targeted 
through the UK and NZ harassment acts.56 These include conduct by individuals such 
as ‘trolling’ on social media, posting of private photographs and the use of fake online 
profiles to harass individuals. 
                                                        
48  Protection from Harassment Act 1997 (UK) ss 1, 2. The UK Supreme Court recently discussed the 
complexity in interpreting the Act: Hayes (FC) v Willoughby [2013] UKSC 17. 
49  Protection from Harassment Act 1997 (UK) s 1. 
50  Ibid s 1(2). 
51  Ibid s 11. 
52  Harassment Act 1997 (NZ) s 8. 
53  Ibid. 
54  Ibid s 9. 
55  C v Holland [2012] 3 NZLR 672. 
56  For example, cases of workplace harassment: Majrowski v Guy’s and St Thomas’ NHS Trust [2006] 
UKHL 34; aerial surveillance over private property: Howlett v Holding [2006] EWHC 41 (QB); 
restraining media and paparazzi from following individuals: Thomas v News Group Newspapers Ltd 
[2002] EMLR 78. 
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15.48 At the time of writing this Report, New Zealand’s government was also 
considering legislation to tackle ‘harmful digital communications’ by way of the 
Harmful Digital Communications Bill 2013. If enacted, the legislation would prohibit 
an individual from sending a message to another person—for example by text, online 
publication or email—where the conduct of that message is grossly indecent, obscene, 
menacing or knowingly false, and where the sender intends the message to cause 
emotional distress to the recipient.57 This offence would be punishable by up to three 
months imprisonment or a NZ$2,000 fine. 
15.49 Singapore’s Protection from Harassment Act 2014 criminalises stalking and 
other forms of anti-social behaviour. The Act provides for a civil action of harassment 
whereby plaintiffs can receive an award of damages. Courts are also empowered under 
the Act to issue civil protection orders against offenders and have the power to remove 
offending material from a platform such as the internet.58 
15.50 Other jurisdictions have enacted legislation to specifically target cyber-harms 
and so-called ‘revenge pornography’.59 Revenge pornography is understood as the 
collection and distribution of sexually graphic images of an individual without their 
consent, with the deliberate intention of embarrassing, demeaning and distressing that 
individual. These images are often taken consensually during an intimate relationship. 
15.51 For example, Nova Scotia’s Cyber-Safety Act 2013 creates a tort of cyber-
bullying so that ‘a person who subjects another person to cyber-bullying commits a tort 
against that person’.60 Cyber-bullying is defined as using  
electronic communication through the use of technology, including … social 
networks, text messaging, instant messaging, websites and electronic mail … typically 
repeated or with continuing effect, that is intended or ought reasonably to be expected 
to cause fear, intimidation, humiliation, distress or other damage or harm to another 
person’s health, emotional well-being, self-esteem or reputation.61  
15.52 In an action for cyber-bullying under this Act, a court may award damages 
including general, special, aggravated and punitive damages.62 A court may also issue 
an injunction,63 or make an order that the court considers ‘just and reasonable in the 
circumstances’.64 
15.53 These laws provide a useful model for Australian legislatures when enacting a 
statutory tort of harassment, or other harassment legislation. 
                                                        
57  Harmful Digital Communications Bill 2013 (NZ) cl 19. 
58  Prior to the enactment of the Protection from Harassment Act 2014, the Miscellaneous Offences (Public 
Order and Nuisance) Act ch 184, ss13A–D criminalised offline harassment. 
59  Eg, New Jersey legislation criminalises the reproduction or disclosure of images of sexual contact without 
consent: NJ Rev Stat § 2C:14-9 (2013). 
60  Cyber-Safety Act, SNS 2013, c 2 2013 s 3(b). 
61  Ibid. 
62  Cyber-Safety Act 2013 (SNS) s 22(1)(a). 
63  Ibid s 22(1)(b). 
64  Ibid s 22(1)(c). 
 16. New Regulatory Mechanisms 
 
Contents 
Summary 309 
Privacy Commissioner investigations for serious invasions of privacy 310 
Deletion, removal and de-identification 312 
Complaints about media invasions of privacy 314 
Conciliation process 316 
Amicus curiae and intervener functions 317 
An amicus curiae function for the Commissioner 318 
An intervener function for the Commissioner 318 
Deletion of personal information 319 
Review of the small business exemption 321 
 
 
Summary 
16.1 This chapter sets out recommendations about new regulatory mechanisms to 
reduce and redress serious invasions of privacy. The new regulatory powers the ALRC 
recommends in this chapter are not intended to be an alternative to a statutory tort for 
serious invasions of privacy—although, in the absence of a statutory tort, the new 
regulatory powers would increase the legal protection of privacy. Rather, the new 
regulatory powers would complement a statutory tort, providing a low cost alternative 
to litigation, which may, in some cases, lead to a satisfactory outcome for parties. 
16.2 The ALRC recommends that consideration be given to conferring extended 
powers on the Privacy Commissioner to investigate complaints about serious invasions 
of privacy. This would provide a forum for consideration of complaints about serious 
invasions of privacy without requiring parties to commit the time and resources that 
might be needed for court proceedings. Under these extended powers, the 
Commissioner could be given the power to recommend the non-publication or removal 
of private information from publication. However, court action would be required to 
enforce such a recommendation. 
16.3 The ALRC also recommends conferring additional functions on the Privacy 
Commissioner to act as amicus curiae or intervener in court proceedings, with the leave 
of the court, where the Commissioner considers it appropriate. 
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Privacy Commissioner investigations for serious invasions of 
privacy 
Recommendation 16–1 The Commonwealth Government should consider 
extending the Privacy Commissioner’s powers so that the Commissioner may 
investigate complaints about serious invasions of privacy and make appropriate 
declarations. Such declarations would require referral to a court for enforcement. 
16.4 There may be a number of benefits to empowering the Privacy Commissioner to 
investigate complaints about serious invasions of privacy, in addition to providing a 
cause of action allowing individuals to undertake court proceedings for serious 
invasion of privacy.1 These benefits may include: 
• greater accessibility and lower cost of a complaints mechanism as compared to 
court proceedings;2 
• use of the Commissioner’s experience and expertise in handling privacy 
complaints;3 
• benefits of providing the Commissioner with a formal role in addressing serious 
invasions of privacy, including the benefits of avoiding the fragmentation that 
might occur if the Commissioner had no such role;4 and 
• significant public awareness of the Commissioner in relation to privacy 
concerns.5 
16.5 The mechanism might face challenges, including: 
• the need for additional resources to be provided to the Commissioner; and 
• the limitations of exemptions in the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth), which generally 
does not apply to individuals, small businesses or media organisations. 
16.6 A power for the Commissioner to investigate complaints about serious invasions 
of privacy could be integrated with the Commissioner’s existing powers to investigate 
                                                        
1  Under the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth), privacy functions are conferred on the Australian Information 
Commissioner. However, in the 2014 Budget, the Australian Government announced an intention to 
disband the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner. The Privacy Commissioner would hold 
an independent statutory position within the Australian Human Rights Commission. At the time of 
writing, these changes have not taken place. In this Report, the ALRC uses the terms ‘Privacy 
Commissioner’ and ‘Commissioner’ to refer to the person exercising the privacy functions under the 
Privacy Act. 
2  ACCAN, Submission 106; Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Submission 90; 
G Greenleaf, Submission 76.  
3  Australian Privacy Foundation, Submission 110; Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, 
Submission 90; G Greenleaf, Submission 76. 
4  Australian Privacy Foundation, Submission 110; Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, 
Submission 90; G Greenleaf, Submission 76. 
5  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Submission 90. 
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complaints about breaches of information privacy. The Privacy Act currently provides 
for complaints to be made to the Commissioner where there may have been an 
‘interference with the privacy of an individual’.6 Under the Act, an interference with 
the privacy of an individual will have occurred where there has been a breach of: 
• any of the Australian Privacy Principles (APPs);7 
• a registered APP code;8 
• the credit reporting provisions or the registered CR code;9 
• certain rules relating to tax file numbers;10 or 
• certain provisions of other legislation, where that legislation provides that a 
particular act or conduct is an interference with the privacy of an individual for 
the purposes of the Privacy Act.11 
16.7 The Privacy Act could be amended to provide that a serious invasion of privacy 
would also be an interference with the privacy of an individual. This approach was 
suggested by Professor Graham Greenleaf, who submitted that, if an Act providing for 
the tort for serious invasions of privacy were enacted: 
a new sub-section 13(6) should be added to the Privacy Act 1988: ‘(6) A serious 
invasion of privacy under the [Act providing the statutory tort] is an interference with 
the privacy of an individual …’12 
16.8 In the event that an interference with the privacy of an individual occurs, the 
Commissioner has the power to receive and investigate a complaint from the individual 
whose privacy has been interfered with, or to begin an ‘own motion investigation’ of 
the interference.13 Following an investigation, the Commissioner may make a 
determination including various declarations, such as a declaration that the respondent 
to the complaint must take specified actions, a declaration that the respondent must 
take steps to redress any loss or damage suffered by the complainant, or a declaration 
that the complainant is entitled to a specified amount of compensation.14 A 
determination following an investigation is enforceable through the Federal Court and 
Federal Circuit Court, on application of either the complainant or the Commissioner.15 
If a serious invasion of privacy was also an interference with the privacy of an 
                                                        
6  Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) s 36. 
7  Ibid s 13(1). 
8  Ibid. 
9  Ibid s 13(2). 
10  Ibid s 13(4). 
11  An interference with the privacy of an individual can arise, for example, under Anti-Money Laundering 
and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006 (Cth) s 35L. 
12  G Greenleaf, Submission 76. As noted in Professor Greenleaf’s submission, if a new section in the 
Privacy Act referred to ‘an act’, a range of exemptions, such as the media exemption under s 7B(4), 
would take effect, limiting the effect of the new provisions.  
13  Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) ss 36, 40. 
14  Ibid s 52(1). Similar declarations may be made in the case of an own motion investigation: ibid s 52(1A). 
15  Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) s 55A. 
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individual under the Privacy Act, these same determinations could be made following a 
complaint to the Commissioner about a serious invasion of privacy. 
16.9 Further consequences of an interference with the privacy of an individual under 
the Privacy Act include: 
• where an interference with the privacy of an individual is ‘serious’ or ‘repeated’, 
the Commissioner is empowered to seek civil pecuniary penalties from the 
Federal Court or Federal Circuit Court;16 and 
• where a person has engaged in, or is engaging in, conduct that contravenes the 
Act, an individual or the Commissioner may apply to the Federal Court or the 
Federal Circuit Court for an injunction.17 
16.10 The media, small businesses and individuals are not exempt from liability under 
the tort for serious invasions of privacy discussed in Part 2 of this Report. However, 
they are generally exempt from regulation under the Privacy Act.18 If the 
Commissioner’s functions were extended to hear complaints about serious invasions of 
privacy, this should include complaints about invasions of privacy by the media, small 
business and individuals. There would be little value in extending the Commissioner’s 
powers if the existing exemptions also applied to complaints made under the extended 
powers. The amendments to the Privacy Act would need to make this clear. 
16.11 Before any extended powers were conferred on the Commissioner, consideration 
would need to be given to whether or not the extended powers would require the 
Commissioner to exercise a judicial power. The Australian Constitution restricts the 
conferral of judicial powers on non-judicial bodies.19 Although ‘judicial power’ has not 
been exhaustively defined, one characteristic of a judicial power is its binding nature.20 
A determination under the Privacy Act complaints process is not binding, since it must 
be enforced through action in the Federal Court or Federal Magistrates Court. This 
suggests that the Privacy Act does not confer judicial powers on the Commissioner.21 
Deletion, removal and de-identification 
16.12 The Commissioner’s existing powers in relation to an interference with the 
privacy of an individual include a power to make a declaration that the respondent 
                                                        
16  Ibid ss 13G, 80W. 
17  Ibid s 98. This provision appears to be rarely used. However, it provides a useful means for an individual 
to seek relief for a breach of the Privacy Act. 
18  For the media exemption, see Privacy Act s 7B(4). For the small business exemption, see Privacy Act 
ss 6C(1), 6D. For the exemption for individuals, see Privacy Act s 16. Individuals will also generally fall 
outside the definition of relevant types of entities; see, for example, Privacy Act s 6(1) (definition of ‘APP 
entity’). 
19  R v Kirby; ex parte Boilermakers’ Society of Australia (1956) 94 CLR 254. 
20  Brandy v Human Rights & Equal Opportunity Commission (1995) 183 CLR 245, 268 (Deane, Dawson, 
Gummow, McHugh JJ). 
21  An example of a regulator being found to have exercised a judicial function can be found in Today FM 
(Sydney) v Australian Communications and Media Authority (2014) 307 ALR 1. There, the Full Federal 
Court found that the Australian Communications and Media Authority had exercised a judicial power in 
finding that a broadcaster had breached a licence condition by committing a criminal offence. 
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‘must not repeat or continue such conduct’22 or a declaration that the respondent ‘must 
take specified steps within a specified period to ensure that such conduct is not 
repeated or continued’.23 It appears that such declarations may require the respondent 
to delete, remove or de-identify personal information. 
16.13 A number of stakeholders supported the introduction of a regulator take-down 
mechanism.24 However, there is a risk that such a system may have an undesirably 
chilling effect on online freedom of expression, and any such power would need to 
balance the interests of the complainant against the interests of the party in publishing 
the material and broader public interests. The power would need to be exercised with 
caution. 
16.14 The existing availability of declarations that a respondent to a complaint not 
repeat or continue the conduct complained about may provide a suitable mechanism for 
individuals to seek to have information removed, while avoiding the chilling effect that 
may come from other take-down mechanisms. There may be no need to confer 
substantial new powers on the Commissioner, beyond the power to investigate 
complaints about serious invasions of privacy. Furthermore, a declaration that a 
respondent must not repeat or continue the conduct complained about would not, by 
itself, be enforceable; the complainant would need to apply to the Federal Court or 
Federal Circuit Court for enforcement if the respondent refused to comply with the 
Commissioner’s declaration. 
16.15 Several stakeholders were opposed to any take-down mechanism on the grounds 
that such a mechanism may, in some cases, be ineffective.25 The Australian Mobile 
Telecommunications Association and Communications Alliance submitted that, given 
the speed and volume at which content is created and published online, 
the implementation of such a system is likely to be impossible to comply with and 
costly and time-consuming for government and business, as well as being ineffective 
in relation to user-generated content.26 
16.16 Several other organisations noted the difficulty of effectively removing 
information that has become more widely available,27 or where the respondent is 
located overseas.28 
                                                        
22  Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) s 52(1)(b)(i). 
23  Ibid s 52(1)(b)(ia). 
24  Domestic Violence Legal Service and North Australian Aboriginal Justice Agency, Submission 120; 
Pirate Party of Australia, Submission 119; Women’s Legal Services NSW, Submission 115; T Butler, 
Submission 114; Australian Privacy Foundation, Submission 110; Office of the Victorian Privacy 
Commissioner, Submission 108; UNSW Cyberspace Law and Policy Community, Submission 98; 
Redfern Legal Centre, Submission 94; Australian Sex Party, Submission 92; J Chard, Submission 88; 
S Higgins, Submission 82; I Turnbull, Submission 81. 
25  Telstra, Submission 107; AMTACA, Submission 101; Australian Bankers’ Association, Submission 84. 
26  AMTACA, Submission 101. 
27  Australian Communications and Media Authority, Submission 121; Pirate Party of Australia, Submission 
119. 
28  Australian Communications and Media Authority, Submission 121; Pirate Party of Australia, Submission 
119; UNSW Cyberspace Law and Policy Community, Submission 98; Office of the Australian 
Information Commissioner, Submission 90. 
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16.17 The ALRC acknowledges that a take-down mechanism may have limited effect 
in cases where material has been widely disseminated or where material is hosted 
overseas. However, the ALRC considers that the possibility of the mechanism having 
limited effect in some cases is not, in itself, a reason not to make the mechanism 
available in those cases where it may be effective. This is particularly the case given 
that the Commissioner is already empowered to make the relevant declarations under 
the existing provisions of the Privacy Act. 
Complaints about media invasions of privacy 
16.18 In the Discussion Paper, the ALRC proposed an extension of the powers of the 
Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA). However, the ALRC has 
concluded that such declarations would be more appropriately made by the Privacy 
Commissioner. 
16.19 The proposed extension would have allowed the ACMA to make a declaration 
that the complainant was entitled to a specified amount of compensation, in response to 
a complaint about a serious invasion of privacy in breach of a broadcasting code of 
conduct. This would have been equivalent to the powers of the Privacy Commissioner. 
16.20 Although the Commissioner already has such powers under the Privacy Act,29 
the relevant provisions of the Privacy Act do not apply to a media organisation acting 
in a journalistic capacity if the organisation has publicly committed to observing 
privacy standards.30 The result is that an individual whose privacy is invaded by a 
broadcaster has little access, if any, to regulatory mechanisms providing for 
compensatory redress. 
16.21 The ACMA’s powers with respect to broadcasting codes of conduct are 
provided under the Broadcasting Services Act 1992 (Cth). These powers are primarily 
exercised by promoting self-regulation—in which industry members regulate 
themselves under industry guidelines, codes or standards; and co-regulation—in which 
industry members develop guidelines, codes or standards that are enforceable under 
legislation. 
16.22 If a code is breached, the ACMA may: determine an industry standard;31 make 
compliance with the code a condition of the broadcaster’s licence;32 or accept an 
enforceable undertaking from the broadcaster that the broadcaster will comply with the 
code.33 Further consequences exist, including civil penalties, criminal penalties and 
suspension or cancellation of a broadcaster’s licence, for a breach of a standard,34 a 
licence condition35 or an enforceable undertaking.36 If a complaint is made against the 
                                                        
29  Under Privacy Act s 52(1A)(d), the Australian Information Commissioner, in response to a complaint, 
may make a determination including a declaration that the respondent pay an amount of compensation to 
the complainant. 
30  Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) s 7B(4). 
31  Broadcasting Services Act 1992 (Cth) s 125. 
32  Ibid s 44. 
33  Ibid s 205W. 
34  Ibid pt 9B div 5. 
35  Ibid pt 10 div 3. 
36  Ibid pt 14D. 
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ABC or SBS, the ACMA may recommend that the broadcaster take action to comply 
with the relevant code, or that the broadcaster take other action including publishing an 
apology or retraction.37 
16.23 There was significant opposition from broadcasters and media organisations to 
the proposal to extend the ACMA’s powers. A key argument among broadcasters was 
that the proposal was inconsistent with the ACMA’s existing role as the manager of a 
co-regulatory scheme which has the goal of ‘encouraging broadcasters to reflect 
community standards’.38 The Australian Subscription Television and Radio 
Association (ASTRA) submitted, for example, that 
Such a proposal would represent a significant shift in the functions and powers of the 
ACMA. The ACMA does not currently have the power to order compensation be paid 
to an individual in relation to a breach of any broadcasting code of practice, 
broadcasting licence condition or any other obligation on broadcasters established 
under the Broadcasting Services Act 1992 (BSA). This does not represent a 
‘limitation’ of the ACMA’s powers under the BSA—rather, it reflects … the intention 
of the regulatory framework for broadcasting established by Parliament.39 
16.24 Stakeholders—including the ACMA itself—were also concerned that, if the 
ACMA were empowered to suggest compensation for invasions of privacy, there 
would be increased fragmentation of privacy protections. This fragmentation would 
result in confusion and complexity for individuals and organisations: 
• different regulators would regulate privacy in different sectors;40 
• the new power would apply only to breaches of broadcasting codes involving 
serious invasions of privacy, and not to other breaches of the codes;41 
• within the media sector, different regulatory schemes would apply to different 
forms of media.42 
16.25 The risks of fragmentation under the proposed ACMA power are, to a large 
extent, an unavoidable consequence of the fragmented nature of media regulation in 
Australia. While the ACMA has powers relating to broadcast media under the 
Broadcasting Services Act, regulation of non-broadcast media is a matter of self-
regulation by the Australian Press Council. 
16.26 Although a number of stakeholders were supportive of the proposed ACMA 
power,43 the ALRC has determined, in view of the changes to the existing regulatory 
landscape that would be involved, not to proceed with the proposal. 
                                                        
37  Ibid ss 150–152. 
38  Australian Communications and Media Authority, Submission 121. 
39  ASTRA, Submission 99. See also SBS, Submission 123; Free TV, Submission 109. 
40  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Submission 90. 
41  Australian Communications and Media Authority, Submission 121. 
42  SBS, Submission 123. 
43  Domestic Violence Legal Service and North Australian Aboriginal Justice Agency, Submission 120; 
T Butler, Submission 114; Australian Privacy Foundation, Submission 110; S Higgins, Submission 82; 
I Turnbull, Submission 81; G Greenleaf, Submission 76; D Butler, Submission 74.  
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16.27 The ACMA suggested, as an alternative to the proposed new power, that the 
ACMA should be empowered:  
[to] refer found privacy breaches to the [Office of the Australian Information 
Commissioner] to make a determination as to the seriousness of the breach, to provide 
for conciliation and to make [a] declaration as to the amount of any compensation 
payable.44 
16.28 Noting that the ACMA’s role, as discussed above, is not to provide individual 
redress, the ALRC agrees that the Privacy Commissioner is an appropriate body to 
make declarations relating to compensation for serious invasions of privacy. However, 
if the Commissioner’s powers are extended to include investigating complaints about 
serious invasions of privacy by broadcasters or other media, the media exemption of 
the Privacy Act should not apply in respect of complaints about serious invasions of 
privacy. The media exemption could, however, continue to apply in respect of 
information privacy under others parts of the Privacy Act. 
Conciliation process 
16.29 An alternative to extending the Commissioner’s existing investigation powers is 
a conciliation process operated by the Commissioner. Such a conciliation process could 
be similar to that used by the Australian Human Rights Commission (AHRC). Under pt 
IIB of the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth), the President of the 
AHRC may attempt to conciliate a complaint alleging unlawful discrimination. In 
certain circumstances—for example, where the President of the AHRC is satisfied that 
there is no reasonable prospect of the matter being settled by conciliation—a complaint 
may be taken to the Federal Court or the Federal Circuit Court.45 
16.30 The Law Institute of Victoria expressed a preference for this type of model, 
whereby 
the Privacy Commissioner would be providing alternative dispute resolution services, 
rather than making a finding about the claim. If the dispute is not resolved, the 
plaintiff would be required to pursue the claim through the courts.46 
16.31 A conciliation process would not be binding on parties. However, conciliation 
may lead to satisfactory outcomes for both parties, without the need to resort to court 
proceedings. In the event that conciliation was unsuccessful, the complaint could be 
taken to a court under the tort for serious invasions of privacy, if that statutory tort 
were enacted. 
16.32 The conciliation process would thus provide an initial low cost mechanism for 
resolving disputes. Such a process need not be mandatory. However, the ALRC 
recommends that a failure to make a reasonable attempt at conciliation should be a 
factor considered by a court in the event that damages were to be awarded.47 
                                                        
44  Australian Communications and Media Authority, Submission 121. 
45  The usefulness of the AHRC’s conciliation function as a model was noted by the Media and 
Communications Committee of the Law Council of Australia, Submission 124. 
46  Law Institute of Victoria, Submission 96. 
47  See Ch 12 and in particular Rec 12–2. 
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Amicus curiae and intervener functions 
Recommendation 16–2 The following functions should be conferred on 
the Privacy Commissioner: 
(a) to assist a court as amicus curiae, where the Commissioner considers it 
appropriate, and with the leave of the court; and 
(b) to intervene in court proceedings, where the Commissioner considers it 
appropriate, and with the leave of the court. 
16.33 The ALRC recommends that the Privacy Commissioner be given new functions 
to act as amicus curiae (‘friend of the court’) or to intervene in legal proceedings 
relating to serious invasions of privacy. These functions would be additional to a range 
of existing functions conferred on the Commissioner under Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) 
ss 27–29, including: preparing guidance about the Act; monitoring the privacy impacts 
of new laws; and providing advice about the operation of the Act. 
16.34 These amicus curiae and intervener functions would be similar to functions 
conferred on other administrative bodies—such as the Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission (ACCC), the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission (ASIC) and the AHRC. 
16.35 Stakeholders who commented on the ALRC’s proposal were generally 
supportive of the Commissioner being given amicus curiae and intervener functions.48 
The Office of the Australian Information Commissioner (OAIC) suggested that it 
should be given amicus curiae and intervener roles in its submission to the Issues 
Paper.49 In its submission to the Discussion Paper, the OAIC noted that amicus curiae 
and intervener roles would be particularly appropriate if the OAIC had a greater role in 
hearing complaints about serious invasions of privacy.50 
16.36 It is likely that, if a statutory cause of action for serious invasions of privacy 
were enacted, there would be an increase in the number of claims relating to the 
intentional disclosure of personal information. In such cases, the Commissioner may be 
in a position to assist the court as amicus curiae, or to represent the Commissioner’s 
interests as an intervener. 
                                                        
48  T Butler, Submission 114; Australian Privacy Foundation, Submission 110; Office of the Victorian 
Privacy Commissioner, Submission 108; Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Submission 105; S Higgins, 
Submission 82; I Turnbull, Submission 81; Guardian News and Media Limited and Guardian Australia, 
Submission 80; G Greenleaf, Submission 76. 
49  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Submission 66. 
50  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Submission 90. 
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An amicus curiae function for the Commissioner 
16.37 The role of an amicus curiae is to assist the court ‘by drawing attention to some 
aspect of the case which might otherwise be overlooked.’51 An amicus curiae may 
‘offer the Court a submission on law or relevant fact which will assist the Court in a 
way in which the Court would not otherwise have been assisted’.52 The amicus is not a 
party to the proceedings and is not bound by the outcome of the proceedings. This role 
does not extend to introducing evidence to the court, although an amicus may be 
permitted to lead non-controversial evidence in order to ‘complete the evidentiary 
mosaic’.53 
16.38 An example of legislation conferring an amicus curiae function on an 
administrative body is s 46PV of the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 
(Cth). This section allows an individual (‘special-purpose’) Commissioner within the 
AHRC to act as amicus curiae, with the court’s leave: 
(1) A special-purpose Commissioner has the function of assisting the Federal Court 
and the Federal Circuit Court, as amicus curiae, in the following proceedings under 
this Division: 
(a)   proceedings in which the special-purpose Commissioner thinks that the orders 
sought, or likely to be sought, may affect to a significant extent the human rights 
of persons who are not parties to the proceedings; 
(b)   proceedings that, in the opinion of the special-purpose Commissioner, have 
significant implications for the administration of the relevant Act or Acts; 
(c)   proceedings that involve special circumstances that satisfy the special-purpose 
Commissioner that it would be in the public interest for the special-purpose 
Commissioner to assist the court concerned as amicus curiae. 
16.39 Importantly, an amicus curiae does not have a legal interest in the outcome of 
the proceedings. Any person with a legal interest in proceedings may, with the leave of 
the court, intervene in the proceedings. 
An intervener function for the Commissioner 
16.40 The role of amicus curiae can be distinguished from the role of an intervener. 
While the role of amicus is to assist the court, the role of an intervener is to represent 
the intervener’s own legal interests in proceedings. 
16.41 An intervener’s legal interests may be affected in a number of ways. The 
intervener’s interests may be directly affected by the court’s decision. For example, a 
decision about the property interests of the parties to proceedings might also affect the 
property interests of the intervener. The intervener’s interests may also be indirectly 
affected: for example, the court’s decision might have an effect on the future 
                                                        
51  Bropho v Tickner (1993) 40 FCR 165, 172 (Wilcox J). On the role of an amicus curiae generally, see 
Australian Law Reform Commission, Beyond the Door-Keeper: Standing to Sue for Public Remedies, 
Report 78 (1996) Ch 6. 
52  Levy v Victoria (1997) 189 CLR 579, 604 (Brennan CJ). 
53  Bropho v Tickner (1993) 40 FCR 165, 172 (Wilcox J). 
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interpretation of laws affecting the intervener.54 Under the ALRC’s recommendation, a 
court might, for example, give leave to the Commissioner to intervene in a case that 
would have future repercussions for the work of the Commissioner. 
16.42 Functions to intervene are conferred upon a number of administrative bodies. 
For example, s 11(1)(o) of the Australian Human Rights Commission Act confers an 
intervention function on the AHRC: 
where the Commission considers it appropriate to do so, with the leave of the court 
hearing the proceedings and subject to any conditions imposed by the court, to 
intervene in proceedings that involve human rights issues.55 
16.43 The ACCC has an intervention function in relation to proceedings under the 
Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth).56 ASIC has an intervention function in 
relation to proceedings about consumer protection in financial services.57 
Deletion of personal information 
16.44 Several submissions to the Issues Paper noted that the harm caused by a serious 
invasion of privacy in the digital era will often increase the longer private information 
remains accessible.58 It is therefore important that individuals be able to exercise a 
degree of control over their personal information, especially information that they may 
themselves have provided previously. In particular, individuals should be empowered 
to have their personal information destroyed—or, at a minimum, de-identified—when 
appropriate. 
16.45 In the Discussion Paper, the ALRC proposed that a new APP be inserted into the 
Privacy Act, that would: 
• require APP entities to provide a simple mechanism for an individual to request 
destruction or de-identification of personal information that the individual had 
provided to the entity; and 
• require APP entities to take reasonable steps in a reasonable time to comply with 
such a request, subject to suitable exceptions, or to provide the individual with 
reasons for non-compliance. 
16.46 The ALRC argued that the proposed APP would complement existing APPs that 
require APP entities to correct personal information (the correction principle)59 and to 
destroy or de-identify personal information when it is no longer required for a relevant 
                                                        
54  Levy v Victoria (1997) 189 CLR 579, 601–602 (Brennan CJ). 
55  The Australian Human Rights Commission also has intervention functions, see for example, Australian 
Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) s 31(j); Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) s 48(1)(gb); Racial 
Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) s 20(e); Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) s 67(1)(1); Age 
Discrimination Act 2004 (Cth) s 53(1)(g). 
56  Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) s 87CA. 
57  Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) s 12GO. 
58  National Children and Youth Law Centre, Submission 61; Google, Submission 54; Australian Privacy 
Foundation, Submission 39; B Arnold, Submission 28. 
59  Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) APP 13. 
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purpose (the security principle).60 Although the existing APPs provide some protection, 
they do not incorporate a mechanism allowing individuals to request destruction or de-
identification. 
16.47 The proposal was supported by a number of stakeholders.61 Others were 
opposed to it,62 noting the existing correction and security principles63 and the need to 
retain personal information for business purposes, such as billing.64 Some stakeholders 
were not opposed to the proposal, subject to particular concerns being met.65 
16.48 The OAIC opposed the proposal. The OAIC noted that it would not be relevant 
to most information held by Australian Government agencies due to the retention 
requirements of the Archives Act 1983 (Cth). The OAIC also noted that, in addition to 
the existing correction and security principles, other principles restrict the 
circumstances in which an APP entity may collect or disclose information:66 
The requirement in the proposed APP for an organisation to destroy or de-identify the 
personal information, in circumstances where the organisation is still authorised to use 
or disclose it under the Privacy Act … has the potential to impose a significant burden 
on the organisation and disrupt its business practices. The OAIC considers that the 
existing measures in the APPs balance the need to give an individual control over the 
handling of their personal information with the regulatory burden on entities when 
carrying out their functions and activities, and that the additional burden in the 
proposed new APP is unjustified and unnecessary.67 
16.49 The OAIC also submitted that, rather than introducing a new APP into the 
Privacy Act, the OAIC could 
issue additional guidance on an entity’s obligations under the existing APPs to destroy 
or de-identify personal information and good privacy practice when an individual 
requests the entity to destroy or de-identify their personal information. 
16.50 The ALRC accepts that the existing APPs require the destruction or de-
identification of personal information in many circumstances. However, there are 
scenarios in which an APP entity may be able to retain personal information even after 
the individual has ceased their business relationship with the APP entity. For example, 
if the purpose of the collection includes the APP entity’s own statistical research, it is 
not clear that the entity would be required to destroy or de-identify the information 
                                                        
60  Ibid APP 11.2. 
61  T Butler, Submission 114; Australian Privacy Foundation, Submission 110; Office of the Victorian 
Privacy Commissioner, Submission 108; Australian Communications Consumer Action Network, 
Submission 106; Australian Sex Party, Submission 92; S Higgins, Submission 82; I Turnbull, Submission 
81; G Greenleaf, Submission 76. 
62  Telstra, Submission 107; AMTACA, Submission 101; ASTRA, Submission 99; Office of the Australian 
Information Commissioner, Submission 90; Interactive Games and Entertainment Association, 
Submission 86; Australian Bankers’ Association, Submission 84. 
63  AMTACA, Submission 101; Interactive Games and Entertainment Association, Submission 86. 
64  ASTRA, Submission 99. 
65  Australian Interactive Media Industry Association (AIMIA), Submission 125; Insurance Council of 
Australia, Submission 102. 
66  Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) APPs 3, 6. 
67  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Submission 90. 
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unless and until the research was concluded, regardless of the duration or purpose of 
the research. 
16.51 However, the ALRC accepts that the introduction of a new APP may require 
further consideration of the existing APPs, and that the effect of the recent reforms of 
the Privacy Act should be determined before further reforms take place.68 The ALRC is 
not, therefore, recommending the introduction of a new APP. The ALRC remains 
concerned, however, that the existing APPs do not require an entity to provide a simple 
mechanism allowing an individual to request the destruction or de-identification of 
personal information. 
Review of the small business exemption 
16.52 The APPs under the Privacy Act regulate the handling of personal information 
by APP entities: government agencies and organisations.69 Notably, small businesses 
with an annual turnover of less than $3 million70 are exempt from the definition of 
‘organisation’ and hence from the ambit of the APPs unless, for instance: 
• the small business trades in personal information; 
• the small business handles health information; or 
• the small business operator notifies the OAIC in writing of its desire to be 
treated as an organisation.71 
16.53 In its 2008 report, For Your Information, the ALRC recommended that the small 
business exemption be removed from the Privacy Act. Several stakeholders, in 
submissions to the ALRC’s current Inquiry, noted that the exemption remains in the 
Privacy Act, and that the removal of the exemption would have substantial benefits for 
the protection of privacy.72 
16.54 Ensuring that small businesses handle personal information in an appropriate 
way may be particularly important in the digital era. A small business in the digital era 
can readily collect personal information through, for example, software on mobile 
phones or websites.73 
16.55 The ALRC considers that the small business exemption should be given further 
consideration, particularly given the growth of digital communications and the digital 
economy since 2008. The ALRC acknowledges that simply removing the small 
                                                        
68  Privacy Amendment (Enhancing Privacy Protection) Act 2012 (Cth). 
69  Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) s 6(1) (definition of ‘APP entity’). 
70  Ibid ss 6C, 6D. 
71  Ibid ss 6D, 6E, 6EA. 
72  Australian Law Reform Commission, For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice, 
Report 108 (2008) Rec 39–1. 
73  ‘Mobile Apps’ (Occasional paper 1, Australian Communications and Media Authority, May 2013); ‘The 
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business exemption would increase compliance costs for small businesses. However, 
options other than simply removing the exemption are available. 
16.56 The Productivity Commission may be well-placed to investigate the likely 
impacts on small businesses if the small business exemption were removed, or if other 
options for protecting personal information held by small businesses were introduced. 
Such an investigation could give detailed consideration to the application of data 
protection laws to small businesses in other jurisdictions74 as well as other options for 
improving the protection of personal information held by small business. These options 
might include, for example, the introduction of an accreditation scheme to encourage 
small businesses to opt in75 to the Privacy Act in order to demonstrate a commitment to 
good privacy practices, or a limitation of the small business exemption so that small 
businesses handling sensitive information76 or financial information would not be 
exempt from the Act. 
                                                        
74  For example, small business are bound by the Data Protection Act 1998 (UK). 
75  Small businesses may elect to be treated as organisations under s 6EA of the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth). 
76  Sensitive information includes personal information about an individual’s racial or ethnic origin, political 
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professional or union membership, sexual orientation or practices or criminal record, as well as health 
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